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Abstract 
Previous research into the use of strategies to regulate affect has mostly focused 
on how effective particular strategies are in reducing unpleasant affect. More recently 
affect regulation strategies have been recognised as effortful, conscious processes, that 
may pose a cost to subsequent executive control. The aim of this thesis was to further our 
understanding of what processes may be involved in making affect regulation strategies 
effective in reducing anxious affect and in preserving the capacity to demonstrate 
executive control. The present research compared the effects of the cognitive affect 
regulation strategies, distraction and acceptance, under high- and low-threat conditions on 
(1) attentional focus and engagement in rumination, worry and suppression, (2) affect, and 
(3) subsequent executive control. University student participants (N = 180) were randomly 
allocated to one of the six experimental conditions in a 2 (threat) X 3 (regulation strategy: 
distraction, acceptance, mind-wandering control) design. Electrocardiogram (ECG) 
responses were recorded throughout the experiment. Reported affect was measured 
following each experimental phase. Following baseline, participants were told of an 
upcoming task of high- or low-threat value and were then directed to undertake a 
regulation strategy. Subsequently, participants completed two executive control tasks: 
response inhibition and working memory. Participants then undertook their allocated 
threat-manipulation task followed by a recovery period when they reported on their 
attentional focus and engagement in worry, rumination and suppression during regulation.  
The results indicated that participants spontaneously initiated regulatory attempts 
(shown by the mind-wandering control conditions) to direct attentional focus away from 
threats and feelings, equally in both high- and low-threat levels.  Distraction resulted in less 
reported attentional diversion from threats relative to mind-wandering. Acceptance 
facilitated attention to threat-related thoughts relative to mind-wandering and towards 
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affect relative to distraction. Worry, rumination and suppression increased in high-threat 
circumstances but did not differ between regulatory conditions. Regulatory conditions that 
resulted in more attention to threats (i.e., distraction and acceptance) also showed 
increased reported affect and physiological arousal, although acceptance did lead to 
reduced arousal during sustained regulation in high-threat circumstances. Regulation was 
shown to moderate the impact of threat on response inhibition but not working memory. 
Distraction impaired inhibitory ability under both high- and low-threat. Acceptance 
preserved executive control in high-threat circumstances, across both executive control 
measures. However, under low-threat, acceptance impaired prepotent response inhibition, 
but had no impact on working memory. Increased threat led to impairments to working 
memory when averaged across all regulatory conditions. Heart rate was negatively related 
to executive control but did not account for the effects of threat or regulation on executive 
control. These findings suggested that increased affect did not necessarily equate to 
impaired executive control. Rather, the findings suggested that the affect regulation 
strategies of distraction and acceptance involve processes that, independent of affect, can 
either preserve or impair the ability to demonstrate executive control.      
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Chapter 1: Introduction 
The experience of anxious affect, characterised by tension, apprehension and 
increased physiological arousal, is subjectively unpleasant (C. D. Spielberger, 1972), 
cognitively unhelpful (Eysenck & Calvo, 1992b; Eysenck, Darakshan, Santos, & Calvo, 2007), 
and can be harmful to physical health (Bleil, Gianaros, Jennings, & Flory, 2008). Increased 
stress and anxiety have been implicated in the development of mental health problems, 
including depression (Hammen, 2005). Furthermore, anxiety and affective disorders, 
including depression, are the most prevalent of diagnosed psychiatric disorders in Western 
countries (Bijl, Ravelli, & van Zessen, 1998; Kessler et al., 1994).  In addition, stress and 
anxiety have also been implicated in the development and maintenance of a range of 
physical health problems including the maintenance of chronic pain (T. Pincus, Burton, 
Vogel, & Field, 2002), and an increased predisposition to develop heart disease (Esch, 
Stefano, Fricchione, & Benson, 2002). Hence, prolonged states of anxious affect are linked 
to impaired psychological and physical health. 
Anxious affect can be categorised as part of a primitive fear-based response, 
developed through the evolutionary process, to meet clearly identifiable threats to one’s 
own physical safety within the immediate situation (C. D. Spielberger, 1972). Present day 
situations that elicit anxiety often involve a symbolic threat that is inherent in a mentally 
demanding task or in a socially evaluative situation. These circumstances may lead to 
negative outcomes that may potentially damage one’s positive self-perceptions (i.e.,  ego-
threat; Epstein, 1972). A multitude of situations provide the necessary features to elicit 
anxious affect, some of which, if avoided, would restrict life quality and functioning (e.g., 
not attending a job interview or avoiding asking a romantic interest out on a date) and 
hence must be tolerated to meet one’s needs. Therefore, effective strategies that alter 
14 
 
attention and thought with the aim of reducing stress and anxiety in stressful situations, 
are of particular importance to human health, well-being and optimum functioning.  Such 
strategies are referred to as cognitive regulation strategies (Garnefski & Kraaij, 2006; 
Kamholz, Hayes, Carver, Gullivver, & Perlman, 2006). 
The increased tendency to experience anxiety has been linked to individuals’ 
allocation of attentional focus, for example, scanning for and fixating on external 
environmental or internal thought content of a threatening nature (Bar-Haim, Lamy, 
Pergamin, Bakermans-Kranenburg, & Ijzendoorn, 2007; MacLeod, Mathews, & Tata, 1986). 
Cognitive affect regulation strategies can involve changing the allocation of attentional 
focus and thought content (Garnefski, Kraaij, & Spinhoven, 2001; Gross & Thompson, 2007; 
Kamholz et al., 2006). There are many such strategies intended to alter the affective 
experiences, some of which are maladaptive in that they are counterproductive in reducing 
anxious affect (e.g.,  worry, rumination, and suppression), while others are adaptive, in that 
they are effective in achieving anxious affect reductions (e.g., reappraisal; Gross & 
Thompson, 2007).  
Distraction and acceptance are two therapeutically recommended cognitive affect 
regulation strategies (S. C. Hayes, 2004a; Nolen-Hoeksema, 1998, 2000; Orsillo, Roemer, 
Block Lerner, & Tull, 2004) suggested to lead to an eventual reduction in anxious affect 
despite marked differences in their allocation of attentional focus. Engaging in effective 
distraction is proposed to involve focusing attention away from threatening stimuli in the 
environment, the self, one’s affective response and associated threat-related thoughts 
(Augustine & Hemenover, 2009; Gross & Thompson, 2007). In contrast, acceptance is 
proposed to involve focusing attention toward one’s affective experience and threat-
related thoughts in an open, experiential, non-judgemental way (Cardaciotto, Herbert, 
Forman, Moitra, & Farrow, 2008; S. C. Hayes et al., 2004). The particular focus of attention 
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is an important distinction between distraction and acceptance. It is this distinction that 
results in different theoretical predictions for the two strategies in relation to their 
effectiveness in reducing anxious affect. In addition, this distinction in attentional focus 
between the regulation strategies, the effort to maintain these regulation strategies, and 
the affect resulting from these strategies, may also temporarily impact on the subsequent 
ability to perform tasks requiring the control of thought and action (i.e., demonstrate 
executive control; Eysenck & Calvo, 1992b; Eysenck et al., 2007; Hagger, Wood, Stiff, & 
Chatzisarantis, 2010; Muraven & Baumeister, 2000).  
Three questions have not been convincingly answered in relation to the cognitive 
affect regulation strategies of distraction and acceptance. These questions are: (1) Do the 
regulatory strategies of distraction and acceptance regulate affect through altering 
attentional focus to threat and affect, or via reduced engagement in maladaptive 
regulatory processes? (2) Are distraction and acceptance effective in reducing anxious 
affect in anticipation of, experience of, and recovery from the experience of threat? (3) 
What are the subsequent impacts of distraction and acceptance on executive control when 
anticipating undertaking high or low ego-threatening tasks? This thesis aims to answer the 
above three questions. 
First, a literature review identifying the current theories and empirical findings 
relevant to the questions is presented (chapter 2). Following the literature review, chapter 
3 outlines the focus of the present research and chapter 4 describes the methodology used 
to address the research questions. The following three chapters (5, 6 and 7) present the 
empirical analyses relevant to each one of these research questions. The final chapter 
(chapter 8) presents a discussion of the findings of the present research in the context of 
previous research, and proposes a model that integrates several previous theories to 
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provide a unifying explanation of how distraction and acceptance, in altering attentional 
focus, change anxious affect and influence subsequent executive control.   
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Chapter 2: Literature Review 
This literature review aims to summarise the relevant theory and previous research 
to assist in explaining the potential impacts that engaging in the cognitive affect regulation 
strategies of distraction and acceptance may have on: attentional focus and engagement in 
maladaptive regulatory attempts, anxious affect experienced prior to, during, and following 
threatening situations, and subsequent executive control. This chapter is divided into three 
major sections aimed at addressing the pivotal issues in investigating affect regulation 
effectiveness and its impacts on subsequent executive control. These sections include: (1) 
the nature of affect and how it arises, including specific discussion of anxious affect and its 
assessment; (2) affect regulation theory, its relation to affect regulation strategies, and 
empirical evaluation of theory and strategies, and; (3) how affect regulation, affect and 
vagal tone may influence executive control. 
2.1 Affect: Definitions, Causes and Methods of Measurement 
The term “affect” is given to a broad group of emotions that are of a particular 
valence, specifically, unpleasant/aversive versus pleasant/appetitive (Russel, 1980; Watson, 
Clark, & Tellegen, 1988). Emotions can also be quantified in terms of level of arousal, which 
refers to the level of intensity or level of activation versus deactivation experienced (Russel, 
1980). Arousal can be quantified physiologically, or subjectively through reporting the 
experienced level of alertness (M. M. Bradley, Codespoti, Cuthbert, & Lang, 2001). Hence, 
the two dimensions of valence and arousal encompass the subjective experience, 
physiological changes and behavioural motivations or actions that characterise particular 
emotions (Gross & Thompson, 2007; Mauss, Bunge, & Gross, 2007; Moors, 2009).  
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The contrast between two emotions: misery and fear illustrates how emotions can 
differ in arousal but not valence. Both emotions have negative valence (i.e., are associated 
with negative evaluations of a stimulus and are subjectively unpleasant). However, while 
misery involves low arousal (i.e., low motivation, physiological arousal and activity levels), 
fear involves high arousal (i.e., increased motivation, physiological responding indicative of 
increased energetical requirements associated with fight or flight actions). Thus, despite 
both being of negative valence, the two emotions produce distinguishable subjective 
experiences. Misery could be classed within a broader category of depressed affect with 
other such specific emotional states as sadness, emptiness, tiredness, all being negative in 
valence and of low arousal. Fear can be considered part of the broader anxious affect 
category, being associated with other feelings such as stress, agitation, nervousness, all 
being of negative valence and high arousal.   
Negative affect is the overarching term used to describe an unpleasant emotional 
state that is displeasing and often associated with a negatively valenced situation or 
aversive stimuli. Negative affect can involve the subjective experience of anxiety, tension, 
and nervousness (P. F. Lovibond & Lovibond, 1995; C. Spielberger, Gorsuch, Lushene, Vagg, 
& Jacobs, 1983), but can also incorporate anger, guilt, revulsion, self-dissatisfaction and 
sadness (Watson & Clark, 1984). Particular feelings within negative affect are associated 
with very specific types of stimuli (M. M. Bradley et al., 2001; Gross & Levenson, 1995). 
However, more than stimuli themselves, it is the situational interpretations of these stimuli 
in combination with physiological sensations that influence how individuals label affective 
states (Schachter & Singer, 1962). Particular affective states may endure over time when 
evoking conditions/stimuli persist (C. D. Spielberger, 1972). Affective states can also recur 
when evoked by the same or similar stimuli (M. M. Bradley et al., 2001). Linked to the 
persisting or recurring stimulus are the terms frequency, intensity, and duration, describing 
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the extent to which the response is experienced. These terms imply that affective states 
are transient and will inevitably dissipate over time if evoking conditions and stimuli are 
removed or avoided. The time duration of states can be defined from minute to minute 
(Marteau & Bekker, 1992), or from week to week (S. H. L. Lovibond, P. F., 1995). Hence, 
state simply refers to an affective experience that has distinguishing beginning and 
endpoints.  
2.1.1. Anxious Affect: Terminology 
The term “anxious affect” in this thesis will denote emotional states such as fear, 
stress, and anxiety.  Anxious affect, as suggested from the preceding discussion is a subtype 
of negative affect, associated with specific appraisals and stimuli.  The terms anxiety, fear 
and stress are, in this thesis, subordinate to the superordinate term anxious affect, and are 
not interchangeable.  
Different stimuli or situations are associated with the different states of anxiety, 
fear and stress. The term threat refers to an individual’s idiosyncratic appraisal of a 
particular situation or stimulus as being physically or psychologically damaging (C. D. 
Spielberger, 1972). Therefore, a threat is any stimulus that an individual appraises to be 
personally dangerous in the near or somewhat distant future. Threats are associated with 
the fear and anxiety.  In contrast to threats, a stressor is a stimulus that places particular 
physical or mental demands on an individual in that particular moment and is associated 
with stress.  
Although both fear and anxiety arise from threats, there is a subtle difference 
between these two emotions. Fear is defined as a basic emotional state of high arousal and 
unpleasant phenomenological qualities that results from a stimulus that clearly indicates 
immediate physical danger and clearly defined actions would avoid the harmful stimulus 
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(Epstein, 1972). In contrast, anxiety refers to a more complex and diffuse emotional 
reaction, also of unpleasant phenomenological qualities and high arousal involving tension 
and apprehension, evoked when the individual interprets an anticipated, ambiguous 
and/or uncertain situation as personally threatening to one’s  physical or psychological 
wellbeing (C. D. Spielberger, 1972). Hence, the evoking situation that elicits anxiety may 
represent a threat to one’s positive views of oneself. In addition, anxiety can occur when 
there is a large degree of uncertainty and ambiguity about the about the nature of the 
possible threat (Bloom, Houston, Holmes, & Burish, 1977; Epstein, 1972; Lazarus & Averill, 
1972), resulting in difficulty in choosing a behavioural response to avoid the harm. Hence, 
while fear focuses on immediate danger, anxiety is triggered by the perception of future 
threat, related to the temporal uncertainty and/or the ambiguous nature of the threat. 
Stress is an emotion arising from stressors, which are situational (like threats) but, 
unlike threats, relate to more clear demands of a current situation (physical, social or 
psychological) rather than anticipated uncertain demands. Unlike fear, stress does not refer 
to immediate physical danger, but rather a performance requirement, internally or 
externally imposed, that is perceived by the individual to be difficult to meet. Both stress 
and anxiety occur when the performance required of the individual is perceived by that 
individual to be challenging (C. Spielberger et al., 1983), manifesting as increased 
unpleasant subjective feelings of tension and increased physiological arousal. However, 
stress occurs in the process of attempting to meet the demands of a socially or mentally 
challenging situation, not in passively anticipating them as in anxiety.  
Two additional terms associated with threats and stressors, often used in the 
context of affect regulation, are “affective reactivity” and “affective repair/recovery”. 
Affective reactivity relates to the magnitude of a person’s anxious reaction to a particular 
situation or stimulus in terms of change from a resting baseline. The term affective 
21 
 
repair/recovery relates to the degree to which an affective state disperses, following an 
encounter with a threatening or stressful situation.  
2.1.2. Affect Causation 
How stimuli lead to particular affective states is a matter of much discussion (Gross 
& Thompson, 2007; Izzard, 1993; LeDoux, 1995; Moors, 2009; Schachter & Singer, 1962; 
Westphal & Bonanno, 2004; Zajonc, 1980). Some theoretical perspectives are based upon 
the premise that it is an individuals’ conscious evaluation of a situation that lead to a 
particular feeling (Lazarus & Folkman, 1984). An alternative theoretical perspective is that 
the mind is able to unconsciously evaluate a situation and this unconscious evaluation 
causes physiological arousal (to prepare the energetical requirements for that situation) 
before conscious awareness of the emotion arises or a conscious evaluation of the situation 
has been undertaken (LeDoux, 1995, 2000; Zajonc, 1980). However, most theoretical 
discussion around the causation of affect agrees that, at some level (conscious or 
unconscious), the meaning a particular stimulus has to the individual’s wellbeing (i.e.,  the 
individuals evaluation of the stimulus) will be pivotal determining the subjective feeling 
that is experienced (Gross & Thompson, 2007; Izzard, 1993; Lazarus & Folkman, 1984; 
LeDoux, 1995, 2000, 2002; Westphal & Bonanno, 2004; Zajonc, 1980, 2000). Discussed in 
the following sections are two models of emotion causation that each provide a distinct 
framework in addressing how affect is caused.    
2.1.3. Gross and Thompson’s Modal Model of Affect Causation  
Gross and Thompson’s modal model is one model that proposes the necessary 
preconditions for specific emotions to occur. See Figure 2.1.  
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Figure 2.1. The “Modal Model of Emotion Causation”. Taken from “Emotional regulation: 
Conceptual foundations”, by by J.J. Gross and R. A. Thompson 2007, In J. J. Gross (Ed.), 
Handbook of emotion regulation, P 5. Copyright 2007 Guilford Press. 
The modal model, in its simplest form, represents a linear sequence that leads to 
an affective response. An example of the sequence provided for fear begins with a person 
being in a situation involving an immediate threat to his or her financial livelihood (e.g., the 
individual is under a performance review at a workplace looking to downsize their 
workforce). The person’s attentional focus is towards the present situation and salient 
stimuli (e.g., the individual starts observing the reviewer’s reactions to his or her job 
performance data). The situation is subsequently appraised or interpreted in a particular 
way, to create a particular meaning (e.g., the individual appraises their job performance as 
inadequate to justify continued employment). Lastly, the meaning that the individual 
derives from the situation in relation to his or her long- or short-term wellbeing creates a 
basic affective response (e.g., the individual fears losing his income and housing). 
The modal model can also capture multiple iterations resulting in more complex 
affective responses. In its more complex cyclical form, the generation of an affective 
response feeds back to the preceding processes in the sequence. Through this recursive 
feedback loop, it becomes possible for the affective response to become part of the 
situation (e.g., changes in vocalisations, body language, facial expression in the interview 
indicating fear), which is then attended to and appraised by the individual having the 
affective response (e.g., appraisal: “I am showing that I have lost confidence in my ability to 
Situation Attention Appraisal Response 
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do the job and will be considered incompetent”) and the appraisal may generate an 
additional layer to the emotional response (e.g., introjected anger towards one’s self).   
2.1.4. Control-Process Self-Regulatory Perspectives 
Another model of affect causation is based on the self-regulation of behaviour and 
goal attainment. This perspective is known as the cybernetic models or control-process 
view of regulated behaviour and affect causation (Carver & Scheier, 1988, 1990). The 
control process model makes the assumption that people set goals for themselves (short-
term and long-term). As people act in accordance with these goals, they self-attentively 
monitor their actions with reference to their goals. This monitoring provides feedback to 
adjust their actions to more closely conform to their goals. This monitoring draws attention 
to any discrepancy between an ideal end-state and the current actual-state.  Any 
discrepancy potentially leads to unpleasant affect due to the evaluative nature of this self-
focused attention (Carver & Scheier, 1982, 1988). Hence, attempts to regulate behaviour, 
and concomitant increased self-awareness may lead to unpleasant affective states (Carver 
& Scheier, 1988, 1990; Duval & Wicklund, 1972). See Figure 2.2.   
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Figure 2.2. Cybernetic or Controlled Process Models. Adapted from “Control theory: a 
useful conceptual framework for personality-social, clinical, and health psychology”, by C. 
S. Carver and M. F. Scheier, 1982, Psychological Bulletin, 92, p112. Copyright 1982 by the 
American Psychological Association.  
 
There are a number of steps within the control process model. The first of these 
involves the comparator component identifying discrepancies between an actual state and 
an ideal state.   If there is a discrepancy, the operate component initiates a search process 
to identify and select a corrective action to minimise the discrepancy. Once an appropriate 
action is identified, it is implemented and the corrective action’s subsequent output is 
monitored (i.e., allocated attentional resources). The result of such corrective action may 
or may not change the actual state. The actual state is then evaluated by the comparator to 
determine if the actual state is consistent with the ideal state. If the comparator’s 
evaluation still identifies a discrepancy then the process begins again. 
Similar to Gross and Thompson’s modal model, the comparator component creates 
an evaluation of the consequences of the current situation for the individual’s future 
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wellbeing, or more specifically in this model, achieving the desired outcome (i.e., the ideal 
state) through the goal-directed behaviour. Carver and Scheier (1990) suggest that negative 
affect results if the comparator continually detects a discrepancy between the actual and 
desired state, with the corrective action being ineffective. Furthermore, negative affect 
also occurs if the rate of progression in closing the gap between the actual and ideal state is 
not as fast as expected (Carver & Scheier, 1990).  
The control process model has been specifically applied to the occurrence of 
anxiety (Carver & Scheier, 1988). This model proposes that anxiety occurs when current 
behaviour is increasing the gap between the actual state and desired state or when control 
processes are not executed smoothly and easily, due to environmental impediments or 
conflicting goals (i.e., attainment of one goal may limit progress or diminishes the ability to 
attain another goal). Hence, this model proposes that experiencing anxiety is primarily due 
to the difficulty of identifying an appropriate behavioural action to reconcile conflicting 
goals.  This model implies that some potential harm could occur to the individual if such 
conflicting goals were not in some way reconciled. Hence, the control process model makes 
the constant motivation to avoid harm and attain goals a central feature of the self-
regulation and the experience of affective states.  
2.1.5. Measures of Anxious Affect 
From the foregoing discussion, affect can be measured through several modalities.  
Specifically, its subjective component may be assessed through self-report, while its arousal 
component may be assessed directly through various physiological measures.  Theories 
regarding how affect changes the deployment of attention also suggest that cognitive 
measures can be used to quantify affective responses.  However, choosing measures of 
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anxious affect that are free from experimenter demand, participant expectancy effects, 
and regulatory attempts is very difficult.   
Self-Report Measures  
Introspective verbal reports can provide information on the subjective experience 
of physiological, cognitive, and behavioural indicators of affect (C. D. Spielberger, 1972; C. 
Spielberger et al., 1983). Self-report measures may ask participants to rate their feelings 
using particular sets of adjectives describing anxious states (e.g., “nervous”). Participants 
can report their levels of motivation, behavioural activity, ability to concentrate, and 
physiological states, such as dryness in the mouth, racing or pounding heart or ability to 
relax and sleep (Beck & Steer, 1987, 1990; P. F. Lovibond & Lovibond, 1995; C. Spielberger 
et al., 1983). However, sensitivity of self-report measures to changes in affect can vary from 
measure to measure when testing the effects of manipulations of threat and regulation. 
Some self-report measures will show differences where expected, based on individual 
tendencies to experience affect or situations that are likely to elicit increased affect 
(Blagden & Craske, 1996; Schmader & Johns, 2003; Wong & Moulds, 2009),and other 
measures are not sensitive to these differences (Hofmann et al., 2005; Johns, Inzlicht, & 
Schmader, 2008; Schmader & Johns, 2003). Importantly, it is the self-report measures that 
have demonstrated this sensitivity  to differentiate between participants in different levels 
of experimental threat (Bloom et al., 1977; Holmes & Houston, 1974; Schmader & Johns, 
2003) and to differentiate between individuals meeting a clinical diagnosis for an anxiety 
disorder (Antony, Bieling, Cox, Enns, & Swinson, 1998; S. H. L. Lovibond, P. F., 1995) that 
show the best validity in measuring the construct. 
The main importance of self-report measurement is that it is the only way of 
gaining access to the subjective experience of affect and allows for the nuanced differences 
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between different negative affective states to be assessed.  It is also relatively economical 
for both the researcher and the participant in terms of time and resources. Clinically, it is 
highly relevant because it is often what people with clinical problems want to change. The 
primary disadvantage of self-report measurement is that of biased reporting. This may 
occur in either direction as different individuals may be motivated to under- or over-report 
their affective response in different situations.  In the context of intervention, participants 
may be susceptible to experimenter demand effects and may over-report changes in affect.   
Physiological Measures  
There are many physiological measures of arousal, some that even provide specific 
indications of either sympathetic or parasympathetic activity. Physiological  measures 
include heart rate (Hofmann, Heering, Sawyer, & Asnaani, 2009; Low, Stanton, & Bower, 
2008; Monat, Averill, & Lazarus, 1972), heart rate variability (Fuller, 1992; Hofmann et al., 
2005; S. C. Segerstrom & Solberg Nes, 2007), galvanic skin conductance (Dunn, Billotti, 
Murphy, & Dalgleish, 2009; Erisman & Roemer, 2010; Monat et al., 1972), and salivary 
alpha-amylase (Schmader, Forbes, Zhang, & Mendes, 2009). Importantly, such measures 
indicating changes in autonomic activity may be interpreted as indicating fluctuations in 
anxious affect when combined with subjectively reported affect change (e.g., I feel 
anxious/nervous) or in conjunction with consideration of the context in which they occur 
(Schachter & Singer, 1962). 
Heart rate (HR) in beats-per-minute (BPM) is a commonly used measure to provide 
an objective indicator of physiological arousala. Changes in the activation of autonomic 
                                                          
a
Simple HR data is widely used in experimental studies measuring anxious affect, however 
within psychophysiological studies, heart period (HP), rather than HR has been suggested as more 
appropriate (Berntson, Quigley, & Lozano, 2007).  Heart period is also commonly referred to as 
either R-R intervals or inter-beat-intervals and is simply a reciprocal of HR. It can be easily calculated 
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subsystems indicate changes in affective states, particularly their arousal component. 
However, these changes do not indicate the valence of that affective state being 
experienced. Increased physiological arousal could either represent increased anxiety 
(negative valence) or increased excitement (positive valence). Importantly, the primitive 
functional origins of increased arousal are in preparing an organism for action.  Heart rate 
provides a reasonably rapid indication of the physiological state, and can be assessed in a 
way that does not disturb an individual’s attention, thus providing a useful measure to 
assess anxious affect.  
Two autonomic sub-systems (sympathetic and parasympathetic) determine levels 
of physiological arousal that is well reflected in HR (Berntson et al., 2007; Grassi et al., 
1998). Normal resting HR for an average adult is about 72 BPM. However, if there is a 
complete absence of parasympathetic activity (e.g., if the vagus nerve is severed) without 
an increase in sympathetic activity, resting HR increases to around 100-120 BPM (Berntson 
et al., 2007). This rise would occur due to automatic electrical impulses produced at the 
sinoatrial (SA) node (the heart’s pacemaker) that provides electrical stimulation at this rate 
in the absence of autonomic control. Hence, the vagus nerve, providing the central 
parasympathetic influence to the sinoatrial node, inhibits HR acceleration. This means that 
the parasympathetic system is usually the dominant influence over HR fluctuations from 
71-120 BPM (Berntson et al., 2007). Hence, reductions in parasympathetic influences as 
indicated by decreased vagal tone are consistent with decreases in inhibition or control of 
anxious affect (Appelhans & Luecken, 2006).  
                                                                                                                                                                    
(60000/HR), and is expressed in milliseconds (ms) rather than BPM. The reason for its use within the 
psychophysiological literature is its proposed superior statistical properties in demonstrating 
changes in autonomic activity when the interplay between the two autonomic subsystems is non-
linear (Berntson et al., 2007). Despite the usefulness of HP, the current thesis will not focus on the 
interplay between the sympathetic and parasympathetic influences over arousal. Hence, for 
simplicity only HR in BPM will be referred to in the remainder of this thesis rather than HP. 
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Heart rate variability (HRV) is proposed to provide a reliable indicator of 
parasympathetic influences over HR transmitted via the vagus nerve (Akselrod et al., 1981; 
Berntson et al., 1997; Grassi et al., 1998; Malliani, 1999). Parasympathetic influences 
transmitted via the vagus nerve indicating rapid, flexible responses to altering arousal as a 
result of changing environmental demands (Porges, 2001, 2007). Influences over the HR 
time series that peak at about 0.5 - 1.0 sec on HR are indicative only of vagal influences (the 
nerve carrying central parasympathetic influences)(Berntson et al., 1997). Two types of 
HRV analysis are used to identify the rapid changes in HR that are proposed to measure  
parasympathetic activity. These analyses are frequency (or spectral) analyses and time-
based analyses. Using spectral methods, the power (msec2) in particular frequency bands 
can indicate particular aspects of autonomic activity (Akselrod et al., 1981; Malliani, 1999). 
Studies involving pharmacological blockade have demonstrated that the frequency band 
between 0.15-0.4Hz, referred to as the high frequency (HF) band, is indicative of 
parasympathetic influences over the heart, in particular those resulting from fluctuations in 
vagus nerve influence. Increased in power within this frequency band suggests increased 
parasympathetic activity. This frequency band is often contrasted with a lower frequency 
(LF) band (.04-.15), suggested to reflect slower sympathetic influences over HR, although it 
has been demonstrated to be contaminated by parasympathetic reflexive responses 
associated with the short-term regulation of blood pressure known as the baroreflex 
(Berntson et al., 1997). Another metric of HRV, root-mean-square-of-successive-differences 
(RMSSD), is a time domain measure that, like the HF band, also reflects the more rapid 
fluctuations in HR, with increased values representing increased parasympathetic 
influences or vagal inhibition of HRb. Although decreased HRV on the indices indicating 
                                                          
b
 An important consideration with HRV indices is that the rapid fluctuations in HR arising 
from the vagus nerve can be influenced by respiratory changes including rate and possibly depth 
(Berntson et al., 1997; Jorna, 1992). The indicators parasympathetic influences by HRV are impacted 
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vagal tone (parasympathetic influence over HR) often coincides with increased experienced 
affect, the measure has been suggested to be an indicator of regulated responding 
(Appelhans & Luecken, 2006), rather than affect per se. See section 2.3.8 for more detailed 
discussion of HRV as an indicator of regulated responding.  
The validity of both heart rate variables (i.e., HR and the parasympathetic 
indicators of  HRV) in measuring anxious affect has been demonstrated through their ability 
to differentiate between different levels of experimental threat (Austin, Riniolo, & Porges, 
2007; Grassi et al., 1998; Kudielka, Buske-Kirshbaum, Hellhammer, & Kirschbaum, 2004; 
Monat et al., 1972; S. C. Segerstrom & Solberg Nes, 2007; Taelman, Vandeput, Spaepen, & 
Van Huffel, 2008; B.  Verkuil, Brosschot, de Beurs, & Thayer, 2009) and naturally occurring 
threats (Dishman et al., 2000; Fuller, 1992; Pieper, Brosschot, van der Leeden, & Thayer, 
2007).  Heart rate variables have also been shown to differentiate clinical and non-clinical 
groups under resting baseline conditions (Cohen et al., 1998; B. H. Friedman & Thayer, 
1998; Lyonfields, Borkovec, & Thayer, 1995; Thayer, Friedman, & Borkovec, 1996). Heart 
rate and HRV can also differentiate between individuals high and low in trait anxiety under 
rest conditions (L. L. Watkins, Grossman, Krishnan, & Sherwood, 1998), but are particularly 
sensitive in capturing differences between high and low trait anxious individuals under 
mental stress (Demaree & Everhart, 2004; Miu, Heilman, & Miclea, 2009; Shapiro et al., 
                                                                                                                                                                    
by respiration due to a phenomenon known as pulmonary gating.  During inhalation, the vagal 
motor neurons are inhibited, temporarily gating off afferent parasympathetic influences that usually 
suppress HR, leading to an increase in HR. During exhalation the gating no longer inhibits central 
parasympathetic activity to the vagal motor neurons, allowing central afferent parasympathetic 
influences to suppress HR (Berntson et al., 1997). Therefore, slowed respiration can lead to 
overestimation of the extent of central parasympathetic influences, as it prolongs the gating 
processes leading to artificially higher peaks and lower troughs in HR. Hence, due to pulmonary 
gating of central parasympathetic influences to the heart, HRV is a measure of vagally mediated 
central parasympathetic influences rather than direct central parasympathetic influences 
(Appelhans & Luecken, 2006). 
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2000). However, physiological measures also may represent the mental demands of a 
situation or a regulation strategy engaged in by individuals rather than affect (McLaughlin, 
Borkovec, & Sibrava, 2007; Taelman et al., 2008) and thus may best be used alongside 
other measures of affect. 
Cognitive Measures of Affect  
 Some studies have sought to use cognitive attentional measures as indicators of 
the experience of affect (Egloff, Willhelm, Neubauer, Mauss, & Gross, 2002; Johns et al., 
2008). It has been well documented that patterns of responding on cognitive attentional 
measures indeed differentiate between individuals with and without clinical diagnoses, 
individuals of high and low level of trait-anxiety, and individuals of high and low state 
anxiety (Bar-Haim et al., 2007). Reflexive attentional biases to threat-stimuli may co-occur 
with increased reported anxiety (Bar-Haim et al., 2007) or increased physiological reactivity 
to stressors (Egloff et al., 2002). Additionally, these measures have often been suggested to 
measure implicit (or unconscious) experiences of affect (Egloff et al., 2002), thus bypassing 
the issue of experimenter demand effects when assessing anxiety via measuring conscious 
experiences of affect via self report. However, such cognitive attentional tasks have also 
been argued to represent attempts to regulate affectc (Bar-Haim et al., 2007;Johns et al., 
2008; Koole & Jostmann, 2004). Thus, caution is required when interpreting the results of 
these cognitive attentional measures as representing affective responding.  
Conclusions Regarding Measures of Affect 
In conclusion, self-report measures, heart rate variables of HR and HRV, and 
cognitive attentional measures can distinguish higher and lower levels of affect. Self-report 
                                                          
c
 For more on different cognitive and attentional processes indicating affect regulation 
rather than affect, see sections 2.2, through to 2.2.17.  
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measures of affect are economical and provide a vital indication of subjective states, 
however, due their susceptibility to be influenced by demand effects, measurement of 
reported affect should ideally be accompanied by a more objective measure, such as 
physiological measures or cognitive attentional measures. This should occur so that other 
sources of data that are not as influenced by the conscious control of the individual can be 
used to establish the validity of the self-report measure. The reasons for multiple 
modalities of measurement is not just centred on self-report being possibly influenced by 
demand effects, but also because physiological measures may represent the mental 
demands of a situation or affect regulation strategy rather than affect. In addition,  
although cognitive performance measures can limit the level of conscious control 
participants have over their responses, they may nevertheless indicate reflexive or 
spontaneously initiated attempts to regulate affect as well as the affect itself (Johns et al., 
2008; Koole & Jostmann, 2004). Hence, each measure has its limitations in gaining an 
accurate indication of affect under experimental circumstances and, thus, multiple sources 
should be used to assess affective states. 
2.2. Affect Regulation: Attentional Focus and the Adaptive and 
Maladaptive Strategies  
Individuals typically do not merely experience affect passively. Rather, one will 
automatically and/or spontaneously adjust responding depending upon the situation.  
Affect regulation can be defined as an individual’s deliberate or automatic attempts to alter 
affective responding (Gross & Thompson, 2007; Mauss et al., 2007). Affect regulation can 
take many different forms (Carver, Scheier, & Weintraub, 1989; Gross & Thompson, 2007; 
Kamholz et al., 2006; Mauss et al., 2007). Regulatory attempts can be behavioural (e.g., 
avoidance or removal of oneself from the situation) or cognitive (i.e., operating via the 
control of attention or thought).  Regulation can be adaptive (i.e., have outcomes that are 
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consistent with an individual’s intentions) or maladaptive (i.e., have outcomes that are 
inconsistent with an individual’s intentions). Some strategies can be employed before an 
affective episode occurs and others may occur after affective episode has been initiated.  
Regulatory attempts may be categorised as avoidance attempts designed to minimise the 
experience of affect (i.e., behavioural or mental disengagement/distraction/avoidance). 
Other cognitive and behavioural regulatory attempts may be considered experiential, 
increasing the awareness, experience, expression and tolerance of affect (e.g., experiential 
observation, immersion and acceptance).  
The element of attentional focus is a key feature distinguishing among the types of 
affect regulation strategies available. It is the premise behind any regulatory action that in 
some way an individual has either anticipated or has observed an affect-eliciting stimulus. 
Therefore, the individual has become aware of a situation that may cause an unpleasant 
affective episode, has become aware of the experience of unpleasant affect, or has 
encountered a combination of the above. Hence, all theoretical frameworks attempting to 
explain the process of affect regulation involve attentional focus and conscious awareness 
explicitly or implicitly within their frameworks (Greenberg & Paivio, 1997; Gross & 
Thompson, 2007; Moors, 2009; Power & Dalgleish, 1997; Westphal & Bonanno, 2004). 
However, there is some disagreement amongst the affect regulation models regarding 
exactly what role attentional focus and the awareness of affect and affect-eliciting stimuli 
have on the affect subsequently experienced. Two models that capture the competing 
arguments are Gross and Thompson’s modal model (2007) and Greenberg and Paivio’s 
process of a feeling model (1997).   
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2.2.1. Gross and Thompson’s Modal Model of Affect Regulation     
In addition to proposing a model of affect causation, Gross and Thompson (2007) 
also proposed separate regulation categories (modes) relating to each step of the affect 
generation sequence (see Figure 2.3). These include situation selection, situation 
modification, attentional deployment, cognitive change (i.e., reappraisal), and response 
modulation. Gross and Thompson categorised the affect regulation strategies into those 
that occurred before the affective response (e.g., situation selection, attentional 
deployment and cognitive change) as antecedent based strategies, and strategies that 
occurred after the initiation of the affective response (e.g., response modulation) is a 
response-focused strategy. However, this categorisation seems only appropriate when 
discussing situations where the simpler linear version of the model applies.  When 
situations involve a number of iterations of the response cycle, some strategies previously 
categorised as antecedent in the model may be occurring after the affective response has 
been initiated. For example, the internal processes of attention and appraisal may occur 
either consciously or reflexively and outside conscious awareness in the first iteration 
(Gross & Thompson, 2007; Mauss et al., 2007). However, after the first reflexive affective 
response iteration, these processes of attentional deployment and appraisal may rise into 
awareness and may come under conscious top-down influences and be altered after the 
affective response has already been initiated.  
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Figure 2.3. Modal Model of Affect and Affect Regulation. Taken from Emotional regulation: 
Conceptual foundations by J. J. Gross and R. A. Thompson, R. A., 2007, in J. J. Gross (Ed.), 
Handbook of emotion regulation, p. 10. Copyright 2007 by Guilford press. 
  
The modal model proposes two possible mechanisms through which affect may be 
regulated.  The first (in the simple linear form) is that it is possible to alter attentional 
deployment and appraisal, consciously, before the affective response has been initiated to 
change the affective trajectory.  The second operates via the feedback loop within the 
modal model, whereby directing attention away from the threat-related stimulus or the 
initial affective response reduces the likelihood of the presence or continuation of that 
response, regardless of whether this redirection of attention occurs before or after the 
affective response has been initiated. Slightly different outcomes would result from each 
mechanism. The first would result in no affective response in relation to a stimulus that 
was not attended, whereas the second would result in an affective response which then 
subsides following regulation. 
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2.2.2. Greenberg and Paivio’s Process of a Feeling Model 
The process of a feeling model proposed by Greenberg and Paivio (1997), see 
Figure 2.4, begins with the premise that basic emotions, such as fear, can occur without 
conscious awareness (LeDoux, 1995; Zajonc, 1980) and that emotions serve a vital role in 
human functioning, enabling adaptation of behaviour to the external environment and, 
hence, should not be ignored. Importantly, this model comes from the dialectical-
constructivist view of human functioning, which states: 
“personal meaning emerges by the self-organisation and explication of one’s own 
emotional experience and optimal adaptation involves an integration of reason and 
emotion. This integration is achieved by an ongoing circular process of making sense of 
experience by symbolising bodily felt sensations in awareness and articulating them in 
language, thereby creating a new experience” (Greenberg, 2004,  p. 4) 
Hence, this theory suggests that an individual is only able to self-regulate 
consciously after the affective response has been initiated and that this affective response 
must have reached conscious awareness for it to begin a process towards the response’s 
completion, which is the transformation of an initial affective state to an affective 
experience of a different valence.  
 
Figure 2.4. The Process of a Feeling Model. Taken from Greenberg, L. S. & Paivio, S. C. 
(1997). Working with emotions in psychotherapy. New York: Guilford press. p 27.  
 
The process of a feeling model focuses on the necessary conditions for the affective 
response to reach completion. In order to reach completion, according to this model, the 
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affective response must pass through the necessary steps of (1) conscious awareness 
(rather than unawareness), particularly of the physiological and sensory experiences, as 
distinct from the subjective experience; (2) ownership of and the integration of such 
feelings and sensations with cognitive processes, and (3) expressive action involving the 
articulation of sensations and reason into language rather than through other expressions 
such as movement (Greenberg, 2004). Importantly, the process of a feeling model is based 
on increasing conscious experiencing of affect, thereby transforming an unpleasant 
emotional reaction to an alternative more pleasant, perhaps, less arousing emotional state 
(Greenberg, 2004). Thus, the process of a feeling model shares some similarities with the 
behavioural concept of habituation, in that individuals must fully expose themselves to the 
unpleasant stimulus for distress to reside. 
2.2.3. Similarities and Differences Between the Two Affect Regulation 
Models  
Gross and Thompson’s (2007) and Greenberg and Paivio’s (1997) models have 
points of similarity. These relate to the roles of attentional processes (i.e., attentional 
deployment or conscious awareness, respectively) and of evaluative processes (i.e., 
appraisal and owning respectively). Both theories predict that regulation strategies 
involving directing attention toward negative affect, coinciding with a negative appraisal of 
the experience of that affect, is likely to create a more complex affective response. This 
more complex affective response is likely to be of a similar valence to the initial response 
and to prolong the experience of negative affect. Based on the modal model, if indeed a 
fear based response became part of the situation and was evaluated by the individual as 
unhelpful and unwanted, then this evaluation is likely to lead to more intense and 
unpleasant affect. Likewise, when considering the process of a feeling model, if an 
individual becomes aware of an emotional response and evaluates this emotion as 
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unwanted, this would also be predicted to lead to the prolonging and intensification of that 
emotional response. Furthermore, both theories contain a component within their model 
regarding the outward and/or internal expression or response of the experienced affect. 
Both models suggest that inhibiting the expression of an affective response once the 
affective response has emerged is unlikely to lead to a decrease in the subjective or 
physiological presence of such affect.  
Importantly, however, the modal model and process of a feeling model disagree 
about the necessity of increased awareness of and attention to the affect-eliciting situation 
and associated affective response. These disagreements begin with the assumptions about 
the role of consciousness in the experience of affect (Westphal & Bonanno, 2004). Gross 
and Thompson’s (2007) modal model allows for the cognitive processes that play a causal 
role in the initiation of an affective experience to be under the conscious control of the 
individual. This allowance of the possibility of conscious cognitive processes causing affect 
results in a range of antecedent strategies that the process of a feeling model does not 
include that may alter the affective response trajectory. The reason for this lack of 
antecedent strategies in the process of a feeling model is that this model emphasises that 
affect occurs without conscious cognitive processes and, therefore, attempts to control 
attention and thought in relation to affect can only begin after the initiation of an affective 
response (Greenberg, 2004).  
When considering a situation in which an affective response has already been 
initiated, the modal model predicts that increased attentional focus on the affect-inducing 
situation, without a change in the way that situation is appraised, will lead to an increased 
affective response. Furthermore, increased attention to that affective response, without a 
change in the negative evaluation of that response is predicted to lead to a continuation of 
a similar but more intense and prolonged affective response of a the same valence. 
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Moreover, affect expression is also not predicted to be necessarily helpful within Gross’s 
model. In contrast, the process of a feeling model predicts that increased attentional focus 
on the situation and the associated sensory experience of the resulting affective response 
will likely integrate the meaning of the situation with the affective response through the 
articulation of this affective response in language, leading to altered affective state. 
In summary, these two models capture two opposing views of (1) the role of 
consciousness in the causation of affect; (2) at what point in the process affect regulation 
can take place, and; (3) where attention needs to be focused for affect regulation to be 
effective. Gross and Thompson predict that decreasing attentional awareness of the 
situation and the affective experience will lead to a decrease in the affective response. In 
contrast, Greenberg and Paivio’s model predicts that if conscious awareness is reduced by 
taking attentional focus away from the affective experience, this prevents the affective 
response reaching completion.   
2.2.4. Self-Regulation Theories’ Perspective on Affect Regulation 
Two self-regulation theories, Carver and Scheier’s control process perspective 
(Carver & Scheier, 1988, 1990) and Duval and Wicklund’s (Duval & Wicklund; 1975) 
objective self-awareness theory, suggest that when individuals are seeking to regulate their 
outward behaviour, this requires self-focused attention. However, this self-focused 
attention is proposed to have affective consequences. Duval and Wicklund’s objective self-
awareness theory states that when individuals view themselves as an object (i.e., direct 
attention to themselves and observe and monitor their own features and responses) they 
inevitably find flawed features. This identification of flawed features leads to the 
experience of negative affect. Rather than seeking to change these self-identified flaws, 
which may require considerable effort to alter, individuals spontaneously attempt to avoid 
40 
 
focusing attention on themselves and avoid situations that may promote self-awareness as 
an attempt to minimise the experience of unpleasant affect.  Situations that may make 
individuals self-aware include those that place social performance demands on an 
individual such that they receive direct observation from others, leading the individual to 
focus on him or herself also. Duval and Wicklund suggest that some individuals may avoid 
self-awareness by engaging in tasks that focus attention on the external environment, thus 
limiting attention available to be focused on the self and thus limiting the experience of 
negative affect.  Hence, objective self-awareness theory predicts that when individuals are 
not in situations that draw attention towards the self, and attention can easily be directed 
outside of the self, they can maintain a pleasant affective state. However, when either 
directing attention towards the self, or when in a situation that automatically draws 
attention to the self, individuals will experience increased negative affect.    
In a socially evaluative situation where individuals are suggested to automatically 
monitor their own responding (Duval & Wicklund, 1972), they may alter their self-
presentation in the situation to reduce the chance of this negative evaluation from 
occurring. Carver and Scheier (1988) suggest that when unable to regulate behaviour to 
meet such self-presentations standards, attention to discrepancy between the current level 
of preparedness for the socially evaluative situation and their ideal level of preparedness 
only increases the experience of anxious affect. Furthermore, both Duval and Wicklund 
(Duval & Wicklund, 1972), and Carver and Scheier (Carver & Scheier, 1988) suggest that if 
there are no options to remove oneself from the situation behaviourally then one will 
automatically, but generally very unsuccessfully, seek to minimise self-awareness, typically 
through self-distraction, to reduce the experience of unpleasant affect.  
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2.2.5. Contrasting the Theories of Action Regulation with the Theories of 
Affect Regulation 
The theories of the self-regulation of behaviour differ from those of affect 
regulation in that they propose a way in which individuals spontaneously regulate affect. 
Specifically, both Duval and Wicklund (1972) and Carver and Scheier (1988) propose that 
individuals spontaneously direct attention away from the self and the situation in order to 
avoid unpleasant affect. This proposed spontaneous tendency is contrary to what the 
process of a feeling model predicts will lead to effective affect regulation. Furthermore, the 
theories of the self-regulation of behaviour predict that in threat situations, which naturally 
facilitate attention to the self and to the situation, individuals will find it difficult to 
implement spontaneously initiated attempts to minimise attention these foci. This 
prediction from the action regulation theories challenges the assumption of the modal 
model that complete and effective attentional redeployment is possible once attention has 
already been directed to a threat and will be effective in reducing affect. Despite the 
divergence in predictions, the action regulation theories are also consistent with the modal 
model in predicting that diverting attention from the self and threats is likely to provide 
some limited reduction to unpleasant affect experienced and perhaps to maintain more 
pleasant states in situations of limited threat value.   
2.2.6. Conceptualisation of Particular Strategies Within an Affect 
Regulation Framework 
To enable easy comparison, particular cognitive regulation strategies can be 
conceptualised within the common framework of the affect regulation models.  From this, 
it becomes apparent that different strategies operate on different components deemed 
necessary in altering an affective episode, specifically: (1) attention to threats; (2) attention 
towards feelings; (3) the motivation to avoid the experience of affect; (4) increased self-
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awareness; and (5) reappraisal of affect. The maladaptive strategies of worry, rumination 
and suppression, and the adaptive strategies of distraction and acceptance are cross-
tabulated against these components in Table 2.1. 
Table 2.1. 
Cross-Tabulation of Cognitive Regulatory Strategies against Regulatory Factors. 
  Regulation Strategy 
  Distraction Acceptance Worry Rumination Suppression 
 
 
 
 
Regulatory 
factors 
Attention to 
threats 
no yes yes yes yes 
Attention to 
Feelings 
no yes yes yes yes 
Attempt to 
Avoid Affect 
yes no yes yes yes 
 Self-
Awareness 
Decreased Increased Increased Increased Increased 
 Reappraisal 
of Affect 
No Yes No No No 
 
Table 2.1 allows the identification of the model components that distinguish 
between the particular strategies. The increased intensity and persistence of affect 
associated with the maladaptive strategies can explained on these factors by both Gross 
and Thompson’s more complex cyclical version of their model and via Greenberg and 
Paivio’s process of a feeling model. Furthermore, Table 2.1 shows how distraction and 
acceptance differ from each other and from the maladaptive strategies on these same 
factors.  A more detailed description of the affect regulation strategies and how they fit 
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into the affect regulation models and the dimensions in the Table 2.1 is presented in 
sections 2.2.7 to 2.2.12 to follow.   
2.2.7. Defining the Adaptive Self-Regulatory Processes: Distraction and 
Acceptance  
Different principles regarding the focus of attention support the use of distraction 
and acceptance for down regulating affect. These differing principles are consistent with 
the contrasting predictions of Gross and Thompson’s (2009) and Greenberg and Paivio’s 
(1997) models. Distraction can be defined as a regulation strategy where one “seeks to 
avoid the experience of unwanted negative affect by cognitively removing oneself from the 
cause of that affect, with the overlying purpose to stop thinking about the negative event 
or emotion” (Augustine & Hemenover, 2009; p. 1185). Directing attention towards 
distracting tasks creates task-related thoughts, thereby, in contrast to the maladaptive self-
regulatory attempts, restricting attention to particular content that is self- or threat-
focused (Van Dillen & Koole, 2007). More specifically, it is the minimisation of attention to 
thoughts such as judgmental appraisals (Gross & Thompson, 2007; E. Watkins, 2004), worry 
(Rapee, 1993), and affect-related ruminations (Van Dillen & Koole, 2007), which are 
proposed  both to initiate (Gross & Thompson, 2007) and maintain unwanted negative 
affect (Blagden & Craske, 1996; Lyubomirsky & Nolen-Hoeksema, 1993), that results in 
diminished experience of negative affect. Hence, distraction can be classified as an “anti-
experiencing” strategy as it removes attentional focus from the self, from the subjective 
and sensory experience of affect and threat-stimuli. Importantly, distraction shares the 
characteristic of attempting to avoid or inhibit the experience, similar to the maladaptive 
strategy of suppression. However, distraction also differs from suppression in that 
distraction involves shifting attention away from unpleasant experiences and toward 
alternative foci, whilst suppression involves some monitoring of these unwanted 
experiences so as to inhibit them with no alternative focus of attention.  
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In contrast to distraction, acceptance is an “experiencing” strategy and is viewed as 
a more internally validating strategy that can be defined as: “the way in which present 
moment awareness is conducted: non-judgmentally, with an attitude of acceptance, 
openness and even compassion toward one’s experience” (Cardaciotto et al., 2008; p. 205). 
The sequential process of achieving successful anxious affect regulation using acceptance 
as a strategy is argued to involve awareness, noticing and observing of negative thoughts 
and feelings, and allowing the thoughts and feelings to continue, rather than evaluating 
these thoughts and feelings, attempting to suppress them, or distract oneself from them. It 
is proposed that attempts to avoid the unwanted negative internal events only prolong and 
intensify these events (S. C. Hayes, 2004a; S. C. Hayes et al., 2004). Hence, broadly 
consistent with Greenberg and Paivio’s process of a feeling model, it is argued that an 
affective episode can reach completion through the awareness of the sensory experience 
and integrating this experience with the self through articulation and reason, which 
facilitates the process of an affective state unfolding.  
Acceptance is often conceptualised in the literature as what it is not, with several 
measures of the construct emphasising its opposite (Block-Lerner, Salters-Pedneault, & 
Tull, 2005), being that of experiential avoidance (R. A. Baer, Smith, & Allen, 2004; 
Cardaciotto et al., 2008; S. C. Hayes et al., 2004). Conceptual support for acceptance as a 
strategy comes from Wegner’s ironic processes of mental control (Wegner, 1994), and 
Borkovec’s worry avoidance theory (Borkovec, Alcaine, & Behar, 2004), which both support 
the notion that affect regulation strategies involving the avoidance of the experience of 
negative thoughts and feelings result in prolonging the very state that these strategies seek 
to avoid. Hence, arguments in support of experiential observation and acceptance are 
based not so much on why increasing attention to one’s internal experiences reduces 
affect, but rather why sustained effort to avoid the experience of affect prolongs and 
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intensifies that affect. Evidence for the effectiveness of distraction and acceptance in 
reducing affect is presented in section 2.2.9.  
2.2.8. Conceptualising Distraction and Acceptance within the Affect 
Regulation Models 
From Table 2.1, it can be seen that the strategies, distraction and acceptance, differ 
on all five dimensions of regulated response. Distraction involves attention away from 
threats and affect, aiming to reduce unpleasant affect by avoiding its experience and 
associated thoughts, minimising self-awareness, and not altering the appraisal of an 
affective response. Conversely, acceptance involves attention to threat-related thoughts 
and towards feelings with the motivation to fully experience unpleasant affect, to increase 
self-awareness, and possibly to allow for the reappraisal of the affective response.  
The modal model predicts that distraction should be an effective regulation 
strategy as attention to negative thoughts and feelings is theorised to give rise to and 
maintain the experience of unwanted negative affect. Thus, diverting attention from 
negative thoughts and feelings would be expected to extinguish the resulting affect. 
However, according to the process of a feeling model, engaging in distraction and avoiding 
thoughts relating to threats and the associated unpleasant affect would not allow for 
awareness to increase to a level allowing integration of affect with reason, so resurgence of 
negative affect would be expected.    
Acceptance, in contrast to distraction, is conceptualised as leading to increased 
attention to threat-related thoughts and feelings. The simple version of the modal model 
would thus predict an increase in anxious affect resulting from this strategy.  In contrast, 
the process of a feeling model would predict an initial increase in affect that should shortly 
be followed by a marked decrease as affect is integrated with reason and feelings are 
articulated. However, it may be that “integration with reason” involves the reappraisal of 
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thoughts and feelings from being unwanted and unhelpful to being natural and 
informative. In this case, the modal model, in its iterative form, would not necessarily 
predict that acceptance will counterproductive, because affective responding arising from 
negative evaluations of affective responses should be reduced. Under this interpretation, 
the modal model would, however, concur with the process of a feeling model in predicting 
an initial increase in affect, due to the increased attentional focus towards threat-related 
thoughts and feelings, followed by a dissipation of affect if this affect is appraised non-
judgementally.  
The behavioural self-regulation theories’ perspective of distraction is that it will 
draw attention away from the self and therefore reduce self-awareness, leading to 
decreased affect. However, these self-regulatory theories recognise that engaging in 
distraction may be difficult in high-threat situations as not being able to escape a situation 
will inevitably lead to attention being drawn to threat-stimuli that promote self-awareness 
(Carver & Scheier, 1988; Duval & Wicklund, 1972). Hence, distraction is predicted to only 
offer very minimal reprieve from experiencing unpleasant affect. In contrast, acceptance, 
involving focusing attention to the self is a strategy that increases self-awarenessd. 
Increased self-awareness is predicted by the self-regulation theories to spontaneously lead 
to evaluative cognitions, rather than acceptance. Hence, this self-focused attention 
generated by engaging in acceptance is predicted by the self-regulation theories to lead to 
increased affect.  
                                                          
d
 Experiential observation and acceptance (mindfulness) has been shown to increase meta-
awareness (Hargus, Crane, Barnhofer, & Williams, 2010; Roemer & Orsillo, 2009). 
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2.2.9. Research on the Adaptive Strategies: Conflicting Evidence for the 
Two Competing Affect Regulatory Models   
Studies investigating distraction’s effect on anxious affect have often compared 
distraction to rumination (Blagden & Craske, 1996; Wong & Moulds, 2009). These studies 
evaluate the effectiveness of the strategies after a threat event has passed (i.e., how well 
they promote affective repair/recovery) rather than while the threat event is still 
anticipated. Some studies have indicated that distraction is not effective in reducing 
anxiety that occurs in response to an upcoming threat (Houston & Holmes, 1974) whilst 
others report that distraction does effectively reduce affect (Bloom et al., 1977). Such 
discrepancies are possibly due to differences in the manipulation of strategies. Van Dillen 
and Koole (2007) claim that the down-regulation of affect through distraction is 
proportional to the attentional load imposed by distraction, with maximum load being 
most effective at reducing affect. Another possible reason offered for why distraction can 
be ineffective is that threat situations initially draw an individual’s attention reflexively 
towards threat-related self-relevant thoughts (Bar-Haim et al., 2007; MacLeod et al., 1986; 
Wilson & MacLeod, 2003),  therefore, achieving  complete unawareness of such threats 
through distraction would be very difficult in situations of high-threat (Carver et al., 1989; 
Wicklund, 1975).  
Outside of anticipated threat circumstances, distraction has consistently been 
demonstrated as effective when the attentional diversion co-occurs with the affect 
manipulation, such as whilst watching a movie (Sheppes & Meiran, 2007) or viewing affect 
laden picture content (Van Dillen & Koole, 2007). It has also been successful in speeding up 
affective repair following affect inductions (Augustine & Hemenover, 2009) and threats 
(Wong & Moulds, 2009). However, the effectiveness of distraction in reducing affect in 
these studies is often measured relative to a maladaptive strategy (Blagden & Craske, 1996; 
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Morrow & Nolen-Hoeksema, 1990; Rusting & Nolen-Hoeksema, 1998; Wong & Moulds, 
2009). In the circumstances where distraction has outperformed another suggested 
adaptive strategy (reappraisal), this has occurred with participants self-directing their own 
distracting content whilst watching affective content (Sheppes, Catran, & Meiran, 2009; 
Sheppes & Meiran, 2007). Hence, research on experimentally manipulated distraction has 
had mixed results, but this seems to be attributable to different forms of distraction 
manipulation, different research paradigms, and the chosen comparison conditions against 
which the strategy is evaluated.  
Research on individuals considered to be well rehearsed in avoiding anxious affect 
from rising to conscious awareness (i.e., high-anxious repressors) report attending to 
distracting thoughts in order to minimise attention to affect related content (Bonanno, 
Davis, Singer, & Schwartz, 1991).  However, these high-anxious repressor individuals, 
although reporting decreased anxiety, show increased physiological arousal in threat 
circumstances (Asendorpf & Scherer, 1983; Fuller, 1992). This research on high-anxious 
repressors further supports the notion that distraction during the presence of threats may 
be ineffective at reducing anxious affect, even for well-rehearsed users of the strategy. 
Hence, studies of experimentally manipulated and naturally occurring distraction do not 
suggest that distraction will always lead to reductions in negative or anxious affect.   
Support for acceptance in reducing anxious affect has come from studies both 
using non-clinical (Braams, Blechert, Boden, & Gross, 2012; Dunn et al., 2009; Hofmann et 
al., 2009; Low et al., 2008) and clinical samples (Campbell-Sills, Barlow, Brown, & Hofmann, 
2006; Levitt, Brown, Orsillo, & Barlow, 2004). There are methodological differences in the 
studies evaluating acceptance in regards to such factors as: how affect is manipulated, time 
when the strategy is elicited during the affective sequence, for how long the strategy is 
engaged in, how affect is measured, and if the strategy is evaluated subsequent to its use. 
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However, understanding when acceptance is found to reduce affect can be best shown 
when organising the findings of previous research, first into the impacts of acceptance 
separately in clinical and non-clinical samples, followed by the particularly important 
factors of time length of strategy engagement and affect modality measured.  
Support for acceptance as an effective strategy in non-clinical samples has been 
found on  measures indicating physiological arousal when the strategy has been engaged in 
for a period more than 10 minutes (Dunn et al., 2009; Hofmann et al., 2009; Low et al., 
2008). Low et al.’s (2008) study showed that the beneficial effects of acceptance in 
reducing anxious affect were found on HR only during a second 10 minute session of 
engaging in the strategy relative to an evaluative rumination condition. Hofmann et al. 
(2009) tested acceptance when anticipating, during, and following a socially-evaluative 
threat-task. This study showed reduced HR in the acceptance condition relative to a 
suppression condition occurring across all three phases of the experiment, with the total 
duration of engagement in acceptance being 14 minutes, during which HR was measured. 
Both the Hofmann et al. and Low et al. studies showed that acceptance did not result in 
reduced arousal relative to another proposed adaptive conditions (i.e., reappraisal and 
factual recall) and showed no difference in reported affect from the other experimental 
conditions. Dunn et al., (2009) showed acceptance reducing electrodermal activity during 
engagement during a film clip (12.5 minutes in duration) relative to suppression and 
control condition, but no difference in reported affect. Thus, these three studies provide 
the support for acceptance on physiological measures relative to a maladaptive comparison 
condition in non-clinical samples. 
In contrast to the aforementioned studies, if acceptance is engaged in for a short 
period of time in non-clinical samples, its benefits are demonstrated on self-report 
measures but not on physiological measures. Braam, Blechert, Boden, and Gross (2012) 
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showed that acceptance did not lead to a reduction in arousal when the strategy was 
engaged in briefly (for a period of less than 2 minutes) during anticipation and receipt of a 
painful stimulus in comparison to suppression and control conditions. However, 
participants in the acceptance condition reported reduced affect relative to suppression. 
Hence, investigations of the effectiveness of acceptance in reducing negative affect show 
that the beneficial impacts of acceptance on arousal in studies involving non-clinical 
samples occur over a duration that is longer than 10 minutes, and benefits are usually 
relative to a maladaptive strategy. In contrast, acceptance reduces self-reported affect in 
non-clinical samples when acceptance is engaged in for shorter durations of approximately 
2 minutes, despite no difference in physiological arousal emerging in this timeframe.    
The effectiveness of acceptance among individuals meeting a clinical diagnosis also 
appears to be influenced by the time period over which it is engaged in and the affect 
measures employed.  Campbell-Sills et al., (2006) demonstrated that acceptance reduced 
reported negative affect relative to suppression in combination with reduced HR during the 
exposure to a film clip for 4.5 minutes in a sample of participants meeting diagnostic 
criteria for an affective disorder. In contrast, Levitt et al. (2004) evaluated acceptance use 
during 15 minutes of engagement in a feared task (carbon dioxide challenge for panic 
disordered participants) and showed that the strategy led to reduced reported anxiety 
relative to suppression and control conditions, but no difference on physiological 
measures. In addition, those who engaged in acceptance expressed increased willingness 
(indicative of behavioural approach rather than withdrawal) to attempt the carbon dioxide 
challenge again relative to the other conditions. Hence, taking these findings together, the 
effects of time period of engagement on subjective and physiological measures of affect 
appear to be reversed when observing the impacts of acceptance on clinical samples 
relative to non-clinical samples. The reason for this is unclear. However, a limiting issue in 
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making any conclusions regarding different results found between clinical and non-clinical 
samples is the possibility that different clinical populations may respond differently to 
affect and the affect eliciting situations in which acceptance is evaluated under.   
2.2.10. For How Long are Distraction and Acceptance Predicted to show 
Beneficial Effects?   
A pivotal question, if indeed distraction and acceptance can reduce anxiety in an 
anticipated threat situation, is for how long is each strategy effective? If a strategy is 
engaged in during anticipation of a threat, but then its engagement is disrupted when the 
individual encounters the threat and undertakes the threat-task, does the previous 
engagement in the strategy still influence affective reactivity to the threat? Furthermore, 
does a strategy engaged in during the anticipation of a threat influence affective repair 
once the threat has passed? Gross’s modal model would predict that a strategy such as 
reappraisal (engaged in prior to encountering the threat) would start to demonstrate its 
beneficial effects once the situation had taken on the new, more benign meaning. 
Assuming that the predominant interpretation of the situation is the new, more benign 
interpretation of the threat, then benefits from this reappraisal would be predicted to 
continue when encountering the threat (i.e., reduced threat reactivity) and also during the 
recovery from the threat (i.e., more rapid affective repair).  
Both the modal model and the process of a feeling model predict that engaging in 
distraction in an anticipated threat circumstance would have entirely different outcomes 
from reappraisal during the threat-task engagement and the recovery. According to the 
modal model, distraction may prevent an individual from having worrisome thoughts about 
the impending threat and temporarily reduce the experience of anxiety. However, when 
the threat is finally encountered, and cannot be ignored, it is likely that an individual 
previously using distraction during the anticipation of this threat would show increased 
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reactivity and slower affective repair, relative to those that reappraised the threat.  This 
likelihood is due to the lack of opportunity for that individual to prepare mentally or 
reappraise the event during its anticipation because of the load that distraction places on 
attention (Houston & Holmes, 1974; Kamphuis & Telch, 2000). 
Results consistent with the predictions from the modal model regarding the latter 
detrimental effects of distraction relative to reappraisal were noted in claustrophobic 
individuals when initially introduced to a chamber of limited space (Kamphuis & Telch, 
2000). Participants were given a strategy (distract only, reappraise only, combined 
distraction and reappraisal) before they entered the chamber and which they engaged in 
once entering it.  Participants in the reappraisal conditions were asked to identify a threat 
related to entering the chamber and encouraged to reappraise this threat whilst in the 
chamber. The participants in the distraction conditions were asked to rehearse a set of 
digits whilst in the chamber. Individuals were asked to stay there as long as possible. The 
results showed that, following time spent in the chamber (i.e., the threat), participants who 
engaged in distraction showed significantly more elevated levels of fear in regards to 
returning into the chamber than those who only engaged in reappraisal of the threat 
associated with the chamber.  Hence, both the modal model and previous research are 
consistent in suggesting that prior distraction in anticipated threat circumstances is likely to 
lead to increased affective reactivity and slower recovery when the threats are 
encountered, perhaps because it reduces the chance to interpret the threat in a more 
benign way (Houston & Holmes, 1974; Kamphuis & Telch, 2000).        
In contrast to distraction, the modal model does not make clear predictions 
regarding the subsequent impacts of acceptance. It is unclear whether individuals would 
need to continually engage in acceptance whenever they encountered the same 
threatening situation rather than simply apply the same evaluation of the threat and affect 
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used previously, as with reappraisal. However, the process of a feeling model predicts the 
effects of engaging in acceptance while anticipating a stressful event to be unambiguously  
beneficial, both during anticipation and subsequent to the strategy’s engagement when 
evaluated during the undertaking and recovery from a threat-task. As acceptance involves 
the integration of affect and reasoned thought and the articulation of feelings related to 
the situation, the affect related to the situation should reduce when encountering and 
recovering from the threat.     
  No known study has tested the impacts of acceptance, engaged in only during the 
anticipation of threatening task, and then evaluated on its subsequent impacts to affective 
reactivity and recovery from that threat-task. However, Dunn et al., (2009) evaluated the 
subsequent impacts of acceptance on emotional stimuli unrelated to initial stimuli used to 
elicit an initial affective response to which participants regulated their responses. 
Participants first watched a film clip during which they engaged in regulation and 
acceptance was found to lead to reduced arousal during this period relative to a 
suppression and control condition. Participants were subsequently shown affect-eliciting 
pictures. These pictures were used as an assessment of processing of emotional stimuli 
following regulation. Prior engagement in acceptance was shown to lead to increased 
physiological reactions, indicated by deceleration of HR over 6 seconds (i.e., freeze 
response), for all emotion stimulus types (positive, sadness, fear, disgust and neutral) and 
increased reported negative affect at one week follow up relative to suppression. These 
results suggest that acceptance limits processing of affective stimuli subsequently 
encountered following the engagement of acceptance. However, it is unclear if the 
increased response to the subsequently presented affective stimuli was because these 
stimuli were unrelated to the initial affective material presented towards which 
participants were asked to use acceptance. It may have be that participants using 
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acceptance would have subsequently shown less reactivity to affective stimuli if these 
stimuli were more directly related to the original affect-eliciting stimulus towards which 
they were originally asked to regulate their responses.  
2.2.11. The Maladaptive Processes that Maintain Negative Affect: Worry, 
Rumination and Suppression  
Maladaptive regulation strategies are mental processes that are proposed to 
unintentionally maintain and intensify negative affect (Borkovec, 1985; Borkovec et al., 
2004; Pyszczynski & Greenberg, 1987; Wegner, 1994; Zebb & Beck, 1998). These 
maladaptive processes typically involve deliberately directing attentional focus towards the 
affect and internal and external affect-related stimuli in a way that identifies shortcomings 
of the individual and the individual’s responses regarding the current situation (Borkovec et 
al., 2004; Borkovec, Robinson, Pruzinsky, & DePree, 1983; Pyszczynski & Greenberg, 1987; 
Wegner, 1994). These maladaptive strategies, despite increasing attention towards affect 
and towards the self, arise from the individual’s motivation to avoid the experience of 
unpleasant affect. 
  When the maladaptive processes are conceptualised in terms of either the modal 
model (Gross & Thompson, 2007), the process of a feeling model (Greenberg & Paivio, 
1997), or the action regulation theories (Carver & Scheier, 1988; Duval & Wicklund, 1972) 
increased affect is always the predicted outcome, although for somewhat different 
reasons. As it can be noted from Table 2.1, there is considerable overlap between these 
three maladaptive self-regulatory attempts, which has also been established empirically (S. 
Segerstrom, Tsao, Alden, & Craske, 2000; Wenzlaff & Luxton, 2003).  
Three maladaptive strategies discussed extensively in relation to negative and 
anxious affect are worry, rumination, and suppression. Worry can be defined as an 
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attempted problem solving process in which “the worry sequence seems to be initiated by 
a fear stimulus (that may be in the external environment and/or imagined) which elicits 
mental problem-solving activity designed to prevent the occurrence of traumatic future 
events and/or to devise coping strategies for such events”, (Borkovec, 1985; pp. 481-482). 
The coping strategies occur even when no behavioural coping option exists to thwart the 
event. With some similarities to worry, rumination is defined as “focusing passively and 
repetitively on one’s symptoms of distress and the meaning of those symptoms without 
being able to take action to correct the problems one identifies” (Nolen-Hoeksema, 1998; 
p. 216). Hence, both worry and rumination involve focusing on threats and feelings in 
attempt to problem solve to avoid the continued experience of unpleasant affect 
(Pyszczynski & Greenberg, 1987).  
Worry and rumination are both perseverative processes, having the distinguishing 
feature of repetitive thought. They relate either to the reflection on and evaluation of past 
events, typical of rumination, or to predicting and focusing on possible ambiguous threats 
that may occur in the future, typical of worry (L. L. Martin & Tesser, 1996). The 
perseverative processes are often discussed together, as individuals often engage in both 
rather than one or the other (McLaughlin et al., 2007). Despite the co-occurrence of worry 
and rumination, the two attempts are distinct strategies (E. Watkins, Moulds, & 
Mackintosh, 2005). Importantly, both mental processes are different constructs and predict 
different types of negative affect (Bieling, Antony, & Swinson, 1998; Davey, Hampton, 
Farrell, & Davidson, 1992; Kelly, 2004; Treynor, Gonzalez, & Nolen-Hoeksema, 2003; Zebb 
& Beck, 1998). Worry is more predictive of anxiety symptoms, and rumination is more 
predictive of depressive symptoms (Hong, 2007; McLaughlin et al., 2007). However, both 
perseverative processes have also been shown to increase depressed mood (S. Segerstrom 
et al., 2000). 
56 
 
The third maladaptive process, suppression, is the active avoidance of and attempt 
to inhibit thoughts or feelings experienced internally or expressed externally, with 
attention directed towards the self, with the intention to dampen the phenomenological 
experience or inhibit the expressive action (Augustine & Hemenover, 2009; Wegner, Erber, 
& Zanakos, 1993). Suppression is a separate strategy from the perseverative processes 
(Kamholz et al., 2006). However, rumination is associated with increased suppression (E. R. 
Watkins, 2009; Wegner et al., 1993; Wenzlaff & Luxton, 2003) and, like the perseverative 
processes, suppression has been associated with anxiety and depression (Wegner et al., 
1993; Wegner & Zankos, 1994). Hence, there is considerable overlap between the 
maladaptive strategies and negative affect with the engagement in maladaptive strategies 
co-occurring such that they facilitate each other.  
2.2.12. Conceptualising the Maladaptive Strategies within the Affect 
Regulation Models and Action Regulation Theories   
Gross and Thompson’s model conceptualises the maladaptive strategies as 
occurring after an affective response has been generated and involving attention to the 
threats in the situation and the affective response, with the appraisal of the affective 
response as being negative. This combination of factors in the model is predicted to be 
especially counterproductive, focusing on the threats in the situation and the affective 
response and evaluating the response as unwanted and negative, only leading to a 
continued and intensified unpleasant affective response.   
Greenberg and Paivio’s model offers an alternative explanation of how the 
maladaptive strategies lead to the maintenance of negative affect. This explanation relates 
to the motivation behind the maladaptive strategies of avoiding the unpleasant experience 
of negative affect either through problem solving and evaluating symptoms (i.e., worry and 
rumination), which take attention away from the sensory experience of the affect, or 
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simply through simply inhibiting the internal experience of it (i.e., suppression). These 
maladaptive strategies limit attention available for the observation of the sensory 
experience of feelings and limit integration between the feeling states and reason through 
expressive language. Hence, the process of a feeling model conceptualises the maladaptive 
regulatory attempts as disallowing integration of the emotion with the self, thereby 
preventing an alternative affective state from being experienced.  
The action regulation theories of Carver and Scheier and Duval and Wicklund have 
been specifically applied to the perseverative processes of worry and rumination (Carver & 
Scheier, 1988; Pyszczynski & Greenberg, 1987). Both theories propose that individuals 
continually focus attention on the situation and the shortcomings of the self in being 
unable to take overt action to resolve the discrepancy between the actual state and an 
ideal state. Carver and Scheier’s control process perspective has also been specifically 
applied to suppression (Wegner, 1994). It is suggested by Wegner (1994) that individuals 
self-focus attention with the motivation to detect the presence of an internal event, 
thought or feeling, with the objective of inhibiting and stifling its presence. However, in 
order for the search process to detect the unwanted phenomenon, the individual must 
hold in mind the very unwanted internal experience sought to be eradicated, which 
inevitably leads to the increased and sustained presence of the unwanted internal events.e 
2.2.13. Research on the Maladaptive Strategies  
The three maladaptive strategies of worry, rumination and suppression as 
regulatory responses to situations and subsequent affect as conceptualised within both the 
models of affect regulation (sections 2.2.1. and 2.2.2) are predicted to intensify and 
                                                          
e
Wells (2009) suggested that such maladaptive regulatory attempts indicate that an 
individual is not aware of their own thought process and, therefore, could be construed as lacking 
self-awareness.  
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prolong unpleasant affect.  Due to the various ways in which the strategies focus attention 
on, yet attempt to avoid the experience of the affect leads to the predictions of increased 
unpleasant affect. These predictions regarding the perseverative processes are well 
supported across all research designs investigating the strategies on both self-report and 
physiological variables. However, unlike the perseverative processes, suppression has not 
shown the same consistency across research designs and between self-report and 
physiological measures. 
Cross-sectional research investigating individual differences in maladaptive self-
regulatory attempts has shown evidence in support of the above predictions, in that worry, 
rumination and suppression have been shown to be associated with increased naturally 
occurring negative affect (Borkovec et al., 2004; Hong, 2007; Meyer, Miller, Metzger, & 
Borkovec, 1990; Nolen-Hoeksema & Morrow, 1991; Roemer, Salter, Raffa, & Orsillo, 2005; 
Salters-Peneault, Suvak, & Roemer, 2008; S. Segerstrom et al., 2000; Treynor et al., 2003; 
Wegner et al., 1993). In addition, quasi-experimental studies of individuals with pre-existing 
tendencies to use maladaptive regulation attempts (including the use of suppression) show 
that these strategies prolong and intensify affective experiences as measured via self-
report and HR when an affective state is experimentally induced (Egloff, Schmukle, Burns, 
& Schwerdtfeger, 2006; Gross & Levenson, 1993; Morrow & Nolen-Hoeksema, 1990; Trask 
& Sigmon, 1999; B.  Verkuil et al., 2009).  
In contrast to studies investigating pre-existing differences, studies using 
experimental manipulations of the maladaptive regulatory attempts have shown that 
suppression does not lead to consistent results across affective measures, whilst worry and 
rumination do. The experimental manipulation of the perseverative processes has been 
demonstrated to consistently increase the self-report and physiological measures of affect 
(Blagden & Craske, 1996; Dua & King, 1987; Hofmann et al., 2005; Morrow & Nolen-
59 
 
Hoeksema, 1990; Trask & Sigmon, 1999; B. Verkuil, Brosschot, Borkovec, & Thayer, 2009; 
Wong & Moulds, 2009). Experimentally manipulated rumination often results in increased 
and prolonged self-reported negative affect following the anxious affect induction (Blagden 
& Craske, 1996; Wong & Moulds, 2009) and induced worry increases levels of self-reported 
distress (Hofmann et al., 2005). Increased HR is often noted in experimentally induced state 
worry relative to periods of rest or relaxation (Davis, Montgomery, & Wilson, 2002; 
Hofmann et al., 2005).  
In contrast to the perseverative processes, experimentally manipulated 
suppression in non-clinical samples can lead to rather inconsistent effects on anxious 
affect, which vary between self-report measures and physiological measures. Increased 
affect is often shown on physiological measures but not reflected on self-reports (Dunn et 
al., 2009; Gross & Levenson, 1997 ; Hofmann et al., 2009; Richards & Gross, 2000). Johns et 
al. (2008) found no difference in reported affect between suppression and a reappraisal 
condition. However, Hofmann et al. (2009) showed that suppression led to significantly 
increased reported anxious affect when compared to reappraisal, despite having a very 
similar method to Johns et al., (2008). Interestingly, Hofmann et al. (2009) showed that 
instructed suppression resulted in no difference from instructed acceptance in levels of 
anxiety reported, but the two conditions were found to differ significantly in HR changes, 
with acceptance showing lower HR than suppression. Dunn et al. (2009) demonstrated that 
suppression led to increased arousal (as demonstrated by increased galvanic skin 
conductivity relative to acceptance during engagement), but no difference on self-reported 
affect during this period. Hence, suppression is sometimes associated with a divergence of 
reported affect from physiological arousal, possibly because of self-report measures being 
influenced by participant demand characteristics or self-presentation concerns in non-
clinical samples. This explanation is likely because participants high in social 
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desirability/defensiveness who also report unusually low anxiety levels, suggested to be 
unconsciously using suppression (i.e., repression), also show a disconnect between self-
report and physiological measures of anxiety, reporting decreased affect but 
demonstrating increased physiological arousal  (Asendorpf & Scherer, 1983; Derakshan & 
Eysenck, 2001a).  
2.2.14. An Alternative Mechanism Through Which The Adaptive Strategies 
may Alter Affect  
Despite the difference between distraction and acceptance in regards to 
attentional focus, it is possible that they may both achieve reductions in unpleasant affect 
through the same mechanism: minimising the attentional capacity available to engage in 
maladaptive regulatory strategies. This argument is based on the premise that engaging in 
a particular cognitive regulation strategy reduces the attentional resources available to 
support other processes. Evidence has suggested that maladaptive processes are likely to 
demand online attentional capacity (S. Hayes, Hirsch, & Mathews, 2008; Rapee, 1993; 
Richards & Gross, 2000), and adaptive strategies also require these same online attention 
resources (Houston & Holmes, 1974). Therefore, engaging in a strategy that allocates 
attentional focus to different stimuli from those focal to the maladaptive processes is likely 
to consume attentional capacity and reduce the level of engagement in these maladaptive 
regulatory attempts. In addition, engaging in a strategy that involves evaluating affect in a 
non-habitual way is also likely to consume attentional capacity and thus restrict 
engagement in maladaptive regulatory attempts.  
Distraction has been proposed to operate by focusing attention away from the self 
and towards task-related stimuli, thereby restricting the capacity available for engaging in 
perseverative thought (Nolen-Hoeksema, 1998, 2000; Van Dillen & Koole, 2007). 
Acceptance has been proposed to limit any engagement in strategies that seek to avoid the 
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experience or limit the expression of affect, including the perseverative processes (S. C. 
Hayes, 2004b), but particularly suppression (Hofmann & Asmundson, 2008) by encouraging 
increased attention to affect in an experiential, non-judgemental way rather than an 
inhibitive way. Hence, distraction and acceptance have been recommended within 
different therapeutic approaches to limit and replace the maladaptive processes that 
maintain and intensify negative affect (S. C. Hayes, 2004a; S. C. Hayes, Luoma, Bond, 
Masuda, & Lillis, 2006; Lyubomirsky & Nolen-Hoeksema, 1993; Nolen-Hoeksema, 1991; 
Orsillo & Roemer, 2005; Roemer & Orsillo, 2009). This consumption of online attentional 
capacity by adaptive strategies restricting use of maladaptive regulatory strategies provides 
an alternative avenue for distraction and acceptance to regulate affect that differs from 
changing the focus of attention. This alternative avenue for regulation is compatible with 
altered attentional focus, and thus each of these avenues for affect regulation may operate 
simultaneously.  
2. 2. 15. Endogenous and Exogenous Control of Attention: Regulating in 
the Presence of Sustained Threats  
Both distraction and acceptance by definition should involve controlling attentional 
focus towards particular content. However, threatening circumstances, stimuli and affect 
have been demonstrated to influence attentional focus too (Bar-Haim et al., 2007; Cornwell 
et al., 2011; Derryberry & Reed, 2002; Ellenbogen, Schwartzman, Stewart, & Walker, 2002; 
Eysenck et al., 2007; Koster, Crombez, Verscheuer, Van Damme, & Wierseman, 2006; 
MacLeod et al., 1986; Wilson & MacLeod, 2003)f. This section discusses these 
circumstantial and affective factors that may influence how effectively distraction and 
acceptance can be engaged, and their potential to lead to unintended affective 
consequences in some situation and not others.  
                                                          
f
 Anxiety’s impact on attentional control will be discussed in section 2.3.7. 
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Threatening stimuli  have been demonstrated to engage attentional focus over 
short durations (100-250ms), perhaps indicating the existence of a reflexive response that 
has evolved for survival purposes (Derryberry & Reed, 2002; Koster et al., 2006). However, 
when threat-stimuli are present for longer durations (≥500ms), the initial engagement of 
attention is replaced by attentional diversion (Derryberry & Reed, 2002; Ellenbogen et al., 
2002; MacLeod et al., 1986), a process that is likely to be effortful and to require significant 
cognitive control (Cornwell et al., 2011; Knight et al., 2007; Mather & Knight, 2005; Mogg & 
Bradley, 1998), be difficult to maintain, but function to minimise unpleasant affect (Carver 
& Scheier, 1988; Duval & Wicklund, 1972; Mogg & Bradley, 1998). In addition, it has been 
suggested that stimuli of lower threat  have less of an attentional engagement influence 
(Wilson & MacLeod, 2003) and/or are more easily ignored than stimuli of higher threat 
(Mackintosh & Mathews, 2003), and hence attempts at attentional diversion from these 
stimuli may require less controlled processing. 
The extent to which threat influences attentional focus has important implications, 
particularly for distraction as this strategy requires individuals to actively direct their 
attention away from threat-related information.  The higher the threat, the more difficult 
individuals find it to intentionally override the automatic tendency to focus on the threat 
(Inzlicht, McKay, & Aronson, 2006; Schmader & Johns, 2003). Hence, it may be that 
distraction is less effective in diverting attention from threat and, thus, in reducing affect in 
high-threat circumstances because of the greater difficulty of controlling attention in such 
high threat and affective circumstances. Thus distraction may be more effective in reducing 
affect in less threatening circumstances where it is easier to direct attention away from the 
threats (Wilson & MacLeod, 2003). In contrast to distraction, engaging in acceptance 
encourages attention to threat-related thoughts and feelings. Focusing on such internal 
stimuli may be facilitated by high-threat circumstances, where more threat-salient 
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thoughts and more intense feelings are present and likely to capture attention relative to 
low-threat situations.  In circumstances with limited threat, however, more effort may be 
required to direct attention to inner thoughts and feelings (Carver & Scheier, 1988; Duval & 
Wicklund, 1972) thus making the strategy more difficult to engage in such circumstances 
and perhaps less effective in reducing or maintaining low levels of negative affect. 
Individuals have been demonstrated to engage in automatic or spontaneousg 
attempts to regulate affect (Ellenbogen et al., 2002; Johns et al., 2008). Both the control 
processes perspective on anxiety (Carver & Scheier, 1988) and objective self-awareness 
theory (Duval & Wicklund, 1972) predict that individuals will self-initiate distracting 
thoughts to minimise attention to threat-stimuli. However, both theories also predict, 
consistent with evidence regarding an overriding tendency for attention to engage with 
threats when anxious (Bar-Haim et al., 2007), that this self-initiated distraction and the 
inhibition of attention towards threats is  difficult to maintain, especially if the threats are 
continually present within the physical environment, resulting in re-engagement of 
attention to threat information and elevation of affect. Hence, it is likely that in situations 
that involve the sustained presence of threats, two competing attentional processes are 
                                                          
g
The terminology associated with regulatory attempts that have been initiated by an 
individual without experimental imposition has not been well defined within literature discussing 
affect regulation. Some researchers will use the term “automatic” to describe spontaneously 
initiated affect regulation (e.g., Mauss et al., 2007). In cognitive articles, automatic process are 
considered to be effortless, requiring little attentional focus and carried out with minimal error 
(Schneider & Shiffrin, 1977). However, the functions of some regulatory strategies, that are 
automatically initiated, consume attention, and/or require the monitoring of and inhibiting of 
prepotent affective responses. Despite being automatically initiated, such regulatory acts are indeed 
effortful and completely inconsistent with a strict cognitive definition of an automatic process. 
Hence, just because a regulation strategy has been automatically or spontaneously initiated, does 
not mean that actively engaging in that regulation strategy and the cognitive processes supporting 
that strategy are not forms of controlled responding. As a result the term “spontaneous” rather than 
“automatic” is used in this thesis to describe self-initiated attempts to cope with a threat/stressor 
(Egloff et al., 2006).  
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occurring: the first being the reflexive engagement of attention with threatening 
information when anxious (Bar-Haim et al., 2007) and the second being a controlled 
regulatory attempt to reduce unpleasant affect by inhibiting attention to threatening 
information (Johns et al., 2008), perhaps through a process of active ignoring (Derryberry & 
Reed, 2002; Ellenbogen et al., 2002; Koster et al., 2006) or self-distraction (Carver & 
Scheier, 1988; Duval & Wicklund, 1972).   
2. 2.16. Unintended Consequences of Affect Regulation 
Several previous sections (e.g., 2.2. 3, 5, 6, 8, and 9) have suggested that, despite 
both distraction and acceptance being therapeutically recommended, there may be 
circumstances in which the strategies may actually have unintended negative 
consequences. The arguments presented include distraction reducing attentional capacity 
to engage in situation reappraisal ( Houston & Holmes, 1974; Kamphuis & Telch, 2000), and 
difficulties in directing attention away from threats when anxious (Bar-Haim et al., 2007; 
Wilson & MacLeod, 2003). Additional accounts also provide potential explanations for why 
distraction and acceptance may have negative unintended consequences in regards to 
experiencing negative affect.   
The first relates to Wegner’s (1994) theoretical account, which also predicts that 
engaging in effective distraction may be difficult in high-threat circumstances because the 
strategy is one requiring mental control. Wegner (1994) would conceptualise distraction as 
an effortful process that requires the individual to maintain an attentional load. It has been 
demonstrated that engaging in a mental control task either requiring the inhibition of 
unwanted thoughts or feelings or maintenance of a mental load, when already attempting 
to alter an affective state, ironically leads to the increased presence of the internal 
phenomenon sought to be avoided (Wegner, 1994; Wegner et al., 1993). Hence, individuals 
already engaged in effortful processes seeking to avoid unpleasant affect who then engage 
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in a task with an attentional load demanding a participant’s concentration may suffer 
increases in these unwanted thoughts or feelings that may have otherwise been 
successfully avoided (Cornwell et al., 2011; Knight et al., 2007; Mather & Knight, 2005; 
Wegner et al., 1993)h. For example, Conwell et al. (2011) demonstrated that engaging in a 
distracting task impaired spontaneously initiated, effective attentional inhibitory processes 
that reduced the experience of affect in another condition where no distraction task was 
used. Hence, distraction may be a double-edged sword, reducing capacity available for 
adaptive regulatory strategies as well as maladaptive strategies and potentially leading to 
increased rather than reduced affect and threat-related thoughts in threatening situations.  
Like distraction, acceptance may also have unintended consequences. Acceptance 
involves directing attention towards the self. This self-focused attention may lead to 
negative evaluations of the self and is likely to increase negative affect, even if little affect 
is present to begin with (Duval & Wicklund, 1972; Wicklund, 1975).  In addition, attention 
may not be captured and/or held to any great degree by stimuli of lower threat value, and 
thus are more easily ignored (Wilson & MacLeod, 2003). Engaging in a strategy to focus 
attention on stimuli that would usually be ignored is likely, at least initially, to be difficult 
and effortful and affect arousing. Hence, like distraction, acceptance may also have 
unintended negative consequences. 
                                                          
h
 Wegner (1994) outlines many situations that may induce ironic effects. Such situations 
include when one wants to regulate thought or attention in combination with maintaining an 
imposed attentional load. The argument falls back to Wegner’s assertion that when an individual 
monitors for the absence of a particular target (e.g., unpleasant thoughts), this search process 
inevitably activates the very thoughts sought be avoided. If the operate component (see Figure 2.2 
in section 2.1.4 aimed at reducing this internal event is impaired due to it being consumed in an 
alternative control action, such as maintaining an attentional load, the monitoring process (which 
requires less processing resources) increases the very internal events sought to be avoided.  
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2.2.17. Summary of Affect Regulation Theory, Strategy and Research  
 There are two competing views of effective affect regulation. The first view consists 
of Gross and Thompson’s modal model, and the action regulation theories, including the 
control process perspective and the objective self-awareness perspectives that predict that 
limiting attention to affect and affect- or threat-related thought will reduce the experience 
of affect (Carver & Scheier, 1988; Duval & Wicklund, 1972; Gross & Thompson, 2007). The 
second view, represented by Greenberg and Paivio’s (1997) process of a feeling model, is 
that effective reductions in negative affect are best achieved through increasing attention 
towards the affective experience. Both adaptive and maladaptive strategies can be 
conceptualised within each of these models in terms of how they impact on attention, and 
the intended function of the strategy either to avoid or to experience affect.  The proposed 
adaptive strategies of distraction and acceptance, when placed within the different models, 
are predicted to lead to different affective outcomes during engagement in the strategies. 
Distraction involves limiting attention towards affect and towards the self, with the 
motivation to avoid the affective experience. Acceptance is the reverse combination of the 
attentional and motivational elements, involving the focus of attention on affect and 
towards the self with the motivation to immerse oneself fully in the sensory experience of 
that affect. Hence, the strategies provide a method by which to test the predictions of 
theories regarding the effects of attentional focus and motivational intent to experience or 
avoid affect on affect both during and following strategy engagement. An alternative 
mechanism by which distraction and acceptance may reduce affect is simply restricting 
attentional capacity available to engage in maladaptive regulatory attempts that may 
otherwise sustain and intensify negative affect. However, despite the suggested 
therapeutic benefit of distraction and acceptance, it may be that altering attentional focus 
effectively is excessively difficult under some circumstances but not others, limiting the 
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utility of the strategies in reducing affect across different circumstances. In addition, 
altering attentional focus may also have unintended consequences if it disrupts effective 
and spontaneously initiated regulatory attempts, thereby limiting the extent to which a 
strategy can be considered useful.   However, the influence a strategy has on affect is not 
the only factor determining how useful that strategy could be.   
2.3. The Influence of Affect Regulation on Executive Control 
Numerous studies have demonstrated that prior attempts at self-regulation (i.e., 
the control of attention, thought, affect or behaviour) aimed at altering the experience in 
one domain (i.e., affect, thought or behaviour), can impair subsequent self-regulatory acts 
in another domain (Hagger et al., 2010; Muraven & Baumeister, 2000). This section 
discusses how cognitive affect regulation may temporarily impact on an individual’s 
subsequent capacity to control their attention, thought and behaviour. Three mechanisms 
are proposed through which affect regulation could have such impacts on later acts of self-
control in the cognitive and/or behavioural domains, including an internal resource 
explanation (Muraven & Baumeister, 2000), an affective explanation of impaired 
attentional control and capacity (Eysenck & Calvo, 1992a; Eysenck et al., 2007), and a 
neurological account of sustained vagal inhibition of arousal supporting activation within 
the prefrontal cortex (Thayer, Hansen, Saus-Rose, & Johnsen, 2009; Thayer & Lane, 2000). 
However, first a discussion of self-regulation in the cognitive and behavioural domains is 
presented in relation to the concept of executive functioning. This is followed by a 
discussion of the three accounts of why previous affect regulatory attempts may impair 
subsequent attempts at demonstrated control of attention, thought and action.  
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2.3.1. Executive Functioning 
The term “executive functioning” stems from Baddeley’s (1986) highly influential 
component model of working memory. Baddeley’s original model comprised the central 
executive and two slave systems (the visuospatial sketchpad and the phonological loop). 
However, Baddeley did not originally specify the functions in which the central executive 
was involved, other than in working memory. Later, Baddeley’s (1996) account relied 
heavily upon Norman and Shallice’s (1986) Supervisory Attention System (SAS) from their 
theory of control of action and thought selection in defining the functions in which the 
central executive was involved. Hence, the best way to define executive functioning is 
through the proposed operations of the SAS.  
Shallice, Burgess, Schon and Baxter’s (1989) model of thought and action control 
involved more components than the SAS to explain controlled behaviour. Such components 
included schemes (i.e., program-like entities for each qualitatively distinct, well-learned 
action or thought operation) and contention scheduling (i.e., routine scheduling of 
schemes). Hence, schemes and contention scheduling epitomise what others have 
conceptualised as automatic processes, which are considered effortless and require few 
attentional resources (Schneider & Shiffrin, 1977).  When particular schemes or routine 
scheduling of such schemes is not suitable for the situation, the SAS was proposed to 
intervene in contention scheduling in order to produce more suitable actions adapted 
specifically for the situation. Therefore, the SAS was proposed to coordinate appropriate 
courses of action in novel situations via the modulation of contention-scheduling and by 
activating or inhibiting particular schemes to create a unique sequence or combination of 
operating schemes. Hence, the mental acts requiring the use of the SAS are novel or 
complex acts requiring concurrent attentional resources (Schneider & Shiffrin, 1977) and 
controlled processes (Carver, 1979; Carver & Scheier, 1982). Such mental functions 
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suggested to require the SAS include planning, decision-making, error detection and 
correction, generating novel sequences of actions, operations of technical difficulty and 
overcoming of strong habitual responses (Shallice & Burgess, 1993).  
Essentially, these functions that the SAS performed proposed by Norman and 
Shallice (1986) were suggested to be relevant to Baddeley’s central executive component 
of his working memory model. Thus, planning, decision-making, error detection and 
correction, novel sequences of actions, operations of technical difficulty and overcoming of 
strong habitual responses have now become “executive functions”. Like the operations of 
the SAS, executive functions are “top-down” in nature and are characterised as requiring 
the control of attention to modify thoughts and actions (A. Baddeley, 1996; Norman & 
Shallice, 1986; Shallice & Burgess, 1993).  
At a psychometric level, executive functioning has been simplified into three 
primary processes that may be used simultaneously or in sequence for the engagement in 
the more complex sequential functions such as planning or decision making (Miyake et al., 
2000). The first of these is the ability to inhibit and override automatic responses. The 
inhibition of prepotent responses is defined as: “the ability to deliberately inhibit dominant, 
automatic, or prepotent responses when necessary” (Miyake et al., 2000; pp. 57-58). 
The second executive function is that of updating and monitoring of working 
memory representations. It can be described as: 
“coding incoming information for relevance to the task at hand and then 
appropriately revising the items held in working memory by replacing old, no longer 
relevant information with newer, more relevant information. ..Importantly, this updating 
function goes beyond the simple maintenance of task-relevant information in its 
requirement” (Miyake et al., 2000; p. 57).   
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The third basic executive function is a shifting function, which involves shifting 
attention back and forth between multiple tasks or operations sometimes called “attention 
switching” where the shifting is driven internally rather than through prompts or 
distractors. 
2.3.2. Self-Regulation and Executive Control 
Like executive functioning, self-regulation or self-control can be defined as one’s 
own modification of automatic thoughts, feelings and behaviours (Muraven & Baumeister, 
2000). Thus, self-control involves successfully inhibiting harmful behaviours that may 
undermine that person’s long-term best interests. Muraven and Baumeister (2000), like 
others discussing executive functioning (Norman & Shallice, 1986; Schneider & Shiffrin, 
1977; Shallice & Burgess, 1993; Shallice, Burgess, Schon, & Baxter, 1989) discuss self-
control in the context of the distinction between automatic and controlled processes. 
Automatic processes are efficient and rigid, requiring limited self-focus of attention. In 
contrast, controlled processes are costly of online attentional resources but allow for 
flexible responses tailored to suit specific demands of a novel situation (Schneider & 
Shiffrin, 1977).  
Muraven and Baumeister also implicate control processes (described in section 
2.1.4) within their conceptualisation of self-regulation. Control processes can be described 
as conscious mental processes including the control of attention, the active engagement of 
corrective action and the evaluation of that corrective action required in the regulation of 
thought and action (Carver, 1979; Carver & Scheier, 1982; Miller, Galanter, & Pribram, 
1960). Control process models have been proposed to underlie successful self-control 
(Carver, 1979; Carver & Scheier, 1982; Carver et al., 1989). Muraven and Baumeister (2000) 
identify the operate phase (see Figure 2.2) within the sequence as of particular relevance 
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to self-control. The reason for identifying the operate phase as particularly important is 
that it symbolises the process of reducing a discrepancy between actual behaviour and a 
desired behaviour and is argued therefore to represent the act of exercising self-control. 
This operate component cannot only be represented by action but also be represented as 
inhibiting pre-existing patterns of responses to develop alternative responses.  
Notably, there is much consistency between the operations of Norman and 
Shallice’s (1986) SAS, the definition of self-control provided by Muraven and Baumeister 
(2000) and the engagement of control processes as described by Carver and Scheier (1979; 
1982). A key difference in the terminology usage is that the term executive functioning is 
discussed in reference to neuropsychological studies of individuals with frontal lobe 
damage (Miyake et al., 2000; Shallice & Burgess, 1993; Shallice et al., 1989), whilst self-
control is more often discussed in relation to objective self-awareness (Carver, 1979) and 
control process theory (Carver & Scheier, 1982) and the experience of affect and 
engagement in goal-driven behaviour. Schmeichel (2007) brings these highly related 
constructs of executive functioning and self-control/regulation, together under the term 
“executive control”.    
2.3.3. Self-Focus of Attention, and the Subsequent Impacts on Executive 
Control and the Experience of Affect   
Vital in the control process framework is the self-focus of attention. It has been 
suggested that self-focused attention is vital in regulating actions (Carver, 1979; Carver & 
Scheier, 1982). In ego-threatening circumstances, increased self-focused attention has 
been suggested to facilitate mental performance during task engagement (McDonald, 
1980; Pulus, Annis, & Risner, 1978) and to lead to superior self-control (Heatherton, Polivy, 
Herman, & Baumeister, 1993). Hence, self-focusing attention is required in acts of self-
control (Carver, 1979; Carver & Scheier, 1982; Duval & Wicklund, 1972; Wicklund, 1975). 
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However, many studies have demonstrated that previous acts of self-control diminish the 
ability to perform subsequent acts of self-control (Hagger et al., 2010; Muraven & 
Baumeister, 2000). This is the focus of the following section, outlining the theory of, and 
previous research on, the impacts of prior attempts at self-control on subsequent acts 
requiring self-control.  
2.3.4. Depleting Executive Resources: A Theory of Self-Regulatory Strength  
Prior regulation in one response domain having a detrimental impact on a 
subsequent task requiring self-control in another response domain has been demonstrated 
by many studies (Hagger et al., 2010; Muraven & Baumeister, 2000). Some have measured 
impacts of spontaneously initiated attempts at coping with situational stressors and threats 
on the subsequent ability to demonstrated executive control. Such stressors and threats 
have included: noise (Hartley, 1973), stereotype threat (Inzlicht et al., 2006; Schmader & 
Johns, 2003), physical threat (Heatherton, Herman, & Polivy, 1991), and social-evaluative 
threat (Heatherton et al., 1993). Prior control of attention and thought has been 
manipulated by initial experimental tasks requiring executive control, including the control 
of attention and thought in affect regulation, and has been shown to reduce performance 
on subsequent executive control tasks (Schmeichel, 2007; Schmeichel, Vohs, & Baumeister, 
2003). Furthermore, a number of studies have demonstrated that prior attempts to 
regulate can impact on executive control as indicated by behaviours that relate directly to 
clinical disorders, including overeating (Heatherton et al., 1991; Heatherton et al., 1993), 
alcohol use (Muraven, Collins, & Nienhaus, 2002; Muraven, Collins, Shiffman, & Paty, 
2005), sexual behaviour (Gailliot & Baumeister, 2007) and aggression (DeWall, Baumeister, 
Stillman, & Gailliot, 2007; Stucke & Baumeister, 2006).    
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A theory of limited resources—akin to notions of available strength or energy - has 
been proposed to explain the negative impacts of prior self-control on attempts at 
subsequent controlled responding (Baumeister, Muraven, & Tice, 2000; Muraven & 
Baumeister, 2000). The terms “self-regulatory resources” (Muraven & Baumeister, 2000) or 
“executive resources” (Schmeichel, 2007) are defined as the finite reserves of energy that 
are required  to carry out self-regulatory acts requiring abilities associated with executive 
functioning, such as inhibiting prepotent (i.e., strong habitual) responses.  These executive 
resourcesi are considered a finite internal reserve that is depleted following acts of self-
controlj. Depletion of these resources has sometimes been indicated via participant reports 
of increased mental effort being expended during regulation (Baumeister, Bratslavsky, 
Muraven, & Tice, 1998; Muraven, Tice, & Baumeister, 1998; Schmeichel, 2007; Schmeichel, 
Demaree, Robinson, & Pu, 2006), but primarily in combination with individuals showing 
reduced capacity to demonstrate controlled responding (Hagger et al., 2010; Muraven & 
Baumeister, 2000). Controlling attention, inhibiting behavioural responses, and coping with 
exposure to threats and stressors have all been identified as depleting reserves of 
executive resources (Johns et al., 2008; Muraven & Baumeister, 2000; Schmader & Johns, 
2003).  
                                                          
i
The term executive resources will be used from now onwards due to the acknowledgement 
by Muraven and Baumeister (2000) that executive capacity is what appears to be temporarily 
impacted.    
j
Muraven and Slessareva, (2003) and Vohs, Baumeister and Schmeichel (2012)  suggest that 
resource depletion occurs for two reasons: (1) because participants are unable to muster the 
resources to perform due to exhaustion and fatigue and (2) because participants may be motivated 
to preserve the limited resources they have remaining on a more meaningful or reinforcing task that 
follows the experiment. 
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A physiological explanation has been offered for the executive resource depletion 
observed after acts of self-controlk. Specifically, the brain has a high usage of glucose during 
tasks that are particularly mentally demanding and likely to involve executive 
functioning/control (Benton, Owens, & Parker, 1994; Gailliot et al., 2007; Scholey, Harper, 
& Kennedy, 2001). Following this initial self-control, blood glucose levels remain 
temporarily lower than before undertaking self-control. Consequently, available glucose 
may no longer be sufficient to supply the energetical requirements for effective self-
control, leading to temporary executive control impairments. Gailliot et al. (2007) 
demonstrated that prior self-regulation led to decreased blood glucose levels, and that 
decreased blood glucose levels after the first self-control task predicted reduced 
performance on the second self-control task. Furthermore, Gaillot et al. also demonstrated 
that providing a glucose-rich drink reversed the depleting effects of prior self-control. Thus, 
these findings support the causal role of blood glucose in reduced executive resources. 
Like other acts of self-control in thought and behavioural domains, particular forms 
of affect regulation have also been shown to temporarily impair executive control in the 
form of prepotent response inhibition (Johns et al., 2008; Sheppes & Meiran, 2008) and 
working memory (Schmader et al., 2009; Schmeichel, 2007). Studies demonstrating these 
effects all involved non-clinical student samples who initially engaged in an affect 
regulation strategy (based on experimentally provided regulation instructions), involving 
altering attention, thought or behavioural responses related to affect, followed by a second 
                                                          
k
 Inzlicht and Schmeichel (2012) have proposed a mechanistic account of the self-regulatory 
strength (or depletion) model. This mechanistic account, although intriguing, does not directly relate 
to the concepts tested in this thesis. In addition, has somewhat restricted in explanatory power as 
indicated by the results of Muraven and Slessareva, (2003) and Vohs, Baumeister and Schmeichel 
(2012).   
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task involving self-control in a suggestedl alternative domain (i.e., cognitive/attentional 
and/or behavioural response). Prior affect regulation has been shown to diminish 
performance on tasks measuring global executive control such as reasoning and decision 
making (Schmader et al., 2009; Schmeichel et al., 2003), fluency or set shifting (Schmeichel 
et al., 2006), and restraining impulsive behaviours such as eating unhealthy foods in dieters 
(Heatherton et al., 1993; K. D. Vohs & Heatherton, 2000). Regulating emotions has also 
been shown to reduce physical stamina (e.g., sustained hand grip) and sustained mental 
effort (e.g., on unsolvable anagrams) (Baumeister et al., 1998; Muraven et al., 1998). 
Hence, these studies consistently indicate that affect regulation (akin to other forms of 
regulation) can deplete executive resources and impair subsequent acts of self-control.  
2.3.5. Why Increased Threat Depletes Executive Resources: The 
Spontaneous Initiation of Control Processes  
Like prior acts of self-regulation, the mere presence of threats and stressors has 
been demonstrated to lead to impaired executive control represented in prepotent 
response inhibition (Inzlicht et al., 2006) and working memory (Croizet et al., 2004; 
Schmader & Johns, 2003) tasks. Furthermore, threats have also led to a loss of self-control 
on a wide range or restrained behaviours including dietary restraint and alcohol 
consumption (Heatherton et al., 1991; Muraven et al., 2002; Muraven et al., 2005; Wallis & 
Hetherington, 2004) and aggression (DeWall et al., 2007). Muraven and Baumeister (2000) 
argue that individuals, when exposed to threats and stressors, spontaneously initiate 
monitoring and inhibitory responses such as blocking painful thoughts or feelings from 
                                                          
l
 Although affect regulation could be considered to belong in the response domain of 
emotion,  affect regulation strategies can also be conceptualised as simply controlling attention 
and/or inhibiting and altering behavioural responses, the impacts of such affect regulation strategies  
are consistent with other self-regulatory acts that involve controlling or inhibiting attention to 
distracting stimuli or unwanted thoughts leading to similar impairments on tasks requiring executive 
control (Baumeister et al., 1998; Schmeichel, 2007; Schmeichel et al., 2003). 
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rising to awareness either through self-distraction (Heatherton et al., 1993) or suppression 
(Johns et al., 2008) and this regulation of attention uses executive resources. Thus, even 
though these acts of self-regulation may be initiated spontaneously, their engagement may 
reduce the executive resources available for subsequent acts of self-controlled responding 
in the same way as imposed regulation (Heatherton et al., 1993; Johns et al., 2008; 
Muraven & Baumeister, 2000).  
2.3.6. Executive Resource Depletion and Controlling Attention: The 
Importance of Situational Circumstances  
The previous two sections discussed the impacts of prior self-control on 
subsequent control attempts, and the impacts of increased threat on acts of self-control. 
The extent to which affect regulation depletes executive resources may be influenced by 
the situational circumstances in which that particular affect regulation strategy is engaged. 
Studies investigating distraction have demonstrated that if the strategy is engaged during 
anticipation of a task eliciting unpleasant affect, it depletes executive resources (Alberts, 
Martijn, Nievelstein, Jansen, & De Vries, 2008; Heatherton et al., 1993), however, 
distraction does not deplete resources when it is engaged in simultaneously with engaging 
in the affect-eliciting task (Alberts et al., 2008; Sheppes & Meiran, 2008). Similarly, the 
extent to which the strategy of reappraisal depletes executive resources has been shown to 
depend on the circumstances in which it is engaged. If used prior to the exposure to an 
affect-eliciting stimulus, the strategy preserves executive resources (Johns et al., 2008), but 
if initiated during an affect-inducing task or exposure to an affect-producing stimulus, the 
strategy can deplete executive resources (Sheppes & Meiran, 2008).  
No published studies, to the author’s knowledge, have assessed the impacts of 
acceptance on subsequent executive control. However, studies investigating increased self-
awareness (Heatherton et al., 1993) and meta-cognitive awareness (Schmader et al., 2009) 
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and sensation focus (Alberts et al., 2008), concepts that involve similar attentional foci and 
thought processes, have been demonstrated to influence subsequent executive control. 
Importantly, these studies, when taken together, demonstrate that the situational 
circumstances in which these strategies that increase awareness of thoughts, feelings and 
behaviour and perhaps the experience of affect are undertaken, influence subsequent 
executive control. Heatherton et al. (1993) showed that, in high-threat circumstances, 
increased self-awareness preserved capacity to demonstrate self-control on a dietary 
restraint task relative to conditions that reduced self-awareness. In addition, Schmader 
(2009) showed that participants who were part of a minority group, when in stereotype 
threat situations, demonstrate superior executive control when bringing attention to and 
altering their interpretation of their affective responses compared to other minority group 
participants who did not. In contrast, Alberts et al., (2008) showed that concurrent 
engagement in a painful task whilst focusing attention on muscular sensations resulted in 
poorer persistence on this painful task than concurrent distraction, but no difference from 
a prior distraction condition.  Hence, these studies support the suggestion that the impacts 
of acceptance may have different impacts on executive control depending upon the 
situation in which it is engaged.       
Why affect regulation strategies may deplete executive resources in some 
circumstances and preserve them in others may relate to the difference in reflexive 
attentional and/or interpretive responses occurring in these different circumstances. When 
anxious, individuals show attention towards threatening stimuli, proportional to their 
threat value (Bar-Haim et al., 2007). Hence, strategies (spontaneously initiated or 
experimentally manipulated) that seek to inhibit these reflexive attentional responses have 
been suggested to require significant levels of controlled processes and online attentional 
resources (Cornwell et al., 2011; Knight et al., 2007; Mather & Knight, 2005) and, therefore, 
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are more likely to deplete executive resources. However, if stimuli are not of high-threat 
value or not present to elicit reflexive attentional engagement, and are thus easier to 
ignore (MacLeod et al., 1986; Wilson & MacLeod, 2003), the level of inhibition required to 
prevent attention to them would be minimal. Similarly, if an individual is familiar with a 
particular stimulus and is comfortable with the affect it elicits, there is limited sustained 
attentional engagement with it. Therefore, it may be effortful to attend to this familiar 
stimulus, depleting executive resources in the same way that merely controlling attention 
would (Schmeichel, 2007; Schmeichel et al., 2003), in comparison to letting attention drift. 
Hence, it is possible that the reason affect regulation has different impacts on subsequent 
executive control in different situations relates to the extent to which the regulation 
strategy must inhibit reflexive or over-learned responses elicited by that particular 
situation.    
2.3.7. Effects of Anxious Affect on Executive Control   
 Self-regulatory strength theory recognises that some situations that involve self-
control, or indeed the act of engaging in self-control, coincide with increased affect. 
However, self-regulatory strength theory specifically states that it is the resource depleting 
nature of the previous self-control attempts, not the increased affective state, which 
causes impaired executive control. However, other studies have suggested increased 
anxious affect, rather than attempts to regulate, leads to impairments in executive control 
(Derakshan, Smyth, & Eysenck, 2009; Eysenck, 1985; Lavric, Rippon, & Gray, 2003; MacLeod 
& Donnellan, 1993; Shackman et al., 2006; Sorg & Whitney, 1992; Tohill & Holyoak, 2000).  
Theories suggesting how negative affect can impair executive control are prolific. 
Easterbrook (1959) suggested that increased arousal narrows attentional focus and, 
therefore, task-relevant stimuli that may be peripheral fall outside this focus, thus 
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diminishing performance. Hasher and Zacks (1979) suggested that affect temporarily 
diminishes attentional capacity and, therefore, reduces the ability to retain task-relevant 
stimuli in memory.  Alternatively, Lavric and colleagues (Lavric et al., 2003; Shackman et al., 
2006) have suggested that both anxious affect and  processes involved in spatial working 
memory may be lateralised to the right hemisphere, with increased affect-disrupting 
circuitry involved in controlling attention, retaining and reorganising spatially represented 
stimuli, and thus specifically impairing spatial working memory (Lavric et al., 2003; 
Shackman et al., 2006). In contrast to Lavric and Colleagues,  Eysenck and Calvo’s (1992b) 
Processing Efficiency Theory (PET) proposes that anxiety leads to worrisome task-irrelevant 
cognitions, which are retained within the phonological loop, incidentally restricting capacity 
for task-relevant stimuli and disrupting verbal, rather than spatial, working memory 
performance. Eysenck and Calvo (1992) further predicted that accuracy would only be 
disrupted at high-load levels when anxious individuals exceeded their ability to compensate 
for their reduced capacity by increasing effort. This increased effort was argued to be 
evident in increased physiological responding and increased reaction times (RT) on correct 
working memory trials.  
In the face of data contradicting the hypothesis of anxiety only specifically 
impairing verbal working memory or spatial working memory, and with impairments found 
on tasks involving mainly the central executive (Eysenck, Payne, & Derakshan, 2005),  
Eysenck et al. (2007) suggested an alternative explanation for the impairments noted to 
executive control - Attentional Control Theory (ACT). This theory postulates that anxiety 
impacts on the ability to control attention (i.e., inhibit or shift attention) rather than 
directly on working memory. This argument regarding attentional control is based on the 
arguments presented by Engle and colleagues (Engle, 2002; Kane, Bleckley, Conway, & 
Engle, 2001) suggesting that working memory performance can be explained by 
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combinations of inhibiting and shifting attention. Eysenck et al. (2007) suggest that when 
anxious, top-down processes are impaired as anxiety prepares the individual for more 
bottom-up processing, and situational stimuli capture attention and facilitate survival 
responses to threat-related stimuli. Hence, the top-down processes of attentional 
inhibition and switching are impaired and any performance decrements noted in working 
memory were due to the associated impairment in attentional control.  
Attentional Control Theory, as proposed by Eysenck et al. (2007) seems to account 
best for the impacts noted on both spatial (Lavric et al., 2003; Shackman et al., 2006) and 
verbal working memory tasks (Eysenck, 1985; MacLeod & Donnellan, 1993; Sorg & 
Whitney, 1992), and also explains how anxiety impacts on attentional inhibition (Inzlicht et 
al., 2006) and switching tasks (Derakshan et al., 2009).  Eysenck et al. (2007) attribute the 
impairment of attention control, when anxious, to reflexive attentional biases towards 
threat-based information (Bar-Haim et al., 2007), citing neurological evidence of increased 
anxiety linked to amygdala activation and the inhibition in the prefrontal cortex, the 
neuroantomical region suggested to support the control of attention and executive 
functioning (Davidson, 2002; LeDoux, 2002; Perez-Jaranay & Vives, 1991; Quirk, Likhtik, 
Pelletier, & Pare, 2003). Section 2.3.8 discusses the interaction between the amygdala and 
prefrontal activation and executive control.  
2.3.8. Neurovisceral Explanations of the Relationship Between Prior Self-
control, Affect and Executive Functioning: The Central Autonomic Network  
Both the self-regulatory strength and affective explanations of temporary 
impairments in executive control have been linked with neurological theory relating to 
prefrontal cortex activation. One neurophysiological theory, which overlaps with 
components of self-regulatory strength theory, ACT and PET is Thayer and colleagues’ 
neurovisceral account (Thayer et al., 2009; Thayer & Lane, 2000). This theory links cardiac 
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output and executive control to the interplay between the amygdala and the prefrontal 
cortex. The neurovisceral account makes reference to a network of neuroanatomical 
structures, the central autonomic network (CAN; see Figure 2.5), and provides wide ranging 
implications for why increased affect or dysregulated affect coincides with impaired 
executive control. The pivotal and distinguishing feature of Thayer’s neurovisceral account 
is the role of tonic vagal inhibition of arousal, which influences the activity of the CAN to 
impact on attentional control, which in turn impacts on the regulation of emotion, thought, 
and action.   
To make the connection between tonic vagal inhibition of arousal and attentional 
controlm, Thayer’s neurovisceral account draws on evidence that the prefrontal cortex 
(including the many subdivisions within it) supports the ability to control attention, 
regulate behaviour and thought processes required to adapt to one’s environment 
(Asplund, Todd, Snyder, & Marois, 2010; Dove, Pollmann, Schubert, Wiggins, & von 
Cramon, 2000; Kane & Engle, 2002; Miyake et al., 2000). Particular subdivisions within the 
prefrontal cortex are related to particular self-regulated actions. These include the 
dorsolateral prefrontal cortex in working memory and attentional control and the medial 
and lateral prefrontal cortex in regulating emotions (Braver, Cohen, Nystrom, Jonides, & 
Smith, 1997; Lane et al., 2009; Ochsner, Bunge, Gross, & Gabrieli, 2002). Other cortical 
structures, apart from the prefrontal cortex, including the anterior cingulate cortex, the 
orbito-frontal cortex and the insula have been suggested to be involved in regulated 
responding (Braver et al., 1997; Etkin, Egner, Peraza, Kandel, & Hirsch, 2006; Lane et al., 
                                                          
m
 Thayer and colleagues claim that vagal tone both reflects and influences prefrontal 
activation. The reason for specification of vagally mediated suppression of HR is related  to 
arguments presented by Porges (2001, 2007) regarding the evolutionary qualities of the vagus nerve 
and how it promotes flexible and rapid regulation to changing environmental demands relative to 
the slower parasympathetic or sympathetic responses (Porges, 2001; Thayer & Lane, 2000). 
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2009; Ochsner et al., 2002). Many anatomical regions that support regulated responding 
work in parallel (Goldman-Rakic, 1996), however most forms of regulated functioning 
remain highly correlated with prefrontal cortex activity (Braver et al., 1997) and, therefore, 
this region is recognised as perhaps the most important part of the brain for regulated 
responding in the behavioural, cognitive and affective domains (Goldman-Rakic, 1996; 
Shallice & Burgess, 1993; Shallice et al., 1989; Thayer et al., 2009; Thayer & Lane, 2000). 
Thayer’s neurovisceral account is consistent with this assertion.   
Thayer’s neurovisceral account is a theory of regulation that draws on findings 
about the interaction between the medial prefrontal cortex and the amygdala (associated 
with the experience of fear and anxiety). The medial prefrontal cortex is linked to the 
amygdala via neural tracts that are mutually inhibitory (Amat, Baratta, Bland, Watkins, & 
Maier, 2005; Davidson, 2002; Drevets et al., 1997; Simpson, Drevets, Snyder, Gusnard, & 
Raichle, 2001). Hence, efferent tracts from the medial prefrontal cortex transmit inhibitory 
signals to the amygdala during activation of the medial prefrontal cortex (Amat et al., 2005; 
Davidson, 2002; Drevets et al., 1997; Simpson et al., 2001) and activation in the amygdala 
inhibits activation in the medial prefrontal cortex (LeDoux, 1995; Perez-Jaranay & Vives, 
1991; Simpson et al., 2001). Therefore, fearful affect, associated with amygdala activation, 
results in inhibition of prefrontal activity, associated with controlled responding in 
affective, cognitive and behavioural domains. Conversely, inhibition in the medial 
prefrontal cortex leads to increased and prolonged emotional stress (Davidson, 2002; 
Simpson et al., 2001).  
Thayer and colleagues suggest that the interaction between the amygdala and the 
prefrontal cortex both influences and is influenced by the output of peripheral end-organs, 
particularly the heart. Thayer and colleagues make this connection between the prefrontal 
cortex and heart via the neural network of the CAN. This network includes such structures 
83 
 
as the prefrontal cortex, cingulate cortex, the insula, orbitofrontal cortex, amygdala, the 
paraventricular nucleus and lateral hypothalamus the periaqueductal gray and cells in the 
brain stem, such as nucleus of the solitary tract, motor nucleus of the vagus nerve and 
sympathetic neurons of the intermediolateral column. It is these final brain stem structures 
that have a direct influence on fluctuations in HR, whilst the cortical structures are 
suggested to have an indirect influence. However, these brain stem structures and 
thalamus are also suggested to relay information back to the prefrontal cortex, influencing 
prefrontal cortex activity.  Hence, a key aspect of the neurovisceral account is that signals 
are suggested to flow bi-directionally throughout the CAN so that both top-down 
influences of the cortical structures on the peripheral end-organs and bottom-up influences 
of the peripheral end-organs on cortical activity are explained, a notion supported by 
others (Brodal, 2010; Clark, Boutros, & Mendez, 2005). 
Given that both top-down and bottom-up processes influence activity on particular 
structures within the network, two possible scenarios could explain why individuals may 
show impaired executive control. First, Thayer and colleagues suggests that cortical 
(particularly prefrontal) activity “tonically inhibits cardioacceleratory circuits” (Thayer et al., 
2009 pp. 144). Thus, if individuals attend to internal or external stimuli, this activates the 
amygdala, leading simultaneously to inhibition of the prefrontal cortex resulting in 
impaired responding in affective, cognitive and behavioural domains and the deactivation 
of the parasympathetic nervous system, leading to reduced vagal tone over HR (i.e., a top-
down influence). The second scenario is that vagally mediated output from the heart is fed-
back through the sub-cortical structures to the prefrontal cortex (i.e., the circuit’s origins) 
and this feedback influences activation of the prefrontal cortex (i.e., a bottom-up 
influence). The increased tonic inhibition of HR should sustain increased activation within 
the prefrontal cortex, inhibit amygdala activation and allow regulated responding in 
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cognitive and behavioural domains. In contrast, increased output from the heart, resulting 
from decreased vagal tone over HR, is proposed to eventuate in a decreased activation in 
the prefrontal cortex, thus impairing executive control. 
In summary of Thayer’s neurovisceral account and proposed interaction arising 
from the CAN, the changes in beat-to-beat fluctuations in the output from heart that are 
vagally mediated are suggested to be indicative of the interactions between the prefrontal 
cortex and the amygdale, with decreased vagal tone associated with decreased prefrontal 
activity and increased amygdale activity. From a top-down perspective, activation in the 
amygdala due to a threat would inhibit the medial prefrontal cortex, resulting in vagal 
disinhibition of HR (i.e., reduced HRV and increased HR) and impaired regulated responding 
in cognitive and behavioural domains. From a bottom-up perspective, when vagal inhibition 
of HR is low, this reduced vagal tone is fed back through the CAN to bring about a decrease 
in activity within the prefrontal cortex and impair regulated responding in cognitive and 
behavioural domains. 
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Figure 2.5. A Schematic Diagram of the Central Autonomic Network. Adapted from “Claude 
Bernard and the heart-brain connection: Further elaboration of a model of neurovisceral 
integration” by Thayer et al., 2009, Neuroscience and Biobehavioral Reviews, 33, p. 143. 
Copyright 2009 by Elsevier.   
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2.3.9. Evidence Supporting Thayer’s Neurovisceral Account 
 The suggestion that increased vagal tone over HR (i.e., increased HRV) is associated 
with superior regulated responding in the domains of thought and behaviour has received 
support from many different research designs using behavioural measures.  Neuro-imaging 
evidence has also supported the notion that HRV may be a marker for regulated 
responding derived from the frontal neuroanatomical structures, particularly the prefrontal 
cortex (Lane et al., 2009).  Indices of vagally mediated central parasympathetic activity, 
including the .15-.5Hz or high frequency (HF) band and RMSSD, have been associated with 
superior regulated responding across cognitive, behavioural and affective domains (Croizet 
et al., 2004; Demaree, Pu, Robinson, Schmeichel, & Everhart, 2006; Demaree, Robinson, 
Everhart, & Schmeichel, 2004; Hansen, Helge, & Thayer, 2003; Hansen, Johnsen, Sollers, 
Stenvik, & Thayer, 2004; Hansen, Johnsen, & Thayer, 2009; S. C. Segerstrom & Solberg Nes, 
2007).  
Croizet et al. (2004) showed that decreased power within the HF band of HRV or a 
lower RMSSD score during the performance of an executive task accompanies impaired 
executive control relative to those with increased HF-HRV or RMSSD. Furthermore, 
individuals with increased resting HRV (RMSSD or HF) have demonstrated superior 
executive control under normal testing situations (Hansen et al., 2003) and under the 
threat of electric shock (Hansen, Johnsen, & Thayer, 2009), relative to those with lower 
HRV at resting baseline. This result has been replicated in a mental persistence task (solving 
anagrams) with increased HRV associated with more persistence (S. C. Segerstrom & 
Solberg Nes, 2007). Demaree et al. (2004) showed that increased HRV at rest was 
associated with a better ability to modulate behavioural expressions of affect when 
individuals were instructed to exaggerate emotional responses. Furthermore, Demaree and 
colleagues (2006) showed that when asked to watch an affect-inducing video, those with 
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greater resting HRV displayed less facial expression of negative emotion when exposed to 
negative content in comparison to those with lower HRV. Moreover, it has been 
demonstrated that those who increase their resting vagally mediated HRV by undertaking 
an aerobic exercise program show improvements in executive control whilst those who do 
not improve their resting vagally mediated HRV do not show improvements in executive 
control (Albinet, Boucard, Bouquet, & Audiffren, 2010; Hansen et al., 2004).  
Converging with the behavioural evidence, neuro-imaging evidence from a study by 
Lane, McRae, Reiman, Chen, Ahern and Thayer (2009) showed support for the proposed 
association between medial prefrontal cortical activity and vagally mediated fluctuations in 
HR. Using the simultaneous measurement of HR (with an electrocardiogram) and cerebral 
blood flow (with positron emission tomography), neutral, positive and negative affective 
states were induced in participants. Participants were encouraged to maintain a particular 
affective state (which arguably demands affect regulation). Under emotion-provoking 
conditions, HF-HRV was positively correlated with increased activity in medial prefrontal 
cortex, dorsolateral prefrontal cortex, anterior cingulate cortex, the left insula, thalamus, 
the periaqueductal gray, and the caudate nucleus. The fact that participants were 
encouraged to maintain a particular affective state explains why such neuroanatomical 
structures usually involved in controlling attention and maintaining representations in 
memory, such as the dorsolateral prefrontal cortex, were activated (Braver et al., 1997; 
Lane et al., 2009; Ochsner et al., 2002). A similar study was undertaken by Gianaros, van 
der Veen, and Jennings (2004), showing a similar positive associations between HRV and 
activation of the same neuroanatomical structures when participants were undertaking 
difficult working memory tasks. Hence, the results of Lane et al. (2009) and Gianaros et al. 
(2004), when taken together, suggest that the same neuroanatomical structures are active 
when attempting to regulate affect (in this case specifically prolonging affect) as when 
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undertaking an executive function task involving updating and maintaining mental 
representations.  
Shapiro et al., (2000), showed additional evidence for the relationship between 
HRV and activation of the prefrontal cortex . This study showed that among individuals who 
perceived stimuli as threatening when under mental stress, increased HR and decreased 
HRV coincided with reduced blood flow within the prefrontal cortex to a greater extent 
than among those who perceived stimuli as less threatening. Hence, like the previous 
studies, vagally mediated reductions in HRV were associated with reduced blood flow in 
the prefrontal cortex.  Thus, neuro-imaging studies, using several different manipulations, 
have shown the relationship between medial prefrontal activity and tonic vagally mediated 
HRV. 
Activation (indicated by increased blood flow) in the dorsolateral and ventromedial 
prefrontal cortex, according to previous research, should support superior performance on 
working memory and attentional control tasks (Braver et al., 1997; Lane et al., 2009; 
Ochsner et al., 2002). Hence, these neuroimaging studies, when taken together with 
behavioural studies, provide evidence to suggest that the link between increased vagally 
mediated HRV and the superior regulated responding in central executive tasks, and in 
emotional regulation, is due to overlapping influences that the prefrontal cortex has on all 
forms of regulated responding.   
2.3.10. Attentional Focus, Distraction and Acceptance, and the Impact on 
the CAN: Predictions from the Neurovisceral Account 
 Based on the two scenarios via which the connection between vagally mediated 
fluctuations in HR and executive control may occur, predictions can be made regarding how 
the focus of attention to different stimuli and the level of situational threat will influence 
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vagal tone and, therefore, executive control. The impact on the CAN when attempting to 
direct attention away from threat-related stimuli and affect via distraction could vary 
depending on how effectively attention was diverted from threat-stimuli. If attention is 
successfully diverted from threatening information, this would inhibit amygdala activation 
and sustain prefrontal activation, preserving capacity to demonstrate executive control and 
increased HRV. However, if distraction does not successfully limit attention to threat then 
the opposite would be predicted (i.e., impaired executive control and decreased HRV). 
Although acceptance increases attention to threat-related information, it has been 
demonstrated to reduce HR (Hofmann et al., 2009; Low et al., 2008), which is more 
proximally related to the CAN and thus more relevant to predictions derived from the 
neurovisceral account.  If this reduction in HR represents tonic vagal inhibition then this 
increased vagal tone would be expected to be fed back through the network to support 
increased activation in the prefrontal cortex and inhibition of amygdala activation, leading 
to superior executive control.    
2.3.11. Comparing Predictions of the Self-Regulatory, Affective and 
Neurovisceral Accounts Regarding Executive Control 
 From the previous sections presenting the self-regulatory, affective, and 
neurovisceral accounts, it can be seen that there are both consistencies and inconsistencies 
among the theories’ predictions for what situations are likely to influence executive 
control. For a summary of the different predictions of each of the accounts see Table 2.2. 
First, the different theoretical accounts are consistent in their predictions that 
increased threat will impair executive control relative to lower threat. However, each 
account has a different reason to offer for why these performance decrements may occur.  
For the self-regulatory strength explanation, the effect of threat is attributable to 
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spontaneously initiated inhibitory regulatory attempts. For the affective theory of ACT and 
the neurovisceral account, the effect is attributed to increased amygdala activation, 
resulting in increased affect and dysregulated responding. 
Second, each theoretical account provides different explanations for differences in 
executive control amongst individuals using alternative affect regulation strategies. Each 
theoretical account requires certain preconditions to be met in order for to provide a valid 
explanation of differences noted in executive control. The self-regulatory strength theory 
requires that individuals engaging in the different regulatory strategies will differ in their 
perceived investment of mental resources during affect regulation - conditions showing 
impaired executive control will report greater investment of mental resources during 
regulation. In contrast, PET or ACT require that individuals undertaking different regulatory 
strategies should differ in their levels of anxious affect in the period prior to and during 
executive task performance, with greater affect associated with poorer performance. The 
neurovisceral account of impaired executive control requires differences amongst the 
regulatory conditions in vagal tone, either during task performance or immediately before 
undertaking the executive task.  In addition, the neurovisceral account requires that the 
regulation strategies or threat circumstances resulting in poorer executive control should 
also coincide with reduced vagal tone. 
 For the self-regulatory strength theory to be a valid explanation of the differences 
in executive control, differences in executive control after regulation must still exist when 
affective variables, measured during and immediately preceding the executive task, are 
controlled. For the affective theories of PET or ACT to explain impairments in executive 
control after regulation, controlling for affect should eliminate differences in executive 
control between regulatory strategies or threat circumstances.  Lastly, for the neurovisceral 
account to explain impairment in executive control, controlling for vagal tone should 
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eliminate differences in executive control amongst threat circumstances or regulation 
strategies.  
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Table 2.2.  
Predictions from Self-regulatory Strength, ACT and PET, Neurovisceral Account on The 
Impact of Threat, Prior Regulation, Affect, and HRV on Executive Control.  
 Theoretical Predictions 
Effect on Executive 
Control 
Self-regulatory 
Strength Predictions 
ACT and PET 
predictions 
Neurovisceral 
Predictions 
Decrease when under 
threat  
Yes Yes Yes 
Decrease following 
prior regulation 
Yes Only if regulation 
leads to differences 
in affect 
Only if 
regulation 
leads to 
differences in 
HRV 
Negative correlation 
with mental exertion 
during regulation  
Yes No Prediction No Prediction 
Negative correlation 
with concurrent affect  
No Yes Yes 
Controlling for affect 
reduces effects of 
threat and prior 
regulation 
No Yes No 
Negative correlation 
with concurrent HR 
No Yes Yes 
Controlling for HR 
reduces effects of 
threat and prior 
regulation 
No Yes Yes 
Positive correlation 
with concurrent HRV 
No Yes Yes 
Controlling for HRV 
reduces effects of 
threat and prior 
regulation 
No Yes Yes 
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2.4. Summary of Literature Review 
 This literature review has introduced many concepts relating to affect regulation. 
The starting point for the literature review was a definition of affect, its causes and 
methods by which affect can be measured. The focus was particularly on anxious affect and 
how it is distinguishable from other forms of negative affect, due to its unique combination 
of high arousal and of negative valence experienced in the presence of an anticipated 
threat or stressor. Anxiety it was identified as a complex emotional reaction associated 
with subjective feelings, behavioural motivation, and physiological responding that ideally 
should be assessed through multimodal measurement of both subjective and objective 
indicators. Following this review of anxious affect, theories relating to affect causation 
were discussed and contrasted. This discussion focused on the necessary factors (common 
to all models of affect causation), including external (threats and/or stressors) and internal 
(attention and appraisal) factors necessary for the elicitation of anxious affect to arise.   
Following the discussion of affect, the concept of affect regulation was reviewed, 
primarily with regards to regulatory attempts that alter attention and thought (i.e., 
cognitive affect regulation) to change affect. The possible mechanisms by which particular 
cognitive affect regulation strategies may influence the experience of anxious affect were 
discussed via Gross and Thompson’s modal model and Greenberg and Paivio’s process of a 
feeling model, and their competing predictions regarding different foci of attention, 
thought content and processes  in leading to reductions in affective responses. The two 
cognitive regulation strategies of distraction and acceptance were discussed in relation to 
how the strategies should influence attentional focus, thought content and processes, and 
how this related to strategy conceptualisation within each of these models. It was 
suggested that distraction provided a good test of the modal model’s predictions, and 
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acceptance a test of the process of a feeling model’s predictions regarding attaining 
reductions in affect. Maladaptive strategies were also conceptualised within each of the 
affect regulation models. A separate, but not incompatible, alternative pathway for affect 
regulation was presented centring on the argument that the adaptive strategies of 
distraction and acceptance may limit attentional capacity to engage in maladaptive 
strategies, and thus reduce affect. The evidence for the theories and strategies were 
evaluated and several factors were identified that may influence how effective particular 
strategies are. These factors included: the threat circumstances in which regulation is 
undertaken, when the strategy is engaged in relation to the anticipation, presence or 
removal of an affect eliciting stimulus, for how long the strategy is used, if the strategies’ 
subsequent impacts are evaluated and what affective variables are used to evaluate its 
effectiveness. It was suggested that some affect regulation strategies may show utility in 
reducing affect in some situations and circumstances but may be ineffective or 
counterproductive in others.   
The last major concept that this literature review discussed was the concept of 
executive control and the importance of this concept to optimal functioning across many 
domains in situations that may require affect regulation. It was established that both prior 
acts of self-control (including affect regulation) and increased threat have led to temporary 
impairments in executive control. The literature review presented arguments for why 
particular regulation and threat circumstances may result in impaired executive control. 
Theories considered vital included the impact of affect regulation strategies on executive 
control via reductions in the internal reservoir of resources required for acts of executive 
control (i.e., self-regulatory strength theory). Alternatively, the possibility that regulation 
strategies may have an indirect influence on executive control through variations to how 
the strategies influenced anxious affect (i.e., PET and ACT) and vagal tone (i.e., the 
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neurovisceral account) was also considered. The competing predictions for each theory 
were set out with the evidence that would be required for these theories to provide 
explanations for impaired executive control.  It was suggested that affect regulation 
strategies may show utility in preserving executive control in some circumstances but may 
be counterproductive in others and this may be relevant to distraction and acceptance.  
In summary, the present literature review showed that the evaluation of the utility 
of affect regulation strategies is a complicated domain of research. Particularly, it was 
argued that there are many factors to consider when evaluating the utility of strategy, 
regarding both in reducing affect and preserving executive control. Although it was 
recognised that a strategy that leads to increased affect may result in impaired executive 
control, the possibility that increased affect may also co-occur with preserved capacity to 
demonstrate executive control remains. Hence, the above literature review provided 
detailed analysis of the key factors worthy of consideration in investigating affect 
regulation, and suggested that no one affect regulation strategy may be suitable for all 
circumstances and objectives.   
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Chapter 3: The Present Research  
Three major research questions were identified as the focus of this thesis, and 
were discussed in relation to the relevant theory and previous research within chapter 2. 
The first research question concerned how the regulatory strategies of distraction and 
acceptance alter the affective experience.  Two possible pathways exist: the strategies may 
alter attentional focus and/or they may reduce the level of engagement in maladaptive 
regulatory processes. Despite many previous studies investigating the impacts of 
distraction and acceptance on affect no studies, to the author’s knowledge, have measured 
the extent to which these strategies alter attentional focus in anticipated threat 
circumstances or reduce maladaptive regulatory attempts. Thus, answering this question 
may provide answers to why and when the strategies are likely to be most effective.  
The second research question builds upon the first question, centring on how 
effective the strategies of distraction and acceptance are in reducing anxious affect. The 
strategies’ effectiveness in reducing anxious affect can be assessed in the anticipation of, 
engagement in, and recovery from socially evaluative tasks of high and low ego-threat. An 
extensive literature search did not find a study that directly compared distraction and 
acceptance’s influence on affect during the anticipation of high- and low-threat-tasks, or 
that compare their influences on affective reactivity to and recovery from threat-tasks. 
Answering this question in combination with the first will provide unique test of affect 
regulation theory and will further understanding on the effectiveness and limitations of the 
strategies.  
The third question concerns the subsequent impacts distraction and acceptance 
may have on executive control. No studies could be identified that have evaluated the 
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impacts of engaging in acceptance on subsequent executive control. In addition, no studies 
could be identified that rule out physiological measures of affect explaining the impacts 
distraction on executive control. It may be that the regulatory strategies, as acts requiring 
control of attention, deplete an internal reservoir of resources required for acts of 
executive control, thus impairing performance in subsequent tasks requiring executive 
control. If affect regulation does impair executive control, it may also be that the effort 
demanded by the strategy varies according to level of ego-threat, rather than particular 
strategies imposing consistent demands across situations.  Alternatively, if executive 
control is impaired, it may be increased residual affect and/or reduced vagal tone, rather 
than a depletion of internal resources that causes these impairments. Answering these 
questions will aid understanding of when to use particular strategies to sustain optimal 
functioning and the mechanisms by which regulation may preserve executive control.  
Each of the empirical chapters (chapters 5, 6 and 7) involve the testing of 
competing plausible answers to the research questions presented in literature review. To 
answer the research questions, a single, large experimental study that manipulates both 
threat circumstance and regulation strategy is used. A mind-wandering control comparison 
condition is utilised in order to test the impacts of distraction and acceptance that involve 
controlling and altering attentional focus. The strategies are evaluated both during active 
engagement in circumstances of anticipated threat. The subsequent impacts of the affect 
regulation strategies are also evaluated  regarding  affective reactivity during engagement 
in a threat-task and  affective recovery following the threat-tasks. Executive control is 
assessed directly after engaging in regulation but prior to the threat-task. Participant 
attentional focus, engagement in maladaptive regulatory attempts, and understanding of 
regulatory instructions are assessed subsequent to all experimental manipulations and 
phases. Each chapter draws on relevant data from the one large experimental study.  
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3.1. Hypotheses Tested in Chapter 5  
Chapter 5 tests three hypotheses relating to the question of how the strategies of 
distraction and acceptance may influence affect. The first hypothesis concerns the different 
attentional focus of distraction and acceptance, distraction predicted to divert attention 
from threat-related information and affect (Morrow & Nolen-Hoeksema, 1990; Nolen-
Hoeksema, 1991; Van Dillen & Koole, 2007), and acceptance predicted to direct attention 
towards threat-related information and affect (Cardaciotto et al., 2008; Orsillo & Roemer, 
2005). Hence, this first hypothesis predicts that individuals engaging in distraction will 
report less attentional allocation to threatening information and to affect relative to 
acceptance and to control conditions (i.e., an effective distraction hypothesis).  
The second and alternative hypothesis to the first relates to the effect of threat 
level on attentional focus within the strategies. There is an automatic response tendency 
for higher level threats to draw attention when individuals are experiencing anxious affect 
(Bar-Haim et al., 2007). The sustained presence of such threats have been proposed to lead 
to spontaneous attempts at self-distraction (Carver & Scheier, 1988; Duval & Wicklund, 
1972), or attentional diversion (Derryberry & Reed, 2002; Koster et al., 2006; Koster, 
Verscheuer, Crombez, & Van Damme, 2005). Imposing an attentional load on individuals 
during such a time when individuals are spontaneously seeking to alter their feelings and 
thoughts in a situation may have paradoxical effects, leading to an increase in the very 
experience sought to be reduced (Knight et al., 2007; Mather & Knight, 2005; Wegner et al., 
1993). Hence, it is hypothesised that the ability to effectively engage in distraction may be 
impaired in high-threat circumstances, and individuals engaging in tasks facilitating the use 
of distraction should report more attention to threatening information than individuals in 
the mind-wandering condition that does not involve an attentional load task (i.e., a 
disruptive distraction hypothesis).  
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The third hypothesis tested in chapter 5, relating to how the strategies alter affect, 
is based on two premises. The first premise is that maladaptive regulatory attempts are 
spontaneously initiated in response to threats (Lazarus & Folkman, 1984). The second is 
that engaging in an adaptive strategy restricts the attentional capacity to undertake a 
maladaptive regulatory attempt (Hofmann & Asmundson, 2008; Van Dillen & Koole, 2007). 
Hence, the third hypothesis is that individuals engaging in either distraction or acceptance 
will report lower levels of engagement in maladaptive regulatory attempts than individuals 
in the control group.  
3.2. Hypotheses Tested in Chapter 6 
Chapter 6 tests several hypotheses drawn from the modal model and the process 
of a feeling model concerning the effectiveness of distraction and acceptance in reducing 
anxious affect. The literature review identified that both the situation and the time period 
under which distraction and acceptance were evaluated could influence how effective a 
strategy is at reducing affect. Hence, the second research question has three parts: (1) How 
effective are distraction and acceptance at reducing anxious affect during anticipation of a 
threat when the strategies are being actively engaged in? (2) Under what level of threat 
circumstances will the strategies be effective? (3) What subsequent impacts will engaging 
in distraction and acceptance have on affective reactivity and repair, when encountering 
and recovering from the threats? 
As suggested in chapter 2, distraction and acceptance are likely to differ in the 
impacts they have on anxious affect during their engagement. Firstly, it may take time for 
an individual to effectively consume themselves in a distracting task and, therefore, based 
on the predictions of the modal model, it is hypothesised that distraction would result in 
reduced affect, during its engagement, after a period of 10 minutes, relative to acceptance 
and control conditions (i.e., effective distraction hypothesis). In contrast, based on the 
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predictions of the process of a feeling model, engaging in distraction may disrupt the 
sequence of steps for affect to reach completion and therefore is predicted to lead to 
increased affect relative to acceptance and control conditions (i.e., disruptive distraction 
hypothesis). In contrast to distraction, the process of a feeling model predicts that 
acceptance will lead to an initial increase in affect as the individual attends to their 
experience, but that this allows for integration threat-related thoughts and affect with 
reasoning (Greenberg, 2004) resulting in a decline in affect after 10 minutes (i.e., the 
effective acceptance hypothesis). 
In chapter 2 it was also recognised that the impacts that distraction and acceptance 
have on affect may be influenced by the threat/affective circumstances they are engaged 
in. This recognition produces competing hypotheses to those predicting uniform impacts of 
distraction and acceptance across different situations. Regarding distraction, directing 
attention away from threat-stimuli is likely to be difficult and ineffective, particularly in 
high-threat circumstances (Carver & Scheier, 1988; MacLeod et al., 1986; Wilson & 
MacLeod, 2003) when already experiencing increased affect (Bar-Haim et al., 2007), but be 
effective in low-threat circumstances where re-directing attention away from threats is not 
difficult. Thus, distraction is hypothesised to be less effective in high-threat circumstances, 
but more effective in low-threat circumstances relative to mind-wandering (i.e., susceptible 
distraction hypothesis). In contrast, acceptance (which is likely to increase self-awareness), 
may be a strategy that requires high levels of affect to be experienced for it to demonstrate 
beneficial effects in reducing anxious affect, as it involves the process of integrating 
affective sensory information with reason (Greenberg, 2004). If only limited affect exists, 
the integration process may not be initiated appropriately and the increased attention to 
threats and to the self is likely to increase affect during threat anticipation (Gross & 
Thompson, 2007; Wicklund, 1975). Hence, acceptance is hypothesised only to reduce 
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anxious affect in high-threat circumstances, relative to distraction and the mind-wandering 
control condition, but to lead to increase affect in low-threat circumstances relative to 
distraction and the mind-wandering control condition (i.e., susceptible acceptance 
hypothesis).  
In chapter 2 distraction and acceptance were also suggested to differ in their 
effects on affective reactivity and recovery from threat-tasks. Once engagement in 
distraction strategy has ceased, as the individual has not had the opportunity to mentally 
prepare or reappraise the threat (Houston & Holmes, 1974) it is hypothesised that 
distraction will lead to increased reactivity and slower recovery from engagement in a 
threat-task relative to the control condition. In contrast, once engaging in acceptance has 
ceased, if affect has been integrated, acceptance is hypothesised to limited affective 
reactivity and quicker affective repair when encountering the anticipated threats relative to 
distraction and control conditions.  
3.3. Hypotheses Tested in Chapter 7 
Chapter 7 investigates the impacts the regulation strategies, undertaken in 
different threat circumstances, have on subsequent executive control and compares some 
alternative explanations for these effects. The first plausible pathway tested is that 
temporary impairments in executive control are related to the concept of a limited reserve 
of energy (i.e., executive resources) that facilitates individuals demonstrating executive 
control. It is predicted that different regulation strategies may have different impacts on 
these executive resources and thus subsequent executive control. Specifically, distraction, 
due to the load it imposes on attention and the requirement to inhibit the tendency for 
attention to be drawn to threat-stimuli in high-threat circumstances when participants are 
anxious (Bar-Haim et al., 2007; MacLeod et al., 1986; Wilson & MacLeod, 2003), and to 
disallow attention to wander in low-threat circumstances (Muraven & Baumeister, 2000) is 
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predicted to be mentally effortful. Therefore, distraction is hypothesised to deplete 
executive resources irrespective of threat level (i.e., disruptive distraction hypothesis) 
relative to conditions that do not involve inhibiting reflexive responding (i.e., mind-
wandering in low-threat circumstances).  
In contrast to distraction, in chapter 2 it was suggested that acceptance’s impact on 
executive resources would differ depending upon the threat level in which it is undertaken. 
At a high-threat level, where participants would experience increased anxiety, attention 
will reflexively engage with threats (Bar-Haim et al., 2007) and physiological changes. 
Therefore, attention to these threats and physiological changes, that is facilitated when 
engaging in acceptance, should not diminish executive resources (Heatherton et al., 1993). 
Thus, acceptance is hypothesised to result in superior executive control, in high threat 
conditions, relative to strategies that inhibit this attentional focus (i.e., distraction). 
However, engaging in acceptance in low-threat circumstances, which would involve 
focusing attention on threats or on the self in a situation that involves little anxious affect 
and limited social evaluation and thus not facilitating self-awareness or attention to 
threats, is predicted to be effortful and require the control of attention.  Therefore, 
acceptance in low threat circumstances is predicted to lead to decrements in later 
executive control relative to mind-wandering, which does not require the control attention 
(Muraven & Baumeister, 2000; Schmeichel, 2007; Schmeichel et al., 2003). These 
predictions together form the susceptible acceptance hypothesis.  
The second plausible pathway via which different regulatory strategies might give 
rise to differences in executive control is via their impact on affect experienced (i.e., PET 
and ACT affective hypothesis), as both threat circumstances and affect regulation are likely 
to lead to systematic differences in affect. Furthermore, the extent to which the strategies 
influence vagal tone (i.e., neurovisceral account hypothesis) provides a third alternative 
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explanation for differences in executive control between distraction and acceptance 
undertaken in the different threat circumstances. In summary, chapter 7 tests the self-
regulatory strength, affective (ACT and PET), and neurovisceral accounts’ predictions in an 
attempt to answer the question of what mediates the effect of affect regulation strategies 
of distraction and acceptance on subsequent executive control.  
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Chapter 4: Method 
This chapter describes the methods used in the large single experimental study to 
gather the data presented in chapters 5, 6 and 7. Each of these following chapters analyses 
a subset of the measures employed.  
4.1. Participants  
The sample size of 180 participants was chosen based on the calculations of the 
effect size reported by studies using similar experimental designs and measures involving 
university student samples randomly allocated to experimental conditions. These 
calculations were carried out with the G*Power Software calculator (Erdfelder, Faul, & 
Buchner, 1996), with an anticipated effect size of d = .5 on measures of executive control 
comparing individuals who had subsequently engaged in a effortful regulation task versus 
those who had not (Schmeichel, 2007). The distraction focused studies using self-report 
measures of affect have reported effect sizes d = .046-.95 (Augustine & Hemenover, 2009). 
For HRV RMSSD data, an effect size of d = 1.15 has been noted for studies of self-regulation 
of behaviour, but a size effect of d = 1.47 has been demonstrated for those involving a 
threat manipulation (S. C. Segerstrom & Solberg Nes, 2007). The effect sizes were much 
smaller for studies investigating acceptance’s impact on HR, with some studies reporting 
effect sizes as small as d = .30 (Hofmann et al., 2009) and others reporting d = .91 (Low et 
al., 2008). As a result, a sample of 156 participants (26 per cell) or above, providing actual 
power of .91, was considered to be adequate to show the impacts self-regulatory effects of 
affect regulation on HRV and executive control.  
Participants were university undergraduates, 18 years of age or older, with fluent 
English language skills, and with normal or corrected to normal vision. One hundred and 
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eighty-one students volunteered to take part, of whom 180 completed the experiment. Of 
those who completed the experiment, 49 were malen. The sample mean age was 24.90 
years (SD= 8.67), with ages ranging from 18-60. Participants were recruited through 
posters, and flyers handed out to students in tutorials, in addition to the Murdoch 
University School of Psychology’s Subject Pool website. Psychology student participants 
were provided with 2.5 hours of subject pool credit, and non-psychology participants were 
given four free hot drink vouchers in exchange for their time.     
4.2. Design  
A mixed design was used. This involved two between-subjects factors. Threat level, 
the first factor, comprised two levels: high and low. Regulation-strategy, the second factor, 
comprised three levels: distraction, acceptance and control. Threat level was manipulated 
by introducing two different anticipated tasks. The high-threat level used an anticipated 
impromptu speech task to induce anxious affect. This task has been shown to be highly 
effective at increasing anxiety (self-reported, behavioural, and autonomic) in individuals of 
both high and low social anxiety (Mauss, Wilhelm, & Gross, 2003, 2004). The participants in 
the low-threat condition anticipated watching a film clip on UK tax law, intended to be of 
lower threat. Regulation strategies (distraction and acceptance) were manipulated through 
a combination of techniques used in previous studies including: instructions (Hofmann et 
al., 2009; Richards & Gross, 2000), completing guided mental activities by following audio 
taped instructions (Arch & Craske, 2006; Levitt et al., 2004), and writing on a set topic (Low 
et al., 2008; Schmeichel, 2007). Distraction was manipulated by diverting attention towards 
relatively affect-neutral stimuli (Van Dillen & Koole, 2007). Acceptance was manipulated by 
                                                          
n
 Males and females were distributed evenly amongst the cells, with separate 
randomisation sheets for each gender.  
106 
 
encouraging participants to engage in a mindful meditation activity. All strategy conditions, 
including the control group, were played on audio files that were designed both to facilitate 
strategy adoption and assist participants in the subsequent writing task. The writing tasks 
were on topics aimed to demonstrate participants’ understanding of and compliance with 
the regulation strategy instructions.     
There were three types of dependent variables measured, the first being the 
physiological data (heart rate, heart rate variability and respiration rate). The second was 
self-reported (affect level, attentional focus, maladaptive regulatory attempts and 
perceived mental demands of regulation), and the third - executive control (prepotent 
response inhibition and working memory).  Heart rate (HR) measurements were taken at 
six time points: (1) baseline, (2) when the threat was revealed, (3) during the regulation 
period , (4) during the performance the executive control tasks (Stroop test and  Letter-
Number-Sequencing, (5) during the threat-task (i.e., speech or movie), and (6) during 
recovery from threat or control task. The regulation period included a thinking and a 
writing phase, enabling both reliable measurement of heart rate without movement and, 
subsequently, a manipulation check.  The thinking period within the regulation period (3) 
was further split into three separate 5-minute epochs in order to test Greenberg and 
Paivio’s process of feeling prediction.  Heart rate variability was calculated during baseline 
(1), regulation epochs (3), and during threat-task recovery (6). HRV was not calculated 
during revealing of the threat, during the executive control tasks, or during the 
performance of the threat-task, due to increased movement artifacts influencing the ECG 
signal during these periods.  As respiration rate was relevant only to HRV analyses, it was 
only computed during the HRV epochs. The self-report measures were taken with 
reference to: (1) baseline, (3) post regulation, (4) each executive control task, (5) during the 
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threat-task, and (6) following the engagement in the threat-task. See Figure 4.1 for a flow 
diagram of the design and procedure.  
4.3. Materials and Apparatus  
 Several different types of experimental material were used. These include (1) pre-
experimental questionnaires; (2) physiological equipment, materials and data collection 
software; (3) materials used in threat manipulation; (4) executive control measures; (5) 
self-reported affect measures used in the experimental procedure; (6) manipulation check 
quizzes and items.    
4.3.1. Self-Report Measures in Pre-experimental Questionnaire 
 Several self-report questionnaires were administered before participants began the 
experiment.  In order of presentation, the measures assessed the typical extent to which 
the following maladaptive affect regulation strategies were used: (1) suppression, (2) 
worry, and (3) rumination. Additionally, pre-existing negative affect including trait anxiety, 
state depression, anxiety and stress were measured. The scales’ descriptions and 
psychometric properties are presented below.   
Suppression: The White Bear Suppression Inventory (WBSI; Wegner & Zankos, 1994) 
is  a 15-item questionnaire that measures thought suppression. It has been previously 
shown to have excellent internal reliability (α = .88) in a student sample. The scale also has 
excellent temporal stability, with correlations ranging from .69 over 3 months to .92 over a 
1 week period. Furthermore, the WBSI has been found to be related to obsessional thinking 
and depressive and anxious affect (Wegner & Zankos, 1994).  
Trait Worry: The Penn State Worry Questionnaire (PSWQ; Meyer et al., 1990) is a 
16-item questionnaire that measures an individual’s predisposition to worry.  The 
questionnaire measures worry as a single factor structure and has good internal reliability 
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α= .94 and concurrent validity with a student sample, showing positive correlations with 
other measures of anxiety, low thrill seeking and low self esteem.  
Rumination: The Ruminative Response Scale (RRS; Nolen-Hoeksema, 1991), is a 22-
item scale with the entire scale shown to have a high internal consistency (α= .89) and a 
test-retest correlation of .67 in undergraduate students. Higher scores on this measure has 
been demonstrated to be associated with increased negative affect (Nolen-Hoeksema, 
Parker, & Larson, 1994) and experience of a depressive episode (Just & Alloy, 1997).   
Pre-existing Negative affect: The Depression Anxiety and Stress Scale (DASS-21; P. 
F. Lovibond & Lovibond, 1995) is a 21-item questionnaire that assesses depression, anxiety 
and stress over the last week. The questionnaire has a three factor structure, assessing 
each construct separately. Internal reliability was α= .94 for depression, α= .87 for anxiety 
and α=.91 for stress and good concurrent validity (Antony et al., 1998) with a mixed sample 
clinical and non-clinical respondents.  
Trait Anxiety: The State- Trait Anxiety Inventory (STAI; C. Spielberger et al., 1983) 
form Y2 measures trait anxiety with 20 items. The measure has an internal reliability α= .92 
for males and females aged from 19 to 49 in the working adult population, .90 for males 
college students and .91 for females college students.  Furthermore, the test retest 
reliability for college students was high for both 20 days (males .86 and females .76) and 
104 days (males .73 and females .77). The trait scales also showed high to medium range 
correlations with other trait anxiety measures for college males and females, 
demonstrating good concurrent validity. Moreover, those with diagnosed neuropsychiatric 
disorders, including anxiety and depression, showed higher mean trait anxiety than college 
student or working adult samples.  
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4.3.2. Physiological Equipment Material and Data Collection Software  
A BIOPAC Systems, Inc MP 100 was used to receive the input for both heart and 
respiration rate from two pre-amplifiers.  
  Electrocardiogram Preamplifier: A Biodata Physiological Amplifier 300 was 
connected to the Biopac set on Electrocardiogram (ECG), with resistance (gain) set to 50 
mV. Skintact Esitabs sensors attached to alligator clips were used to sample the QRS signal 
(representing ventricular contraction).  
Respiration Preamplifier: A Biopac AC systems RSP 100 preamplifier was used to 
measure respiration rate.  
Physiological software: Acqknowledge 3.9.0 software was used to collect 
physiological data, with the ECG channel set to a sampling rate of 1000 per second.  
4.3.3. Materials Used for the Threat and Regulation Manipulations  
 The high-threat manipulation involved using a video camera, mounted on a tripod, 
to make a recording of participants speaking on an academic topic. A red light at the front 
of the camera indicated when the camera was recording. Two envelopes with the titles 
“Question 1” and “Question 2” contained the questions on which participants were 
instructed to speak.   
The low-threat manipulation involved the film clip UK tax explained by former tax 
inspector Adrian Huston. Today…Offshore money….The New disclosure Opportunity in 
depth and can be accessed from http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=JHnPq7wHvRI 
accessed 07/04/2010.  
Audio files including recordings of instructions to facilitate the use of particular 
regulation strategies were created. Two writing sheets (see Appendix A) with instructions 
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at the top of the page reminding participants of the writing topic were used, with the 
sheets having 10 number and 10 symbols around the edges of the writing areao. 
To present the film clip and audio files, a Laptop with a 16” screen was used and 
audio content projected using external speaker.   
4.3.4. Executive Control Measures  
Inhibition of Prepotent Responses: The Stroop Test original paper/card version 
(Stroop, 1935) measures prepotent response inhibition (N. P. Friedman & Miyake, 2004; 
Miyake et al., 2000) by asking participants to name aloud the colour of the print (i.e., the 
ink colour) in which colour words inconsistent with the ink colour were printed 
(incongruent colour word trials). To determine the interference effect, neutral control 
stimuli consisted of strings of “X’s” (e.g., XXX) that were matched in length to the colour 
words (e.g., an XXX string matched for the colour word “GREEN” would be “XXXXX”).  All 
stimuli were printed in Calibri size 13 font. Three trials of both XXX strings and incongruent 
colour words with 40 stimuli in each trial were used, with the first trial treated as practice. 
The colours of the trials and the colours that participants were instructed to name were 
red, green, blue, purple and brown. The Stroop test has been demonstrated to be a reliable 
measure (Siegrist, 1997) with a test-retest reliability of .86 for incongruent colour words, 
and .84 for “XXX” strings, within a short time period between trials. In addition, the Stroop 
task has been demonstrated to correlate more highly with other tasks measuring prepotent 
response inhibition than with other executive functions (Miyake et al., 2000). 
Updating Representations in Working Memory: The second executive control task 
was Letter-Number Sequencing from the Wechsler Intelligence Scales (Wechsler, 1997), 
                                                          
o
 These originally were for a recognition memory task subsequently demonstrated to be of 
limited sensitivity.  
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which is designed to measure the executive function updating and maintaining working 
memory. It involves the reordering of auditorily presented stimuli that are random 
numbers and letters, into first numbers from lowest to highest, then letters in alphabetical 
order. There are seven item levels, each containing a set of three trials of the same length, 
with every successive set of items the load increased by one digit or letter, starting from a 
load of two, and ending at eight.  The test-retest coefficient for individuals 16-54 years of 
age is r = .71 and a split-half reliability of .82. 
4.3.5. Self-Reported Anxious Affect Measures Used During Experimental 
Procedure 
Affect Measures: A self-report measure of anxious affect used by Johns, Inzlicht and 
Schmader (2008) comprising six adjectives: agitated, anxious, nervous, uneasy, and 
worried, asked participants to report how they felt on a 7-point scale anchored by “not at 
all “(1) and “very much” (7). Johns et al. report good internal reliability (α = .86). See 
Appendix B for scale and instructions provided to participants.  
4.3.6. Manipulation Check Quizzes and Items  
Three separate quizzes, one for each regulation strategy, tested participants’ 
memory of the content presented in the audiotaped instructions. These quizzes comprised 
questions involving both short answer and yes/no responses, similar to those used in 
previous studies (e.g., Levitt et al., 2004). See Appendix C for the three quizzes and 
corresponding answers). Examples of questions are: “Were you asked to let go of efforts to 
change your thoughts and feelings?” (acceptance item), or, “Were differences in food 
consumption mentioned?” (distraction item), or, “Did somebody mention something about 
going to work?” (mind-wandering item). 
112 
 
Effort and Difficulty Manipulation Checks: Two items were administered asking 
participants to report their perceived effort expended, and the difficulty of the regulation 
thinking task on a scale from one (indicating low effort or difficulty) to seven (indicating 
high effort and difficulty). See Appendix D for items.  
Attentional Focus, Cognitive Evaluations and Attempts at Controlling Thoughts or 
Feelings : Twenty-one items (see Appendix E for items) were used to measure participants’ 
perception of their mental activity during the regulation strategy manipulation thinking 
task. The first three items (1-3) were aimed at measuring participants’ level of attention to 
the upcoming threat-task, followed by three items (4-6) that assessed participants’ 
evaluation of the threat. Next were three items aimed assessing the extent of allowing the  
experiencing of unpleasant thoughts and feelings (7-9). There were three items that related 
to thoughts about poor future performance during the threat-task (items 10-12). Three 
items assessed evaluations of thoughts, feelings, and reactions experienced (items 13- 15) 
that were based on the RRS by Nolen-Hoeksema (1991). Three items assessed the 
participant’s attempts to inhibit his or her thoughts or feelings (items 16-18). The last three 
items (19-21) asked of the extent to which participants were mentally engaged in the 
experimental setting reflecting items taken from the ICARUS mental disengagement scale 
by Kamholz, Hayes, Carver, Gullivver, and Perlman (2006). 
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Phase 1: Participant Screening and Pre-Experimental Questionnaire 
 
Random Allocation of Participants to Threat and Regulation Conditions 
Phase 2: Preparation and Baseline  
Phase 3: Threat Manipulation 
High-Threat 
Introduction to Impromptu Speech and Test 
Recording 
Low-Threat 
Introduction to UK Offshore Asset Disclosure 
Video Viewing  
Phase 3: Regulation Manipulation Tasks 
“Writing Task”  
5 minute Writing on Regulation Strategy Consistent Topic   
Post Regulation SR Affect (present moment) 
“Thinking Task”                                 
15 minute Audio Regulation Strategy Consistent Audio Content  
 
Phase 4: Stroop 
 
Post Stroop SR Affect (during incongruent trials)  
 
Post LNS SR Affect task (during latter trials) 
 
Phase 4: Letter-Number-Sequencing (LNS) 
 
Phase 5: Threat-Task and Recovery 
Low-Threat 
Watch Video 
High-Threat 
Deliver Impromptu Speech  
Post Threat HR, RR Recovery and SR Affect (During and Following Threat-Task)  
Phase 6: Regulation Manipulation Checks 
Regulation Strategy Quiz, Self-Reported Effort and Difficulty and, Attention 
Allocation Focus, Cognitions and Regulatory Attempts 
 
Figure 4.1. Flow Diagram of Procedural Phases 
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4.4. Procedure 
The procedure can be split into six phases: (1) recruitment and pre-experimental 
questionnaires, (2) participant preparation and baseline, (3) threat and regulation 
manipulations, (4) executive control testing, (5) engagement in and recovery from threat-
tasks, and (6) manipulation checks and debrief. It took participants about 20 minutes to 
complete the questionnaires. The time taken to administer the experimental procedure 
was approximately two hours for each participant.     
4.4.1. Phase 1: Recruitment and Pre-Experimental Questionnaire 
  Potential participants were informed of the need for volunteers to participate in a 
study focused on the relationship between stress and performance on creative versus 
assessment-based tasks, providing a cover story that did not draw attention to the 
experimental manipulations (see Appendix F for advertisement). Volunteers were told that 
they were likely to experience some stress when taking part in the experiment, but no 
information about the affect manipulations was provided, consistent with Wong & 
Moulds’s (2009) procedure, to reduce demand awareness. Participants were asked to 
refrain from consuming caffeine for six hours before taking part, and to abstain from 
alcohol and nicotine on the day of testing to reduce confounds that may influence HR and 
HRV. Participants were asked to complete the questionnaire on their predispositions to 
experiencing particular types of affect or engaging in particular regulation strategies 
(presented as personality questionnaires) before attending the experimental session. 
Participants were randomly assigned to each of the six between-subjects conditions before 
entering the experimental session, based on randomisation sheets developed for the 
experiment.  
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4.4.2. Phase 2: Preparation and Baseline 
Testing occurred in a well-lit room maintained at 21-25 degrees Celsius. 
Participants’ QRS signal was gathered by placing the Skintacts on the outside of the upper 
arm, with a ground placed on the inside of the left ankle after the skin site was cleaned 
using an alcohol-based mediswab. A 7-minute baseline measurement of heart and 
respiration rate was taken, and was followed by a self-report of participants’ present 
affective state.  
4.4.3. Phase 3: Threat and Regulation Strategy Manipulation 
Participants in the high-threat condition were notified that, as part of the 
assessment-based task (consistent with the cover story), they would be asked to deliver an 
impromptu speech at some point in the middle of the experiment. To enhance the efficacy 
of the threat manipulation,p the experimenter conducted a test run of the video recording 
equipment targeting the participant. This was used to ensure that participants were 
convinced of the impending threat’s occurrence so that increased anxious affect resulted. 
Participants were told that the speech would be on an important academic topic, and high 
performance would demonstrate understanding of this core academic topic. Participants 
were notified that their speech would be videotaped and shown to university staff who 
would rate their speech on clarity of presentation, correctness of points, and level of detail 
provided. To make the induction more believable, participants were presented with two 
envelopes and told that they contained two slightly different speech questions from which 
they were to pick one. Both envelopes actually contained the same question. The speech 
question asked “what are the possible ways investigators might establish that an 
                                                          
p
 Piloting of the threat manipulation showed that mere presentation of the threat was 
insufficient for participants to exhibit an increased arousal response, presumably because they did 
not believe it would eventuate. 
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event or construct causes another event or changes in another construct? Give 
examples and give a description of such methods.” Participants were then instructed to 
hold onto the envelope on their desk and not to open it until the time came to do the 
speech. This envelope remained with them during all the following tasks to remind them of 
the upcoming threat until recovery period following the speech. The quick test run of the 
video recording equipment, which included an initial recording of the participants reporting 
their year of study and what they were studying, was used to increase the believability of 
the likelihood of the experiment involving an upcoming speech.  
Participants in the low-threat condition were told that in the middle of the 
experiment they would be watching a short film clip on UK tax law, stating there was some 
interest in their physiological responses to it. Furthermore, participants were reassured 
that they would not be assessed on their knowledge of UK tax law or tested on any of the 
information presented in the film clipq. The participants were read a description of the 
content of the film clip so they knew what to expect and were asked if they had any further 
questions about the film clip and if they had any interests in UK tax law (see Appendix G for 
instructions for both high- and low-threat manipulations).  
Following this information, participants were asked to engage in one of the 
regulation strategies, which were disguised as creative writing tasks with a prior 15 minutes 
to think about the topic while listening to a set of audio-taped instructions designed to 
assist them prepare for the topic. Each regulation condition had its own initial set of 
instructions (see Appendix H for initial instructions).  To help the participants to sustain 
                                                          
q
 This reassurance was added during piloting to limit the perceived level of threat this task. 
Although pilot participants reported that this task was not obviously threatening, some reported 
that they anticipated a surprise in the video, or a test. Despite the reassurance provided the 
information regarding the video was considered ambiguous to many participants to create a lower 
level of threat.   
117 
 
their focus during a regulatory periodr, they listened and followed along to a set of audio 
tape instructions consistent with their conditions (Levitt et al., 2004). Furthermore, to 
ensure participants understood the concept of acceptance, participants in this condition 
were given good, bad and improved examples of written stream of consciousness (see 
Appendix I).  To maintain equivalence among the conditions, the distraction and control 
participants also received example scripts that represented appropriate performance of the 
particular regulation strategy they were to undertake. These examples and were matched 
for length and themes for each strategy. 
The distraction condition instructions asked participants to concentrate their 
thought on generating as many different uses as possible for donkeys, ponies and horsess. 
The acceptance condition instructed participants to be aware of and to accept all naturally 
occurring thoughts, feelings and sensations. Meanwhile, the control group was instructed 
to let their minds wander whilst the sounds of a waiting area in a university library foyer 
were playing. The acceptance audiotape instructions were based on several scripts 
presented in Roemer and Orsillo (2009, pp. 120-121, 123-124, 126-127) asking participants 
firstly to notice their sensations, including their breathing and to slow and deepen their 
                                                          
r
 During piloting some initial difficulties were encountered in eliciting participants’ 
consistent use of distraction and acceptance when instructed. A lack of understanding of the 
concept of acceptance was also a problem. Following extensive piloting, manipulation procedures 
were modified to rectify these issues. Hence, including a mindfulness activity to facilitate the 
engagement of acceptance showed that participants better understood, and made use of, the 
strategy of acceptance, as indicated on their performance on the writing task. 
s
This particular distraction manipulation was used, rather than other more commonly used 
distraction manipulations, such as; a card sorting task (Blagden & Craske, 1996), reading (Bloom et 
al., 1977; Houston & Holmes, 1974), or a typical working memory task (Kamphuis & Telch, 2000; Van 
Dillen & Koole, 2007). This manipulation was chosen so that the manipulation formats of both 
distraction and acceptance could be identical on a number of salient dimensions that could 
confound results. These included the physical task demands (both involving sitting still, listening and 
writing), stimulus materials used (both involving audio instructions and writing sheets) and the 
period of time (together, the thinking and writing tasks lasted for a duration of 20 minutes).  
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breath, then to notice and accept their negative thoughts and feelings. Distraction 
instructions were matched to the acceptance instructions for length and number of words, 
and mimicked the acceptance instructions in terms of imagining particular content - in this 
case donkeys, ponies and horses, in particular settings. Each audio file went for 
approximately 15 minutes. See Appendix J for audiotape instructions for regulation 
conditions.  
This thinking task was immediately followed by the writing task, used to provide 
tangible evidence that participants demonstrated actual engagement in the intended 
strategy. Participants were asked to write continuing on from the thinking task. Participants 
were given a brief reminder of the instructions (see Appendix K), verbally and in print at the 
top of the writing pages.  Participants were instructed to write for the entire 5-minute 
period even if they had to repeat what they had previously written, consistent with (Low et 
al., 2008). Blind coders then categorised these responses, as a manipulation check. 
Following the writing task, participants were asked to self-report their current affective 
state.  
4.4.4. Phase 4: Executive Control Testing   
In this phase, participants completed two executive control tasks (Stroop, and 
Letter Number Sequencing) after each they retrospectively self-reported their affective 
states during the performance of the task.  
Stroop Task: Participants were first asked to name aloud the colour that the XXX 
strings were printed in, as quickly as possible, but without making mistakes. After 
completing three trials (the first being a practice), participants were asked to the same for 
the incongruent colour words (see Appendix L for instructions).  Responses were verbal and 
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were recorded manually by the experimenter. Completion time and errors were recorded 
for each trial. 
Working Memory (LNS) task: Participants were verbally presented random 
numbers and letters that were to be reordered by the participant: numbers in order from 
lowest to highest, followed by letters in alphabetical order. The task began after five 
practice trials used to ensure participants understood the task. Responses were made 
verbally and were recorded manually by the experimenter. Accuracy   and reaction time 
(using a stop watch) was noted for each item. Instructions and stimuli were sourced from 
Wechsler (1997). 
4.4.5. Phase 5:  Engagement in and Recovery from Threat-Tasks 
Following this, participants either delivered the impromptu speech or watched the 
film clip on UK tax law for five minutes (see Appendix M for instructions regarding threat-
tasks). This was immediately followed by a recovery period of five minutes, where 
participants were instructed to sit still for five minutes, during which HR and RR were 
measured. Two versions of the self-reported affect measures were administered, the first 
asking how the participants felt during the speech or film clip, the second asking how they 
felt right at the present moment.  
4.4.6. Phase 6: Manipulation Checks and Debrief 
A separate 10-question quiz on the regulation audio instructions, specific to each 
strategy was administered. Next, two manipulation check items related to the amount of 
effort, and the difficulty of the thinking task were administered, followed by the 21 
remaining items asking the participants to report what mental activity (attentional focus 
and thought content) they perceived themselves to be engaged in during the thinking 
phase while the audio files were playing.  
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Finally, participants were debriefed by providing feedback on their HR levels and 
cognitive task performance and were provided an internet link that provided strategies for 
how to handle stress during assessment. Participants were told that the full extent of the 
experiment’s focus would be revealed to them via the School of Psychology website once 
data collection was completed. Participants were requested not to discuss or reveal the 
procedure or tasks used in the experiment or their purpose to others, consistent with 
procedures used by (Bloom et al., 1977).  
4.5. Data Preparation and Hypothesis Testing   
All forms of data went though several preliminary transformations. The steps 
behind these preliminary analyses are outlined below.  
4.5.1. HR and HRV: Raw QRS Voltage Data to Change Scores 
Several steps had to be taken to convert the raw QRS signal to scores to be 
used in the inferential analysis.  
QRS voltage signal data were recorded and stored initially as Acqknowledge 
files 3.9.0. Using AcqKnowledge 3.9.0. Data were manually edited to remove errors 
from movement artefacts and ectopic beats before HR and HRV calculations were 
obtained (Berntson et al., 1997; Task Force of the European Society of Cardiology 
and the North American Society of Pacing and Electrophysiology, 1996).  
Heart rate variability index calculation began through the calculation of R-R 
intervals, achieved in Acqknowledge to millisecond accuracy. The intervals were 
then saved as a text file that was subsequently uploaded into the HRV analysis 
software, Kubios HRV version 2.0 (Tarvainen & Niskanen, 2008), 
http://kubios.uku.fi, developed by the Biosignal Analysis and Medical Imaging 
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Group, Department of Physics, University of Kuopio, Finland. Root-Mean-Square-of-
Successive-Differences (RMSSD) was calculated within this program.  
4.5.2. Respiration Data: From Voltage Fluctuations to Respiration Rate 
Change Scores  
Due to technical issues with the Pneumotrace respiration strain gauge, the 
representation of the raw voltage data in Acqknowledge 3.9.0 contained significant 
degrees of noise. Therefore, respiration rate was not able to be calculated using an 
automated process. However, the period at which inhalation had peaked was 
clearly detectable for most breaths when inspected visually. Hence, each breath 
was counted via visual inspection of the respiratory peaks in the raw voltage signal 
to within approximately half a breath. The frequency of breaths for each 5-minute 
period was converted to breaths per minute. Respiration rate data were converted 
to change scores from baseline for each time period (epoch of interest RR minus 
the baseline RR).   
4.5.3. Data Screening: Outliers 
Before conducting the inferential analyses to test the hypotheses, all 
dependent variables were screened for missing values and outlying cases.  The 
criterion for determine outlying cases was +/- 3 standard deviations for the mean. 
Outliers were only deleted if their inclusion altered whether an inferential test met 
significance (Field, 2009; Tabachnick & Fidell, 1996) for that particular dependent 
variable.  
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4.6.2. Inferential Test Statistics; Alpha Levels, Assumptions, and 
Hypothesis Testing 
The alpha criterion to reject the null hypothesis was set at .05 for inferential 
statistics. Many of the ANOVA used involve mixed designs. When dependent 
variables were in violation of the assumption of sphericity, multivariate tests were 
used because they do not depend on this assumption (Field, 2009). Hotelling’s trace 
was chosen as the appropriate multivariate test due to the robustness of this test 
when in violation of Box’s statistic when cell sizes are equal (Field, 2009; Tabachnick 
& Fidell, 1996).  
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Chapter 5: The Effects of 
Distraction and Acceptance on 
Attentional Focus and the 
Engagement in Maladaptive Self-
Regulatory Attempts 
We have seen from chapter 2 that there are many different mental acts involving 
the control of attention and thought that aim to reduce unpleasant affect (Gross & 
Thompson, 2007; Kamholz et al., 2006; Lazarus & Folkman, 1984). These mental acts are 
referred to as cognitive affect regulation strategies (Garnefski et al., 2001) and are the most 
commonly used coping option when encountering threats that cannot be behaviourally 
removed or avoided (Lazarus & Averill, 1972; Lazarus & Folkman, 1984). Some of these 
cognitive regulatory attempts are effective in reducing unwanted affect (i.e., adaptive). 
However, other strategies are not effective, and some are even counterproductive (i.e., 
maladaptive). The attentional focus required for a particular strategy is suggested to 
dictate a the strategy’s effectiveness (Borkovec et al., 2004; Greenberg & Paivio, 1997; 
Gross & Thompson, 2007; Pyszczynski & Greenberg, 1987; Wegner, 1994). This chapter 
focuses on the therapeutically recommended regulation strategies of distraction and 
acceptance, and the impacts that these regulation strategies have on: (1) the focus of 
attention and (2) the concurrent capacity available to engage in spontaneously initiated 
maladaptive regulatory attempts.  
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Gross and Thompson’s (2007) modal model predicts that attention towards 
situational threats and associated affect will result in the maintenance and intensification 
of unwanted affect.  In contrast, Greenberg and Paivio (1997, 2004) theorise that increased 
attention to affect and affect-related thoughts will lead to an integration of this experience 
with reason so as to create an alternative affective experience. However, the situational 
threat level may influence how effectively attentional focus can be altered as ignoring, or 
disengaging attention from threat-stimuli when anxious may be more difficult if such 
stimuli are of high-threat value relative to low-threat value (Bar-Haim et al., 2007; Mogg & 
Bradley, 1998; Wilson & MacLeod, 2003). Additionally, the attentional focus of an adaptive 
strategy (e.g., distraction, acceptance) may also impose a load on attentional capacity 
(Richards & Gross, 2000) and, therefore, the ability to effectively engage in concurrent 
maladaptive regulatory attempts (Lyubomirsky & Nolen-Hoeksema, 1993; Van Dillen & 
Koole, 2007).  
Distraction and acceptance differ in regards to where the individual focuses his or 
her attention. The strategy of distraction has been defined as reducing attention to both 
internal and external stimuli that cause and sustain unwanted affect (Gross & Thompson, 
2007; Van Dillen & Koole, 2007). The diversion of attentional focus from these affect-
inducing stimuli (i.e., distraction) is encouraged through engagement in an attention 
consuming task (Blagden & Craske, 1996; Lyubomirsky & Nolen-Hoeksema, 1993; Nolen-
Hoeksema, 1991; Van Dillen & Koole, 2007). The control of attention to divert attention 
may be more difficult in highly threatening circumstances (Carver & Scheier, 1988; 
Wicklund, 1975), possibly due reflexive engagement with threats when anxious (Bar-Haim 
et al., 2007). However, when individuals have prolonged time periods to respond to threats 
they will make attempts to actively ignore high-threat-stimuli (Derryberry & Reed, 2002; 
Koster et al., 2006), possibly  in a spontaneous attempt to regulate their experience (Mogg 
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& Bradley, 1998). Imposing  an attentional load during concurrent attempts to control 
one’s experience (i.e., to inhibit attention to threat-related thoughts or feelings) has 
previously been found to result in increased occurrence of the very experiences sought to 
be avoided (Knight et al., 2007; Mather & Knight, 2005; Wegner et al., 1993). Hence, 
although imposed distraction may be a strategy that attempts to reduce attention towards 
threatening and emotive stimuli, its effectiveness may be limited due to difficulties in 
controlling attention in the circumstance and may actually disrupt spontaneously initiated 
attempts that are effective in reducing attention to threatening stimuli.    
In contrast to distraction, acceptance is a strategy that brings attention towards an 
affective response. Roemer and Orsillo (2009) and Greenberg (2004) suggest that it is 
through this continual attention to the affective response and the adoption of a non-
judgmental or non-reactive interpretation of that response that an individual can integrate 
the sensations and the thoughts with reason to produce an alternative affective response.  
Hence, acceptance should encourage increased attention towards affect and threat-related 
thoughts.  
Aside from the proposed difference in attentional focus of the two strategies, 
distraction and acceptance have both been suggested to restrict the use of maladaptive 
regulatory attempts (Hofmann & Asmundson, 2008; Lyubomirsky & Nolen-Hoeksema, 
1993). This suggestion is based on the premise that one particular regulatory strategy 
precludes the use of another. It has been demonstrated that regulation reduces online 
attentional capacity (S. Hayes et al., 2008; Rapee, 1993; Richards & Gross, 2000; Sheppes & 
Meiran, 2008), implying that engaging in one regulatory activity limits the ability to 
effectively engage in another regulatory activity (Knight et al., 2007; Mather & Knight, 
2005; Wegner et al., 1993). From such previous findings, one may hypothesise that 
initiating an adaptive strategy reduces attentional capacity, thereby restricting the level of 
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continued engagement in a maladaptive regulatory strategy (Lyubomirsky & Nolen-
Hoeksema, 1993; Morrow & Nolen-Hoeksema, 1990; Nolen-Hoeksema, 1991, 2000). 
Furthermore, the initiation of an adaptive strategy (e.g., emotional expression) that 
involves objectives that conflict and interfere with the goal of a maladaptive strategy (e.g., 
expressive suppression) is also a possible mechanism to limit the impacts of such 
maladaptive regulatory attempts (Hofmann & Asmundson, 2008; Lyubomirsky & Nolen-
Hoeksema, 1993; Morrow & Nolen-Hoeksema, 1990; Nolen-Hoeksema, 1991). Therefore, 
in addition to attentional resource restriction, competing and interfering regulatory actions 
can limit the engagement in maladaptive regulatory attempts.    
Maladaptive cognitive regulation strategies known to prolong and intensify anxious 
affect include worry, rumination, and suppression (Borkovec et al., 2004; Gross & 
Levenson, 1993; Pyszczynski & Greenberg, 1987; Wegner & Zankos, 1994; Wong & Moulds, 
2009). These self-focused maladaptive strategies are initiated when a situation is appraised 
as threatening, and no clear action is available for removing that threat (Lazarus & 
Folkman, 1984).  Worry is a perseverative process that has been defined as a constant 
focus towards an impending threat and the initiation of problem solving attempts to 
remove the threat (Borkovec, 1985; Borkovec et al., 2004). In many threat situations there 
is no clearly identifiable avenue to remove the threat without avoiding the situation, 
making threat removal problem solving attempts fruitless. Hence, worry has been 
demonstrated to be a counter-productive strategy in reducing unwanted affect (Davis et 
al., 2002; Hong, 2007; Pieper et al., 2007; S. Segerstrom et al., 2000; Thayer et al., 1996). 
Furthermore, engagement in worry has been suggested to focus attention on threats while 
seeking to avoid attention to affect (Borkovec et al., 2004), suggesting it would be 
incompatible with a strategy that seeks to fully experience an affect. In addition, worry has 
been demonstrated to limit concurrent attentional capacity (S. Hayes et al., 2008), 
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suggesting that it requires and competes for attentional capacity along with other 
regulatory strategies and processes.   
Rumination, is a maladaptive regulatory attempt that is also perseverative, similar 
to worry.  It  has been defined as focusing on a situation and trying to understand how it 
came about, and analysing why one tends to react in particular ways (Nolen-Hoeksema, 
1991; Nolen-Hoeksema, Wisco, & Lyubomirsky, 2008). Like worry, rumination provides no 
obvious solution or direct action to remedy the situation (Pyszczynski & Greenberg, 1987). 
Hence, rumination is also counter-productive in reducing negative affect (Blagden & 
Craske, 1996; Hong, 2007; Lyubomirsky & Nolen-Hoeksema, 1993; Morrow & Nolen-
Hoeksema, 1990; S. Segerstrom et al., 2000; Trask & Sigmon, 1999; Wong & Moulds, 2009). 
Like worry, the attentional focus is towards the threat and how it came about accompanied 
by an evaluation of how unhelpful the emotional response is. To the extent that rumination 
is a perserverative response similar to worry, it is likely that it also restricts attentional 
capacity.  
Suppression is different from the two perseverative regulatory attempts. 
Suppression can be split into two components: (1) thought suppression (Wegner & Zankos, 
1994) and (2) affect suppression. Suppression of affect can involve the subjectively felt 
internal responses and observable external behavioural responses (Gross & Levenson, 
1997; Gross & Thompson, 2007).  Attention is directed towards the self, with attempts to 
detect the presence of the unwanted thoughts or feelings that are subsequently inhibited 
(Gross & Levenson, 1997; Wegner, 1994). Despite suppression representing an attempt to 
reduce the presence of the unwanted thoughts or feelings, evidence suggests that 
suppression results in the increased presence of the very thoughts (Wegner, 1994) and 
affective physiological arousal intended to be inhibited  (Egloff et al., 2006; Gross & John, 
2003; Gross & Levenson, 1997). The focus of attention in suppression is towards threat-
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related thoughts and associated affective responses (Wegner, 1994) and has been 
demonstrated to restrict online attentional capacity (Richards & Gross, 2000).  
Previous research utilising well-validated measures of the maladaptive regulation 
strategies, such as the Penn State Worry Questionnaire (Meyer et al., 1990), Ruminative 
Response Styles (Nolen-Hoeksema & Morrow, 1991), and the White Bear Suppression 
Inventory (Wegner & Zankos, 1994) has supported the conceptual distinctions among the 
maladaptive strategies, with each of the maladaptive regulatory attempts shown to be 
separate regulatory processes (Fresco, Frankel, Mennin, Turk, & Heimberg, 2002; Kamholz 
et al., 2006). However, this research has also shown that the maladaptive strategies have a 
moderate level of interrelatedness (Crowe, Mathews, & Walkenhorst, 2007; Erskine, 
Kvavilashvili, & Kornbrot, 2007; Fresco et al., 2002). Individuals high in reported worry 
often also report increased rumination (Fresco et al., 2002; Hong, 2007; McLaughlin et al., 
2007) and suppression (Crowe et al., 2007). There is a moderate positive association 
between the self-reported usage of the strategies: correlations being .52-.62 between 
worry and rumination, .50-.36 between suppression and rumination, and .62 between 
worry and suppression (Crowe et al., 2007; Erskine et al., 2007; S. Segerstrom et al., 2000). 
It has been suggested that thought suppression fuels further perseveration, giving rise to 
positive associations between thought suppression and worry and thought suppression and 
rumination (E. R. Watkins, 2009; Wenzlaff & Luxton, 2003). Hence, it is possible that all of 
these maladaptive attempts occur within a short period and do not necessarily compete 
with each other for attentional resources, as each of these maladaptive attempts promote 
the engagement in the other. 
Distraction and acceptance may limit particular maladaptive regulatory attempts. 
Distraction is proposed to limit engagement in the perseverative attempts by limiting self 
focused attention to internal thoughts and feelings regarding the threatening situation 
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(Lyubomirsky & Nolen-Hoeksema, 1993; Nolen-Hoeksema, 2000). In contrast, acceptance is 
proposed to limit suppression through attention to the affect and associated thoughts in a 
non-reactive, non-judgmental way, allowing the experience and expression of these 
negative thoughts and feelings (Hofmann & Asmundson, 2008). Hence, for worry and 
rumination, the attentional focus towards thoughts is considered to be the problem and is 
remedied by providing an alternative attentional focus. Similarly, attentional focus is also 
an issue with suppression, although in suppression it is the monitoring of the unwanted 
experiences so that they can be inhibited that leads to those unwanted experiences being 
held within consciousness, paradoxically increasing the extent to which they are 
experienced (Abramwitz, Tolin, & Street, 2001; Wegner, 1994). Hence, it is suggested that 
these unwanted thoughts and feelings may be best reduced by individuals attending to 
such thoughts and feelings and experiencing and expressing them (Hofmann & Asmundson, 
2008). As such, the success of the therapeutically recommended strategies is predicted to 
rely on the assumption that the limited attentional capacity of the individual restricts his or 
her ability to engage in strategies involving attentional processes that are inconsistent with 
the recommended strategy. Hence, distraction involves altering attentional focus in a way 
that is inconsistent with worry and rumination, but consistent with the avoidance and 
inhibition of thoughts involved in suppression. In contrast, the attentional focus of 
acceptance is to unpleasant thoughts and feelings, similar to worry and rumination; 
however, unlike all the maladaptive strategies, especially suppression, acceptance actively 
encourages the experience of these thoughts and feelings in a non-evaluative way and is 
thus likely to engage inconsistent cognitive processes than the maladaptive strategies.      
The present study uses an experimental design to investigate the proposed effect 
of distraction and acceptance on attentional focus.  In addition, the present research tests 
the extent to which distraction and acceptance alter the engagement in the maladaptive 
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regulatory attempts.  As a part of the process of investigating the impacts of distraction and 
acceptance on the engagement in maladaptive regulatory attempts, this study also will 
validate experimental scales (ES) consisting of items designed to measure maladaptive 
regulatory attempts within an experimental threat situation. These ES will then be used to 
demonstrate the impacts of distraction and acceptance on the level of engagement in the 
maladaptive regulatory attempts of worry, rumination and suppression. In this 
investigation both threat level (high and low) and the adaptive regulation strategy 
(distraction and acceptance) are manipulated. To establish the impacts of the distraction 
and acceptance strategies on attentional focus and amount of engagement in maladaptive 
regulatory attempts, the strategies will be compared to a control condition consisting of a 
mind-wandering (a mental state that does not involve a particular attentional focus). 
Based on the literature discussed above, the following hypotheses are proposed for 
the regulatory period. First, participants in the high-threat circumstances in the mind-
wandering conditions will report less attentional diversion from threats and feelings than 
participants in low-threat circumstances. Second, those in the distraction condition will 
report less attentional focus towards their feelings and thoughts relating to the threats 
than individuals who engage in acceptance and those in the mind-wandering control 
condition. However, when taking into consideration of the threat level that the strategies 
employed, in high-threat circumstances distraction is predicted to lead to more reported 
attention to threat-related thoughts than in low-threat circumstances. In contrast to 
distraction, acceptance should increase attentional focus to affective responses and to the 
thoughts about threats relative to the control condition. Third, the items and resulting 
scales intended to measure maladaptive regulatory attempts (experimental scales; ES) 
should show moderate positive associations (highest between worry and rumination). In 
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addition, ESt will correlate most strongly with their corresponding parent subscale (e.g., 
worry experimental subscale with Penn State Worry Questionnaire). Fourth, increased use 
of the maladaptive strategies should occur in the high-threat conditions relative to the low-
threat conditions. Fifth, those who engage in distraction and acceptance will self-report 
less use of the maladaptive regulatory attempts than those in the control conditions. 
Specifically, distraction should result in less reporting of worry and rumination than the 
control condition, and acceptance should result in less reporting of suppression than the 
control condition.  
5.1. Method 
The experiment involved the manipulation of two independent between-subjects 
variables. The first was threat level with two levels: high and lowu. The second was 
regulation strategy with three levels: distraction, acceptance and control. Thirty 
participants were in each condition.  The dependent measures were the self-report 
attentional focus and regulatory attempt items, and regulation task instruction memory 
quiz administered at the end of the experiment. The self-report items asked the 
participants how much they perceived themselves to be engaging in particular mental 
activities of having particular thoughts during the thinking task (i.e., the 15-minute 
regulatory period) on a scale from one to seven. Although there were 21 items, 11 items 
                                                          
t
 Scales formed to measure the maladaptive strategy use are referred to as “experimental” 
because they are developed with wording specific to the experimental procedure.    
u
 Participants in the low-threat level were under a very low level of threat. Participants in 
the low-threat level did show a significant increase in HR when the threat-task was revealed to them 
(see Chapter 6, section 6.6.2.2 for affect manipulation checks) and thus can not be accurately to 
referred to as a neutral or non-threat condition. In addition, considering that participants were told 
the experiment was on stress and performance this information most likely created a low level of 
threat before the experiment began. Hence, all participants would have experienced some level of 
threat.    
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were selectedv for analysis (Items 2 and 3 for attentional focus; item 2 being, “I 
concentrated on some other topic and task rather than how I felt”, and item 3 being “I 
thought about things other than the impromptu speech/ short film clip” and Items 10-18 
measuring the maladaptive regulatory attempts of worry, rumination and suppression) due 
to their relevance to the hypotheses outlined above (see Appendix E for wording of the 
items used). A pre-experimental questionnaire was also administered to the participants 
including the Penn State Worry Questionnaire (PSWQ; Meyer et al., 1990), the Ruminative 
Response Styles (RRS; Nolen-Hoeksema & Morrow, 1991), and the White Bear Suppression 
Inventory (WBSI; Wegner & Zankos, 1994). The regulation task instruction quiz was used to 
assess their compliance with the regulatory thinking. The quiz asked questions regarding 
the content of the 15-minute audio recording played during the thinking task and was 
scored out of 10.  Subsequent to the completion of the experiment, a random sample of 10 
participants’ written responses from each regulatory condition (total of 30), were 
submitted to two blind coders. The coders were given the instructions for each writing task, 
and provided with photocopies of the written responses, and asked to sort the written 
responses into the categories that they thought best fitted the instructions. See Appendix N 
for materials and instructions provided to the blind coders. See Figure 5.1, showing the 
phase during which the data presented in this chapter were collected. See Chapter 4 for 
more details regarding the method, materials and the procedure.  
  
                                                          
v
The manipulation check items measuring participants’ mental activity during the thinking 
audio was originally developed with the intention of measuring seven commonly used regulation 
strategies with 21 items creating seven experimental scales of three items each to measure each 
strategy. However, many of the scales had low internal consistency, demonstrating low validity in 
measuring the constructs of interest and hence data from these scales and items were not used in 
an inferential analysis.   
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Phase 1: Participant Screening and Pre-Experimental Questionnaire 
 
Random Allocation of Participants to Threat and Regulation Conditions 
Phase 2: Preparation and Baseline  
Phase 3: Threat Manipulation 
High-Threat 
Introduction to Impromptu Speech and Test 
Recording 
Low-Threat 
Introduction to UK Offshore Asset Disclosure 
Video Viewing  
Phase 3: Regulation Manipulation Tasks 
“Writing Task”  
5 minute Writing on Regulation Strategy Consistent Topic   
Post Regulation SR Affect (present moment) 
“Thinking Task”                                 
15 minute Audio Regulation Strategy Consistent Audio Content  
 
Phase 4: Stroop 
 
Post Stroop SR Affect (during incongruent trials)  
 
Post LNS SR Affect task (during latter trials) 
 
Phase 4: Letter-Number-Sequencing (LNS) 
 
Phase 5: Threat-Task and Recovery 
Low-Threat 
Watch Video 
High-Threat 
Deliver Impromptu Speech  
Post Threat HR, RR Recovery and SR Affect (During and Following Threat-Task)  
Phase 6: Regulation Manipulation Checks 
Regulation Strategy Quiz, Self-Reported Effort and Difficulty and, Attention 
Allocation Focus, Cognitions and Regulatory Attempts 
 
Figure 5.1 Flow Diagram of Procedural Phases with phase 6 highlighted.  
134 
 
5.2. Results 
To test the hypotheses regarding the focus of attention, comparisons between 
conditions are required for each item of the attentional focus items. The means and SE for 
each of the conditions for both attentional focus items are presented in Figures 5.2 and 5.3, 
with higher numbers indicating less attention to feelings (item 2) and to thoughts about the 
speech/video (item 3). 
 
Figure 5. 2. Mean reported attentional Diversion from Feelings. Error bars indicate SE. 
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Figure 5.3. Mean reported attentional Diversion from threat-related thoughts. Error bars 
indicate SE. 
Focus of Attention: According to the hypotheses, distraction conditions should 
divert attention away from feelings more than the acceptance and control conditions, 
whilst acceptance would increase attention towards feelings. To test the effectiveness of 
the regulation strategies in altering the attentional focus, a 2 (threat level: high and low) X 
3 (regulation strategy: distraction, acceptance and control) between subjects ANOVA was 
used to analyse participants’ scores from item 2; “I concentrated on some other topic and 
task rather than how I felt”. Results showed no significant effects (F < 1, ns) of threat or 
interaction between threat and regulation. Furthermore, there was no simple main effect 
of threat within the control conditions, t(58) = -.70, p =. 49, d =-.18. The main effect of 
regulation strategy trended towards significance, F(2, 174) = 2.47, p = .088, ηp
2 = .028. Least 
significant difference (LSD) post hoc tests showed that those in the  distraction condition 
rated significantly more attentional diversion from feelings than those in the acceptance 
condition, p = .038, mean difference = .63, SE = .30. There was no difference between 
distraction and mind-wandering undertaken by the control condition, p = .92, mean 
4
4.5
5
5.5
6
6.5
Distraction Acceptance Control
R
e
p
o
rt
e
d
 D
iv
e
rs
io
n
 F
ro
m
 T
h
re
at
s
High-Threat 
Low-Threat
136 
 
difference = .11, SE = .30. There was a non-significant trend towards a difference between 
participants in the acceptance and the control conditions in the direction predicted, with 
the acceptance conditions reporting less diversion of attention from feelings than the 
control, p = .088, mean difference = .-52, SE = .30. Hence, the post hoc analyses did not 
support the prediction that participants engaging in distraction diverted their attention 
away from their feelings, but that acceptance led to increased focus towards feelings. 
  A 2 X 3 ANOVA was used on participants’ scores from item 3; “I thought about 
things other than the impromptu speech/ short film clip” to test the prediction that 
individuals engaging in the distraction task would divert their attention away from the 
upcoming threat-related thoughts and to other topics more than the acceptance and 
control conditions. Results showed no significant main effect of threat level, F(1, 174) = 
1.14, p = .29, ηp
2 = .007, and no interaction between threat level and regulation( F < 1, ns). 
The simple main effect of threat within the mind-wandering conditions was not significant, 
t(58) = .1, p = .92, d = .02. There was a significant main effect of regulation strategy F(2, 
174) = 3.74, p = .026, ηp
2 = .041. Contrary to the predictions LSD post hoc tests showed that 
those in the  distraction condition did not report significantly more attentional diversion 
from threats than acceptance, p = .65, mean difference = .13, SE = .29, and reported 
significantly less diversion of attention to threat than the control condition, p = .036, mean 
difference = .-62, SE = .29. The acceptance conditions also self-reported less diversion of 
attention away from threat-related thoughts than the control conditions, p = .011, mean 
difference = -.75, SE = .30. Hence, distraction was not effective at reducing participants’ 
attention to threat-related thoughts relative to acceptance and the control condition. 
Rather, when observing the results across both threat levels, it was the control conditions 
that attended away from the threat-related thoughts. When testing the impacts of the 
regulatory strategies within the each threat level, it was demonstrated that the impacts of 
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distraction on threat-related thoughts came mainly from the high-threat level, with 
distraction reporting less attention diversion from threat-related thoughts relative to 
control in the high-threat level,  t(58) = -2.50, p = .015 , d = -.49, however,  no difference 
between the distraction and the control condition was noted in the low-threat level, t(58) = 
-.69, p = .49 , d = -.18, -.49.  
Validity of Items Reflecting Regulation Strategies: The nine items representing the 
maladaptive strategies, formed three ES, consisting  of three items each (worry, items 10-
12; rumination, items 13-15; and suppression, items 16-18. The internal consistency of 
each of the maladaptive experimental scales was, worry, α= .89; rumination, α = .76; and 
suppression, α = .74. The items for each subscale were averaged to produce a composite 
score.  
The composite scores for each of the ES were correlated with each other and with 
their parent scales to provide some evidence of validity of the measures. It was predicted 
that the ES representing the maladaptive regulation strategies of worry, rumination and 
suppression would show a moderate positive correlation with each other, the strongest 
being between worry and rumination. Each of the maladaptive ES was also predicted to 
correlate most strongly with its respective parent scale, and the same pattern of 
correlations amongst the experimental scales was expected within the parent scale (i.e., 
suppression ES should correlate most highly with the WBSI). The predictions were 
supported with the correlations between the ES in the pattern predicted (highest 
correlation between worry and rumination) and the correlations between the ES was 
highest with their respective parent scalesw (see Table 5.1). Hence, these results provide 
                                                          
w
 Items in the worry and suppression experimental scales did not overlap with the parent 
scales of, PSWQ and the WBSI respectively. However, the items forming the rumination 
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good evidence to suggest the ES show convergent validity, and therefore provide 
reasonable measures of the constructs of worry, rumination and suppression used during 
the regulatory period.    
Table 5.1. 
Correlation Coefficients Between the Items Reflecting Maladaptive Regulatory Attempts.   
Items 1. 2. 3. 4. 5. 6. 
1. Worry (ES)       
2. Rumination (ES) .57**      
3. Suppression (ES)  .46** .39**     
4. PSWQ .29** .28** .25**    
5.RRS  .23** .31** .24** .48**   
6. WBSI .25** .21** .30** .62** .51**  
** indicates p<.01.  
Distraction and Acceptance effects on Maladaptive Regulatory Attempts: To test 
the threat and regulatory hypotheses in influencing engagement in the maladaptive 
strategies, comparisons between the conditions are required. The means and standard 
error for each of the between group conditions are presented in Figures 5.4., 5. 5. and 5.6. 
                                                                                                                                                                    
experimental scale did directly overlap with Items 5, 10 and 16) in the RRS. Correlations involving 
the RRS were undertaken with these items removed.   
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Figure 5.4. Mean Reported Worry on ES (error bars represent SE). 
 
Figure 5.5. Mean Reported Rumination on ES (error bars represent SE). 
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Figure 5.6. Mean Reported Suppression on ES (error bars represent SE). 
The hypotheses stated that distraction in particular would minimise the occurrence 
of thoughts that were reflective of the engagement in worry. To test this hypothesis, a 2 
(threat level) x3 (regulation strategy) ANOVA was conducted on participants’ scores from 
the experimental worry subscale. The result showed a main effect of threat only F(1, 174) 
=39.17, p < .001, ηp
2 =.184. As predicted, the high-threat conditions reported increased 
worry. The hypothesised main effect of regulation did not occur, F(2, 174) =1.24, p = .29, 
ηp
2 = .014, nor did the interaction between threat level and regulation strategy, F(2, 174) = 
.37, p = .69, ηp
2 =.004. Hence, the results showed that only threat level influenced 
engagement in worry, and the regulation strategies of distraction and acceptance had no 
effect on the level of engagement in worry.     
It was hypothesised that distraction would particularly limit engagement in 
rumination. To test this hypothesis, a 2 X 3 ANOVA was used on participants’ scores from 
the experimental rumination subscale. Results showed only a significant main effect of 
threat level, F(1, 174) = 14.17, p < .001, ηp
2 =.075. As predicted, the high-threat conditions 
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reported increased ruminative thoughts.  Contrary to the predictions, there was no 
significant main effect of regulation strategy, F(2, 174) =.71, p = .49, ηp
2 =.008, or 
interaction between threat level and regulation strategy F(2, 174) = .13, p = .88, ηp
2 =.002. 
These results showed that the predominant influence on rumination was threat level, and 
that the regulation strategies of distraction and acceptance had little influence over the 
extent to which rumination was reported by participants.  
A third hypothesis predicted that acceptance would limit the engagement in 
attempts to suppress thoughts and feelings. To test this hypothesis, participants’ self-
reports from the experimental suppression subscale were subjected to the same 2 X 3 
ANOVA. The results showed a only significant main effect of threat level, F(1, 174) =9.92, p 
= .002, ηp
2 = .054. As predicted, the high-threat conditions reported increased use of 
suppression of feelings. The hypothesised main effect of regulation strategy was not 
significant, F(2, 174) =.59, p = .56, ηp
2 =.007, nor was the interaction between threat level 
and regulation strategy F(2, 174) =1.59, p = .21, ηp
2 =.018. These results show that threat 
increased efforts to suppress feelings and the regulation strategies of distraction and 
acceptance did not significantly reduce the level of engagement in suppression.  
  Blind Coder Classification: Coders each correctly classified 97% of the cases 
(kappa’s coefficient = .90), of which 100% of distraction and mind-wandering cases were 
correctly classified. In contrast 90% of the acceptance cases were correctly classified, with 
each coder incorrectly classifying a different case as representing the mind-wandering 
condition. 
Regulation Instructions Quiz: The quiz assessed whether the regulation instructions 
were followed. This allowed us to assess whether the above results regarding limited 
impact of the regulation conditions on the level of engagement in maladaptive regulatory 
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attempts reported by participants was attributable to participant non-compliance with the 
regulation instructions. Because each strategy had a different quiz (and these were not 
equated for difficulty), the only valid comparisons were across threat levels. Threat level 
was the primary predictor of the engagement in maladaptive regulatory attempts. To rule 
out the threat level impeding the participants’ ability to follow the regulation instructions, a 
2 (threat level) X 3 (regulation strategy) ANOVA (ignoring the main effect of regulation 
strategy) was used to assess whether the threat level impacted on the ability of 
participants to follow the regulation instructions. See Table 5.2 for means and standard 
deviations for each condition).  
Table 5.2. 
Mean Quiz Performance for Each Condition 
                   Threat Level 
 High-Threat Low-Threat Regulation Total 
Distraction 9.50 (.77) 9.43 (.94) 9.47 (.85) 
Acceptance 8.44 (1.29) 8.58 (1.40) 8.51 (1.33) 
Control 6.53 (1.55) 6.63 (1.59) 6.58 (1.55) 
Threat Total 8.16 (1.74) 8.21 (1.77)  
Figures in parentheses indicate SD 
It can be seen from Table 5.2 that both distraction and acceptance conditions 
averaged a score above 8, with the quiz consisting of 10 questions, suggesting a high level 
of accuracy in remembering the regulation instructions. Results from the ANOVA showed 
that there was no main effect of threat level, F(1, 174) = .08, p = .77, ηp
2 < .001, and no 
interaction between threat level and regulation strategy, F(2, 174) = .10, p = .90, ηp
2 = .001. 
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These results suggest that the threat level had no influence on any of the regulatory 
conditions in being able to remember the regulation instructions. 
Follow-Up Analyses: It is possible that a significant number of the participants in 
the distraction and acceptance conditions were not complying with the regulatory 
instructions due to increased engagement in maladaptive regulatory attempts. To test this 
possibility, the scores for the three ES measuring the maladaptive regulatory attempts 
were correlated with the regulation strategy quiz scores within distraction and acceptance 
conditions. The results showed that none of the items significantly correlated with quiz 
performance, r < .15, ns, showing no support for the possibility that the engagement in the 
maladaptive regulation attempts influenced participants’ compliance with the regulation 
thinking task instructions.  
It is possible that participants in the distraction conditions were not focusing on the 
audio regulation instructions during the thinking period, as participants had reported not 
diverting their attention away from thoughts about the threats (results from item 3). To 
rule out this possibility, the distraction participants’ scores from item 3 were correlated 
with their quiz performance scores. If participants were thinking about the threat, 
particularly those doing the speech, to the detriment of following along to the regulation 
instructions then there should be a significant positive correlation between participants’ 
self-reported attention diversion from threat-related thoughts and their performance on 
the regulation thinking period quiz. The results showed, a weak non-significant positive 
correlation, r(60) = .11, p = .42, that was stronger in the high-threat level r(30) =  .26, p = 
.16, therefore suggesting the possibility that participants in the distraction condition were 
having difficulty sustaining attentional diversion from threats that impacted on their ability 
to listen the distracting audio content.  
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5.3. Discussion 
The current study tested the extent to which distraction and acceptance altered 
attentional focus. It also validated groups of items that formed scales representing 
spontaneously initiated maladaptive regulatory attempts during the experiment. These 
items were then used to test the extent to which distraction and acceptance reduced the 
engagement in these maladaptive regulatory attempts.   
Firstly, it was hypothesised that increased threat would lead to less ignoring of 
threat-related thoughts and feelings, and that this would primarily be noted within the two 
control conditions. However, threat level had little influence on attentional diversion from 
threats across regulatory conditions and the control conditions did not demonstrate 
increased threat leading less attentional diversion. These results suggest that threat level 
does not alter the extent to which attention is diverted from these anticipated threat-tasks 
over an extended duration.   
Secondly, distraction was predicted to reduce attention towards the affective 
response and that acceptance would increase attention to the affective response relative 
to the mind-wandering control condition. The results showed that, as predicted, 
participants in the distraction condition self-reported significantly less attention to their 
affective response than those in the acceptance condition. However, there was no 
difference between distraction and control conditions.  These results suggest that 
distraction did not necessarily decrease attention towards the affective experience. 
Furthermore, the participants in the acceptance condition reported attending to their 
feelings more than the control condition, yet this difference only trended towards 
significance.  Hence, the results supported the conceptualisation of distraction, acceptance 
and mind-wandering as differing in attentional focus. However, distraction did not 
decrease attention to the affective response relative to the mind-wandering control 
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condition. Rather, it was most likely that acceptance was effective in increasing attention 
towards the affective response.   
Thirdly, the distraction condition was hypothesised to focus attention on thoughts 
that were unrelated to the anticipated threats more than the acceptance and control 
conditions. Contrary to this hypothesis, the distraction group reported focusing on 
thoughts unrelated to the threats to the same extent as the acceptance group. 
Furthermore, the distraction group also reported significantly less attention to thoughts 
unrelated to threats than the control group. Participants within the distraction condition 
were instructed to focus on generating responses for the upcoming writing task and yet 
there was no evidence that their thoughts about this task displaced thoughts regarding the 
upcoming threats. Unexpectedly, the control condition focused attention away from the 
threats more than the distraction condition. Thoughts about the anticipated speech task 
drew greater attention than the anticipated film clip in the distraction condition. Further 
analyses were conducted to determine whether participants’ increased attention to 
anticipated threat-task-related thoughts within the distraction condition were due to a 
failure to assimilate the regulation instructions. Performance on the regulation task quiz 
was lower among those reporting poor compliance with the instruction to divert attention 
away from the up-coming event. These results suggest that, although the distraction task 
created an alternative attentional focus, participants may have had difficulty sustaining 
attention to the distraction task and were drawn to thoughts about the anticipated threats. 
Additionally, the alternative focus and associated thoughts were not sufficient to replace 
thoughts about the threats any more than the acceptance or the control conditions. Rather 
the opposite occurred, with the distraction task leading to more threat-related thoughts, 
suggestive of a paradoxical effect (Wegner, 1994) or disruptive effect (Knight et al., 2007; 
Mather & Knight, 2005). These paradoxical or disruptive effects were inferred on the basis 
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that the control conditions across both high and low levels of threat were already 
effectively actively diverting attention from the impending threat-tasks. Imposing an 
attentional load concurrently with these spontaneously initiated attentional diversion 
process, that were likely to require significant cognitive control to be effective (Knight et 
al., 2007; Mather & Knight, 2005), disrupted these spontaneous attentional diversion 
process, resulting in paradoxical effects of increased attention to threats.  
These results oppose the conceptualisation of distraction, as the engagement in a 
task with an alternative attentional focus that imposes a cognitive load (Van Dillen & Koole, 
2007), as an effective means of diverting attention in situations where there is natural 
tendency for attention to engage or be continually drawn to threats. Previous research 
evaluating distraction has not asked participants to self-report their perceived level of 
attention to threats. Although some previous studies had some indication of the level of 
performance in the distraction tasks (Bloom et al., 1977; Van Dillen & Koole, 2007), this 
performance did not directly indicate whether or not participants’ attention to task-related 
thoughts limited their attention to threat-related thoughts and thus limit the reliability of 
these studies’ claims about why those engaging in distracting tasks may have resulted in 
reduced reported affect.  
The ES constructed to measure maladaptive regulatory attempts during the 
regulatory period were validated through assessing their association with each other, and 
with previously well-validated measures of individuals’ predisposition to engage in 
maladaptive regulatory attempts. Based on previous studies that used well-validated trait 
measures of the constructs and investigated the association between the maladaptive 
strategies, it was hypothesised that there would be a moderate positive association 
between the scales used to measure the maladaptive regulatory attempts of worry, 
rumination and suppression. This hypothesis was confirmed with results showing highly 
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significant positive correlations that were of moderate strength between each of the ES 
reflecting the maladaptive strategies. As predicted, the highest correlations were between 
the worry and rumination scales, followed by the thought and feeling suppression scales. 
Furthermore, each of the ES correlated most highly with their respective parent scale, even 
when items sharing similar wording were removed. Moreover, the same pattern of 
correlations shown by the ES was reflected in the parent scales. The results from both the 
ES and parent scales were consistent with other studies (Crowe et al., 2007; Erskine et al., 
2007; Fresco et al., 2002) and support the validity of the ES in reflecting the maladaptive 
regulatory attempts.  
Distraction and acceptance have been proposed to achieve reductions in 
unpleasant affect by counteracting and limiting the use of the maladaptive regulatory 
attempts (Hofmann & Asmundson, 2008; Lyubomirsky & Nolen-Hoeksema, 1993; Van 
Dillen & Koole, 2007). Contrary to these predictions, the regulation strategies of distraction 
and acceptance had limited influence over the extent to which participants engaged in the 
maladaptive regulatory attempts of worry, rumination or the suppression of thoughts and 
feelings. These results challenge the notion that distraction reduces perseverative 
responses (Lyubomirsky & Nolen-Hoeksema, 1993; Van Dillen & Koole, 2007), and that 
acceptance reduces attempts at suppression (Hofmann & Asmundson, 2008). Importantly, 
as the threat level was the sole determinant of engagement in the maladaptive regulatory 
attempts, the results were supportive of Lazarus and Folkman’s (1984) prediction that the 
threat level dictates engagement in the maladaptive regulatory attempts. Further analyses 
were used to test the possible explanation that threat reduced the participants’ ability to 
engage in the manipulated regulation strategies of distraction and acceptance. However, 
participants in the high- and low-threat conditions did not perform differently in the 
regulation quiz testing the memory and understanding of the regulation instructions. These 
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results suggest that threat did not undermine participant performance of the manipulated 
regulation strategies.  
There are two possible explanations for distraction and acceptance not limiting the 
use of the maladaptive regulatory attempts. The first is that the imposition of a threat is 
usually spontaneously accompanied by maladaptive regulatory attempts (Johns et al., 
2008; Lazarus & Folkman, 1984) and these attempts may not consume significant online 
attentional capacity (Geisler, Vennewald, Kubiak, & Weber, 2010). Therefore, initiation of 
adaptive strategies that require online attentional capacity cannot restrict engagement in 
the maladaptive strategies that do not require this online attentional capacity. 
Nevertheless, some previous studies have demonstrated that these maladaptive strategies 
do limit online attentional capacity (S. Hayes et al., 2008; Rapee, 1993; Richards & Gross, 
2000), which undermines this interpretation. The second and more likely explanation is 
that the spontaneous attempts to divert attention from threats undertaken in the mind-
wandering condition in the high-threat level required a large quantity of online resources 
to control attention (Knight et al., 2007; Mather & Knight, 2005), similar to imposed 
regulation strategies, and thus restricted engagement in maladaptive regulatory attempts 
to a similar extent to the imposed regulatory strategies.  
From a methodological perspective, there are two possible explanations for why 
previous studies have not falsified the claim that experimentally imposed adaptive 
strategies limit maladaptive regulatory attempts. The first is that previous studies 
evaluating the effectiveness of distraction have used other procedures to manipulate and 
induce affect, such as a movie (Sheppes & Meiran, 2007) or music (Blagden & Craske, 1996) 
or pictures (Van Dillen & Koole, 2007) and these affect manipulations may not 
spontaneously initiate these maladaptive attempts. Therefore, the reductions in affect 
noted in earlier studies evaluating distraction may not necessarily have been due to the 
149 
 
engagement in a distraction task limiting the engagement in the maladaptive strategies. 
The second methodological explanation is that other studies evaluating the regulation 
strategies typically manipulate engagement in the strategies after the threat event has 
passed, effectively investigating whether a strategy promotes recovery (Low et al., 2008; 
Wong & Moulds, 2009) in contrast to the present study, which has evaluated the strategies 
during the anticipation of a threat.  Anticipated threats are likely to result in spontaneously 
initiated maladaptive regulatory attempts (Lazarus & Folkman, 1984). However, where the 
threat event has passed (Low et al., 2008; Wong & Moulds, 2009), the spontaneously 
initiated maladaptive regulatory attempts may be less likely to be actively maintained and, 
thus, more easily replaced with more adaptive strategies. Hence, the means via which the 
strategies promote affective recovery when a threat event has passed may be different 
from the means by which the strategies achieve a reduction in anxious affect when a 
perceived threat remains.  
The current study has several methodological limitations. Firstly, all participants’ 
self-reports were retrospective and therefore may not have been as accurate as reporting 
their attentional focus or engagement in maladaptive regulatory attempts during the 
thinking regulatory period itself. In addition, the small number of items used to measure 
attentional focus and maladaptive regulatory engagement may also contributed to sub-
optimal measurement. These problems in measurement may have made it more difficult to 
detect differences amongst the regulatory conditions.    
Importantly, the distraction task employed to facilitate the diversion of attention 
away from threat-related thoughts may not have demanded sufficient attentional 
resources to completely divert participants’ attention. Van Dillen and Koole (2007) 
demonstrated that when participants completed more complex arithmetic problems 
requiring greater working memory capacity whilst simultaneously viewing affect-inducing 
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pictures, they reported experiencing less negative affect than when completing problems 
requiring less working memory capacity. Similarly, Blagden and Craske (1996) 
demonstrated that when participants had to navigate their way around a room to complete 
a card sorting task, they reported less anxiety than those who completed the task without 
having to move around the room. Hence, both studies suggest that making the distraction 
task more complex and demanding of working memory capacity would make the 
manipulation, and therefore the strategy, more effective. The current study did not use a 
typical working memory task, with a known high level of task load, or ask the participants 
to move around (due to the confounds this may have on physiology) and may not have 
provided the most effective form of distraction.  
In conclusion, these results provide unique insights on issues that have not been 
explored to date regarding the influence distraction and acceptance have on attentional 
focus and the engagement in maladaptive regulation strategies. There was support for 
distraction reducing attention towards affective responses relative to acceptance, but not 
in reducing attention to threat-related thoughts. However, there was support for 
acceptance increasing attentional focus towards affective responses relative to distraction 
and to a lesser extent mind-wandering. These results are important because they suggest 
that distraction and acceptance create different enough impacts on attentional focus so as 
to test the predictions of theories claiming that experiencing affect and integrating such 
affect with reason is necessary for eventually reducing the experiencing of affect 
(Greenberg, 2004; Greenberg & Paivio, 1997). The items and resulting ES, developed to 
measure use of the maladaptive strategies of worry, rumination and suppression, showed 
convergent validity with each other and their parent scales. Most significant was the 
finding that neither distraction nor acceptance instructions had any measurable influence 
over reported engagement in maladaptive regulatory attempts. Future research, 
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undertaken in chapter 6 of this thesis, will evaluate both distraction and acceptance under 
threat circumstances to determine if, despite the strategies not limiting the engagement in 
the maladaptive regulatory attempts, they are indeed effective in reducing anxious affect.  
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Chapter 6: To Distract or to Accept: 
Which Strategy is More Effective in 
Reducing Anxiety? 
As discussed in chapter 2, many situations can invoke anxiety and stress. Such 
situations include a job interview, an examination, public speaking or asking a romantic 
interest out for a date. Due to the possibility of rejection or negative evaluation by others, 
these situations challenge and threaten positive self-perceptions (i.e., represent ego-
threat). Due to the uncontrollability and uncertainty of the outcomes when entering these 
situations, the behavioural actions available may not prevent or remove the possibility of 
negative outcomes. Importantly, the anxious response that these threats generate can 
coincide with self-focused attention (Carver & Scheier, 1988) and appraisals of such 
affective responses as inappropriate and/or unhelpful (Heimberg & Becker, 2002). This self-
focused attention and evaluative appraisal of affective responses can undermine attempts 
to achieve positive interpersonal outcomes in such situations (Lyubomirsky & Nolen-
Hoeksema, 1995) and exacerbate the anxious affect experienced (Heimberg & Becker, 
2002). Behavioural avoidance strategies may limit an individual in pursuing their personal 
goals. In contrast,  adopting particular mental approaches, involving the control of 
attention and thought (i.e., cognitive regulation strategies) may enable effective reductions 
in anxious affect (Garnefski et al., 2001; Gross & Thompson, 2007; Kamholz et al., 2006; 
Lazarus & Folkman, 1984) whilst maintaining the ability to pursue personal goals in ego-
threatening environments.  
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There are many different cognitive regulation strategies available that may reduce 
anxious affect (Garnefski et al., 2001; Gross & Thompson, 2007; Kamholz et al., 2006; 
Lazarus & Folkman, 1984). Some of these strategies have been promoted as effective in 
reducing anxious affect (i.e., adaptive) and others have been demonstrated to be 
counterproductive (i.e., maladaptive). The allocation of attentional focus has been 
identified as a way of contrasting both adaptive and maladaptive strategies, with 
attentional focus away from threats and affect sometimes promoted as adaptive (Gross & 
Thompson, 2007; Lyubomirsky & Nolen-Hoeksema, 1993; Morrow & Nolen-Hoeksema, 
1990; Nolen-Hoeksema, 1991; Pyszczynski & Greenberg, 1987; Wegner, 1994). However, 
other researchers have conceptualised the attempt to avoid the experience of unpleasant 
affect as maladaptive (Borkovec et al., 2004; Greenberg, 2004; Greenberg & Paivio, 1997; S. 
C. Hayes, 2004a).  Hence, there are opposing theoretical positions on how effective a 
strategy will be if attention is focused away from affect (i.e., attentional diversion through 
distraction) as opposed to focusing attention towards these internal experiences (i.e., 
experiential observation and acceptance). The focus of this chapter is to test whether 
attention towards or away from an affective experience during the anticipation of a threat 
is more effective in reducing anxious affect. 
6.1. The Affect Regulation Theories 
There are two affect regulation theories that make opposing predictions regarding 
the optimal focus of attention for the effective self-regulation of unwanted affect. Both 
theories have been applied to a range of affective experiences, including anxiety and stress. 
The first is Gross and Thompson’s modal model (2007), presented in, section 2.2.1. This 
model conceptualises affect regulation in a way that can be applied to many situations and 
affect regulation strategies. The modal model makes the prediction that removing one’s 
attentional focus from affect-eliciting stimuli can reduce sustained unpleasant affect. The 
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modal model predicts that, for an affective response to be initiated, a situation that may 
cause anxiety must first be consciously attended to and then appraised as harmful. Thus, 
attention deployment is a necessary precondition for any affective response to be initiated. 
Over time, a situation may elicit several affective responses; moreover, the first, or 
primary, affective response can form part of the situation. Hence, this affective response 
can also be attended to by the individual and appraised as either harmless or harmful. If 
the affective response is appraised as harmful, and is continually attended, then this 
deployment of attention can lead to the continuation or intensification of affective 
responses that are of similar valence to the primary affective response. Furthermore, if the 
initial stimulus that caused the primary affective response is continually attended to and 
perceived as harmful, this is also likely to lead to the continuation and intensification of 
anxious affect. However, if the threatening stimulus and the associated affective response 
are not attended, then there is no opportunity for the threatening stimuli and associated 
affective response to be perceived as harmful. The key premise behind the modal model is 
that if attention is not deployed to the stimuli (i.e., external events, or internal thoughts 
and feelings) that are causing or sustaining the affective responses, then the possible 
trajectory of continuation or intensification of that affective response is thwarted.  
The second affect regulation model is Greenberg and Paivio’s (2004; 1997) process 
of a feeling, previously presented in section 2.2.2. In contrast to the modal model, the 
process of a feeling model emphasises the need for increased conscious awareness and 
attention towards the affective experience in order for an unwanted affective response to 
reach completion. Completion, according to Greenberg and Paivio would mean that affect 
is integrated with reason and language resulting in an alternative affective state of a 
different valence.  Greenberg and Paivio (1997) predict that the increased experience of 
affect and integrating this affect with one’s knowledge and expression of themselves will 
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achieve the completion of that affective response. Hence, the process of a feeling model 
predicts that avoiding attending to the emergence and presence of an affective response 
would impede the affective experience from reaching completion, and thus only 
perpetuate unwanted affect.  
Both the modal model and the process of a feeling model have empirical support 
for when increased or reduced affect may occur. Studies providing empirical support for 
the predictions of the modal model regarding the focus of attention have used 
experimentally manipulated regulation strategies. This typically involves a manipulation to 
induce affective arousal followed by the engagement in a regulation strategy. The 
distraction condition provides participants with an attention-consuming task suggested to 
facilitate the allocation of attention away from thoughts and feelings related to the 
affective response or affective material, following the exposure to an affect eliciting 
stimulus. This distraction condition is typically contrasted with a strategy that involves 
participants focusing on their feelings and analysing why they feel they way they do and 
why they tend to react this way (i.e., the strategy of rumination) rather than a control 
condition with no attentional focus instructions (Blagden & Craske, 1996; Lyubomirsky & 
Nolen-Hoeksema, 1993; Rusting & Nolen-Hoeksema, 1998; Trask & Sigmon, 1999). Such 
studies typically show that those engaging in a distraction task report less unpleasant affect 
and show reduced physiological arousal than those engaging in the rumination task.  Other 
studies supporting the use of distraction have manipulated attentional focus at the same 
time that the affect induction occurs (watching content whilst doing math problems or 
thinking of alternative topics), and this condition is compared to control condition that 
involves no instructed attentional focus (Van Dillen & Koole, 2007), or a proposed adaptive 
condition, with such studies finding that distraction reduces reported affect and results in 
decreased arousal (Sheppes et al., 2009; Sheppes & Meiran, 2007). These, more recent 
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studies showing support for distraction did not evaluate distraction in anticipated threat 
circumstances. An older study by Bloom, Houston, Holmes and Burish (1977)  evaluating 
distraction under anticipated threat circumstances showed beneficial results for distraction 
relative to a reappraisal condition (i.e., reinterpreting the threat as less harmful). However 
the manipulation of regulation in this study involved an imbalance in the physical and social 
demands placed on participants that may have reduced the validity of the results.  
In contrast to the modal model, evidence in support of the process of a feeling 
model regarding awareness and attention to affect is provided mostly by studies using 
samples of individuals who are anxious repressors.  Individuals who are high-anxious 
repressors report low levels of anxiety and also report trying to present as socially desirable 
(Crowne & Marlowe, 1960; Derakshan & Eysenck, 2001a), however, they also respond to 
threats with increased physiological arousal and parasympathetic withdrawal (Derakshan & 
Eysenck, 2001a, 2001b; Fuller, 1992). Anxious repressor individuals thus show limited 
conscious awareness or willingness to recognise that they are experiencing particular 
affective responses. This interpretation of limited conscious awareness is based on the 
discrepancy high-anxious repressors show between physiological responding  indicators of 
anxious responding and  their self-reported anxious responses during stressful events in 
contrast to high-anxious and truly low-anxious controls (Asendorpf & Scherer, 1983; 
Derakshan & Eysenck, 2001a), whose physiological response is consistent with their self-
reported response. Similar discrepancies have been noted between behavioural/facial 
expression of emotions and reported affect by high-anxious repressors (Asendorpf & 
Scherer, 1983). These discrepancies between response types were suggested to result from 
decreased attention towards their affective responses occurring even under experimental 
manipulations designed to encourage repressor individuals to focus their attention on their 
affective responses (Derakshan & Eysenck, 2001b). Such suggestions have been further 
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supported with repressors reporting actively self-initiating attention to distracting thoughts 
in a dichotic listening task rather than attending to affective stimuli, presumably in an 
unconscious effort to avoid the experience of unpleasant affect (Bonanno et al., 1991). 
A further test of the process of a feeling model comes from the cognitive regulation 
strategy of experiential acceptance. This strategy involves the allocation of attention 
towards the affective experience (Hofmann & Asmundson, 2008). Unlike rumination or 
suppression, experiential acceptance is defined as involving the allocation of attention 
towards the affective response in a non-judgemental, non-reactive way (S. C. Hayes, 2004a; 
Roemer & Orsillo, 2009). Thus, the strategy of acceptance appears to achieve reductions in 
anxious affect in the opposite way to attentional diversion (i.e., via increased attention and 
awareness rather diverted attention and reduced awareness). As acceptance brings 
attention towards affect without judgement, it is more likely that this will facilitate a 
process of integrating the affective experience with reason, a process that is predicted to 
lead to the completion of affective response by the process of a feeling model. Hence, the 
strategy of acceptance provides the opportunity to test the predictions of the process of a 
feeling model against another strategy that also has possible therapeutic effects in threat 
situations - distraction.  
Studies investigating the effectiveness of the strategy of acceptance using student 
samples have found that those engaging in acceptance show reduced heart rate (HR) 
relative to comparison conditions that encouraged the use of pre-identified maladaptive 
regulatory strategies and showed equally reduced HR to pre-identified adaptive 
approaches such as reappraisal (Hofmann et al., 2009; Low et al., 2008).  Furthermore, 
consistent with the predictions of the process of a feeling model, Low et al.’s study showed 
that acceptance took more than 10 minutes of engagement to show reductions in HR 
relative to a condition in which participants were asked to engage in evaluative thoughts. 
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Both Hofmann et al.’s and Low et al.’s studies measured subjective (i.e., self-reported) 
affect and showed that acceptance did not differ from the maladaptive regulation 
conditions, following the strategies engagement (Low et al., 2008), or during engagement 
in the different experimental phases (anticipation, speech, recovery; Hofmann et al., 2009). 
Hence, these studies show discrepancies between measures, with HR showing reductions 
consistent with the process of a feeling model, but self-reported affect not decreasing, 
complementing the repression studies (physiology consistent self-report inconsistent). One 
reason for this discrepancy between HR and self-report measures of affect is that 
acceptance involves focusing on affective states, so it is likely that participants are 
increasingly aware of their feelings and, therefore, report higher levels than expected 
based on their physiology.  
6.2. Why Might the Circumstance Under Which Regulation is Undertaken 
Influence the Effectiveness of the Strategy? 
 It has been demonstrated that situations involving the continued presence of high-
threat often result in steadily increasing affect (Fuller, 1992; Monat et al., 1972).  High 
levels of threat have been demonstrated to limit the ability to successfully divert attention 
whilst moderate level threats have been demonstrated as more easily ignored (Wilson & 
MacLeod, 2003). Despite such difficulty in controlling attention away from threats when 
anxious (Bar-Haim et al., 2007), most healthy individuals spontaneously seek to inhibit their 
awareness of threats (Derryberry & Reed, 2002; Ellenbogen et al., 2002; Koster et al., 2006; 
MacLeod et al., 1986) to avoid experiencing unpleasant affect (Mogg & Bradley, 1998). This 
attentional diversion has been suggested to be achieved by spontaneously mentally 
disengaging and initiating self-distraction (Carver & Scheier, 1988; Wicklund, 1975).  
The direction to engage in the strategy of distraction and the provision of an 
attention-consuming task may facilitate the process of self-initiated mental distraction, 
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rather than merely eliminate the opportunity to engage in worry or rumination. Despite 
this suggestion, it has been demonstrated that individuals who simultaneously try to 
reduce attention to affect-causing stimuli (Cornwell et al., 2011; Knight et al., 2007; Mather 
& Knight, 2005) or to reduce negative affect (Wegner et al., 1993), whilst maintaining 
threat-irrelevant stimuli within working memory, show impaired attentional diversion from 
affective stimuli such that attention reverts to the very stimuli sought to be inhibited and 
increased affect results. Thus, diverting attention from threats and affect via undertaking 
an attention-consuming task may actually disrupt effective spontaneously initiated 
attentional diversion regulatory attempts that are moderately effective in ignoring threat-
related information and reducing affect.  
Regarding acceptance, it may be assumed by the process of a feeling model that for 
a feeling to reach completion, there must be significant affective arousal present that can 
be detected and attended to (Greenberg, 2004; Greenberg & Paivio, 1997). Hence, it may 
be that acceptance may only show reduced affect in circumstances of pre-existing 
significantly increased affective arousal, as opposed to situations of little affective arousal.  
Furthermore, it has been suggested that increased attention to the self can lead to 
increased unpleasant affect, due to automatically initiated evaluation of aspects of the self 
that are less than ideal (Duval & Wicklund, 1972; Wicklund, 1975). Hence, individuals 
engaging in acceptance in circumstances of little threat where only low levels of anxious 
affect may be initially present, may actually only demonstrate increased affect as these 
individuals become more self-aware.  
6.3. Limitations of Previous Research in Investigating Distraction and 
Acceptance  
Although there is research demonstrating support for the competing predictions of 
the modal model and the process of a feeling model, there are four limitations of this 
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previous research. These limitations include: (1) a lack of regulatory manipulations free 
from confounds such as differences in social and physical demands of the regulation task 
(particularly in the older studies evaluating the effectiveness of distraction); (2) the threat 
circumstances under which regulation is undertaken, (3) choice of suitable comparison 
conditions, and (4) the subsequent impacts of the strategies once they are no longer 
actively engaged in.  
Of the first limitation, older studies investigating the effectiveness of distraction in 
anticipated threat situations (Bloom et al., 1977; Houston & Holmes, 1974) have had 
methodological flaws in the way that the regulation strategies were manipulated. Houston 
and Holmes (1974) created an imbalance amongst the conditions regarding the physical 
and social demands imposed, with a distraction condition involving reading aloud with 
performance requirements versus a condition involving sitting still and using reappraisal. 
Bloom et al. (1977) created imbalance in physical demands with a condition involving 
reading quietly to facilitate the distraction versus a condition involving writing to facilitate 
reappraisal. Hence, these differing levels of social and physical demands of the 
manipulations of the regulation strategies, rather than a difference in the focus of attention 
or thinking, may have influenced the affective results as social and physical demands are 
known to increase the arousal of individuals (Berntson et al., 1997; Gramer, 2006).   
Secondly, a common issue that studies evaluating regulation strategies typically 
overlook is the circumstances under which the strategy is adopted. Many studies 
supporting the effectiveness of distraction in reducing anxiety, that are free from 
regulation manipulation confounds, have evaluated the effectiveness of distraction in 
reducing the residing affect once the affect inducing event has passed (Blagden & Craske, 
1996; Rusting & Nolen-Hoeksema, 1998; Wong & Moulds, 2009), or during the passive 
exposure to an affect eliciting stimulus (Sheppes et al., 2009; Sheppes & Meiran, 2007; Van 
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Dillen & Koole, 2007). Thus, these studies have not assessed distraction’s effectiveness in 
anticipated threat circumstances or where some performance requirement is anticipated in 
response to the affective stimulus. Furthermore, the beneficial effects of distraction and 
acceptance in reducing unpleasant affect have predominantly been demonstrated under 
highly affective arousing circumstances (Blagden & Craske, 1996; Hofmann et al., 2009; Low 
et al., 2008; Van Dillen & Koole, 2007; Wong & Moulds, 2009). Acceptance, has been 
recommended for a multitude of circumstances (S. C. Hayes, 2004b; Roemer & Orsillo, 
2009). However, the effectiveness of the strategies in less affectively arousing 
circumstances have not been established. 
Thirdly, of the studies supporting the use of distraction or acceptance, many have 
used a maladaptive strategy as one of the comparison conditions (Blagden & Craske, 1996; 
Hofmann et al., 2009; Low et al., 2008; Trask & Sigmon, 1999; Wong & Moulds, 2009). 
However, studies with the primary comparison condition involving a maladaptive strategy 
may be overstating the usefulness of distraction or acceptance as a strategy, as the 
strategies have not showed effectiveness relative to a neutral control condition or to an 
alternative strategy that may also be perceived as providing some benefit in reducing 
affect.  Many of the acceptance studies do evaluate acceptance relative to a comparison 
condition that may be considered as adaptive (Dunn et al., 2009; Hofmann et al., 2009; Low 
et al., 2008). Of the studies investigating distraction, only two studies (Sheppes et al., 2009; 
Sheppes & Meiran, 2007), which did not have an identified imbalance in physical or social 
demands of one regulatory condition, compared distraction to an alternative strategy that 
was expected to be beneficial (reappraisal). Although these two studies did show 
supportive results for distraction in reducing affect, they evaluated the extent to which 
distraction reduced sadness in response to a film clip, and not to anxiety reduction in an 
anticipated threat situation.  
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The fourth limitation of previous research relates to the evaluation of the 
strategies being limited to the time period during which individuals are directly engaging in 
them. Limiting evaluation only to the directed regulation period does not capture possible 
detrimental after-effects of the affect regulation strategies. A study by Dunn et al., (2009) 
assessed the longer term consequences of engaging in acceptance during a film clip and 
noted that participants in the acceptance condition showed increased reactivity to novel 
picture stimuli following engagement and reported increased affect at one week follow up. 
However, it was unclear if these detrimental effects of acceptance were due to the 
subsequently presented picture stimuli not being related to the film clip content 
participants were asked to regulate their responses towards. A study by Kamphuis Telch 
(2000) investigated the impacts of distraction engaged in during exposure to a feared 
situation, rather than in the anticipation of a stressful task. This study suggested that 
distraction subsequently led to substantial more fear when reintroduced to the feared 
situation for a second time. In contrast, a study by Trask and Sigmon (1999) suggested that 
prior distraction can protect against the impacts of subsequent engagement in rumination 
on negative affect, but this was in relation to depressed affect rather than anxious affect. 
Thus, the potential counterproductive distal consequences of engaging in distraction and 
acceptance during the anticipation of threats may only become evident when actually 
encountering those threats.  
6.4. Selection of Measures of Affect and Affect Regulation: HRV as a 
Indicator of Flexible Affect Regulation 
Objective and theoretically relevant measures to evaluate the effectiveness of the 
strategies are vital in determining their utility. Although self-report measures of affect are 
economical and represent the subjective component of affect, they are susceptible to 
experimental demand effects and social desirability effects (Asendorpf & Scherer, 1983; 
Derakshan & Eysenck, 2001a). Hence, there is an important role for objective measures of 
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affect, such as indicators of arousal including HR. However, it is sometimes difficult with 
regard to some objective measures (including autonomic and cognitive), to determine if 
they best represent affect or affect regulation (Appelhans & Luecken, 2006; Bar-Haim et al., 
2007; Johns et al., 2008). Importantly, measures of affect regulation may complement 
measures of affect in suggesting the mechanism by which reductions in affect are achieved.    
Ideally, an adaptive regulation strategy is one that supports a flexible and effective 
autonomic mechanism to inhibit arousal. The most flexible system that can rapidly control 
physiological anxious arousal is the parasympathetic nervous system via the vagus nerve 
(Porges, 2001, 2007). Unfortunately, heart rate alone does not necessarily represent just 
one autonomic system. However, central parasympathetic influences via the vagus nerve 
can be reflected through the beat-to-beat fluctuations of the heart, that is, heart rate 
variability (Berntson et al., 1997; Thayer et al., 2009). Increased vagal tone can be indicated 
by increased heart rate variability (HRV) on such metrics as root-mean-square-of-
successive-differences (RMSSD) indicating most rapid fluctuations in HR, occurring over 
about 2.40-6.70 seconds (Berntson et al., 1997). HRV metrics  have been suggested to 
provide an index of regulated emotional responding as they indicate the inhibition of fight 
or flight responding (Appelhans & Luecken, 2006; Thayer et al., 2009; Thayer & Lane, 2000). 
Supporting this suggestion is evidence showing that individuals predisposed to increased 
anxiety demonstrate lower vagal tone indicated by low HRV at rest relative to healthy 
controls (Austin et al., 2007; B. H. Friedman & Thayer, 1998; Lyonfields et al., 1995; Thayer 
et al., 1996; Weinberg, Klonsky, & Hajcak, 2009). Similarly, decreases in HRV have been 
demonstrated in individuals in threatening situations relative to those individuals who are 
not under threat, with individuals who show greater HRV also demonstrating superior 
performance in tasks requiring self-control in cognitive and behavioural domains (Croizet et 
al., 2004; S. C. Segerstrom & Solberg Nes, 2007). Hence, HRV has been used to provide an 
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indication of rapid and flexible regulation of arousal (Berntson et al., 1997; Berntson, 
Cacioppo, & Quigley, 1991; Thayer et al., 2009; Thayer & Lane, 2000), and the extent to 
which participants demonstrate effective self-control (Demaree et al., 2004; S. C. 
Segerstrom & Solberg Nes, 2007).  
A neurophysiological interpretation of HRV has been presented by Thayer and 
colleagues (Thayer et al., 2009; Thayer & Lane, 2000). They specifically implicate a group of 
neuroanatomical structures (e.g., orbito-frontal cortex, amygdala, hypothalamus, thalamus 
brainstem), referred to as the central autonomic network (CAN), that link the activity in the 
prefrontal cortex to the output of the heart, particularly HRV. Thayer and colleagues 
suggest that signals in this system flow bidirectionally. The first direction of influence is top-
down, with prefrontal cortex activity suppressing amygdala activation resulting in increased 
vagal tone and the inhibition of arousal. The second direction is bottom-up, with vagal 
inhibition and levels of arousal being relayed back to the prefrontal cortex (via the 
thalamus) increasing the level of activation in the prefrontal cortex.  
The ways in which distraction and acceptance impact the CAN may be reflected in 
HRV. Individuals prone to experiencing anxiety have difficulty in ignoring even moderate 
threats and may continually focus on such threats, which leads to increased amygdala 
activation, decreased prefrontal cortex activation and decreased vagal tone (Thayer et al., 
2009; Thayer & Lane, 2000). Hence, distraction, if successful in limiting attention to threats 
and physiological responding, may sustain activity in the prefrontal cortex by limiting 
continued attention to threats, which would inhibit amygdala activation, leading to 
sustained vagal tone and reduced arousal. In contrast, Thayer and Lane (2000) suggest that 
emotional awareness and emotional monitoring aid emotional processing,  assisting 
individuals in making sense of the situation, and acting in a regulated way. Therefore, if 
distraction led to decreased attention to feelings this may lead to dysregulation (decreased 
165 
 
vagal tone). If acceptance leads to increased emotional awareness this would be predicted 
to lead to increased integration of emotional information to the prefrontal cortex and lead 
more regulated responding to the environment (i.e., increased vagal tone).   
Despite the promise of HRV in evaluating the adaptiveness of a strategy, HRV 
indicators of vagal tone can be confounded by respiratory influences. The respiratory 
influences are particularly pertinent when observing HRV changes, as such changes could 
be due to changes in central parasympathetic activation or withdrawal (i.e., vagal tone) but 
might equally be due to changes in the pulmonary gating of central parasympathetic 
influences to the heart occurring due to changes in respiration (Berntson et al., 1997; 
Berntson, Cacioppo, & Quigley, 1993). During inhalation, the efferent parasympathetic 
influences towards the heart (i.e., vagal inhibition of HR) is temporarily gated off and are 
subsequently reinstated during exhalation.  Slower, deeper breathing increases HRV, not 
because it changes vagal tone, but due to the phasic process of slowed gating.  A slower 
gating process, as noted in slowed breathing, allows for higher peaks in HR (due to 
prolonged gating off of vagal inhibition of HR during longer inhalation) and lower troughs in 
HR (due to prolonged vagal inhibitive influence over HR with longer exhalation). This 
slowed gating can lead to the misinterpretation of HRV as indicating increased vagal tone 
(an increased parasympathetic influence) when there are only systematic differences in 
respiratory activity amongst experimental conditions (Berntson et al., 1997). Hence, 
respiration activity requires measurement to rule out respiratory changes confounding 
changes in HRV and changes being misattributed (Berntson et al., 1997). In addition, 
respiration can also be influenced by emotional states (Bloch, Lemeignan, & Aguilera, 1991; 
Wientjes, 1992). Previous research on HRV has treated respiratory variables as separate 
psychophysiological variables first that are then regressed on HRV changes to remove HRV 
fluctuations due to respiratory changes before comparing experimental conditions 
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(Althaus, Mulder, Mulder, van Roon, & Minderaa, 1998; Berntson et al., 1994; Wientjes, 
1992). 
6.5. The Present Research  
The present research aims to extend the understanding of the role attentional 
focus, towards affective responses, in effectively reducing anxious affect by answering six 
questions. First, is attentional focus away from anxious affect (i.e., distraction) more 
effective at reducing anxious affect than attentional focus towards anxious affect (i.e., 
acceptance)? Second, are the strategies effective in reducing affect during the period when 
participants actively engage in them while anticipating an imminent threat? Third, does the 
threat circumstance impact on the effectiveness of these strategies during their 
engagement? Fourth, does previous strategy engagement, during anticipation, influence 
affective reactivity and repair during the subsequent periods when participants encounter 
the threats and recover from them? Fifth, do distraction and acceptance have a different 
impact on different measures of affect (arousal, as indicated by HR versus the subjective 
experience of anxiety, as indicated via self-report). Sixth, do distraction and acceptance 
alter parasympathetic influences (i.e., HRV) over arousal? These questions are answered in 
two studies: study 6.1, investigating the influence of the strategies, during active 
engagement when anticipating threats, and; study 6.2, investigating the subsequent 
impacts of the strategies on affective reactivity and recovery from threats.  
  
6.6. Study 6.1: The Effectiveness of Distraction and Acceptance 
in Reducing Anxiety when Anticipating a Threat 
This study will evaluate the effectiveness of the regulatory strategies while 
participants anticipate engaging in one of two tasks designed to be perceived as high (i.e., 
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deliver an impromptu speech) or low (i.e., watch a film clip about UK tax law) ego-threat. 
Participants will engage in either distraction, acceptance, or mind-wandering (a control 
condition with no attentional focus) strategies for 15 minutes, giving them time to absorb 
themselves in the strategy. This 15-minute period will be split into three 5-minute epochsx 
to test the effects of the strategies over time.  Change from baseline scores will be used to 
demonstrate the impacts threats and regulation has on the affective variables.   
Firstly, there are three predictions regarding the impacts of threat. Firstly, 
increased threat is predicted to decrease HRV, increase HR, and increase reported affect 
independent of the regulatory strategies, throughout anticipation period. Secondly, that 
the control condition, in the high-threat condition, should show a gradual increase in HR 
over each successive 5-minute epoch, as the threat draws closer (Fuller, 1992; Monat et al., 
1972). Thirdly, the control condition in low-threat condition should show gradually 
reducing affect as the mind drifts and ignores the low level threat (Wilson & MacLeod, 
2003).   
There are a number of predictions regarding the impact of regulation, particularly 
in regard to the modal model. Firstly, the modal model predicts that, individuals in the 
distraction condition, assuming effective reducing attention to threats and affective 
responses, should show greater HRV than the mind-wandering control condition 
throughout regulation, in high-threat circumstances. Secondly, it predicts that engaging in 
distraction will lead to gradual decreases in HR over each successive 5-minute epoch in 
both threat levels. Lastly, the modal model predicts that distraction condition will report 
                                                          
x
 Five minutes is the recommended time period to calculate HRV indices (Berntson et al., 
1997; Task Force of the European Society of Cardiology and the North American Society of Pacing 
and Electrophysiology, 1996). 
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less anxious affect than the control condition. Together these predictions from the modal 
model will be referred to as the “effective distraction hypotheses”.  
In contrast to the modal model, the process of a feeling model predicts that the 
diversion of attention from an affective response to a distracting task should result in lower 
HRV throughout regulation, relative to acceptance and the control condition. Furthermore, 
distraction should result in a gradual increase in HR across successive epochs resulting in an 
increasing discrepancy in HR between it and the acceptance and control conditions. Lastly, 
according to the process of a feeling model, participants in the distraction condition should 
report more anxious affect following regulation than those in the acceptance and control 
conditions. Together these predictions from the process of a feeling model will be referred 
to as the “disruptive distraction hypotheses”.  
In addition, the process of a feeling model predicts that the acceptance condition 
will show greater HRV than the distraction and control conditions. Moreover, the pattern of 
HR results shown by the participants in the acceptance condition is predicted to start at a 
moderate level of HR, escalating to a peak, significantly above the control condition when 
participants are fully consumed in the strategy and asked to focus on unpleasant thought 
and feeling (i.e., occurring between 5-10 minutes), then subsiding to a lower level after 10 
minutes, so that the acceptance condition will show significantly lower HR than the 
distraction and control conditions in the last epoch. Participants in the acceptance 
condition are predicted to self-report less affect following regulation than the participants 
in the distraction and control conditions. Together, these predictions from the process of a 
feeling model will be referred to as the “effective acceptance hypotheses”.  
When taking into account the threat situation that the affect regulation strategies 
are undertaken in, the strategies are predicted to have different impacts on affect in each 
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threat circumstance. In the high-threat level, distraction is predicted to be less effective at 
reducing negative affect due to an individuals’ ability to ignore threat-relevant information 
and the ironic process associated with mental control and, therefore, should lead to 
increased affect relative to the other conditions. The impact ironic processes in low-threat 
levels should be reduced due to the improved ability to ignore even moderately 
threatening stimuli and therefore leading to improved effectiveness of distraction. Hence, 
in low-threat levels distraction should not differ from the control condition. In contrast, as 
it is assumed that a reasonable level of affect arousal is present first in the process of a 
feeling model, acceptance is predicted to eventually lead to decreased affect in the high-
threat level, but not be especially effective in reducing affect in the low-threat level, where 
the increased self-awareness, as a result of engaging in acceptance, is predicted to lead to 
increased affect relative to a control condition (i.e., a susceptible acceptance hypothesis).  
 
6.6.1. Method 
This study presents results from the HR, RR, HRV and SR affect measures taken 
during the baseline and regulation phases of the experimental procedure described in full 
detail in chapter 4. The phases under which the data were collected are highlighted in 
Figure 6.1. The design of the experiment involves three independent variables. The first 
independent variable is between subjects and involves the imposition of threat, consisting 
of two levels: high and low. The second independent variable manipulated between 
subjects is regulation strategy consisting of three levels: distraction, acceptance and mind-
wandering control. The third independent variable was time (a within subjects variable), 
where the regulatory period was split into three 5-minute epochs. Thus, these 
manipulations created a 2 (threat level) x3 (regulation strategy) x3 (time) mixed design. 
One hundred and eighty university students were randomly allocated to each of the six 
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between-subjects conditions. Analyses to determine pre-existing difference in affect were 
undertaken on the Strait-Trait Anxiety Inventory, Trait Version (STAI-T; C. Spielberger et al., 
1983) and the Depression Anxiety and Stress Scale, 21 item versions (DASS-21; S. H. L. 
Lovibond, P. F., 1995), administered before the start of the experiment, and HRV, HR and 
self-reported affect measured during resting baseline. Analyses establishing the 
effectiveness of the threat manipulations focus on the measurement of HR when 
participants were exposed to the threat manipulation, where participants were either told 
that they would be delivering an impromptu speech (high-threat), or watching a short film 
clip about UK tax law (low-threat). A majority of the analyses focus on when participants 
are played an audio file providing regulation instructions that promoted the use of these 
regulation strategiesy. Measurements of anxious affect during the thinking regulation 
period included; (HRV, RR and HR), and immediately prior to the regulation tasks (self-
reported affect measured on a scale from one to seven). Self-report measure of affect was 
taken from Johns et al. (2008), but see appendix B for example. Participants in the 
distraction condition were given a visual imagery task (see appendix C). Acceptance was 
manipulated through a mindfulness mediation audio-tape exercise of first noticing bodily 
sensations (first regulatory epoch) and slowing respiration (first and second regulatory 
epoch), noticing negative thoughts and feelings (second regulatory epoch) and finally 
accepting and watching these negative thoughts and feelings pass using imagery (third 
regulatory epoch). See appendix C for full acceptance instructions.  
  
                                                          
y
 The physical demands of the writing task, used to provide evidence of participants 
understanding and active engagement in the strategies, made this phase of the experiment 
unsuitable for the measurement physiological variables and thus were not used to evaluate the 
strategies.   
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Phase 1: Participant Screening and Pre-Experimental Questionnaire 
 
Random Allocation of Participants to Threat and Regulation Conditions 
Phase 2: Preparation and Baseline  
Phase 3: Threat Manipulation 
High-Threat 
Introduction to Impromptu Speech and Test 
Recording 
Low-Threat 
Introduction to UK Offshore Asset Disclosure 
Video Viewing  
Phase 3: Regulation Manipulation Tasks 
“Writing Task”  
5 minute Writing on Regulation Strategy Consistent Topic   
Post Regulation SR Affect (present moment) 
“Thinking Task”                                 
15 minute Audio Regulation Strategy Consistent Audio Content  
 
Phase 4: Stroop 
 
Post Stroop SR Affect (during incongruent trials)  
 
Post LNS SR Affect task (during latter trials) 
 
Phase 4: Letter-Number-Sequencing (LNS) 
 
Phase 5: Threat-Task and Recovery 
Low-Threat 
Watch Video 
High-Threat 
Deliver Impromptu Speech  
Post Threat HR, RR Recovery and SR Affect (During and Following Threat-Task)  
Phase 6: Regulation Manipulation Checks 
Regulation Strategy Quiz, Self-Reported Effort and Difficulty and, Attention 
Allocation Focus, Cognitions and Regulatory Attempts 
 
Figure 6. 1. Flow Diagram of Procedural Phases with Data Taken from Phases 2 and 3 (Highlighted). 
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6.6.2. Results 
Physiological data, including HRV, RR and HR were taken during the regulatory 
period. Based on the “law of initial values” (Lacey, 1956; Wilder, 1962) all data (including 
self-reported affect) were converted to change scores (period of interest-baseline) for 
“base-free” measure of anxious arousal. Baseline, although representing participant’s initial 
states soon after entering the laboratory, did not necessarily represent a state participants 
may have been expected to return to during the experiment, due to baseline measurement 
occurring in the context of a novel situation where stressful cognitive performance tasks 
were anticipated. Thus the zero point value is not particularly meaningful, with positive and 
negative values simply indicating increases and reductions, respectively, relative to the 
start of the experiment. The base-free change scores were used primarily to remove the 
noise created by individual differences existing between subjects and thus increasing the 
likelihood of detecting the impacts of between subjects’ experimental manipulations.  
6.6.2.1. Checks for Group Differences at Baseline 
 A series of factorial 2 (threat level) X 3 (regulation strategy) ANOVAs were used to 
check for differences on affective and autonomic variables amongst the experimental 
conditions before experimental manipulations occurred. See Table 6.1 for means and 
standard deviations for the measures analysed.  Participants’ tendency to experience affect 
according to their scores on the STAI-T and the DASS-21 scales, was shown not to differ 
significantly amongst the experimental conditions (Fs < 1.7, ns.). Furthermore, there were 
no significant differences between the experimental conditions at baseline for the 
measures of HRV, HR, and reported affect (Fs < 1.5, ns.). Hence, results of baseline checks 
raise no concerns about pre-existing differences in affect-related measures before 
participants were subjected to the experimental manipulations.  
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Table 6.1. 
Mean and standard deviations of participants’ predisposition to experience affect and 
affective state before experimental manipulation.   
Threat Level 
High-Threat Low-Threat 
 Dis Acc Con Tot Dist Acc Con Tot 
STAI 42.63 
(7.46) 
43.87 
(10.09) 
42.40 
(8.91) 
42.97 
(8.81) 
44.40 
(9.58) 
40.37 
(8.81) 
43.23 
(10.90) 
42.67 
(9.84) 
DASS-D 4.87 
(3.46) 
5.70 
(4.83) 
4.03 
(3.42) 
4.87 
(3.97) 
5.43 
(4.75) 
4.17 
(3.57) 
4.67 
(4.38) 
4.75 
(4.25) 
DASS-A 4.57 
(3.52) 
4.10 
(3.77) 
4.10 
(3.51) 
4.26 
3.57) 
4.70 
(3.65) 
3.00 
(3.10) 
3.53 
(2.94) 
3.74 
(3.29) 
DASS-S 8.40 
(4.22) 
8.10 
(4.55) 
7.70 
(2.79) 
8.07 
(3.90) 
9.00 
(4.68) 
7.60 
(4.34) 
7.53 
(4.13) 
8.04 
(4.39) 
HRV 41.31 
(23.75) 
32.06 
(17.49) 
34.71 
(16.36) 
36.03 
(19.65) 
34.06 
(19.07) 
31.78 
(16.01) 
34.06 
(21.37) 
33.30 
(18.76) 
HR 76.74  
(11.48) 
76.23 
(8.85) 
79.07 
(11.94) 
77.35 
(10.31) 
78.93 
(10.64) 
77.33 
(12.61) 
79.43 
(12.52) 
78.56 
(11.85) 
SR 1.69 
(.66) 
1.59 
(.66) 
1.73 
(.63) 
1.67 
(.65) 
1.61 
(.75) 
1.56 
(.79) 
1.76 
(.94) 
1.64 
(.83) 
Figures in parentheses indicate SD. Dist = distraction; Acc = Acceptance, Con = Control, Tot 
= Total. HRV= RMSSD, HR= beats-per-minute, SR= self-reported affect. The DASS-21 scale 
scores indicated by the letters, D= depression, A= anxiety, and S= stress) indicate the 
subscale scores.  
6.6.2.2. Manipulation Checks 
Two further basic assumptions require testing. The first assumption is that the 
threat manipulation was effective. Specifically, the participants in the high-threat condition 
should show a greater increase in HR from baseline (equally across all regulatory 
conditions) than the participants in the low-threat condition during the revelation of the 
174 
 
threat activity. The second manipulation check relates to differences in respiration rates 
amongst the regulation conditions. Participants in the acceptance conditions, adhering to a 
mindfulness meditation script that instructs individuals to slow their breathing during the 
first two periods of regulation, should show lower RR than the distraction and control 
participants during these periods of regulation.  
Manipulation of Anxious Arousal: HR taken during the threat revelation was used 
to test the assumption that the threat manipulations would alter the degree of anxious 
arousal experienced before engaging in the regulation strategies. A 2 (threat level: high and 
low) X 3 (regulation strategy: distraction, acceptance and mind-wandering) between 
subjects ANOVA was conducted on the HR change scores from the threat revelation period. 
The means and standard deviations are presented in the Table 6.2. 
Table 6.2. 
Heart Rate (Beats Per Minute) Mean Change Score for Each Condition Over the Threat 
Revelation Period. 
 Threat Level 
 High-Threat Low-Threat Regulation 
Total 
Distraction 5.86 (4.42) 1.77 (3.16) 3.74 (4.31) 
Acceptance 5.31 (4.88) 1.79 (2.89) 3.52 (4.34) 
Control 5.81 (6.19) 1.07 (3.58) 3.44 (5.55) 
Total 5.66 (5.18) 1.54 (3.20)  
Figures in parentheses indicate SD. 
The results revealed that the threat manipulation was successful across all 
regulation conditions. As predicted, the high-threat conditions showed significantly greater 
increase in HR relative to the low-threat conditions, F(1, 173) = 39.88, p <.001, ηp
2 = .19. As 
expected, neither the main effect of regulation strategy, F(2, 173)= .12, p = .89, ηp
2 = .001, 
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nor the interaction between threat level and regulation strategy, F(2, 173) = .30, p = .75, ηp
2 
= .003, was significant. These non-significant results indicate that there were no pre-
existing differences in HR among regulation conditions and that participants in each 
regulation condition responded similarly to the threat manipulation.  
A paired samples t-test showed that the high-threat condition’s HR increased 
significantly from baseline (M = 77.35, SD = 10.31) to threat revelation (M = 83.10, SD = 
10.73), t(89) = 10.63, p <.001, d = .55. The low-threat conditions also showed a significant 
increase in HR from baseline (M = 78.56., SD = 11.85) to threat revelation, (M = 80.11., SD = 
11.26), t(89) = 4.57, p <.001, d = .13. Thus, both the revelation levels of both high- and low-
threat led to increased affect, but the effect was considerably stronger for the high than 
the low-threat. 
Manipulation of RR: Participants within the acceptance condition were asked to 
slow their breathing during the first regulatory epoch. To confirm that respiration rate was 
significantly lower in the acceptance conditions than the distraction and control conditions 
during, a 2 (affect level: high and low) X 3 (regulation strategy: distraction, acceptance and 
mind-wandering) X 3 (five minute regulatory epochs) mixed design ANOVA was conducted 
on the respiration change scores (period of interest-baseline). Initial data screening 
identified two outliers; both from the low-threat control condition, and these were 
removed from the following analysis.  The means and standard error for each condition for 
each regulatory epoch are shown in Figure 6.2. 
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Figure 6. 2. Respiration rate (breaths per minute) change score means (error bars indicate 
SE) for experimental conditions during epochs of regulatory period.  
The results showed no significant main effect of threat level, F(1, 172) = 2.00, p = 
.16, ηp
2 = .012. The main effect of regulation strategy was significant, F(2, 172) = 7.15, p = 
.001, ηp
2 = .070. Planned contrasts showed that acceptance led to greater reductions in 
respiration rate changes from baseline during the regulatory period than the distraction 
and control conditions, t(175) = -3.76, p < .001, d = -.60, which did not differ, t(175) = .53, p 
=.59, d= .1. There was a main effect of epoch, F(2, 171) = 6.95, p = .001, ηp
2 = .075, with the 
first epoch showing the greatest decrease in respiration rate from baseline, which then 
diminished significantly for each subsequent epoch. Importantly, the predicted two-way 
interaction between regulation strategy and epoch was significant, F(4,340) = 11.37, p < 
.001, ηp
2 = .12, showing that, consistent with the effectiveness of the manipulation, the 
differences between the regulation strategies changed over time. 
As direct instruction to slow respiration rate was given in the acceptance condition 
during the first two phases of the regulatory period, it was predicted that participants in 
the acceptance condition would show a lower respiration rate than those in the distraction 
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and control conditions during these regulatory epochs. To test this prediction, three 2 
(threat level) X 3 (regulation strategy) univariate ANOVAs corresponding to each 5-minute 
epoch were used. The results showed a significant main effect of regulation strategy for the 
first, F(2, 172)= 17.18, p < .001, ηp
2 = .17, and second ,F(2, 172) = 9.79, p < .001, partial η2 = 
.102, regulatory epochs. As predicted, and consistent with the pattern of results across all 
three of the regulatory epochs, pairwise comparisons showed that the acceptance 
condition mean RR change from baseline was significantly lower than the distraction and 
control conditions (p <.001 for epoch 1 and 2), with no difference between the distraction 
and control conditions (p = .43 for epoch one and p = .66 for epoch 2). However, the third 
regulatory period showed no significant main effect of regulation strategy, F(2,172) = .07, p 
= .94, partial η2 = .001. These results confirmed that the acceptance manipulation slowed 
respiration during the initial two epochs of the regulatory period but that respiration rate 
returned to a level not significantly different from the other conditions once it was no 
longer directly manipulated via the audio instructions. 
6.6.2.3. Heart Rate Variability 
Removing Respiratory Effects from HRV: The systematic differences in respiration 
rate change noted above confound the interpretation of HRV change scores (Berntson et 
al., 1997). Therefore, variance due to respiratory changes was removed from HRV change 
scores using regression analyses and saving residuals scores (Berntson et al., 1994). A linear 
regression of RMSSD change scores on respiration rate change scores was conducted for 
each of the three regulatory epochsz. This analysis provided the degree of variance in 
RMSSD change scores (regulatory epoch - baseline) attributable to respiratory changes 
during the same epochs. Results are presented in Table 6.3.    
                                                          
z
 A quadratic model was also tried however this did not account for more variance. 
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Table 6 .3. 
Regression ANOVA Results of RMSSD change scores on respiration change scores for each 
regulatory epoch.  
Epoch R2 B SE B β t P 
1st .129 -.18 .035 -.36 -5.14 < .001 
2nd .059 -.12 .036 -.24 -3.34  .001 
3rd  .075 -.15 .040 -.27 -3.80 < .001 
 
Table 6.3 shows that the respiration difference scores accounted for a small but 
statistically significant amount of the variance for each epoch. 
Effects of Regulation and Threat on HRV:  Nine outliers were detected in the HRV 
RMSSD residual change score data. Three outliers were from the high-threat acceptance 
condition, two from the high-threat distraction condition, and one outlier from each of the 
other four conditions. To test the competing regulatory hypotheses, a 2 (threat level) X 3 
(regulation strategy) X 3 (regulatory epoch) mixed design ANOVA was used on the RMSSD 
change score residuals. The means and standard error for each condition and each epoch 
are summarised in Figure 6.3.  
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Figure 6.3. Mean residual RMSSD change scores (regulatory epoch - baseline) with 
respiration changes statistically controlled. Error bars indicate SE. 
The results showed a significant main effect of threat level, F(1,165) = 7.99 , p = 
.005, ηp
2 = .046, confirming that the low-threat level conditions had higher HRV than the 
high-threat conditions throughout the regulatory periodaa.  The main effect of regulation 
strategy was significant, F(2,165) = 3.75, p =.026, ηp
2 = .043. Post hoc LSD tests showed that 
distraction led to significantly lower HRV than acceptance, p = .028, mean difference = -
2.09, SE = .94, and control conditions,  p = .013, mean difference = -2.34, SE = .93. The 
difference between the acceptance and control conditions were not significant, p = .79, 
mean difference = -.25, SE = .94. There was no significant effect of epoch, F(1, 164) = .32, p 
= .73, ηp
2 = .004. There was a significant interaction between regulation strategy and epoch, 
                                                          
aa
 Two independent samples t-tests were used to test if the effect of threat was present 
between the two mind-wandering control conditions, across the entire regulatory period and in the 
final regulatory epoch. The t-tests showed that the high-threat level led to significantly lower HRV 
during the entire regulatory period, t(56) = -2.02, p = .048, d = -.53, and within the third regulatory 
epoch, t(56) = -2.42, p = .019, d = -.64. These analyses are relevant to the interpretation of the 
executive control results in chapter 7.  
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F(4, 326) = 5.14, p < .001, ηp
2 = .05, showing changes in the relative effects of regulation 
strategies on HRV over time. The interaction between threat level and regulation strategy 
was not significant, F(2, 165) = .11, p = .90, ηp
2 = .001, showing that the threat level did not 
moderate the regulation strategies’ effects on HRV. The three-way interaction between 
threat level, regulation strategy and epoch was not significant, F(4, 340) = 1.73, p = .14, ηp
2 
= .02.  
Despite the lack of interaction between threat and regulation strategy, analysis 
examining regulation strategy within each threat level was undertaken to test the 
regulatory hypotheses taking into account the differential levels of affect induced by the 
threat levelsbb. The results from the first 3 (regulation strategy) X 3 (epoch) ANOVA within 
the high-threat level showed a main effect of regulation strategy approaching significance, 
F(2,81) = 3.07, p = .052, ηp
2 = .070. There was no main effect of epoch, F(2,81) = .22, p = .80, 
ηp
2 = .005, or interaction between regulation strategy and epoch F(4,158) = 1.40, p = .24, 
ηp
2 = .034. It was hypothesised that the influence of the strategies would be most prevalent 
towards end of regulation and because there were no respiratory differences between the 
regulatory conditions in the third regulatory epoch, it was chosen test the impacts of 
regulation. A one-way ANOVA showed a significant effect of regulation F(2,81) = 3.43, p = 
.037, ηp
2 = .078.  Within the third regulatory epoch post hoc LSD tests showed that those in 
the distraction condition had significantly lower HRV than those in the acceptance 
condition, p = .011, mean difference = -5.86, SE =2 .25, and somewhat lower than the 
control condition, but this difference did not reach significance, p = .13, mean difference = -
                                                          
bb
 To allow comparison with previous studies (e.g., Dunn et al., 2009; Hofmann et al., 2009; 
Low et al. 2008) that evaluate regulation strategies within only one threat level, this study evaluates 
the effectiveness of regulation within each threat level separately, despite the interaction between 
threat level and regulation not reaching significance. Due to the limited significance of the three-way 
and two-way interactions, caution should be used in the interpretation of these results. 
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3.37, SE = .13. Acceptance showed no significant difference from the control condition p = 
.27, mean difference = 2.49, SE = 2.23.  
The results from the corresponding 3 (regulation strategy) X 3 (epoch) ANOVA 
within the low-threat level showed no main effect of regulation strategy, F(2,84) = .1.80 , p 
= .17, ηp
2 = .041 and no significant main effect of epoch F(2,83) = 1.81, p = .17, ηp
2 = .042. 
There was a significant two-way interaction between regulation strategy and epoch, 
F(4,164) = 3.28, p = .001, ηp
2 = .11. A one-way ANOVA within the second regulatory epoch 
(the period in was hypothesised to lead to increased affect, showed an effect of regulatory 
strategy, F(2,84) = 3.24 , p = .044, ηp
2 = .072. Post hoc (LSD) analyses showed that 
acceptance resulted in significantly lower HRV relative to the control condition, p = .016, 
mean difference = -3.23, SE = 1.35. The distraction condition did not differ from the 
acceptance condition, p = .51, mean difference = .90, SE = 1.35 and the difference between 
the distraction and the control condition trended towards significance, p = .077, mean 
difference = -2.42, SE = 1.35, with distraction showing lower HRV.  
The regulatory hypotheses also both predicted differences amongst regulatory 
strategies in the final regulatory epoch as participants took time to consume themselves in 
the strategy.  A one-way ANOVA testing these hypotheses in the low-threat level during the 
third regulatory epoch showed the effect of regulation strategy trending towards 
significance, F(2,84) = 2.61, p = .079 ηp
2 = .059. Post hoc (LSD) analysis demonstrated that 
there was no difference between distraction and acceptance, p = .85, mean difference = -
.29, SE = 1.53. The distraction condition showed a lower HRV than the control condition, p = 
.042, mean difference = -3.16, SE = 1.53. Furthermore, the acceptance condition showed 
somewhat lower HRV than the control condition, but the difference only trended towards 
significance, p = .064, mean difference = -2.86, SE = 1.53.  
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6.6.2.4. Heart Rate 
Effectiveness of Regulation: Initial data screening detected three HR change score 
(epoch HR – baseline HR) outliers. Two participants were from the high-threat distraction 
condition and one from the high-threat acceptance condition. These outliers were deleted 
from the subsequent HR analysis. The means and standard error for each condition and 
epoch are presented in Figure 6.4.  
 
Figure 6.4. Mean heart rate change scores relative to baseline (error bars indicate SE). 
To test the competing regulatory hypotheses, a 2 (threat level: high and low) X 3 
(regulation strategy: distraction, acceptance, mind-wandering) X 3 (epoch: first, second, 
and third regulation epoch) mixed design ANOVA was conducted on the HR change from 
baseline scores, with threat and regulation strategy being the between subjects factors, 
and epoch being the within subjects factor.  
As expected, the results showed a main effect of threat level, with the high-threat 
level showing a greater increase in HR relative to the low-threat level, F(1, 171) = 7.96, p = 
.005, ηp
2 = .044. The main effect of regulation strategy was not significant, F(2, 171) = .93, p 
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= .40, ηp
2 = .011. There was significant main effect of epoch, F(2, 170) = 27.55, p < .001, ηp
2 
= .245, showing increasing HR with each epoch. However, this main effect of epoch was 
moderated by the significant interaction between regulation strategy and epoch, F(4, 338) 
= 13.41, p < .001, ηp
2 = .137, showing that regulation strategies influenced HR differently 
over time. Figure 6.4 shows that the distraction condition evinced progressive increases in 
HR over time. Furthermore, Figure 6.4 shows that the acceptance conditions show elevated 
HR in the second epoch relative to the first, followed by decreases in the third epoch. The 
interaction between threat level and epoch approached significance, F(2, 170) = 2.46, p = 
.088, ηp
2 = .028cc. There was no significant interaction between threat level and regulation 
strategy, F(2, 171) = .66, p = .52, ηp
2 = .008, nor was the three-way interaction between 
threat level, regulation strategy and time significant, F(4,338) = 1.21, p = .31, ηp
2 = .017.  
6.6.2.4.1. Testing the Impacts of the Strategies Across Threat Level and 
Across the Regulatory Epochs 
As the predicted interaction between regulation strategy and epoch was 
confirmed, further tests were undertaken to test which of the regulatory hypotheses were 
supported. Planned comparison t-tests were used to test the effective acceptance 
hypotheses prediction that acceptance would lead to increased HR relative to the control 
condition during the second regulatory epoch (when participants were asked to attend to 
their thoughts and feelings). This prediction received marginal support, with the 
acceptance condition showing a greater HR relative to the control condition that 
approached significance, t(117) = 1.97, p = .051, d = .36.  
                                                          
cc
 Three, 2 (threat level) X 3 (regulation strategy) univariate ANOVAs on HR change scores 
for each epoch showed the main effect of threat only approached significance in the first epoch, F(1, 
171) = 3.03, p = .071, ηp
2
 = .019, but was significant in the second, F(2, 171) = 6.54, p = .011, ηp
2
 = 
.037, and third, F(2, 171) = 9.30, p = .003, ηp
2
 = .052. Hence, the impact of threat became greater 
with each successive epoch. 
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The regulatory hypotheses predicted differences in arousal amongst the regulatory 
conditions during the third regulatory epoch. A 2 (threat level X 3 (regulation strategy) 
ANOVA within the third regulatory epoch showed a significant main effect of threat 
persisting, F (1, 171) = 9.30, p = .003, ηp
2 = .052, and a main effect of regulation strategy 
trending towards significance, F (2, 171) = 2.82, p = .062, ηp
2 = .032.  Due to the 
hypothesised main effect of regulation being close to the significance threshold post hoc 
comparisons were undertaken but should be interpreted with caution. Post hoc 
comparisons showed that the acceptance condition demonstrated lower HR relative to the 
distraction condition which trended towards significance,  p = .055, mean difference = -
1.46, SE = .76, and no difference with the control condition, p = .89, mean difference = -.10, 
SE = .75. The distraction condition showed greater HR relative to the control condition, p = 
.039, mean difference = 1.56, SE = .75.  
6.6.2.4.2. Differences Between Strategies within Each Threat Level 
A high level of threat was hypothesised to be necessary to demonstrate differences 
in strategies’ effectiveness. An analysis within each threat level was used to test the 
competing regulation hypotheses. The first analysis, within the high-threat level, involved a 
3 (regulation strategy) X 3 (epoch) mixed design ANOVA. The results showed no significant 
main effect of regulation strategy, F(2, 83) = .79, p = .46, ηp
2 = .019. However, there was a 
significant main effect of epoch, F (2, 83) = 27.42, p < .001, ηp
2 = .398, that was moderated 
by a significant two-way interaction between regulation strategy and epoch, F(4 , 164) = 
7.36, p < .001, ηp
2 = .152. A one-way ANOVA was used to compare regulation conditions 
within each epoch. Only the third epoch showed a significant main effect of regulation 
strategy, F (2, 84) = 3.53, p = .034, ηp
2 = .078. Post hoc LSD tests showed that the distraction 
condition showed significantly greater HR than the acceptance condition, p = .010, mean 
difference = 2.52, SE = .96. Distraction also showed nominally greater HR than the control 
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condition which did not reach significance, p = .14, mean difference = 1.43, SE = .95. 
Similarly, although the acceptance condition exhibited nominally lower HR than the control 
condition, the difference between acceptance and the control condition did not reach 
significance, p = .24, mean difference = -1.13, SE = .95.  
A parallel 3 (regulation strategy) X 3 (epoch) ANOVA was used to test the 
competing regulatory hypotheses within low-threat condition. The results showed no main 
effect of regulation strategy, F(2, 87) = .80, p = .45, ηp
2 = .018. There was a significant main 
effect of epoch, F(2, 86) = 6.97, p = .002, ηp
2 = .14, showing that the first epoch had smaller 
HR increases from baseline relative to the second and third epochs, which did not differ. 
This main effect of epoch was moderated by a significant two-way interaction between 
regulation strategy and epoch, F(4, 170) = 6.45, p < .001, ηp
2 = .13. To test the regulatory 
hypotheses within each threat level, one-way ANOVAs were used within each epoch. The 
results did not show any significant differences between the strategies in either the second, 
F(2, 87) = 2.19, p = .12, ηp
2 = .048dd, or third regulatory epoch, F(2,87) = 1.28, p = .28, ηp
2 =  
.029, where significant differences were hypothesised. Hence, the interaction was not due 
to significant differences in HR change amongst regulatory conditions in particular epochs. 
Rather it was due to within subject effects with different regulation conditions leading to 
different patterns of increases or decreases in HR over time.  
6.6.2.4.3. Impacts of Regulation Strategies on HR Over Time 
A series of 2 (threat level: high and low) X 3 (regulatory epoch: one, two and three) 
repeated measures (regulatory epoch) ANOVAs, were used within each regulatory 
condition to follow up the significant interactions between regulation strategy and epoch 
                                                          
dd
 Acceptance did show significantly increased HR relative to the control condition, t(58) = 
2.09, p = .041, d = .54 in the second regulatory epoch. 
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and near significant interaction between threat level and epoch. In addition, these 
ANOVA’s were used test the regulatory hypotheses that predicted different patterns of 
arousal (HR) over time, and the extent to which threat level influenced the impact of 
regulation overtime. 
The 2 (threat) X 3 (regulatory epoch) ANOVA on HR in the distraction condition 
showed the main effect of threat level did not reach significance, F(1, 56) = 2.71, p = .10, ηp
2 
= .046. There was a significant effect of time, F(2, 55) = 15.14, p < .001, ηp
2 = .36. Pairwise 
comparisons showed that each successive regulatory epoch showed significantly increased 
HR than the previous one, t(57) = 3.77, p < .001, and t(57) = 3.40 p = .001, respectively. The 
interaction between threat and epoch was significant, F(2, 55) = 3.16, p = .05, ηp
2 = .103. 
The high-threat led to significant increased HR relative to the low-threat level within the 
third regulatory epoch t(56) = 2.55, p = .014, d = .67, but not the first and second regulatory 
epochs, (ts < 1.1). 
The 2 (threat) X 3 (regulatory epoch) ANOVA within the acceptance condition 
showed the effect of threat was ns, F(1, 57) = .76, p = .39, ηp
2 = .013. There was significant 
effect of epoch, F(2, 56) = 35.84, p < .0015, ηp
2 = .56. Pairwise comparisons showed that HR 
increased significantly from the first epoch to the second epoch, t(58) = 8.42, p < .001, and 
then decreased significantly from the second epoch to the third, t(58) = -2.48, p = .016. The 
interaction between threat level and regulatory epoch was not significant, F(2, 56) = .25, p 
= .78, ηp
2 = .009. 
The 2 (threat) X 3 (regulatory epoch) ANOVA within the control conditions showed 
a significant effect of threat, F(1, 58) = 4.87, p = .031, ηp
2 = .078, with increased threat 
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showing elevated HR relative to low-threatee. There was s no effect of epoch, F(2, 57) = .40, 
p =.67, ηp
2 = .014. The interaction threat level and regulatory epoch did not reach 
significance, F(2, 57) = 2.34, p = .11, ηp
2 = .076.  The high-threat control condition did show 
an elevation in HR across the epochs, and the HR difference between first regulatory epoch 
to the third epoch trended towards significance, t(29) = -1.82, p = .08. The nominal 
decrease in the low-threat mind-wandering condition noted from the first regulatory epoch 
to the third epoch was not significant (t < 1).  
6.6.2.5. Self-Reported Affect 
To test the regulatory hypotheses regarding self-reported anxious affect, 
participant responses from Schmader and Johns’ (2003) affect scale were converted to 
change scores (post regulation - baseline). Eleven outliers were identified. Within the high-
threat conditions, one from acceptance, three from distraction and two from the control 
condition were identified. Within the low-threat condition, two outliers were from the 
distraction condition, and the remaining three were from the control condition. These 
cases were removed for the subsequent analysis. To test the competing regulatory 
hypotheses and the distinguishing threat hypothesis, a 2 (threat level: high and low) X 3 
(regulation strategy: distraction, acceptance and mind-wandering) between subjects 
ANOVA was conducted on the change scores. Means and standard errors are presented for 
each condition in Figure 6.5 and see Figure 6.6 for the reported affect raw scores.  
                                                          
ee
 An independent samples t-test was used to determine whether the impacts of threat on 
HR were present within the mind-wandering control conditions during the third regulation epoch. 
The results showed that increased threat led to increased HR in the third regulatory epoch, t(58) = 
2.40, p = .020, d = .62.  This analysis is relevant to the interpretation of the executive control results 
in chapter 7. 
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Figure 6.5. Mean post regulation self-reported anxious affect rating expressed as change 
scores from baseline (error bars indicate SE).  
 
 
Figure 6.6. Mean self-reported anxious affect rating raw scores for the baseline and post 
regulation phases (error bars indicate SE).  
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Results showed that there was a significant main effect of threat level, F (1, 163) = 
8.40, p = .004, ηp
2 = .049. As expected, the high-threat conditions self-reported greater 
anxious affect relative to the low-threat conditionsff. There was also a significant effect of 
regulation strategy, F (2, 163) = 3.30, p = .040, ηp
2 = .039. Post hoc (LSD) analyses showed 
that this main effect was attributable to the acceptance condition self-reporting 
significantly greater anxiety than the control condition, p = .013, mean difference = .29, SE 
= .11.  Although the distraction condition had a lower mean level of reported anxious affect 
than the acceptance condition, the difference between the conditions was not significant, p 
= .31, mean difference = -.12, SE = .11. The distraction condition reported nominally 
increased anxious affect relative to control condition, however this difference did not meet 
the threshold of significance, p = .14, mean difference = .17, SE = .12. There was no 
significant interaction between threat level and regulation strategy, F(2, 163) = .68, p = .51, 
ηp
2 =.008.  
6.6.3. Discussion 
Study 6.1 sought to test the effectiveness of distraction and acceptance in reducing 
anxiety in circumstances of high- and low-threat. Before assessing the effectiveness of the 
strategies, some assumptions were checked. First, it was established that there were no 
baseline differences between the experimental conditions (threat or regulatory) on levels 
of affect, suggesting that participant randomisation was effective.  Second, two 
manipulation checks were used to assess the effectiveness of the threat and regulation 
manipulations. The threat revelation was effective at producing greater anxious arousal 
(reflected by increases in HR) in the high-threat level relative to the low-threat level. This 
                                                          
ff
 An independent samples t-test was used to test the impacts of threat between the mind-
wandering control conditions alone. It showed that, despite the higher nominal values of affect 
expressed by the participants in the high-threat level, the difference was not significant,   t(53) = -
1.09, p = .28, d = .30.This analysis is relevant to the interpretation of results in chapter 7.  
190 
 
increase in anxious arousal occurred equally across the regulation conditions. In addition, 
both threat conditions showed increased arousal during the threat revelation relative to 
baseline showing both had some threat value. The results showed that the acceptance 
manipulation was successful in reducing respiration rate in participants in the acceptance 
condition relative to the distraction and control conditions. This was consistent with the 
regulation instructions that directly instructed participants in the acceptance group to slow 
their breathing during the first two regulatory epochs. No differences in respiration were 
detected in the final epoch. Thus, no significant group differences at baseline on the 
dependent variables were present to confound the results, and the threat and regulation 
manipulations had the intended effects on HR and RR respectively.    
It was predicted that threat would increase HR and reported affect, and decrease 
HRV during regulation. All results were consistent with the expected impact of increased 
threat:  when averaging across each of the three regulatory epochs, high-threat led to 
significantly lower HRV and significantly higher HR, and directly after regulation, 
significantly greater reported affect than low-threat. The impacts of threat were also 
significant when the mind-wandering control conditions were compared, leading to lower 
HRV and increased HR, showing the effects of threat without the influence of imposed 
regulation. Hence, threat led to increases in arousal levels during the anticipation period, 
whilst participants were attempting to regulate.  
The effective distraction hypothesis predicted that those engaging in distraction 
would show increased HRV, decreased HR and decreased reported affect relative to the 
control condition. The disruptive distraction hypothesis predicted the opposite (i.e., 
decreased HRV, increased HR, and increased reported affect). Consistent with the 
disruptive distraction hypothesis, the distraction conditions, together, demonstrated 
reduced HRV relative to the mind-wandering control condition and acceptance condition, 
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when averaged across epochs. Furthermore, during the third regulatory epoch when the 
potential confound of group differences in RR was not present, the pooled distraction 
conditions  showed increased HR in comparison to the acceptance and control conditions, 
further supporting the disruptive distraction hypothesis. This was further confirmed with 
the distraction condition leading to increased HR over each successive regulatory epoch. 
Following regulation, the distraction condition reported nominally elevated affect relative 
to the control conditions that trended towards significance, with this elevation being 
consistent with the disruptive distraction hypothesis. Hence, the evidence based on all 
measures, was overwhelmingly inconsistent with the effective distraction hypotheses, and 
mostly consistent with the disruptive distraction hypotheses. 
The effective acceptance hypothesis predicted that acceptance would lead to 
increased HRV, decreased HR and less reported anxious affect than the distraction and 
control conditions towards the end of regulation. Pooling across threat level and epoch, 
including the periods where systematic differences in respiration were present, with these 
influences controlled statistically, the acceptance condition showed significantly higher 
HRV than the distraction condition, but was not significantly different from the control 
condition. This evidence suggests that acceptance did not elevate HRV or provide a more 
rapid and flexible way of regulating than the spontaneous attempts to regulate that 
participants in the control condition were using. Hence, these differences between the 
regulatory conditions only partially support the effective acceptance hypothesis.  
The effective acceptance hypothesis also predicted that acceptance would lead to 
temporarily increased arousal relative to the control condition, as participants were asked 
to observe and notice negative thoughts and feelings. This prediction was confirmed: the 
acceptance condition showed elevated HR during the second regulatory epoch relative to 
the control condition. Acceptance was also predicted to lead to a decrease in arousal in the 
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final regulatory epoch. The HR results showed that, averaged across both threat levels, 
acceptance led to lower HR during the third regulatory epoch relative to distraction, but 
not relative to the control conditions. Therefore, analysis averaged across threat level only 
provided partial support for the effective acceptance hypotheses.  An analysis over time 
demonstrated that only the acceptance conditions showed a decline in HR from the second 
to the third regulatory epoch, which occurred after a significant initial increase in HR from 
the first to the second regulatory epoch. Acceptance did lead to significantly higher HR than 
the control conditions and this result was consistent with the process of a feeling model 
that acceptance may require initially increased arousal for the strategy to demonstrate its 
effectiveness in reducing arousal. Nevertheless, the initial increase did not result in lower 
HR than control, suggesting limit support for this hypothesis.   
  Taking into account that high and low levels of initial affect may demonstrate the 
effectiveness of the strategies differently, and the sustained impact of threat throughout, 
further analyses comparing the regulatory conditions were undertaken within each threat 
level. Amongst the high-threat level groups, where the effective acceptance effects were 
predicted to be most pronounced, acceptance showed significantly increased HRV and 
decreased HR in the third regulatory epoch, relative to the distraction condition, consistent 
with both the effective acceptance and disruptive distraction hypotheses. However, 
although acceptance showed somewhat increased HRV and decreased HR relative to the 
control condition, these differences were not significant, and therefore only provided 
limited support for the effective acceptance hypotheses. Hence, the results from 
comparisons made between regulatory conditions within the high-threat level still only 
provided limited support for the effective acceptance hypotheses and the predictions of 
the process of a feeling model, with acceptance outperforming distraction but not the 
mind-wandering control condition.  
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The results from the low-threat level were inconsistent with the effective 
acceptance hypothesis. These results showed that acceptance led to both lowered HRV and 
increased HR particularly during the second and to a lesser extent the third regulatory 
epoch relative to the control condition. Acceptance did not differ from the distraction 
condition on HRV or HR during these latter two epochs, suggesting that acceptance was 
just as counterproductive in reducing arousal as distraction in the low-threat level.  
Furthermore, contrary to the effective acceptance hypothesis, participants in both 
acceptance conditions reported significantly increased anxious affect relative to the control 
conditions, yet were not different from the distraction conditions. Hence, the reported 
affect results were also inconsistent with the effective acceptance hypotheses, predicting 
that acceptance would lead to lower levels of affect in all circumstances.  
Based on the results of study 6.1, two interpretations have some support: the 
process of a feeling model, and theories of anxiety and attention (Mogg & Bradley, 1998) 
and self regulatory theory (Carver & Scheier, 1988), including objective self-awareness 
theory (Duval & Wicklund, 1972). The results indicating that (a) distraction led to increased 
affect, and (b) acceptance led to increased and then decreased arousal, and are each  
supportive of the process of a feeling model. However, the process of a feeling model also 
predicted that acceptance would lead to significantly decreased arousal relative to the 
mind-wandering control condition and this was not demonstrated in the results. 
Furthermore, the process of a feeling model predicted that participants in the mind-
wandering control condition would report increased affect relative to acceptance, yet they 
reported significantly decreased affect. Considering that chapter 5 showed that the mind-
wandering control conditions reported the least attention towards threat information and 
affect, the results showing comparisons with the control conditions from the present study 
are more consistent with the predictions of motivational theories of attention and anxiety 
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(Mogg & Bradley, 1998) and objective self-awareness theory (Duval & Wicklund, 1972). 
Both these theories claim that individuals have a natural tendency to avoid unpleasant 
affective experiences, and a condition encouraging individuals to engage in mind-
wandering would likely support this natural tendency. Increasing attention towards threats 
and towards the self, including unpleasant feelings, is likely to result in increases in 
unpleasant affect or at least individuals becoming more subjectively aware of their 
experience of anxious affect.  
If acceptance increases self-awareness then it should lead to increased affect 
relative to an individual’s natural attempt to decrease self-awareness, at least in the short-
term.  Based on comparisons between acceptance and the mind-wandering control 
conditions, acceptance led to increased arousal during the second regulatory period. In the 
low-threat level this increased arousal was still present in the third regulatory epoch. 
Moreover, if participants naturally seek to avoid the experience of affect, imposing an 
attentional load (without specific instruction that this is to assist you distract from your 
thoughts and feelings regarding threats) would only disrupt these spontaneously initiated 
regulatory attempts and lead to increased affect (Cornwell et al., 2011; Knight et al., 2007; 
Mather & Knight, 2005; Wegner et al., 1993) as noted from the impacts of distraction.  
The theories of anxiety and attention and objective self-awareness provide 
plausible interpretations of the attentional focus results of chapter 5 and the findings from 
the present study regarding the increased affect occurring in acceptance relative to mind-
wandering. However, the fact that acceptance led to a decrease in arousal after sustained 
engagement, a finding that these theories do not predict, suggests that the process of a 
feeling model may still be a plausible explanation. Acceptance was suggested to facilitate 
participants altering their affective states via increased awareness and integration of affect, 
consistent with the predictions of the process of a feeling model. If acceptance does utilise 
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this process, and the process of a feeling model provides the best explanation for how 
anxious affect can be reduced, prior engagement in acceptance during anticipation of 
threat should lead to decreased affective reactivity to and a rapid recovery from the actual 
threat relative to distraction and control conditions. This hypothesis is tested in study 6.2.  
6.7. Study 6.2: Does Undertaking Distraction and Acceptance 
During Anticipation of Threat Influence Later Affective 
Reactivity and Recovery? 
 Study 6.2 assesses the effects of prior use of the regulatory strategies on affective 
reactivity while undertaking a threat-task and on affective repair when recovering from the 
task. Previous studies investigating the effectiveness of distraction have demonstrated it to 
facilitate affective repair and recovery from a affect-inducing event when engaged in the 
strategy following a threat or stressor,  reducing both physiological arousal and reported 
affect (Neumann, Waldstein, Soller, Thayer, & Sorkin, 2004; Wong & Moulds, 2009).  
However, none of the studies have investigated whether engaging in distraction during the 
anticipation of a threat influences participants’ subsequent affective reactivity to the threat 
and their recovery from it. An older study by Houston and Holmes (1974) demonstrated 
that imposing an attentional load during the anticipation of a threat decreased the 
opportunity participants had to mentally prepare and reappraise the harmfulness of a 
threat. A more recent study investigating the use of distraction during a stressful event 
showed that when participants were subsequently reintroduced to the stressful event they 
demonstrated a significant return of fear relative to a reappraisal condition (Kamphuis & 
Telch, 2000). From this previous research, and the predictions from both the modal model 
and the process of a feeling model, it is hypothesised that distraction used during the 
anticipation of a threat will lead to increased affective reactivity and slower affective repair 
when engaging in and recovering from threat-tasks.  
196 
 
Two studies have investigated the impacts of acceptance in changing experimental 
circumstances. These two studies (Hoffman et al. and Dunn et al.) have produced 
contrasting results; possibly due to the methodological differences relating to instruction 
provided to participants and the level of relatedness affective stimuli have to previous 
phases in the experiment. Hofmann et al. (2009) demonstrated that acceptance led to 
lower HR across the experimental phases of anticipating a threat-task (delivery of an 
impromptu speech), threat-task engagement and recovery, relative to an affective 
suppression condition. Participants were given one minute to focus on using the strategy 
whilst sitting quietly during anticipation of delivering the speech.  Importantly, participants 
were asked to handle their feelings in a manner that was consistent with the strategy 
during delivery of the speech and during recovery. It may be due to these instructions to 
continually regulate in a consistent way throughout the experiment that acceptance 
resulting in lower arousal across all three phases (anticipation, threat and recovery). Similar 
to Hofmann et al., Dunn et al. (2009), found that the active engagement in acceptance, 
although during exposure to video footage of horrific traffic accidents, led to lower arousal 
(reduced electrodermal activity) relative to a suppression condition. However, in contrast 
to Hofmann et al., participants in the Dunn et al study were later assessed on their affective 
reactivity to a set of affective inducing pictures of content not related to the film clip. 
Additionally, participants were not instructed to continue to engage in the strategy used 
previously whilst exposed to the subsequently presented pictures. The results indicated 
that participants who had subsequently used acceptance (and had previously shown lower 
arousal during this engagement) showed increased affective reactivity during picture 
viewing and slower affective repair following the experiment at one week follow up relative 
to the suppression condition.  There are two reasons why the beneficial effects of 
acceptance were not found following engagement in acceptance in the Dunn et al. (2009). 
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The first is participants were not encouraged to actively continue engaging in acceptance 
(like the Hoffman et al.) and this active engagement is necessary for reductions in affect to 
be sustained. The second is that the picture stimuli were not related to the content in 
which participants were instructed to regulate their responses toward. If this latter were 
true, without the first being a necessary precondition, it would be expected that if the 
picture stimuli were related to the initial affective stimulus participants regulated toward, 
this would have led to reduced affective reactivity and more rapid affective repair for those 
in the acceptance condition.  
The current study tests the above two possibilities by slightly differing from the 
Hofmann et al. and Dunn et al. studies.  First, unlike the Hofmann et al. study, participants 
are only directed to engage in the specified affect regulation during anticipation and are 
therefore free to respond naturally during and following the threat-task. Second, unlike the 
Dunn et al. study acceptance will be used during the anticipation of a threat-task, and thus 
participants will be later exposed to stimuli that are related to content they have been 
encouraged to regulate their responses towards, rather than towards 
unrelated/unanticipated stimuli. Thus, the current study provides a unique test of the 
subsequent impacts of acceptance on affective reactivity and recovery to threat-stimuli 
that participants have anticipated and have had an initial regulatory response towards.   
Study 6.2 uses the same between subjects experimental design as Study 6.1: threat 
level (high and low) and regulation conditions (distraction, acceptance and mind-
wandering). The time periods of interest, however, are during the threat-task (speech or 
movie), and after the threat-task. Heart rate and reported affect are measured during the 
threat-task. HRV and respiration could not be measured appropriately during the speech 
because participants adopt different postures and are also inclined to gesture when 
speaking, which disrupts the respiratory and ECG signals to an extent that RR and HRV can 
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no longer be reliably calculated. Nevertheless, RR, HRV, HR and self-reported affect were 
measured during recovery.   
Based on the predictions of the process of a feeling model and previous research, it 
is hypothesised that prior engagement in distraction during anticipation of threat will result 
in increased affective reactivity to the threat-tasks and slower affective repair during 
recovery from the threats demonstrated by increased HR, lower HRV, and increased 
reported affect than the acceptance and control conditions (i.e., the disruptive distraction 
hypothesis). In contrast, based on the predictions of the process of a feeling model and the 
findings from study 6.1, acceptance is hypothesised to support reduced arousal regarding 
threats resulting in reduced affective reactivity during the threat-task and a quicker 
recovery (i.e., increased HRV, decreased HR and less reported affect) relative to the 
distraction and control conditions. As in Study 6.1, the high-threat condition is 
hypothesised to show greater HR and reported affect during the threat-task and decreased 
HRV, increased HR and increased reported affect during threat-task recovery than the low-
threat condition.  
6.7.1. Method 
 A 2 (threat level: high and low) x3 (regulation condition: distraction, acceptance 
and control) X 2 (time: threat-task and recovery) design was used. The participants were 
the same as those in study 6.1. Figure 6.6 indicates (with highlighted sections) the phase of 
the experiment during which the data were gathered for the present study. Participants 
had completed a series of executive control tasks following their engagement in the 
regulation task described in Study 6.1. After completing the two executive control tasks, 
participants were told that it was now time to deliver the speech (high-threat) or watch a 
video clip (low-threat) that they had been anticipating since the threat revelation. 
Participants in the high-threat condition were instructed to talk as much as they could 
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about the topic. Participants in the low-threat condition were asked to concentrate on the 
film clip for the whole five minutes. Both tasks were to take around five minutes. When the 
five minutes were complete, participants were instructed to face away from the camera 
and sit still for five minutes (i.e., recovery period). Dependent variables were HR, RR, HRV 
and SR affect. Respiration rate and HR were taken throughout these tasks. Participants 
reported the level of anxiety they experienced during the threat-task and during the 
recovery period retrospectively at the end of the recovery period.  See Section 4.4.5 in 
chapter 4 for the complete details of what occurred during these tasks (phase 5 of in the 
experiment).     
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Phase 1: Participant Screening and Pre-Experimental Questionnaire 
 
Random Allocation of Participants to Threat and Regulation Conditions 
Phase 2: Preparation and Baseline  
Phase 3: Threat Manipulation 
High-Threat 
Introduction to Impromptu Speech and Test 
Recording 
Low-Threat 
Introduction to UK Offshore Asset Disclosure 
Video Viewing  
Phase 3: Regulation Manipulation Tasks 
“Writing Task”  
5 minute Writing on Regulation Strategy Consistent Topic   
Post Regulation SR Affect (present moment) 
“Thinking Task”                                 
15 minute Audio Regulation Strategy Consistent Audio Content  
 
Phase 4: Stroop 
 
Post Stroop SR Affect (during incongruent trials)  
 
Post LNS SR Affect task (during latter trials) 
 
Phase 4: Letter-Number-Sequencing (LNS) 
 
Phase 5: Threat-Task and Recovery 
Low-Threat 
Watch Video 
High-Threat 
Deliver Impromptu Speech  
Post Threat HR, RR Recovery and SR Affect (During and Following Threat-Task)  
Phase 6: Regulation Manipulation Checks 
Regulation Strategy Quiz, Self-Reported Effort and Difficulty and, Attention 
Allocation Focus, Cognitions and Regulatory Attempts 
 
Figure 6.7. Flow Diagram of Procedural Phases with Data Taken from Phase 5 (Highlighted) 
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6.7.2. Results  
Respiration Rate: One outlier was detected in the respiration rate data (breaths per 
minute change from baseline scores) from the high-threat distraction condition and was 
removed from the subsequent analysis. For the means and standard error of respiration 
change scores see Figure 6.7.  
 
Figure 6.8. Mean change in respiration rate (breaths per minute) from baseline to the 
recovery period (error bars indicate SE). 
A 2 (threat level) x3 (regulation strategy) was used to detect differences amongst 
the threat and regulatory conditions’ respiration rate change scores. The main effect of 
threat trended towards significance, F(1, 173) =  3.06, p = .082, ηp
2 = .014, with increased 
threat showing nominally decreased respiration. The main effect of regulation was not 
significant, F(1, 173) = 1.05, p = .35, ηp
2 = .012, nor was the interaction between threat level 
and regulation strategy, F < 1, ns.  
Controlling for respiratory influences in HRV change scores. A linear regression was 
used to examine the extent to which changes in respiration rate influenced changes in HRV. 
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The results showed that changes in respiration did not account for a significant portion of 
the variance in HRV change at recovery, t(179) = -.87, p = .39, R2 = .004, β = -.065. A 
quadratic function was also tried however a linear equation best accounted for the 
variance in HRV changes. Nevertheless, to remove any variations due to respiratory 
changes, the HRV change score residuals were calculated for use in all subsequent HRV 
analyses.  
HRV: RMSSD change score residuals’ mean and standard error for each of the 
conditions are presented in Figure 6.8. 
 
 Figure 6.9. Five minute recovery period mean HRV (RMSSD) change from baseline scores 
residuals (error bars indicate SE).  
A 2 (threat level: high and low) x3 (regulation strategy: distraction, acceptance and 
control) ANOVA was used to test the effects of threat and regulation strategy on HRV 
changes from baseline. The results showed a main effect of threat level, F(1, 174) = 5.60, p 
= .019, ηp
2 = .031, with a greater decrease in HRV shown within the high-threat level. There 
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was no main effect of regulation strategy, F(2, 174) =  1.56, p = .21, ηp
2 = .018, or 
interaction between threat level and regulation strategy, F(2, 174) = 1.14 , p = .32, ηp
2 = 
.013, suggesting little influence of regulation strategy on HRV during this period.  
Heart Rate and Self-reported affect: Change scores from baseline were calculated 
for HR and SR affect both during the threat-tasks and during the recovery from the threat-
task (see Figures 6.9 and 6.10 for means for each condition).  
 
Figure 6.10. Mean Heart Rate Change Scores (error bars indicate SE). 
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Figure 6.11. Mean Self-Reported Affect Change Scores (error bars indicate SE). 
A 2 (threat level) X 3 (regulation strategy) X 2 (time: threat-task and recovery)  
repeated measures MANOVA, with HR and SR affect change scores as the dependent 
variables, was used to test the threat and regulatory hypotheses. The between subjects 
multivariate test, Hotelling’s trace, showed a significant main effect of threat level, F(2, 
173) =  133.01, p < .001, ηp
2 = .61, with the high-threat level showing increased affect. 
There was also a significant main effect of regulation strategy, F(4, 344) = 4.09, p = .003, ηp
2 
= .045.  
The univariate between subjects tests showed that there was a main effect of 
threat level for both HR, F(1, 174) = 81.69, p < .001, ηp
2 = .319, and self-reported affect, F(1, 
174) = 201.28, p < .001, partial η2 = .536. There was a main effect of regulation strategy on 
HR, F(2, 174) = 6.01, p = .003, ηp
2 = .065. Post hoc (LSD) comparisons were used to establish 
the effectiveness of the regulatory strategies averaged across both time periods and both 
threat levels, in reducing HR. Results showed that the distraction conditions did not differ 
from acceptance conditions, p = .71, mean difference = -.38, SE = .99. However, the 
distraction conditions showed significantly elevated HR relative to the control conditions, p 
-1
-0.5
0
0.5
1
1.5
2
2.5
3
3.5
4
Threat-Task Recovery Threat Task Recovery
High-Threat Low-Threat
C
h
an
ge
 in
 R
e
p
o
rt
e
d
 A
ff
e
ct
Distraction
Acceptance
Control
205 
 
= .023, mean difference = 2.26, SE = .99. Furthermore, acceptance showed significantly 
increased HR relative to the control condition, p = .008, mean difference = 2.64, SE = .99.  
On SR affect, the main effect of regulation trended to significance, F(2, 174) = 2.72, 
p = .068, ηp
2 = .030. Least significant difference post hoc comparisons evaluating the 
regulatory strategies’ effects on self-reported affect, averaged across threat levels and over 
both time periods, showed that distraction did not significantly differ from acceptance, p = 
.40, mean difference = -.15, SE = .18. Although the distraction groups showed nominally 
higher reported affect, the difference between the distraction and control group was not 
significant, p = .14, mean difference = .26, SE = .18.  The acceptance group reported 
nominally higher affect than the control group, and the difference met significance, p = 
.022, mean difference = .41, SE = .18.  
There was no significant interaction between threat level and regulation strategy, F 
< 1, ns. The within subjects multivariate tests showed a main effect of time, F(2, 173) = 
81.79 , p < .001, ηp
2 = .49. There was also a significant two-way interaction between threat 
level and time, F(2, 173) = 248.03, p < .001, ηp
2 = .74. This interaction was due to 
participants in the high-threat level showing a significantly  greater increase in affect during 
the threat-task relative to the recovery period, on HR, t(89) = 13.43, p < .001, and SR, t(89) 
= 15.67, p < .001, whilst in the low-threat level there was no difference between the two 
time periods on HR, t(89) = -.13, p = .90, however, participants self reported being 
significantly less anxious during the movie than during the recovery period, t(89) = -12.42, p 
< .001. The two-way interaction between regulation strategy and time was not significant, 
F(4, 344) = 1.11, p = .35 , ηp
2 = .013, suggesting that there were no changes to the pattern 
of differences amongst the regulatory conditions over the two time periods. Lastly, the 
three-way interaction between threat level, regulation strategy and time also did not reach 
significance, F < 1, ns. 
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6.7.3. Discussion 
 Study 6.2 tested the subsequent impacts of distraction and acceptance. Based on 
the process of a feeling model and previous research showing distraction limits the 
opportunity to reappraise threats, it was predicted that distraction would lead to increased 
affective reactivity and slower recovery (i.e., disruptive distraction hypothesis). In contrast, 
based on the predictions of the process of a feeling model, it was predicted that 
acceptance would lead to reduced affective reactivity and more rapid affective recovery 
due to previous regulation altering an individual’s affective disposition to the situation (i.e., 
effective acceptance hypothesis).  
The results from study 6.2 were supportive of the disruptive distraction hypothesis, 
yet were inconsistent with the effective acceptance hypothesis. Evidence supporting the 
disruptive distraction hypothesis, and refuting the effective acceptance hypothesis came 
from HR and reported affect across both periods (threat-task and recovery). Heart rate and, 
to a lesser extent, the self-reported affect results demonstrated effects of both threat and 
regulatory strategies during the threat-task and the recovery from the threat-task. The 
prior engagement in either of the affect regulation strategies, distraction and acceptance, 
were counterproductive in reducing affective reactivity to threat-tasks and promoting 
subsequent affective repair relative to the mind-wandering control conditions. These 
detrimental impacts of the regulation strategies were demonstrated  when averaging the 
results across both threat levels.  
Heart rate variability was only calculated during the recovery period and showed 
no effect of regulation.  However, consistent with study 6.1, threat level influenced HRV 
recovery, with increased threat leading to decreased HRV, demonstrating that threats that 
had passed still influenced vagal inhibition of HR. Interestingly, changes in respiration rate 
did not significantly predict the changes in HRV, suggesting that the phasic influences over 
207 
 
HRV were reduced during this threat-task recovery period and that changes in HRV were 
primarily due to changes in vagal tone, possibly as a result of increased influence by central 
parasympathetic in the hypothalamus. This would indicate that neurological influences 
over HR during recovery were different from those during the regulatory period.  
Aside from the HRV results, the HR and SR affect results suggested that both 
acceptance and distraction were counterproductive in preparing participants to undertake 
the threat-tasks in a way that reduced affective experience relative to the mind-wandering 
control condition. As acceptance did not show continued lowered affect as demonstrated 
by Hofmann et al., (2009), but rather increased affective reactivity and slower affective 
repair, the results of study 6.2 are inconsistent with the process of a feeling model. 
6.8. General Discussion 
The present research investigated the effect on arousal and anxious affect of 
engaging in distraction and acceptance when anticipating high and low levels of ego-threat.  
Study 6.1 tested the effectiveness of the strategies while anticipating the threats, when the 
strategies were actively engaged in. Study 6.2 tested the longer term consequences of the 
strategies, regarding the level of affective reactivity when undertaking the threat-tasks and 
the subsequent speed of affective repair when recovery from the threat-tasks.  Study 6.1 
tested hypotheses relating to the usefulness of the regulation strategies including the 
effective distraction, disruptive distraction and effective acceptance hypotheses. Study 6.1 
also tested the predictions that both distraction and acceptance may be more effective in 
some threat/affective situations more than others. Distraction was predicted to be more 
effective in low-threat circumstances and acceptance would be more effective in high-
threat circumstances but only lead to increased affect in low-threat circumstances (i.e., 
susceptible acceptance hypothesis). Study 6.2 tested two hypotheses. Neither theory nor 
208 
 
previous research suggested that prior engagement in distraction in the anticipation of a 
threat would result in reduced affect. Therefore, the effective distraction hypothesis was 
dropped but the prediction that distraction would be counterproductive in reducing 
anxious affect (i.e., the disruptive distraction hypothesis) was retained. In addition, based 
on the process of a feeling model previous research (Hofmann et al., 2009) suggesting that 
acceptance may have benefits when encountering and recovering from threats and that 
acceptance would lead to reduced anxious affect (i.e., the effective acceptance hypothesis). 
These hypotheses were tested based on participants’ affective reactivity and 
recovery/repair to the threat-tasks.  
The following discussion will present an overview of the present findings on the 
effects of the threat levels and the regulation strategies on affect and vagally mediated 
parasympathetic influences over arousal. This discussion will include the consistency of 
these finding with the hypotheses made, and how the findings compare to previous 
research. Integrating the findings of the present chapter with those of chapter 5 and 
previous research, the issues of why and when strategies are effective, are discussed with 
reference to the theories of affect regulation.  
6.8.1. An Overview of the Findings in the Context of Previous Research  
In both Study 6.1 and 6.2, the threat manipulation had effects on HRV, HR and 
reported affect in a way that was especially consistent with previous research. Study 6.1 
was consistent with previous studies in showing that anticipated high-threat leads to 
decreased HRV and increased HR (Croizet et al., 2004; Fuller, 1992; S. C. Segerstrom & 
Solberg Nes, 2007), nominally increased RR (Bloch et al., 1991) and increased reported 
affect (Inzlicht et al., 2006; Schmader & Johns, 2003). In study 6.2, the same participants in 
the high-threat circumstances showed lower HRV, and higher HR and reported affect, both 
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during the threat-task and following the threat-task, mirroring the decreased HRV they 
demonstrated in during the anticipation of the threat-tasks in study 6.1. Thus, the threat 
manipulations were effective in elevating affect, and the imposed regulation strategies 
were not powerful enough to eliminate these effects of threat.   
The strategy of distraction resulted in lower HRV in study 6.1, higher HR in study 
6.1 and 6.2, and generally nominally higher reported affect results in both studies relative 
to the control condition.  These results are inconsistent with previous studies supporting 
the effectiveness of distraction (Blagden & Craske, 1996; Van Dillen & Koole, 2007; Wong & 
Moulds, 2009). However, this previous research only supports distraction as an effective 
affective repair strategy where the attentional diversion occurs after the stressful event, 
rather than during anticipated threat circumstances. The only previous study showing 
support for the use of distraction in anticipated threat situations was from Bloom et al., 
(1977), which involved regulatory manipulation confounds, thus reducing the likelihood 
that imposed distraction could be suggested as effective in anticipated threat 
circumstances. Furthermore, most previous research on distraction, involving an imposed 
attentionally consuming task, supports the use of distraction as opposed to rumination 
(Blagden & Craske, 1996; Neumann et al., 2004; Wong & Moulds, 2009).  In contrast, the 
present research has tested distraction in comparison to a control condition during the 
anticipation of a threat and found that, unlike engaging in distraction following 
threat/affect induction,  distraction led to greater affect during and following engagement 
both when undertaking a threat-task and when recovering from that threat-task.  
The HRV and HR results from the distraction conditions shown in the present 
research, are consistent with the high-anxious repressor studies, individuals who report 
using distraction (Bonanno et al., 1991), showing decreased HRV and increased HR relative 
to true low-anxious individuals and high-anxious individuals (Asendorpf & Scherer, 1983; 
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Derakshan & Eysenck, 2001a; Fuller, 1992). The only inconsistency the current shows with 
these studies investigating repressors is that participants in the distraction condition in the 
current study did not report significantly less anxious affect as high-anxious repressors do 
(Derakshan & Eysenck, 2001a). The pattern of HRV and HR results from those in the 
distraction conditions and the high-threat control conditions in study 6.1 showed gradual 
increases in HR and decreases in HRV as the anticipated threat drew nearer. This escalating 
arousal found in the distraction and mind-wandering control conditions in high-threat 
levels in study 6.1 mirrors the results previous studies that have involved either naturally 
occurring (Fuller, 1992) or experimentally manipulated threat (Monat et al., 1972). Lastly, 
when considering that both the threat levels led to increased arousal from baseline, 
distraction may also have been similar to imposing an attentional load while participants 
were already trying to reduce their affect, disrupting this process of spontaneously down 
regulating affect (Duval & Wicklund, 1972; Johns et al., 2008; Knight et al., 2007; Mather & 
Knight, 2005; Mogg & Bradley, 1998) and leading to ironic effects where the affect sought 
to be reduced is actually elevated (Wegner et al., 1993).   
Study 6.1 also extended previous research by demonstrating that acceptance 
conditions did not show this pattern of gradual increased HR and decreased HRV as 
anticipated stressful events draw nearer.  Both acceptance conditions showed rapid peak in 
arousal (i.e., increased HR and decreased HRV in the second epoch) followed by a marked 
decrease (decreased HR and increased HRV in the third epoch). This pattern of arousal 
suggests that acceptance creates a different affective trajectory from distraction and 
unfocused attention conditions of a temporally certain threats (Fuller, 1992; Monat et al., 
1972).  Evidence that the beneficial impacts of acceptance should be noted only after a the 
strategy has been engaged for some time has been demonstrated by Low et al., (2008), 
who found that lower arousal among those engaging in acceptance, relative to a 
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ruminative condition, occurred only during the second session of two 10-minutes sessions. 
Study 6.1 of the present research was consistent with this, showing the beneficial effects of 
acceptance only after sustained engagement (i.e., after 10 minutes of sustained 
engagement), even relative to what can be construed as a maladaptive distraction 
condition. Study 6.1 also shows considerable consistency with Hofmann et al., (2009), 
showing supporting evidence for the use of acceptance in affectively arousing 
circumstances (i.e., in high-threat circumstances) with acceptance leading  to decreased HR 
compared to a suppression condition. Furthermore, the acceptance conditions in both the 
Hofmann et al and Low et al  showed no difference from a comparative condition that may 
be construed as adaptive (i.e., factual observation; Low et al., 2008) and the known 
adaptive strategy of reappraisal (Hofmann et al., 2009). Hence, in study 6.1, like previous 
research, acceptance was found to be of some benefit in high-threat circumstances and to 
lead to an eventual reduction physiological arousal while it was actively engaged in relative 
to a maladaptive condition, which in the present research was distraction.  
In study 6.1 and 6.2, however, acceptance, relative to the mind-wandering control 
condition, was shown to have negative unintended consequences. The results of study 6.1 
showed that engaging in acceptance can lead to decreased HRV and increased HR during 
the course of the affective trajectory with both acceptance conditions (high- and low-
threat) demonstrating increased HR (while focusing on negative thoughts and feelings in 
the second regulatory epoch) and reporting increased anxious affect relative to the mind-
wandering control condition following regulation. Furthermore, study 6.1 also 
demonstrated that in the low-threat condition, acceptance, relative to the mind-wandering 
control condition, decreased HRV, increased HR during latter periods of regulation and in 
study 6.2 (during threat-task engagement and recovery), led to increased HR. Acceptance 
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also led to increased affect in study 6.2, when averaged over the threat-task and recovery 
periods.  
These results showing the negative impacts are acceptance are inconsistent with 
those of Hofmann et al., (2009) who demonstrated the beneficial impacts of acceptance on 
HR across all time periods (anticipation, threat-task and recovery). In contrast to the 
present study, Hofmann et al. encouraged participants to continue to undertake their 
assigned strategy throughout each of the experimental phases. The present study only 
encouraged participants to use the strategies during the anticipation of the threat. Taking 
the results of the two studies together suggests that acceptance may be a strategy that 
must be continually maintained in order to note lasting beneficial effects when confronted 
with a highly threatening situation.   
Dunn et al. (2009), like the present research, found evidence that acceptance can 
reduce arousal when engaged in but have negative unintended consequences regarding 
affective reactivity and repair following its use. The Dunn et al. encouraged participants to 
use acceptance, suppression or their natural responses, in response to a graphic film clip of 
12. 5 minutes about road traffic accidents. Following the film clip participants were also 
exposed to still pictures (unrelated to the content of the film clip) consisting of positive, 
sad, disgusting and neutral content, whilst not actively encouraged to continue using the 
strategy they had been provided. The results of this study showed that during active 
strategy engagement, whilst watching the film clip, acceptance showed reduced 
electrodermal activity (i.e., reduced arousal) relative to suppression. However, following 
strategy engagement, during the exposure to the pictures participants who engaged in 
acceptance exhibited increased affective reactivity, showing rapid HR deceleration, whilst 
exposed to pictures of all content, and reported increased affect after one week relative to 
suppression. The present research extends the findings of Dunn et al., in that even when 
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acceptance was used in relation to an anticipated threat, and even when the reactive 
content is related to content in which affect regulation was used, this did not reduce 
affective reactivity or facilitate affective repair.  
When taking the results of previous research with the current, acceptance can have 
negative impacts -- particularly that it escalates affect experienced during engagement, and 
leads to increased affect following its engagement. However, beneficial effects of 
acceptance may occur in threat circumstances after more than 10 minutes of engagement 
and perhaps if continually engaged in as the situation changes.  In contrast, distraction 
engaged in during the anticipation of a threat only leads to increased affect during its 
engagement and has negative consequences following its engagement. Thus neither 
strategy appears to be suitable for all circumstances, rather are perhaps suited for some 
situations and not for others.   
6.8.2. Theoretical Implications  
The present research tested primarily two theoretical positions regarding the 
effective regulation of anxious affect. The first was the modal model, which claimed that 
decreased attention to threat-related thought and affective responding would lead to 
decreased affect. The second was the process of a feeling model that predicted that 
increased attention to thoughts and feelings regarding threats would lead to an initial 
escalation in affect yet an eventual sustained decreased affective response to the situation. 
It was predicted that the threat level under which the regulation strategy was engaged in 
may influence how effective the strategy is. This recognition was based on (1) evidence 
that suggests individuals, when anxious, reflexively direct attention to high-threat-stimuli 
(Bar-Haim et al., 2007), and such stimuli may be difficult to ignore if of high-threat value 
once reflexively attended to (Wilson & MacLeod, 2003), and (2) the assumptions of 
increased affective arousal being necessary in the process of a feeling model for increased 
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awareness of such affect leading to effective regulation of that affect.  Lastly, in contrast to 
these affect regulatory theories, an alternative perspective arising from theories of anxiety 
and attention (Mogg & Bradley, 1998) and self regulatory theories (Carver & Scheier, 1988) 
including objective self-awareness theory (Duval & Wicklund, 1972), suggests that 
individuals spontaneously initiate controlled attempts to divert attention from threats and 
to limit self-awareness in order to avoid experiencing increased unpleasant affects.  
If, like other studies, the present study assumed that the current distraction task 
led to successful attentional redeployment, then the present findings suggest that there is 
no support for the modal model, with distraction leading to increased, not decreased, 
affect. However, the results of chapter 5 suggest that distraction actually had a paradoxical 
effect, increasing attention to threat-related thoughts (Wegner, 1994). The paradoxical 
effects noted on attention, would have also been likely to influence affect according to the 
modal model (Gross & Thompson, 2007), resulting in distraction increasing affect, noted in 
the present study. Both cognitive motivational theories of anxiety (Mogg & Bradley, 1998) 
and attention and self-regulatory theory (Carver & Scheier, 1988), including objective-self-
awareness theory (Duval & Wicklund, 1972), predict that individuals will spontaneously 
divert attention from threat-stimuli when anxious.  Chapter 5 demonstrated that the mind-
wandering control condition, a condition likely to elicit people’s spontaneous response to a 
threat situation, showed increased attentional diversion from threats (i.e., self-distraction) 
from upcoming threat-tasks and associated affect, and also minimised self-awareness of 
affective responding. Taking into account the results of chapter 5, there is substantial 
support for the modal model, with the control conditions showing lower levels of anxious 
affect based on at least one of the affective measures relative to distraction and 
acceptance at some point during regulation.  Hence, taken together, spontaneously self-
initiated attentional diversion may be more effective in reducing affect than providing an 
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attentional load, as this load disrupts this effective attention diversion (Knight et al., 2007; 
Mather & Knight, 2005) leading to increased affect (Ellenbogen et al., 2002).  
The support for the process of a feeling model, represented by the effective 
acceptance and disruptive distraction hypotheses, received partial support in study 6.1, 
showing acceptance eventually led to reduced arousal, relative to distraction but not 
significantly  affect less than the control condition. The process of a feeling model was 
contradicted in study 6.2, with the control conditions leading to reduced affect relative to 
acceptance. The support for the process of a feeling model from the effective acceptance 
hypothesis was limited to; (1) patterns of arousal during the strategies’ engagement, and; 
(2) from the pattern of group differences in HRV and HR in the high-threat level at the end 
of regulation strategy engagement. The pattern of HR results noted within the acceptance 
condition showed increased arousal followed by a decline in arousal, consistent with 
process of a feeling model. This pattern contrasts with the distraction conditions that show 
elevated arousal throughout each regulatory epoch and the high-threat control condition 
which showed nominally the same pattern as the distraction conditions. Hence, the pattern 
of steadily increasing arousal in these conditions, which limited attention to feelings, is 
consistent with the predictions of the process of a feeling model, with the lack of 
awareness of affect limiting the affective response reaching completion. The pattern of 
group differences in affect was also partially supportive of the process of a feeling model 
where acceptance showed lower affect than distraction, prominent in the high-threat 
circumstances. Hence, these different patterns in affective responding suggest that 
acceptance thwarts the usual affect trajectory, particularly in high-threat situations where 
there is significant affective arousal to be regulated. However, this was the limit to the 
evidence for the process of a feeling model. 
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The process of a feeling model did accurately predict that distraction would lead to 
increased affect. However, when considering the findings from chapter 5 that distraction 
did not only limited awareness of affect, but actually increased attention towards threats, 
relative to the mind-wandering control condition, alternative explanations are more 
plausible. If indeed participants were already regulating to avoid and inhibit the experience 
of anxious affect (Carver & Scheier, 1988; Derryberry & Reed, 2002; Duval & Wicklund, 
1972; Ellenbogen et al., 2002; Koster et al., 2006; Koster, Rassin, Crombez, & Naring, 2003; 
MacLeod et al., 1986; Mogg & Bradley, 1998), an alternative explanations regarding the 
disruptive effects of an attentional load or the paradoxical effects mental control (Wegner, 
1994; Wegner et al., 1993) provide more accurate explanations. Hence, the results from 
distraction, when taking into account that individuals were spontaneously regulating, by 
diverting attention from threats and affect in the mind-wandering control condition 
suggest that the process of a feeling model did not account for the findings from the 
comparisons made between the distraction and control conditions, and may be better 
accounted for by other explanations.   
Evidence contradicting the predictions of the process of a feeling model was 
demonstrated in both study 6.1 and 6.2 from comparisons made between the acceptance 
and control conditions. In study 6.1 the acceptance condition reported increased affect 
following regulation. In study 6.2 prior engagement in acceptance led to greater increases 
in anxious arousal, relative to the mind-wandering control conditions. Hence, the 
predictions of the process of a feeling model regarding acceptance leading to an eventual 
sustained effect of limited anxious affect during the latter periods and subsequent to its 
engagement was contradicted by several results.  
A possible alternative explanation for the results relates to the attentional load 
that both acceptance and distraction could create. The results from study 6.2 showed that 
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both strategies requiring the control of attentional focus engaged in during the anticipation 
of the threat led to increased affective reactivity and slowed affective recovery relative to 
conditions that do not impose a control of attention. This suggests that sustaining an 
attentional focus during anticipation of threat impairs an individual’s ability to cope when 
eventually engaging in the threat-task, and slows affective repair.  A potential explanation 
for the results from both distraction and acceptance is that engaging in strategies that 
require an attentional focus restricts attentional capacity for engaging in reappraisal of 
threat information that may better prepare individuals to undertake threat-tasks relative to 
a condition that does not have this same attention load, as shown in previous studies 
investigating either distraction or acceptance (Dunn et al., 2009; Houston & Holmes, 1974).  
Hence, both strategies could disrupt an individual’s usual mental preparations for 
undertaking a threat-task that may prepare them more appropriately for the threat.  
However, even if acceptance does indeed reduce participants’ mental preparation, 
the Hoffman et al. suggests that, if it is continually engaged, the strategy is nonetheless 
able to reduce affective reactivity and promote affect recovery. Therefore, it may be 
important to consider the process of a feeling as a more cyclical model, such as the modal 
model, where continued experiential awareness and acceptance is required in an ever 
changing situation, and ever changing affective responses, for reduced affect to be 
sustained. 
6.8.3. Limitations and Avenues Future Research 
There are several limitations that are worth some consideration in this chapter 
(other limitations are also identified section 8.3). The first possible limitation in the study is 
the manipulation of distraction. Although the manipulation of distraction needed to be 
consistent (in terms of mental and physical activity and length of time) with the 
manipulation of acceptance, the distraction task was somewhat different from those used 
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in previous studies, which showed beneficial results (Blagden & Craske, 1996; Van Dillen & 
Koole, 2007). Previous research has manipulated distraction through the use of tasks that 
involve sorting stimuli (Blagden & Craske, 1996), answering arithmetic questions (Van 
Dillen & Koole, 2007), or letting the mind drift onto a topic participants prefer (Sheppes et 
al., 2009; Sheppes & Meiran, 2007), whilst others have used a mix of behavioural and 
cognitive tasks (Augustine & Hemenover, 2009). Although there is considerable variance in 
the kinds of distraction tasks that have demonstrated effectiveness, cognitive distraction 
tasks requiring the mental manipulation of provided stimuli have been shown to lead to 
decreased reported affect in anxiety eliciting situations (Blagden & Craske, 1996; Van Dillen 
& Koole, 2007). The current task involves a response generation task where the stimuli 
provided are to be expanded upon to create a series of unique responses to an unusual 
topic and therefore deviates from the previous studies investigating the effectiveness of 
cognitive distraction. It has been previously shown that distraction tasks need to be of high 
intensity or attentional loading and activity level to keep participants’ attention diverted 
and towards task related thoughts (Van Dillen & Koole, 2007). Therefore, the current 
distraction task may not have required sufficient attentional resources to divert attention 
away from affect maintaining thoughts and threat-related physical stimuli.  Thus, future 
research should test distraction tasks, evaluated in previous studies and suggested to be 
effective in reducing affect when used under situations that did not involve an anticipated 
threat, against other supposed effective strategies in anticipated threat circumstances. 
A second limitation of the present research is the standard to which respiration 
was measured. Although many studies do not measure or remove respiratory influences 
from HRV, failing to account for respiratory changes can lead to the misinterpretation of 
HRV as a measure of vagal tone or central parsasympathetic influence over HR (Berntson et 
al., 1997).  Important additions including tidal volume measurement and cycle analysis, 
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which are part of the recommended standard associated with respiration measurement 
and analysis (Wientjes, 1992), were not included due to the limits of the hardware used to 
measure respiration. However, as respiration rate (RR) is typically considered the critical 
respiration indicator in HRV measurement standards (Berntson et al., 1997), and with HRV 
being the dependent measure of interest, respiratory changes were only of interest to 
regressing these fluctuations from HRV (Althaus et al., 1998). Tidal volume can also have an 
impact on HRV and it was not measured appropriately to remove its possible influences. 
Hence, respiratory effects on HRV may have not completely eliminated and it remains 
possible that differences between conditions on HRV could be due to differences in tidal 
volume, rather than central parasympathetic influences. Thus, all future studies 
investigating the impacts of threats and regulatory manipulations on parasympathetic 
indicators of HRV should consider removing the respiratory influences (Berntson et al., 
1997). Furthermore, respiration, if measured and analysed to the appropriate standards 
could have also been used an alternative measure of emotion (Bloch et al., 1991; Wientjes, 
1992), and should be considered for use in future research. 
A third limitation is that, during the recovery phase (study 6.2) the regulation 
strategies may have had a quadratic, rather than liner, effect on arousal, similar to that of 
study 6.1. By evaluating the strategies on the average arousal level over one 5 minute 
epoch during the recovery phase, the present study may have overlooked the possibility 
that some strategies may have initially resulted in increased affect soon after the threat 
task completion (e.g., within the first minute). However, those with high arousal in the first 
minute of recovery may by the end of the recovery phase (the final fifth minute) have had 
lower arousal than those in other conditions that did not initially have high arousal. This 
possibility should be investigated in future analyses on the current data set.  
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Lastly, further research should also seek to eliminate alternative explanations 
regarding why distraction may be ineffective during the anticipation of a threat. The 
process of a feeling model and ironic process of mental control are not the only 
explanations of why distraction may have led to increased affect. Another is that imposing 
an attentional load or alternative attentional focus to the threat may prevent reappraisal 
of, or the mental preparation of engaging in an ego-threatening task. This explanation may 
be examined by asking participants, using well validated self-report measures, the extent to 
which they visualised themselves doing the task, or how they were thinking about the task 
to minimise or damage to their own positive self-perceptions.     
6.8.4. Conclusions 
The present research extends the findings of previous studies investigating 
distraction and acceptance in several different ways. First, it demonstrates that providing a 
distraction task is counterproductive when undertaken in anticipated threat circumstances 
and also subsequently leads to increased reactivity when undertaking threat-tasks and 
slower recovery in comparison to spontaneous attempts to regulate. Second, the present 
research shows that acceptance has limited effectiveness in reducing anxious arousal, only 
showing beneficial effects when engaged in during threat anticipation and only reducing 
physiological arousal after sustained engagement (more than 10 minutes). Third, the 
present research shows that acceptance leads to a different time course of arousal from 
distraction and mind-wandering in high-threat circumstances: notwithstanding its eventual 
reduction of arousal, acceptance can lead to the increased perception of anxious affect 
relative to unfocused attention. Fourth, it demonstrates that acceptance, when engaged in 
under low-threat circumstances does not lead to reduced affect or increased regulated 
responding, and is actually counterproductive. Fifth, acceptance, like distraction, can result 
in subsequent negative unintended consequences increasing affective reactivity to the 
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threat-tasks, and slowed affective repair during recovery when compared to spontaneous 
regulatory attempts in the mind-wandering control conditions, despite it showing reduced 
affect during engagement. Lastly, when taken together with previous research (Dunn et al., 
2009; Hofmann et al., 2009), the present research suggests that acceptance is beneficial 
mainly high-threat circumstances and requires continual engagement as the situation 
changes for the strategy to lead to reduced physiological arousal.  
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Chapter 7: Does Anxious Affect or 
Affect Regulation Explain 
Diminished Executive Control? A 
Comparison of Distraction and 
Acceptance in High- and Low-
Threat Situations 
Many circumstances require controlled responding in behavioural, cognitive or 
affective modalities (i.e., self-regulation). Controlled responding could be restricting 
consumption of food or drink, limiting spending behaviour, persisting with an activity in 
circumstances of physical or mental exhaustion, or limiting expression of emotions in 
socially inappropriate circumstances. At least two factors lead to impaired controlled 
responding. The first is the imposition of a threat or stressor, and the second is the prior 
attempt to inhibit prepotent responses (Muraven & Baumeister, 2000). Previous research 
has shown that threats or the imposition of stressors lead to temporary impairments in 
restraining calorie intake (Heatherton et al., 1991; Herman, Polivy, Lank, & Heatherton, 
1987; Wallis & Hetherington, 2004), refraining from alcohol consumption (Muraven et al., 
2002; Muraven et al., 2005) and success on tests of academic achievement (Ben-Zeev, Fein, 
& Inzlicht, 2005; Tohill & Holyoak, 2000), intellectual  capability (Croizet et al., 2004) and 
physical persistence (Inzlicht et al., 2006). Similarly, previous research has shown that 
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previous inhibition of prepotent responses, across response modalities (thought, behaviour 
and emotion), leads to temporary impairments in restraining aggression (DeWall et al., 
2007; Stucke & Baumeister, 2006) and sexual behaviour (Gailliot & Baumeister, 2007), and 
in reductions in both persistence and performance on tasks requiring either physical 
stamina (Muraven, Baumeister, & Tice, 1999; Muraven et al., 1998) or mental effort 
(Baumeister et al., 1998; K. D. Vohs & Heatherton, 2000). 
Cognitive affect regulation aims to alter the experience of affect via the control of 
attention and thought (Garnefski & Kraaij, 2006; Garnefski et al., 2001; Gross & Thompson, 
2007). Acts of cognitive affect regulation may involve inhibiting prepotent responses to 
threats or stressors such as inhibiting the initial reflexive tendency for attention to engage 
with threats when anxious (Bar-Haim et al., 2007). Distraction and acceptance are two such 
affect regulation strategies that primarily involve the control of attentional focus. These 
strategies may be used in the presence of a threat or stressor in order to reduce anxious 
affect. The current chapter seeks to establish the impacts of the cognitive affect regulation 
strategies of distraction and acceptance on subsequent attempts to regulate thought and 
action.    
7.1. Self-Regulation and Executive Functioning 
Self-control requires individuals to monitor their current responses and detect 
when these responses (thoughts, actions or affect) are deviating from the ideal responses 
for that situation (Carver, 1979; Carver & Scheier, 1982). Similarly, executive functioning 
can be defined as an interrelated set of higher order cognitive abilities that involve the 
control of attentional focus and thought, in the pursuit of a determined goal in a novel 
situation (Miyake et al., 2000; Norman & Shallice, 1986; Shallice & Burgess, 1993). Thus, 
executive functions can be considered to support the ability to demonstrate self-control 
and, hence, Schmeichel (2007) introduces the term “executive control” that attempts to 
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encapsulate both concepts. Importantly, self-regulated acts or acts requring executive 
control are effortful, non-automatic acts that often involve inhibiting and altering 
prepotent responses.gg  
Two executive functions are pivotal in assisting in regulated responding. The first is 
the ability to inhibit prepotent responses. Prepotent response inhibition is the capacity to 
override automatichh thoughts or actions (Miyake et al., 2000). The inhibition function is 
particularly important in exercising self-control and being able to perform future acts of 
self-control (Muraven & Baumeister, 2000). A second executive function crucial to 
regulated responding is updating and maintaining representations in working memory 
(Schmeichel, Volokhov, & Demaree, 2008), defined earlier as the active retention and 
selective abandonment and manipulation of internally represented stimuli (A. D. Baddeley, 
1986; Miyake et al., 2000). Performing working memory tasks has been suggested to 
involve a variety of functions that are important in controlling responding (Engle, 2002; 
Kane et al., 2001) such as successfully  suppressing outward signs of  emotion  (Schmeichel 
et al., 2008).  Importantly, engaging in an initial activity that involves response inhibition or 
the use of working memory has been shown to lead to a temporary impairment in 
subsequent activities requiring regulated responding (Schmeichel, 2007). There are many 
possible reasons for temporary impairments in executive control, of which three will be 
investigated in relation to how the strategies of distraction and acceptance may differ in 
the extent of their influence on the capacity to demonstrate executive control.  
                                                          
gg
 Self-regulatory acts may be initiated spontaneously in order to control or inhibit a 
prepotent response. Such spontaneous acts initiated by the individual can also be considered as 
effortful (Muraven & Baumeister, 2000).  
hh
 Automatic due to prior learning, over-learning  or due to evolutionary reflexive reasons.  
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7.2. Self-Regulatory Strength Theory and the Use of Executive Resources 
The first possible explanation for temporary impairments in executive functioning 
seen in previous research comes from the self-regulatory strength model (Muraven & 
Baumeister, 2000). This model suggests that self-regulated responding requires the use of a 
limited reservoir of resources (i.e., executive resources) vital in the performance of 
executive control tasks (Johns et al., 2008; Schmeichel, 2007).  Like a muscle, self-regulation 
can be impaired due to previous effortful mental activity (Muraven & Baumeister, 2000). 
Gailliot, Baumeister, and De Wall, (2007) demonstrated that executive resources may be 
represented physiologically through blood glucose, with decreased blood glucose indicating 
depleted resources.  Importantly, particular affect regulation attempts that involve 
inhibiting affective expression or inhibiting thoughts (i.e., suppression) have been 
suggested to deplete executive resources leading  to subsequent impairment of executive 
control (Baumeister et al., 1998; Johns et al., 2008; Muraven et al., 1998; Schmeichel et al., 
2003).  
Ego-threats (i.e., situations that are socially evaluative and may challenge positive 
self-perceptions) have similar executive resource-depleting effects to previous acts of self-
regulation (Ben-Zeev et al., 2005; Croizet et al., 2004; Inzlicht et al., 2006; Johns et al., 
2008; Schmader & Johns, 2003). Muraven and Baumiester (2000) propose that an imposed 
threat or stressor results in persistent monitoring of this undesired stimulus requiring the 
control of attention and inhibition of attention to the experience of affect. They also state 
that such situations may result in spontaneous, automatic and persistent self-regulatory 
attempts that require inhibiting negative emotions as noted by (Johns et al., 2008). 
Inhibiting initial reflexive attentional engagement with threatening stimuli (Bar-Haim et al., 
2007) has also been found (Derryberry & Reed, 2002; Koster et al., 2006; Koster et al., 
2003; MacLeod et al., 1986) and suggested as a spontaneously initiated controlled process 
226 
 
to regulate affect (Bar-Haim et al., 2007; Cornwell et al., 2011; Ellenbogen et al., 2002; 
Mogg & Bradley, 1998). Individuals in ego-threat situations often show increased anxious 
affect coinciding with the decreased executive control (Croizet et al., 2004; Inzlicht et al., 
2006; Schmader & Johns, 2003). Importantly, in these studies, decrements in executive 
control are attributed to the requirement of individuals in such circumstances to override 
reflexive attentional engagement, and inhibit thoughts and emotional reactions, rather 
than to increased anxious affect that is measured and reported. Such attributions are 
particularly intriguing as there is much research on affective states’ influence executive 
control (Eysenck & Calvo, 1992b; Eysenck et al., 2007) indicating that the reasons for 
diminished executive control deserve more thorough investigation.   
Another issue in understanding the mechanisms behind temporary impairments in 
executive control relates to the length of time over which impairments can be found. The 
length of time between regulation and executive resource assessment has been under-
investigated or under-reported (Hagger et al., 2010). Earlier research has suggested that 
the effects of prior regulation on performance diminish as participants continue to engage 
in a mentally effortful task that required the control of attentionii (Hartley, 1973). However, 
Hartley (1973) also demonstrated that persistent stressors (i.e., noise) when participants 
were performing the executive control task had additive effects, suggesting that the longer 
the stressor remains, the more of an impact it has on performance. In addition, Hartley 
(1973) demonstrated that previous mental activities had diminished effects the longer time 
between when individuals engage in the prior regulation task to the when executive 
control is measured. Hence, these results suggest that the impacts of regulation may 
                                                          
ii
 The task used in the experiment was likely to have involved both attentional inhibition and 
switching (both executive functions) however, terminology of executive tasks did not exist when this 
study was undertaken and hence has not been described as measuring executive functioning.  
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diminish, especially in the presence of persistent stressors. However, within Hartely’s 
(1973) study it was unclear whether the impacts of the persistent stressor were due to 
increasing arousal caused by the stressor or due to the fatiguing nature of regulating one’s 
attention to ignore the presence of that stressor. 
7.2.1. Affect Regulation, Reflexive Attention, Self-Awareness and Executive 
Resources   
 Affect regulation strategies aiming to alter the experience or expression of emotion 
may either preserve or diminish the temporary capacity to demonstrate executive control. 
Johns, Inzlicht and Schmader (2008), and Schmeichel, Vohs and Baumeister (2003) have 
demonstrated that the strategy of suppression (i.e., inhibition of the external emotional 
expression or internal occurrence of unwanted thoughts), leads to impaired executive 
control . Johns, Inzlicht and Schmader (2008) showed that those engaging in suppression in 
response to a threat performed worse than those engaging in reappraisal (i.e., changing the 
meaning of a stimulus previously interpreted as harmful), which is a strategy argued not to 
require the inhibition of responses if adopted before an affective response is initiated 
(Johns et al., 2008; Richards & Gross, 2000; Sheppes & Meiran, 2008). The reasoning 
explaining why such a difference in executive control existed between suppression and 
reappraisal is that early engagement in reappraisal (unlike suppression) does not require an 
individual to inhibit a response because the strategy has occurred before the initiation of 
an affective response, whilst suppression occurs after the affective response is initiated and 
does involve inhibiting the prepotent affective response. It is this difference in the level of 
inhibition required by the strategies that is proposed to determine the level of effort 
demanded and the impact on subsequent executive control (Muraven & Baumeister, 
2000).   
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However, the same regulatory strategies/tasks, can lead to different impacts on 
executive control when undertaken in different circumstances. Reappraisal, which has 
previously been shown to preserve executive control when initiated before exposure to 
threats and affect (Johns et al., 2008), has alos been demonstrated to lead to impaired 
executive control when the strategy is initiated during an already present affective 
response relative to distraction (Sheppes & Meiran, 2008). In addition, distraction has been 
demonstrated to preserve executive control when used concurrently with being exposed to 
unpleasant stimuli (Sheppes & Meiran, 2008), but not when anticipating engaging an 
unpleasant task (Alberts et al., 2008). This combination of findings suggests that different 
situations may elicit different reflexive responses, and that the same regulation strategy 
may therefore involve inhibition of a reflexive response in one circumstance but not in 
another circumstance.   
Different regulatory tasks or instructions may also result in similar levels of 
inhibition of reflexive responses in similar circumstances, resulting in equivalent impacts on 
subsequent executive control (Heatherton et al., 1993; Johns et al., 2008).  Johns, Inzlicht 
and Schmader (2008) showed that participants in a suppression condition did not show 
impairment in executive control relative to a control condition that was designed to elicit 
individuals’ spontaneous response in that threat situation. However, both conditions 
showed impaired executive control relative to a reappraisal condition. To explain the 
similar levels of impairment in executive control demonstrated by both suppression and 
control conditions relative to the reappraisal condition, Johns et al. suggested that, in 
threatening circumstances, individuals spontaneously initiate the inhibition of outward and 
internally experienced anxious affect and that this inhibition (participant initiated or 
experimenter imposed) depletes executive resources.  
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Consistent with the Johns et al.,  Heatherton, Polivy, Herman and Baumeister 
(1993), reported similar performance impairments for an experimenter-assisted affect 
reduction task (providing distracting, neutral, video content to watch) and experimental 
control condition, relative to a condition that increased self-awareness (looking at video of 
themselves). They, too, suggested that the similar levels of impaired performance 
demonstrated by the distraction and control groups was due to participants spontaneously 
avoiding or inhibit self-awareness of unpleasant affect in threat circumstances. Engaging in 
a task that increases self-awareness was argued not to involve such attempts at inhibition 
of awareness (Duval & Wicklund, 1972), and therefore to preserved self-control.  
 Distraction and acceptance can be conceptualised as affect regulation strategies 
that require the control of attentional focus: distraction away from the self via the 
imposition of an attentional load, and acceptance towards the self with an attitude of 
openness, which arguably could also be mentally demanding. As a regulatory strategy, 
distraction is conceptualised as avoiding the experience of anxious affect. Specifically, 
distraction is defined as the diversion of attention from unpleasant affect and threat-
related stimuli by engaging in a task that consumes attentional focus (Augustine & 
Hemenover, 2009) or working memory capacity (Van Dillen & Koole, 2007). Both inhibiting 
attention and maintaining mental representations in working memory can lead to 
decrements in controlled responding (Schmeichel, 2007; Schmeichel et al., 2003). 
Furthermore, individuals’ attention may reflexively engage with, and be used to monitor, 
threatening stimuli (Bar-Haim et al., 2007), and attentional diversion from these threat-
stimuli has been suggested to require significant cognitive control (Cornwell et al., 2011; 
Knight et al., 2007). Hence, if self-regulatory theory is correct, distraction (directing 
attention away from reflexively attended threats) is likely to require high levels of 
attentional control and response inhibition in high-threat circumstances, and therefore to 
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diminish executive resources. In low-threat circumstances it has been suggested by Duval 
and Wicklund (1972) that there is a natural tendency for the mind to wander, with others 
also suggesting that this tendency may possibly constitute an automatic attempt to 
maintain pleasant affect (Koole & Jostmann, 2004; Mauss et al., 2007) and/or to avoid 
experiencing negative affect (Duval & Wicklund, 1972; Mogg & Bradley, 1998). Distraction 
tasks involve updating and maintaining representations in working memory (Van Dillen & 
Koole, 2007), which would inhibit this natural tendency for the mind to wander (Muraven & 
Baumeister, 2000), and therefore distraction in low-threat circumstances is also likely to 
deplete executive resources. 
In contrast to distraction, acceptance involves allocating attention towards the self 
and affective responses and threat-related thoughts in a way that does not allow for 
avoidance or inhibition of unpleasant experiences (S. C. Hayes, 2004a; Roemer & Orsillo, 
2009). The conceptualisation of acceptance is very similar to self-awareness in that the 
strategy involves increased attention towards threats and one’s own responding. 
Therefore, the use of acceptance would be likely to increase attention to threats and 
increase self-awareness. Both theories of attention (Mogg & Bradley, 1998) and self-
regulation (Carver & Scheier, 1988; Duval & Wicklund, 1972) state that socially evaluative 
or ego-threatening circumstances reflexively facilitate attentional engagement with threats 
when anxious, a notion well supported by empirical evidence (Bar-Haim et al., 2007). The 
self-regulation theories suggest that this attention to threats inevitably leads to increased 
self-focused attention or self-awareness. Based on these assertions, engaging in 
acceptance should be less effortful and should preserve the ability to sustain self-regulated 
responding better than seeking to inhibit attention to threats and self-awareness in these 
high-threat circumstances. Both theories of attention (Mogg & Bradley, 1998) and self-
regulation (Duval & Wicklund, 1972) would also predict that situations of low-threat do not 
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facilitate attention towards the self, therefore engaging in a strategy that does increase 
self-focused attention (e.g., acceptance) would be more effortful and reduce the capacity 
to demonstrate executive control relative to a strategy that allowed more reflexive 
attentional responses.   
7.3. Affective Theory of Impaired Executive Control (ACT and PET)  
The second reason to expect distraction and acceptance to differ in their effects on 
executive control relates to theories that implicate anxious affect in causing temporary 
deficits in executive control. The regulation of anxious affect can, unsurprisingly, lead to 
differences in experienced anxious affect (Blagden & Craske, 1996; Hofmann et al., 2009); 
indeed, this is the very point of self-regulation. Importantly, the imposition of threats, the 
induction of anxious affect or increased anxious affect, and the predisposition to 
experience anxious affect all coincide with poorer executive control (Eysenck, 1982; 
Eysenck & Calvo, 1992b; Eysenck et al., 2007). Aside from self-regulatory strength theory 
(section 7.2), anxious affect has itself been proposed to be the cause of the systematic 
differences noted in executive control (Derakshan et al., 2009; Eysenck, 1982; Eysenck & 
Calvo, 1992b; Eysenck et al., 2007; Tohill & Holyoak, 2000). Indeed, studies that attributed 
executive control differences to depletion in executive resources resulting from previous 
attempts to regulate also demonstrated that those under increased threat show increased 
anxious affect (Ben-Zeev et al., 2005; Croizet et al., 2004; Inzlicht et al., 2006; Schmader & 
Johns, 2003). Hence, research on the depleting influences of affect regulation strategies on 
executive control should seek to rule out anxious affect disrupting executive control as a 
factor in the executive control difference between regulatory conditions.  
There are two prominent anxious affect theories explaining the influence of 
anxious affect on executive control: Attentional Control Theory (ACT; Eysenck et al., 2007) 
accounting for impairments in response inhibition, and Processing Efficiency Theory (PET;  
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Eysenck & Calvo, 1992b) accounting for impairments in working memory.  PET relies heavily 
upon Baddeley’s (1986) working memory model consisting of a central executive and two 
slave systems; the phonological loop and the visuo-spatial sketch pad. The central 
executive in a crude form could be described as attentional capacity and the ability to 
control attention (i.e., attentional inhibition and attentional switching) and the two slave 
systems could simply be described as short term memory stores for different forms of 
information. Eysenck and colleagues (1992b) proposed that the high level of worrisome 
thoughts during the experience of anxiety are the primary cause of working memory 
performance decrement because they consume capacity within the working memory 
system, particularly the phonological loop, predicting that verbal working memory, rather 
than spatial working memory would be impaired. PET specifies that with increased effort 
(indicated by increased physiological responding during task performance), anxious 
participants can maintain similar performance to less anxious individuals as long as working 
memory load (i.e., number of items held within the working memory system) is low. 
However, Eysenck et al. (1992) proposes as the working memory load increases, the load 
imposed by worrisome cognitions begins to impact on performance and to decrease 
response accuracy as effort reserves become no longer adequate to meet the demands of 
the task.  
Several studies investigated the impacts of anxiety on working memory and   
support was found for anxiety impacting specifically on verbal working memory (Eysenck, 
1985; MacLeod & Donnellan, 1993; Sorg & Whitney, 1992), although several studies found 
that anxiety impacted on spatial working memory performance (Lavric et al., 2003; 
Shackman et al., 2006) or only on the central executive rather than  the slave systems 
(Eysenck et al., 2005). To address the evidence clearly contradicting the predictions of PET, 
that verbal working would primarily be impaired, Eysenck and colleagues developed 
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Attentional Control Theory (ACT; Eysenck et al., 2007), which no longer focused on anxiety 
influencing the interaction between the central executive and the phonological loop. 
Rather, ACT specifies the functions of the central executive that should be affected when 
individuals are anxious, namely the attentional control functions of inhibition and set 
shifting. This lost ability is attributed to two factors. The first factor is an extension of PET: 
the innate and automatic tendency for attention to engage with threatening stimuli – 
either internal (worrisome thoughts) or external (threatening stimuli within the 
environment). The second factor is that an anxious state shifts the balance of attention 
away from internal top-down goal-oriented processes and towards the stimulus-driven 
processes used to scan the immediate environment for upcoming threats that may require 
a response. These two factors may temporarily limit the attentional resources available to 
the individual for performing tasks that require top-down processes (i.e., executive control 
tasks). Hence, ACT proposes that anxiety temporarily reduces ability to control attention, 
resulting in decrements in the executive functions of prepotent response inhibition and 
working memory.   
Although the theoretical cause of the impairment to executive control differs 
between affective theory (i.e., PET and ACT) and self-regulatory strength theory, the 
empirical predictions regarding the impact of threat are remarkably similar. Self-regulatory 
strength theory claims that automatically initiated self-regulatory attempts in response to 
stressors temporarily impair subsequent attempts at controlled responding (Muraven & 
Baumeister, 2000), reflected in response inhibition (Inzlicht et al., 2006) and working 
memory performance (Schmader & Johns, 2003). In contrast, the affective theories suggest 
that executive control impairments (working memory for PET and response inhibition and 
set switching for ACT) result from the increased anxious affect (or worrisome thoughts for 
PET) that is experienced due to those stressors or threats. 
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7.4. Neurovisceral Account of Impairments in Regulated Responding 
Another explanation of temporary impairments to executive control is Thayer and 
colleagues’ neurovisceral account (Thayer et al., 2009; Thayer & Lane, 2000). This theory is 
a neurophysiological account of the impacts that disinhibited arousal can have on executive 
control. The neurovisceral account specifies that vagally mediated parasympathetic 
influences over heart rate (i.e., vagal tone) are associated with a network of both central 
and autonomic structures, where the interactions between these structures can either 
facilitate or impair executive control.  
Thayer and Lane (2000) argue that the inhibition of arousal, as demonstrated by 
the vagal inhibition of heart rate (HR), is associated with rapid interactions occurring 
between the prefrontal cortex and the amygdala. The structures involved in the connection 
between the heart and the amygdala and prefrontal cortex are together referred to as the 
central autonomic network (CAN). The CAN comprises cortical structures including the 
insular cortex, the prefrontal cortex, the amygdala, the periaqueductal gray, the nucleus of 
the solitary tract and the nucleus ambiguous and lastly the peripheral end-organs, including 
the heart.  
Thayer and colleagues (Thayer et al., 2009; Thayer & Lane, 2000) suggest that the 
CAN operates with both top-down influences and bottom-up input, meaning that signals 
are bidirectional throughout the network. Arguments for the top-down influences within 
the system linking vagal tone and executive control are based on evidence of interactions 
between the prefrontal cortex, known to support executive control, and the amygdala, 
which is activated during fear (Davidson, 2002; LeDoux, 1995, 2000, 2002). This research 
shows that the neural fibres between the prefrontal cortex and the amygdala are mutually 
inhibitory, whereby increased activity within one reduces activity in the other. An example 
of the top-down influence is activation in the amygdala leading to inhibited activity in the 
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medial prefrontal cortex, leading to both impaired executive control and decreased vagal 
tone (i.e., inhibition of HR). The argument for bottom-up influences in the CAN stems from 
evidence cited in Thayer et al (2009) that parasympathetic influences over peripheral end-
organs are relayed back to the prefrontal cortex via the thalamus. If high levels of vagal 
inhibition still exist over arousal, this would increase activity within the prefrontal cortex, 
and support acts of executive control. Hence, increased activation within the prefrontal 
cortex could be maintained via limited attention to threats (top-down), or via increased 
resting  vagal tone resulting from practiced meditation (Satyapriya, Nagendra, Nagarathna, 
& Padmalatha, 2009) or aerobic training (Hansen, Johnsen, Sollers, Stenvik, & Thayer, 
2009). 
Thayer and colleagues have demonstrated several times that greater vagal tone 
(suggesting increased parasympathetic influences) among individuals at rest is directly 
related to better executive control, particularly on attentional control and working memory 
tasks (Hansen et al., 2003; Hansen et al., 2004; Hansen, Johnsen, & Thayer, 2009). In 
addition, interventions to increase vagal tone, (e.g., aerobic training) have led to superior 
executive control (Hansen, Johnsen, Sollers, et al., 2009). It is plausible that particular 
regulation strategies and particular circumstances may support increased vagal inhibition 
and therefore support increased activity within the prefrontal cortex, leading to superior 
executive functioning.  
The neurovisceral account makes predictions that partially overlap with the other 
affective theories, PET and ACT. Like PET and ACT, increased arousal, particularly decreased 
vagal inhibition of arousal, immediately before undertaking the executive control task, is 
predicted lead to impaired executive control. However, unlike PET and ACT, the 
neurovisceral account also predicts that increased arousal and decreased vagal tone, 
measured during executive task performance (therefore representing increased amygdala 
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activation inhibiting sustained activity within the prefrontal cortex), will coincide with 
impaired executive control. In contrast, ACT and PET predict the increased arousal and 
decreased vagal inhibition (representing increased mental effort) during executive task 
performance should coincide with superior executive control.  
7.5. Summary of the Theoretical Predictions  
The potential impacts of threat level and engagement in different regulation 
strategies on executive control can be predicted by self-regulatory strength theory, the 
affective theories of PET and ACT, and the neurovisceral account. However, the reasons for 
the impacts on executive control are different according to each of the theories.  Each of 
the three theories predicts that increased threat should lead to impaired executive control 
relative to situations of lower threat: Self-regulatory strength, due to the fatiguing nature 
of trying to cope with the threat; PET and ACT, due to the increased affect arising from the 
threat; and, the neurovisceral account, due to the reductions in parasympathetic control of 
heart rate when under threat conditions.  Study 6.1 established that distraction and 
acceptance led to different affective and parasympathetic control outcomes. Hence, if 
executive control  impairments are noted between distraction and acceptance, each of the 
theories already has a plausible explanation for performance differences as the evidence 
exists in study 6.1.  
In the present research, for a self-regulatory strength interpretation of 
performance differences between regulatory conditions to be plausible, there should be a 
co-existing of difference in perceived mental exertion invested by individuals in engaging in 
a strategy. Furthermore, affect experienced during executive task performance or during 
affect regulation should not covary with such performance differences.  
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Self-regulatory strength theory also predicts that because some strategies may be 
more difficult in particular situations that executive resource depletion and diminished 
executive control should follow. Based on the definitions and conceptualisations of 
distraction and acceptance, each strategy should place different demands on executive 
resources in different levels of threat. Due to its requirement to override the automatic 
tendency to focus on affective responses and threat-related thoughts, and involving 
extensive use of the working memory system, a distraction strategy should be more 
effortful and impair executive control more than acceptance and control.  In contrast, as 
the strategy of acceptance involves directing attentional focus towards stimuli reflexively 
attended to in high-threat situations, it is predicted to conserve executive resources, 
relative to distraction and control conditions in which participants are seeking to inhibit the 
experience of negative thoughts and feelings in such circumstances (Duval & Wicklund, 
1972; Heatherton et al., 1993; Johns et al., 2008).   
In low-threat circumstances, controlling attention and undertaking working 
memory tasks have been demonstrated to lead to subsequent impairment in controlling 
response (Schmeichel, 2007; Schmeichel et al., 2003). Hence, distraction in low-threat 
circumstances is predicted to lead to impairments in executive control. In addition, 
attention towards the self and to threat is not facilitated in low-threat circumstances 
(Duval & Wicklund, 1972; Mogg & Bradley, 1998) and, hence, engaging in a strategy that 
increases self-awareness may be effortful to maintain and therefore lead to impairment in 
executive control. Therefore, acceptance is predicted to deplete executive resources in 
low-threat circumstances, leading to significant impairments in executive control relative to 
mind-wandering in low-threat circumstances, but preserve executive resources in high-
threat circumstances, leading to superior performance to distraction and mind-wandering 
in high-threat circumstances. 
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7.6. The Present Research 
The present research uses a complex experimental study to test the impacts of the 
regulation strategies of distraction and acceptance on executive functioning under 
different levels of ego-threat. These strategies are compared with mind-wandering control 
conditions (one in each threat level) that involve no directed focus of attention. Measures 
of executive resource depletion include (1) reports of perceived mental resources required 
when engaging in the regulation strategies (study 7.1), (2) inhibition of prepotent response 
(study 7.2), and (3) working memory capacity (study 7.3). Additionally, the present research 
seeks to evaluate alternative explanations of executive control differences amongst the 
regulatory conditions to the self-regulatory strength theory , including: (a) executive 
control differences resulting from differences in affect experienced and effort invested 
during the executive control task (study 7.4), and (b) executive control differences resulting 
from differences in parasympathetic influences on variations in heart rate (i.e., vagal tone) 
during earlier affect regulation and affect experienced during the regulation period (study 
7.5).  
7.7. Study 7.1 Perceived Mental Demand of Affect  Regulation  
Study 7.1 aims to test the self-regulatory strength theory’s predictions regarding 
participants’ perceived expenditure of executive resources during the regulatory tasks. Self-
regulatory strength theory predicts that differences in perceived mental demands should 
exist amongst the regulatory conditions. Increased threat depletes objectively measured 
executive resources due to automatically initiated regulatory attempts (Johns et al., 2008; 
Lazarus & Folkman, 1984; Muraven & Baumeister, 2000). However, increased threat should 
not influence the perceived demand on executive resources of mind-wandering, as in both 
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conditions individuals are likely to be doing what they spontaneously initiate, which they 
are unlikely to perceive as effortful. However, the mental resources demanded by an 
experimentally manipulated regulation strategy will differ from mind-wandering and may 
depend upon the threat level under which it is undertaken.  
 The self-regulatory hypothesis predicts that the perceived investment of mental 
resources (i.e., effort invested and perceived difficultyjj) will differ amongst the regulatory 
strategies. As the mind-wandering control conditions do not explicitly require the focus of 
attention, these are predicted to be perceived as the least mentally demanding, regardless 
of threat level. The participants in the distraction conditions are expected to report 
increased perceived investment of mental resources relative to the respective mind-
wandering control condition in their threat level. The effects of acceptance on perceived 
mental effort are predicted to differ according to threat level.  In the high-threat level, 
those in the acceptance condition are predicted to perceive investing similar mental 
resources to the mind-wandering control condition, but less than the distraction condition. 
However, in the low-threat level, acceptance is hypothesised to lead to increased perceived 
investment of mental resources relative to the control. Lastly, it is predicted that 
acceptance in high-threat circumstances (being consistent with reflexive attentional focus 
in that circumstance) would be perceived to be as mentally effortless as mind-wandering in 
low-threat circumstances, and less effortful than acceptance in low-threat circumstances 
(being inconsistent with reflexive responding in that circumstance).    
                                                          
jj
Regulation strategies that are hypothesised to require executive control involve inhibiting 
prepotent responses. Hence, such strategies should be perceived and rated as more difficult than 
those strategies that do require this same inhibition. Therefore, task difficulty is considered a proxy 
for efforts at self-regulation (Schmeichel, 2007; K. Vohs & Schmeichel, 2003).  
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7.7.1. Method 
 The method is described in chapter 4 in more detail. A brief overview of the 
relevant variables is provided (see Figure 7.1 for summary of procedure with highlighted 
section indicating when data was gathered for study 7.1). As discussed earlier in chapter 4, 
there were two between-subject independent variables: the first was threat, with two 
levels (low and high). The second independent variable, regulation strategy, had three 
levels (distraction, acceptance, and control), yielding six participant groups. One hundred 
and eighty university students were randomly allocated to one of the six groups (i.e., 30 
participants in each). Participants were told of the threats (deliver an impromptu speech or 
watch a film clip) then to engage in the affect regulation tasks of thinking and then writing. 
Participants were asked to indicate the perceived level of effort that they invested in the 
regulatory tasks, and how difficult they perceived the regulation tasks to be. Ratings were 
provided on a scale from one (no effort or not difficult) to seven (used all effort or was very 
difficult).  
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Phase 1: Participant Screening and Pre-Experimental Questionnaire 
 
Random Allocation of Participants to Threat and Regulation Conditions 
Phase 2: Preparation and Baseline  
Phase 3: Threat Manipulation 
High-Threat 
Introduction to Impromptu Speech and Test 
Recording 
Low-Threat 
Introduction to UK Offshore Asset Disclosure 
Video Viewing  
Phase 3: Regulation Manipulation Tasks 
“Writing Task”  
5 minute Writing on Regulation Strategy Consistent Topic   
Post Regulation SR Affect (present moment) 
“Thinking Task”                                 
15 minute Audio Regulation Strategy Consistent Audio Content  
 
Phase 4: Stroop 
 
Post Stroop SR Affect (during incongruent trials)  
 
Post LNS SR Affect task (during latter trials) 
 
Phase 4: Letter-Number-Sequencing (LNS) 
 
Phase 5: Threat-Task and Recovery 
Low-Threat 
Watch Video 
High-Threat 
Deliver Impromptu Speech  
Post Threat HR, RR Recovery and SR Affect (During and Following Threat-Task)  
Phase 6: Regulation Manipulation Checks 
Regulation Strategy Quiz, Self-Reported Effort and Difficulty and, Attention 
Allocation Focus, Cognitions and Regulatory Attempts 
 
Figure 7. 1. Flow Diagram of Procedural Phases with Phase 6 (Data Collection Point) 
Highlighted. 
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7.7.2. Results 
Self-Reported Regulation Effort and Difficulty Ratings: Initial data screening of both 
effort and difficulty ratings detected two outliers, one each in the high-threat and low-
threat acceptance conditions and these were removed from the subsequent analysis. 
Separate 2 (threat level: high-threat and low-threat) X 3 (regulation strategy: distraction, 
acceptance and mind-wandering) ANOVAs were used to test the hypotheses, on effort and 
difficulty variables. Figures 7.2 and 7.3 show the mean and SE for each item for each 
condition.  
 
Figure 7.2. Mean and Standard Error of Reported Effort of Regulation. 
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Figure 7.3. Mean and Standard Error of Reported Difficulty of Regulation. 
The results from the effort item showed no main effect of threat level, F(1, 172) = 
1.34, p = .25, ηp
2 = .008. There was a significant main effect of regulation strategy, F(2, 172) 
= 9.72, p < .001, ηp
2 = .10. Least significant difference pairwise post hoc tests showed that 
distraction was rated as significantly more  effortful than acceptance, p = .012, mean 
difference = .67, SE = .26, and more effortful than mind-wandering undertaken by the 
control condition, p < .001, mean difference = 1.15, SE = .26. Acceptance was rated to be 
nominally more effortful than mind-wandering and this difference approached significance, 
p = .07, mean difference = .48, SE = .26. The interaction between threat level and regulation 
strategy was not significant, F(2, 172) = .23, p = .78, ηp
2 = .003.  
Because different patterns of mental investment were predicted across the 
regulatory strategies within each threat level, separate analyses were conducted within 
each threat level. A one-way ANOVA within the high-threat level showed a significant effect 
of regulation strategy, F(2, 86) = 5.09, p = .010, ηp
2 = .101. Post hoc LSD comparisons 
showed that distraction was rated to be significantly more effortful than acceptance, p = 
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.033, mean difference = .84, SE = .39, and mind-wandering, p = .003, mean difference = 
1.20, SE = .39. There was no difference between acceptance and the control condition, p = 
.36, mean difference = .36, SE = .39.  A one-way ANOVA within the low-threat level showed 
a significant effect of regulation strategy, F(2, 86) = 4.84, p = .010, ηp
2 = .101.   Post hoc 
(LSD) comparisons showed there was no difference between distraction and acceptance, p 
= .17, mean difference = .50, SE = .36. However, distraction was rated as significantly more 
effortful than mind-wandering, p = .003, mean difference = 1.10, SE = .35. In addition, 
acceptance was rated to be nominally more effortful than the mind-wandering control 
however the difference did not reach significance, p = .094, mean difference = .60, SE = .36. 
An independent samples t-test showed that acceptance in high-threat circumstances did 
not differ from mind-wandering in low-threat circumstances, t(57) = .43, p = .67, d =.12. 
The 2 X 3 ANOVA on the difficulty item showed no significant main effect of threat, 
F(1, 172) = .43, p = .51, ηp
2 = .003. The main effect of regulation strategy was significant, 
F(2, 172) = 3.16, p = .045, ηp
2 = .035. Least significant difference post hoc comparisons 
showed that distraction was rated to be nominally more difficult than acceptance and this 
difference approached significance, p = .06, mean difference = .50, SE = .26. Distraction was 
rated to be significantly more difficult than mind-wandering undertaken by the control 
conditions, p = .02, mean difference = .62, SE = .26. There was no difference between 
acceptance and the mind-wandering control conditions.  There was a significant interaction 
between threat level and regulation strategy, F(2, 172) = 3.15, p = .045, ηp
2 = .035, showing 
that a different pattern existed amongst the regulatory conditions depending on threat 
level (see Figure 7.3).  
A one-way ANOVAs was conducted to compare regulation strategies within each 
threat level. The one-way ANOVA within the high-threat level showed a significant effect of 
regulation strategy, F(2, 86) = 6.12, p = .03, ηp
2 = .125. Post hoc (LSD) comparisons showed 
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that distraction was rated as significantly more difficult than acceptance, p = .003, mean 
difference = 1.12, SE = .37, and mind-wandering, p = .004, mean difference = 1.10, SE = .37. 
There was no significant difference between acceptance and mind-wandering, p = .94, 
mean difference = .03, SE = .37. The one-way ANOVA within the low-threat level showed no 
effect of regulation strategy, F(2, 86) = .24, p = .78, ηp
2 = .006.  An independent samples t-
test showed that those in the high-threat acceptance condition found the regulation task 
somewhat less difficult than the those in the low-threat acceptance condition, and this 
difference approached significance, t(56) = -1.92, p = .060, d = -.50.  
7.7.3. Discussion  
The research question for study 7.1 asked whether the regulation strategies were 
perceived differently in terms of demand for mental resources, and whether the threat 
level in which the regulation strategy is undertaken influenced these perceptions. The 
results were supportive of the self-regulation hypothesis in that the regulatory strategies 
influenced perceived mental demands. The demanding distraction hypothesis was 
supported, within both threat levels, with those engaging in distraction perceiving greater 
mental demands to the acceptance and mind-wandering control conditions.  
At neither threat level was acceptance perceived to demand more mental 
resources than the mind-wandering control condition. However, the influence of threat 
level on acceptance was demonstrated when assessing the regulation strategies under 
each threat level separately. The results from the high-threat level were the same as those 
across both threat levels. However, under low-threat circumstances, acceptance was 
perceived as requiring similar levels of mental effort to distraction. Furthermore, 
acceptance was perceived as nominally more effortful than mind-wandering, although 
these results only approached significance. Moreover, acceptance under low-threat 
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circumstances was rated as nominally more difficult than acceptance under high-threat 
circumstances, although this difference also only approached significance. Furthermore, 
acceptance in high-threat circumstances was perceived to be as effortless as mind-
wandering in low-threat circumstances but less effortful than acceptance in low-threat 
circumstances. The reason for results only approaching significance may have been due to 
large error variance associated with self-report variables and with more power such 
nominal differences may have reached significance.  
Despite the lack of power issue, these results together support tentatively the 
notion that focusing attention towards the self and to low-threat-stimuli in low-threat 
circumstances is more difficult that letting attention wander, but relatively effortless when 
in high-threat circumstances. These findings suggest that the perception of how mentally 
demanding a strategy is depends on the reflexive responses occurring in the circumstances 
in which it is engaged in (Alberts et al., 2008; Sheppes & Meiran, 2008).  
Overall, these results showed that the regulatory strategies were perceived to 
differ in the quantity of mental resources used, thereby supporting the self-regulatory 
hypotheses. Hence, self-regulatory strength theory would predict differences in executive 
control, as this perceived investment is likely to correspond to the depletion of executive 
resources. However, participants’ perception of a task as particularly mentally demanding 
does not necessarily imply that it is objectively executive resource depleting (Muraven & 
Baumeister, 2000; Muraven et al., 1998). The impact of the regulation strategies on 
executive resources is the focus of study 7.2.   
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7.8. Study 7.2: Do Distraction and Acceptance Deplete 
Prepotent Response Inhibition: Does Threat Level Matter? 
Study 7.2 aims to extend the findings of study 7.1 by establishing whether 
differences in perceived demands for mental resources correspond with depleted 
executive resources, as indicated by disrupted prepotent response inhibition. Hence, study 
7.2 aims to test the predictions of the self-regulatory strength theory, that regulating 
attention towards particular stimuli (a top-down process) may preserve executive 
resources in circumstances where those stimuli would have been allocated attentional 
focus based on bottom-up reflexive processes, and that this same top-down regulation 
would deplete executive resources if counter to bottom-up attentional processes elicited 
by another situation. Consistent with self-regulatory strength theory, predictions based on 
the affective theory of ACT are that increased threat should have a detrimental impact on 
participants’ ability to inhibit prepotent responses.  
The chosen measure of the prepotent response inhibition was the colour word 
Stroop task (Stroop, 1935), well established as measuring this particular executive function 
(Miyake et al., 2000). Both reaction time (RT) and uncorrected errors have been used 
previously to demonstrate executive resource depletion effects (Inzlicht et al., 2006; Johns 
et al., 2008). The longer it takes, or the more errors made,  to name the colour of the print 
of colour words that do not match the colour in which they are printed (e.g., the word 
“red” printed in blue) relative to naming colours of “XXX” strings indicates increased Stroop 
interference (i.e., difficulty in inhibiting attention towards the word).   
Based on the predictions of ACT (Eysenck et al., 2007), and self-regulatory strength 
theory, it is hypothesised that increased threat, particularly in the conditions not directly 
providing an attentional focus, will disrupt the ability to exercise response inhibition (i.e., 
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threat hypothesis). Secondly, based on a self-regulatory hypothesis, it is predicted that 
undertaking a regulatory strategy that involves inhibiting reflexive responses should 
temporarily impair the subsequent ability to inhibit automatic responses. Consistent with 
the results of study 7.1, a distraction strategy is expected to deplete executive resources, 
and therefore will diminish performance for both threat levels. The hypotheses regarding 
the importance of threat circumstances for the impacts of acceptance on executive 
resources hypothesis are also retained from study 7.1, predicting that acceptance will be 
protective of executive resources under high-threat circumstances and depleting under 
low-threat circumstances.  
7.8.1. Method 
 The design, procedure and participants are identical to study 7.1, as it was part of 
the same overarching experiment. After completing a self-report of affect following 
regulation, participants undertook the Stroop task (Stroop, 1935). This involved naming the 
colour of the print that XXX strings and colour words were printed in. The words were 
colour names, which were incongruent with the print colour in which they were printed. 
The neutral XXX string trials were completed first followed by the Stoop incongruent colour 
word trials. Both RT and uncorrected errors were recorded from both XXX trials and 
incongruent colour word trials. To derive a measure of inhibition, the time taken to name 
the colour of the print of XXX strings was subtracted from the time taken to name the 
colour of the print of colour words that did not match the colour of they were printed in 
(Inzlicht et al., 2006). This study uses data collected from phase 4 in procedure (see 
highlighted section of Figure 7. 4 giving an overview of the procedure. See chapter 4 for 
more details of procedure.   
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  Phase 1: Participant Screening and Pre-Experimental Questionnaire 
 
Random Allocation of Participants to Threat and Regulation Conditions 
Phase 2: Preparation and Baseline  
Phase 3: Threat Manipulation 
High-Threat 
Introduction to Impromptu Speech and Test 
Recording 
Low-Threat 
Introduction to UK Offshore Asset Disclosure 
Video Viewing  
Phase 3: Regulation Manipulation Tasks 
“Writing Task”  
5 minute Writing on Regulation Strategy Consistent Topic   
Post Regulation SR Affect (present moment) 
“Thinking Task”                                 
15 minute Audio Regulation Strategy Consistent Audio Content  
 
Phase 4: Stroop 
 
Post Stroop SR Affect (during incongruent trials)  
 
Post LNS SR Affect task (during latter trials) 
 
Phase 4: Letter-Number-Sequencing (LNS) 
 
Phase 5: Threat-Task and Recovery 
Low-Threat 
Watch Video 
High-Threat 
Deliver Impromptu Speech  
Post Threat HR, RR Recovery and SR Affect (During and Following Threat-Task)  
Phase 6: Regulation Manipulation Checks 
Regulation Strategy Quiz, Self-Reported Effort and Difficulty and, Attention 
Allocation Focus, Cognitions and Regulatory Attempts 
 
Figure 7. 4. Flow Diagram of Procedural Phases with the relevant Data Collection Period, Phase 
4, Highlighted.  
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7.8.2. Results 
Stroop RT: Stroop interference scores were calculated as time taken on 
incongruent trials minus time taken on XXX string trials (Inzlicht et al., 2006). Five 
participants were detected as outliers (+/- 3 SD from the M))kk. Three were from the high-
threat acceptance condition and the other two were from the low-threat control condition. 
These cases were removed from the subsequent analysis. A 2 (threat level: high and low) x3 
(regulation strategy: distraction, acceptance and control) ANOVA on Stroop Interference 
scores was used to test the regulatory and affective hypotheses. The means and standard 
error for each condition and are presented in Figure 7. 5. The figure shows that the pattern 
of results varies across regulation strategy when comparing each threat level. 
                                                          
kk
Analysis to control for a potential speed accuracy trade off utilising the same 2 X 3 
analysis, including planned comparison t-tests, presented here on the RT difference scores 
(interference) was undertaken using accuracy rate difference scores (incongruent trial accuracy 
score/RT - XXX trials accuracy score/RT). Accuracy rate difference scores were negative with 
increasingly negative accuracy rate scores indicating increased interference. Results were almost 
identical to the analysis presented of the RT difference scores (only that interference scores were 
reversed), with the interaction between threat level and regulation strategy being significant, F(2, 
169) = 8.05, p < .001, ηp
2
 = .087 (see Appendix O for means of Stroop accuracy rate difference 
scores). Reaction time difference scores are presented here to remain consistent with previous self-
regulatory strength research (Inzlicht et al., 2006) followed by the uncorrected error difference score 
results (Johns et al., 2008).  
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Figure 7. 5. Stroop RT (sec) Mean Difference (Interference) Scores (error bars indicate SE).  
The results showed no main effect of threat level F(169) < 1, ns. The main effect of 
regulation strategy was not significant, F(2, 169) = 2.22, p = .11, ηp
2 = .026. Importantly, this 
main effect of regulation strategy was superseded by the predicted significant interaction 
between threat level and regulation strategy, F(2, 169) = 7.76, p = .001, ηp
2 = .084, showing 
that the threat level altered the pattern of differences amongst the regulatory conditions.   
The two control conditions were compared to determine whether the threat level 
influenced executive control, independent from imposed regulation. An independent 
samples t-test showed that the participants under high-threat showed a larger Stroop 
interference effect than the participants under low-threat, t(56) = 2.29, p = .026, d = .52. 
  A simple main effects analysis using two one-way ANOVAs tested the regulatory 
hypotheses separately within each threat level. The results showed that there was an effect 
of regulation strategy within both the high, F(2, 84) = 3.59, p = .032, ηp
2 = .079, and low, 
F(2, 85) = 6.24, p = .003, ηp
2 = .13, threat levels. Post hoc (LSD) comparisons within the high-
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
Distraction Acceptance Control
St
ro
o
p
 In
te
rf
e
re
n
ce
 R
T(
se
c)
High-Threat
Low-Threat
252 
 
threat level demonstrated that participants who engaged in distraction showed a larger 
Stroop interference effect than those who engaged in acceptance, p = .013, mean 
difference = 3.11, SE = 1.23. There was no significant difference between distraction and 
control, p = .63, mean difference = .58, SE = 1.19. Acceptance showed less Stroop 
interference relative to the control condition, p = .042, mean difference = -2.53, SE = 1.23. 
Within the low-threat level, unlike the high-threat level, there was no significant difference 
between distraction and acceptance, p = .32, mean difference = -1.19, SE = 1.20. 
Participants in the distraction condition exhibited a significantly larger Stroop interference 
effect than controls, p = .016, mean difference = 3.01, SE = 1.22. Acceptance also showed 
significantly larger Stroop interference than the control condition, p = .001, mean 
difference = 4.20, SE = 1.22. In addition, an independent samples t- test  showed that the 
acceptance conditions were significantly different, with the high-threat level, showing 
significantly smaller Stroop interference effects than the low-threat level, t(48.33ll) = -3.87, 
p < .001, d = -1.01. A final independent samples t-test showed there was no difference 
between the high-threat acceptance and low-threat control conditions, t(53)= .30, p= .76, 
d= .08. 
To check that these RT results were not due to a potential speed accuracy trade-
off, uncorrected error difference scores (incongruent trials-XXX trials) were calculated for 
each trial. If the pattern of results suggested that increased errors were associated with 
participants responding more rapidly, this result would indicate a speed accuracy trade-off. 
The same 2 (threat level) X 3 (regulation) univariate ANOVA was conducted on the mean of 
the uncorrected error difference scores. See Figure 7.6 for the error difference scores made 
within each condition, with higher scores indicating worse performance.  
                                                          
ll
 Fluctuation in df due to equality of variance assumption violated. 
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Figure 7. 6. Mean Uncorrected Error Difference Score (error bars indicate SE).  
The results showed no significant main effect of threat level, F(169) < 1, ns, and no 
significant main effect of regulation strategy, F (169) < 1, ns. Importantly, the interaction 
between threat level and regulation strategy was also not significant, F(2, 169) = 1.22, p = 
.30, ηp
2 = .014, suggesting that the same pattern noted within the RT results was not due to 
or complicated by a speed accuracy trade-off.    
7.8.3. Discussion 
The research question for study 7.2 concerned the impacts particular regulation 
strategies, undertaken in different threat circumstances, have on prepotent response 
inhibition. The results indicated that threat level influenced the pattern of response 
inhibition performance differently depending on the regulatory strategy undertaken. 
Firstly, increased threat led to impaired prepotent response inhibition in conditions. A self-
regulatory interpretation of this impairment shown by the high-threat mind-wandering 
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condition relative to its low-threat counterpart is that increased effort is required to divert 
attention from threats and the experience of unpleasant affect that participants, when 
anxious, reflexively engage with (Bar-Haim et al., 2007). Decrements in executive control, 
attributed to prior regulation, often co-occur with participants reporting increased effort 
invested during this prior regulation (Baumeister et al., 1998; Schmeichel, 2007; Schmeichel 
et al., 2003), although not always (Muraven et al., 1998). Hence, although there was no 
difference in subjective effort expended between the mind-wandering conditions, this 
result does not mean that a self-regulatory strength explanation of the differences in 
executive control between the conditions is not relevant. However, it does suggest that the 
affective theory of ACT and the neurovisceral account, which would have predicted this 
same pattern of results are highly plausible potential explanations. Differences in heart rate 
and HRV amongst the two mind-wandering control conditions were found in study 6.1 of 
chapter 6 and thus shared variance between these variables and Stroop interference needs 
to be controlled to determine whether the ACT or neurovisceral explanations better 
account for the differences between the two mind- wandering control conditions (see 
study 7.5 for this analysis).  
Regarding the regulatory hypotheses, the results showed support for the 
demanding distraction hypothesis across both threat levels. When taking into account the 
threat circumstances, distraction showed decrements in prepotent response inhibition 
compared to at least one of the other regulatory conditions in each threat level. Within the 
high-threat level, distraction did not show decrements in performance relative to the mind-
wandering control condition. This suggested that distraction did not add significantly more 
demands above the imposition of threat and the automatic regulatory attempts. 
Distraction did show a significant impairment in executive control from the mind-
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wandering control condition in the low-threat level, supporting the demanding distraction 
hypothesis.  
Threat level also influenced the impacts of the acceptance manipulation, but in the 
opposite way to the mind-wandering control conditions. The high-threat acceptance 
condition showed superior performance to the high-threat mind-wandering control 
condition, suggesting that acceptance preserved executive resources under the presence of 
an anticipated threat relative to strategies seeking to avoid the affective experience 
(distraction and, arguably, mind-wandering). However, in the low-threat level, acceptance 
led to the depletion of executive resources relative to the mind-wandering control 
condition. Lastly, acceptance undertaken in high-threat circumstances did not differ from 
engaging in mind-wandering in the low-threat circumstances. These results support the 
notion that the threat level in which acceptance is undertaken influences the demand that 
the strategy places on executive resources. 
The results are strongly supportive of the self-regulatory theory, particularly when 
taking into account the predictions of increased threat facilitating reflexive attention 
towards threats (Mogg & Bradley, 1998) and towards the self (Duval & Wicklund, 1972). 
These predictions suggest that engaging in acceptance in high-threat circumstances would 
be less effortful and thus preserve executive control, relative to engaging in a strategy that 
directs attention away from reflexively attended to threat. Similarly, in low-threat 
circumstances, which do not facilitate attention to threats or to the self, mind-wandering 
appears to be a relatively effortless strategy, preserving executive control. In contrast, 
stimuli of increased threat may require more effort to divert attention from, thus resulting 
in impaired executive control, as indicated by the distraction and the mind-wandering 
control conditions. However, as low-threat circumstances do not facilitate attention to 
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threats or self-awareness, the acceptance strategy becomes more effortful than letting the 
mind wander, resulting in impaired executive control.    
Although there was clear support for a self-regulatory strength explanation of the 
results, there was also support for the threat hypothesis, predicted by both self-regulatory 
strength theory and ACT). This support was limited to the mind-wandering control 
conditions and did not exist across all regulatory conditions. Hence, these results show that 
increased affect, due to increased threat, found across all regulatory conditions noted in 
study 6.1 in chapter 6 was not completely reflected in the response inhibition of study 7.2.  
7.9. Study 7.3: The Effects of Prior Distraction and Acceptance 
on Working Memory: What Are the Impacts of Persisting 
Threats? 
The results from study 7.2 showed the effects of threats and regulation strategies 
on prepotent response inhibition directly after engaging in regulation. Threats and 
regulation strategies also impact working memory, another executive function (Miyake et 
al., 2000) that requires executive control (Eysenck et al., 2007; Kane et al., 2001; 
Schmeichel, 2007). Both response inhibition and updating representations in working 
memory require executive resources (Johns et al., 2008; Schmeichel, 2007) and the impacts 
of threat and regulation on working memory have demonstrated in similar impacts to 
response inhibition (Inzlicht et al., 2006; Johns et al., 2008; Schmader & Johns, 2003).  
If the differences noted between regulatory conditions are due to executive 
resources depletion, the same pattern of results should occur in both measures. The 
executive function of updating representations in working memory (WM) is different from 
prepotent response inhibition as the difficulty of the task can be increased by increasing 
the number of representations to be retained within working memory. Previous studies 
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have found that threats and affect regulation impact on overall capacity (Croizet et al., 
2004; Johns et al., 2008; Schmader & Johns, 2003; Schmeichel, 2007). Furthermore, 
depleting self-regulatory effects can negatively impact on task persistence (Baumeister et 
al., 1998) and impairments in performance can occur when the task increases in difficulty 
due to reductions in the resources available to support such effortful acts (Hagger et al., 
2010).  
Study 7.3 uses a WM task that incrementally increases the load level (i.e., the 
number of representations to be retained and reorganised), and therefore performance in 
these higher load levels indicates increased task persistence in the face of increased task 
difficulty. Self-regulatory strength theory predicts that threat level and regulation will 
combine to impact on performance when participants continue through to the more 
difficult, higher load trials (Hagger et al., 2010). Likewise, the affective theory, PET, predicts 
that any WM performance differences due to situational circumstances (e.g.,  threat levels) 
and/or regulation should also be found within higher load levels due to anxiety restricting 
capacity. Hence, if a WM task gradually increases the attentional load, both theories 
predict the differences in the experimental conditions will occur in the high-load level, 
although for different reasons: Self-regulatory strength due to diminishing executive 
resources; and PET due to restricted attentional capacity in the presence of anxiety and 
worry. Lastly, self-regulatory strength theory predicts that differences in executive control 
between the threat and regulatory conditions should follow a similar pattern to those in 
study 7.2.  
7.9.1. Method 
The design of study 7.3 is identical to the previous two studies. This chapter 
presents results from the Letter-Number-Sequencing task that measures working memory 
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capacity (Wechsler, 1997). Participants listen to a set of random letters and numbers that 
they must remember and reorder the stimuli - numbers in order first from lowest to 
highest, followed by letters in alphabetical order. Participant verbal response accuracy was 
recorded for each attempted trial, scored as either correct or incorrect. Figure 7.7 indicates 
the point at which WM was measured in the experimental procedure.  
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Phase 1: Participant Screening and Pre-Experimental Questionnaire 
 
Random Allocation of Participants to Threat and Regulation Conditions 
Phase 2: Preparation and Baseline  
Phase 3: Threat Manipulation 
High-Threat 
Introduction to Impromptu Speech and Test 
Recording 
Low-Threat 
Introduction to UK Offshore Asset Disclosure 
Video Viewing  
Phase 3: Regulation Manipulation Tasks 
“Writing Task”  
5 minute Writing on Regulation Strategy Consistent Topic   
Post Regulation SR Affect (present moment) 
“Thinking Task”                                 
15 minute Audio Regulation Strategy Consistent Audio Content  
 
Phase 4: Stroop 
 
Post Stroop SR Affect (during incongruent trials)  
task  
Post LNS SR Affect task (during latter trials) 
 SR Affect task (during 
latter trials) 
 Post Recognition HR, RR Recovery and SR Affect (during recognition)  
Phase 4: Letter-Number-Sequencing (LNS) 
 
Phase 5: Threat-Task and Recovery 
Low-Threat 
Watch Video 
High-Threat 
Deliver Impromptu Speech  
Post Threat HR, RR Recovery and SR Affect (During and Following Threat-Task)  
Phase 6: Regulation Manipulation Checks 
Regulation Strategy Quiz, Self-Reported Effort and Difficulty and, Attention 
Allocation Focus, Cognitions and Regulatory Attempts 
 
Figure 7. 7. Flow Diagram of Procedural Phases with Relevant Data Collection (Phase 4: LNS) 
highlighted 
260 
 
    
7.9.2. Results 
Working Memory (WM) Performance: To test both the regulatory and anxious 
affect hypotheses on the ability to retain and reorganise representations in WM, a 2 (threat 
level: high and low) X 3 (regulation strategy: distraction, acceptance, and mind-wandering) 
X 3 (WM Load) mixed design factorial ANOVA was used. The analysis was conducted on the 
mean score of the trials within a load level: low (trials of 2, 3 and 4 digits in length), 
medium (trials of 5 and 6 digits in length), and high (trials of 7 and 8 digits in length). Load 
levels are expressed as the average correct for each item difficulty level for high, medium 
or low load resulting in the lowest possible score of 0 and highest 3. Means and standard 
deviations are presented in Table 7.1.   
Table 7. 1.  
Letter Number Sequencing Mean Score for the Trials in Low, Medium and High-Load Levels. 
                                       Threat Level 
  High-Threat  Low-Threat 
 WM 
Load 
Low Medium High Total  Low Medium High Total 
 
 
Reg 
Strategy 
Distract 2.87 
(.22) 
1.90  
(.86) 
.15 
(.35) 
1.64 
(.37) 
 2.86 
(.23) 
1.77  
(.80) 
.47 
(.64) 
1.70 
(.45) 
Accept 2.90 
(.22) 
1.58  
(.85) 
.48 
(.66) 
1.66 
(.47) 
 2.90 
(.18) 
1.78 
(.82) 
.55 
(.78) 
1.74 
(.49) 
Control 2.88 
(.20) 
1.87 
(.73) 
.30 
(.50) 
1.68 
(.40) 
 2.91 
(.17) 
2.00 
(.84) 
.63 
(.69) 
1.85 
(.46) 
Figures in parentheses are SD.  
There was an expected significant main effect of load, F(2,173) = 1426.03, p < .001, 
ηp
2 = .94, with performance decreasing with increasing load. The main effect of threat level 
was not significant, F(1, 174) = 2.45, p = .12, ηp
2 = .014, although the high-threat conditions 
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showed nominally decreased performance relative to the low-threat level. The main effect 
of regulation strategy was not significant, F < 1, ns. There was a significant interaction 
between threat level and load, F(2, 173) = 3.44, p = .034, ηp
2 = .038, suggesting that at 
higher levels of load the detrimental impacts of increased threat are exposed. The 
interaction between regulation strategy and load was approaching significance, F(4, 344) = 
2.27, p = .061, ηp
2 = .026, showing that at higher load levels the regulation strategy were 
marginally affecting WM capacity. The interaction between threat level and regulation 
strategy was not significant, F < 1, ns, showing that the different threat levels did not result 
in a different pattern of results amongst the regulatory conditions. The three-way 
interaction between threat level, regulation strategy and load was not significant, F(4, 344) 
= 1.25, p = .29, ηp
2 = .014.  
A 2 (threat level) x3 (regulation strategy) ANOVA was used on the high-load WM 
performance data to confirm that the effects of both threat and regulation were present in 
the higher WM loads. The results showed a significant main effect of threat level, F(1, 174) 
= 6.65, p = .011, ηp
2 = .037, with the high-threat level showing impaired performance 
relative to the low-threat level. The main effect of regulation strategy was not significant, 
F(2, 174) = 1.84, p = .16, ηp
2 = .021 nor was interaction between threat level and regulation 
strategy, F(2, 174) = .87, p = .42, ηp
2 = .010, showing that threat level did not lead to a 
different pattern of performance amongst regulation strategies.  
To compare the pattern of results with study 7.2, the regulatory strategies were 
evaluated separately within each threat level within the high-load level. Results from one-
way ANOVAs within each of the threat levels showed that there was a significant effect of 
regulation strategy approaching significance within the high-threat level, F(2, 87) = 3.08, p = 
.051, ηp
2 = .066, but a non-significant effect of regulation strategy in the low-threat level, 
F(1, 87) = .42, p = .66, ηp
2 = .009. Least significant difference post hoc comparisons were 
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conducted within the high-threat level. Distraction led to lower accuracy in the high-load 
trials relative to acceptance, p = .015, mean difference = -.33, SE = .13. Distraction did not 
significantly differ from the control, p = .27, mean difference = -.15, SE = .13. Additionally, 
acceptance did not significantly differ from the control condition, p = .17, mean difference 
= .18, SE = .13. 
Follow-up analyses to test for consistency with the findings of study 7.2 were 
undertaken. An independent samples t-test comparing the high- and low-threat mind-
wandering conditions, in the high-load level, was used to test the impact of threat level 
without the influence of the provided regulation strategies. Participants in the high-threat 
level showed significantly impaired performance, t(52.81mm) = -2.13, p = .038, d = -.55. An 
independent samples t-test was used to assess whether the impact of threat in the 
acceptance conditions. No difference between high- and low-threat levels was found 
amongst the acceptance conditions, t(58) = -.36, p = .72, d = -.10. An independent samples 
t-test was used to test whether acceptance in high-threat circumstances preserved WM 
performance to a similar extent to mind-wandering in low-threat circumstances. The 
difference between acceptance at high-threat and mind-wandering at low-threat was not 
significant, t(58) = -.86, p = .40, d = -.22.  
7.9.3. Discussion 
The results of study 7.3 further confirmed the predictions of self-regulatory 
strength theory. The results showed that the impacts of threat and the regulation 
strategies became more prevalent with increased task persistence and difficulty (Hagger et 
al., 2010) in that threat and regulatory strategies only impacted on WM performance in the 
high-load level. However, relative to studies 7.1 and 7.2, the results from study 7.3 showed 
                                                          
mm
 Fluctuation in df due to violation of equal variances assumption. 
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that the impacts of prior regulation were minimal, with differences between the regulatory 
conditions only found under high-threat circumstances. However, the impacts of the 
persistent threats were demonstrated when averaging across the regulatory conditions in 
the high-load level.  
As mentioned earlier, the impacts of the regulation strategies were only found 
within the high-threat level, although distraction did show a nominal overall detrimental 
impact on performance independent of threat level. The results from within the high-threat 
level when analysing the high-load level further supported the demanding distraction 
hypothesis. Distraction resulted in decreased executive control relative to acceptance, and 
did not differ from the control. Unlike study 7.2, acceptance did not show significantly 
better performance than the control condition, although the means were in this direction. 
This non-significant difference suggests that the influence of prior regulation may diminish 
in the presence of persisting threats or stressors.  
There was a notable difference in the pattern of executive control results amongst 
the threat and regulatory conditions from studies 7.1 and 7.2 to the present study. The 
most notable difference was that there were no regulatory effects within the low-threat 
level, as shown in study 7.2, particularly that engaging in acceptance in low-threat 
circumstances did not result in executive resource depletion. Follow-up analyses suggested 
that the impact of threat on the control conditions remained. Furthermore, acceptance in 
high-threat circumstances still preserved executive control to a similar extent to mind-
wandering in low-threat circumstances. However, no difference existed between the two 
acceptance conditions.  
The present research is not the only study to find that persistent stressors may 
diminish the impacts of prior regulation.  Hartley (1973) showed that persistent exposure 
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to noise led to increasingly impaired executive control as increased exposure to the 
stressor occurred. Furthermore, Hartley (1973) also demonstrated that persistent exposure 
to noise also diminished the negative impacts of prior participant engagement in reading 
(suggested as a regulatory act) on executive control. The present study suggests that a 
noise stressor may have similar impacts as an ego/social evaluative threat and that like 
prior engagement in reading, prior affect regulation can have diminished influence on 
executive control as time passes. Hence, consistent with previous research, the negative 
impacts of prolonged exposure to a persisting high level threat became more pronounced 
relative prior regulation (Hartley, 1973). 
Two theoretical accountsnn may provide plausible explanations for the different 
pattern of executive control exhibited amongst the experimental conditions from study 7.2 
to 7.3. The first is a self-regulatory strength account, in that the persistent stressors cause 
ongoing executive resource depletion due to sustained regulation in response to their 
presence (Muraven & Baumeister, 2000). In addition, the diminished impact of regulation 
in low-threat circumstances was due to participants opportunity to rest and replenish 
executive resources (Muraven & Baumeister, 2000), thus remove the impacts of prior 
regulation. In high-threat circumstances, when threats persist, individuals may be still 
                                                          
nn
 It is possible that threat and regulation, and their combination, may influence response 
inhibition and working memory differently because of the influence of threat and regulation may be 
unique for each of the executive functions. However, in self-regulatory strength research, these 
executive functions have been shown to be impacted similarly (Hagger et al., 2010; Johns et al., 
2008; Muraven & Baumeister, 2000). In addition, Kane and Engle (2001) have suggested that 
working memory may best be understood by how effectively individuals can both inhibit and shift 
attention, and thus the results from study 7.2 and study 7.3, should have been identical if other 
factors (such as the prolonged exposure to threat) were not present. As there are no obvious well 
supported theories that may explain why the influence threat and regulation should be unique for 
each executive function, the alternative explanations discussed relate specifically to the theories 
presented in the literature review (i.e., self-regulatory strength theory, PET, ACT, and the 
neurovisceral account).     
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engaging in regulatory attempts to cope with this stressor and therefore the negative 
impacts of prior regulation persist, although in a somewhat reduced form (Hartley, 1973).    
The second explanation for the different pattern of executive control results 
amongst the threat and regulatory conditions from study 7.2 to the present study (study 
7.3) is an affective theory explanation. It may be that the differences in results are due to 
different patterns of affect experienced amongst these conditions during the performance 
of each of the executive tasks, with increased affect leading to impaired performance 
(Eysenck & Calvo, 1992b; Eysenck et al., 2007). An affective explanation would also account 
for why there was an increased impact of the threat level on WM compared to response 
inhibition, as participants in the high-threat level would be experiencing increased affect as 
the threat approaches, producing an increasing impact on executive control (Hartley, 
1973).  
7.10. Study 7.4: Does Anxious Affect Experienced Whilst 
Undertaking an Executive Task Explain Differences in Executive 
Control? 
Study 7.4 aims to establish whether the level of anxiety experienced when 
undertaking the executive tasks explains the patterns of performance in response inhibition 
and working memory noted amongst the threat and regulatory conditions, in accordance 
with the affective theories of ACT and PET and to a lesser extent the neurovisceral account. 
In contrast, self-regulatory strength theory predicts that differences noted between 
regulation strategies should be accounted for by differences in available executive 
resources rather than differences in experienced affect. To demonstrate a self-regulatory 
strength explanation of the results, affective influences need to be controlled. It is possible 
that the patterns of affect experienced amongst the threat and regulatory conditions were 
different for each of the executive tasks. If the patterns of affect experienced amongst the 
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threat and regulatory conditions were different for both executive tasks this may have 
caused the variation in the patterns of performance amongst the threat and regulation on 
these two executive tasks.  
 The affective theories of ACT and PET make four key predictions regarding 
performance. Firstly, there should be differences between threat and regulatory conditions 
on physiological arousal and/or self-reported anxiety. Secondly, the reported affect 
variable should be associated with impaired executive control (i.e., greater anxious affect 
associated with greater Stroop interference and fewer correct responses on LNS). Positive 
heart rate changes (i.e., increases in HR) measured during executive task performance 
represents increased effort to sustain performance (Jorna, 1992), especially while anxious 
(Eysenck & Calvo, 1992b), and therefore increased HR should be associated with superior 
executive control (i.e., smaller Stroop interference and more correct responses on LNS). For 
WM, increased effort will be necessary to maintain performance as difficulty increases, 
hence, increased HR during the later trials should be associated with better performance in 
those later trials. Fourthly, these variables (i.e., reported affect and HR) should account for 
a significant level of variance in executive control, and furthermore should eliminate 
significant differences amongst the experimental groups noted when not accounting for 
these variables.  
In contrast to PET and ACT, the neurovisceral account predicts that increased HR 
during the performance of the executive tasks should be associated with impaired 
executive control. Similarly, the neurovisceral account predicts that HR changes should 
account for a significant portion of the variance in executive control and that, when 
statistically controlled, the differences amongst the experimental groups will no longer be 
significant. Conversely, if the differences between the threat and regulatory conditions 
remain significant after statistically controlling for HR change or reported affect change 
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variables, the results are consistent with the self-regulatory theory and executive resource 
depletion.  
7.10.1. Method 
 The design was identical to the previous studies, being part of the same 
experimental procedure. Heart rate was recorded during the performance of both the 
Stroop and LNS. Following the completion of each of the tasks, participants rated the 
extent to which five adjectives (anxious, agitated, nervous, uneasy and worried) described 
their affective state on a scale from one (not at all) to seven (very much). The ratings from 
each of the adjectives were averaged to form a composite score of anxiety (see chapter 4 
for details of method). Executive control measures were Stroop interference effect RT and 
WM score. Se Figure 7.8 for when the data was collected within the experimental 
procedure.    
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Phase 1: Participant Screening and Pre-Experimental Questionnaire 
 
Random Allocation of Participants to Threat and Regulation Conditions 
Phase 2: Preparation and Baseline  
Phase 3: Threat Manipulation 
High-Threat 
Introduction to Impromptu Speech and Test 
Recording 
Low-Threat 
Introduction to UK Offshore Asset Disclosure 
Video Viewing  
Phase 3: Regulation Manipulation Tasks 
“Writing Task”  
5 minute Writing on Regulation Strategy Consistent Topic   
Post Regulation SR Affect (present moment) 
“Thinking Task”                                 
15 minute Audio Regulation Strategy Consistent Audio Content  
 
Phase 4: Stroop 
 
Post Stroop SR Affect (during incongruent trials)  
 
Post LNS SR Affect task (during latter trials) 
 
Phase 4: Letter-Number-Sequencing (LNS) 
 
Phase 5: Threat-Task and Recovery 
Low-Threat 
Watch Video 
High-Threat 
Deliver Impromptu Speech  
Post Threat HR, RR Recovery and SR Affect (During and Following Threat-Task)  
Phase 6: Regulation Manipulation Checks 
Regulation Strategy Quiz, Self-Reported Effort and Difficulty and, Attention 
Allocation Focus, Cognitions and Regulatory Attempts 
 
Figure 7. 8. Flow Diagram of Procedural Phases with Relevant Data Collection Period 
(Phase 4) Highlighted 
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7.10.2. Results 
7.10.2.1. Response Inhibition 
Heart Rate: HR shift scores were used to separate the impacts on HR reactivity of 
naming colours from HR changes representing the mental effort required for naming 
incongruent colour words. To calculate these shift scores, participants’ baseline to colour 
naming HR change scores (i.e., HR during XXX trials - HR during baseline) were calculated as 
the indicator of HR reactivity to naming colours alone. The same procedure was used to 
calculate the level of HR reactivity to the combination of inhibition requirements and 
naming requirements (HR during baseline – HR during incongruent colour word trials). To 
demonstrate participants’ HR change due to inhibition, free from colour naming reactivity, 
the HR shift scores were calculated as participants’ HR change scores (i.e., the incongruent 
trial HR change scores - the XXX trial HR change scores). See Figure 7.9 for the mean shift 
scores for each condition for each trial. 
 
Figure 7. 9. Mean HR Shift scores (incongruent trial change scores – XXX trial change 
scores) for each condition (error bars indicate SE).     
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A 2 (threat level: high and low) X 3 (regulation strategy: distraction, acceptance and 
mind-wandering) ANOVA was used to establish whether there were differences amongst 
the experimental conditions in arousal experienced during the incongruent colour words 
trials. There was no effect of threat level, F(1, 169) = 1.13, p = .29, ηp
2 = .007, or effect of 
regulation strategy, F(2, 169) = 1.03 , p = .36, ηp
2 = .012. Furthermore, there was no 
interaction between threat level and regulation strategy, F(2, 169) = 1.34, p = .27, ηp
2 = 
.016. These results show that there were no detectable differences in physiological arousal 
changes resulting from mental effort differences amongst the threat and regulatory 
conditions. 
Testing for Differences in Stroop Performance After Controlling for HR Shift Scores: 
It is possible that the differences in Stroop interference between experimental threat and 
regulatory conditions may be due to variations in arousal. The negative correlation 
between the Stroop interference effect and HR shift scores pooling across conditions 
showed a trend towards significance, r (175) = -.13, p =.09oo, suggesting that higher HR was 
associated with smaller Stroop Interference. A 2 (threat) X 3 (regulation strategy) ANCOVA 
on Stroop RT interference scores, using HR shift scores as a covariate assessed the 
possibility that this variable would alter the Stroop performance results. The results 
showed that physiological arousal as represented by increased HR shift scores did not 
                                                          
oo
 There was significant positive correlation between the Stroop HR shift scores and the 
Stroop accuracy rate difference scores (incongruent trial accuracy score/RT - XXX trials accuracy 
score/RT), r (175) = .17, p =.027. This indicates that as HR increased Stroop interference decreased.  
A 2 (threat level) X 3 (regulation strategy) ANCOVA on the Stroop accuracy rate difference scores, 
with the Stroop HR shift scores as a covariate was used to determine the impact of threat and 
regulation when the shared variance between the Stroop HR shift scores and the Stroop accuracy 
rate difference scores was removed. The results showed that HR shifts scores shared an amount of 
variance with Stroop accuracy rate difference scores that trended to significance, F(1, 168) = 3.29, p 
= .071, ηp
2
 = .019.   However, identical to the analysis presented of the RT difference scores, with the 
interaction between threat level and regulation strategy remained significant, F(2, 168) = 7.21, p = 
.001, ηp
2
 = .079.  
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account for a significant amount of the variance in Stroop interference, F(1, 168) = 1.40, p 
= .24, ηp
2 = .008 and did not alter the Stroop interference effect results, with the 
interaction between threat level and regulation strategy remaining relatively unchanged,  
F(2, 168) = 7.12, p = .001, ηp
2 = .078.  
Self-Reported Anxiety During Stroop: A 2 (threat level) X 3 (regulation strategy) 
ANOVA was used on participants’ self-reported anxious affect change scores (self-reported 
anxiety during Stroop minus baseline). The Stroop interference outliers were excluded from 
this analysis.  Figure 7.10 displays the means for each group.   
 
Figure 7.10. Mean Self-reported Anxiety Change Scores During Incongruent Trial 
Performance for Each Condition (error bars indicate SE).  
Results showed no significant main effect of threat level, F(1, 169) < 1, ns. The 
main effect of regulation strategy was non-significant, F(2, 169) = 1.15, p = .18, ηp
2 = 
.020. The interaction between threat level and regulation strategy was not 
significant, F(2, 169) < 1, ns. These results show that neither threat level imposed 
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nor the regulation strategy engaged in (nor their combination) influenced self-
reported anxiety experienced during the incongruent Stroop trials.    
Testing for Differences in Stroop Performance After Controlling for Self-Reported 
Anxiety:  Stroop interference and self-reported affect did not correlate significantly, r (175) 
= .10, p= .17pp. A 2 (threat level) X 3 (regulation strategy) ANCOVA was used to test whether 
experienced affect predicted Stroop interference, and to examine group differences in 
performance controlling for anxiety. Self-reported anxiety change scores were included as 
a covariate and the Stroop interference as the dependent variable. Reported anxiety 
change scores did not account for a significant portion of the Stroop interference variance 
F(1, 168) = 1.31, p = .25, ηp
2 = .008, and the interaction between threat level and 
regulation strategy remained largely unchanged, F(2, 168) = 7.61, p = .001, ηp
2 = 
.083. Hence, the Stroop interference results showed the same pattern of differences 
between the threat and regulation conditions whether or not anxiety was controlled via 
covariationqq.  
7.10.2.2. Working Memory 
Heart Rate: PET predicted that participants in the high-threat level would show 
elevated HR during the latter periods of the LNS task as the WM load of the items 
increased. To test this prediction, the last 2 minutes of HR recording during the 
performance of LNS were examined in a 2 (threat level: high and low) X 3 (regulation 
                                                          
pp
 Correlation between the Stroop Accuracy Rate Difference Score and changes in reported 
affect, was not significant, r (175) = .06, p= .43.  
qq
Adding both HR shift scores and self-reported change scores simultaneously into the 
ANCOVA also made no significant change to the Stroop Interference results. 
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strategy: distraction, acceptance and control) ANOVA. Means of each condition are 
presented in Table 7.2. 
Table 7.2. 
Mean Self-Reported Anxious Affect Change Scores (HR during LNS - baseline) for Each 
Condition. 
 Threat Level  
 High-Threat Low-Threat Regulation Total 
Distraction 4.06 (5.60) 4.17 (5.62) 4.12 (5.56) 
Acceptance 4.02 (5.09) 2.93 (6.89) 3.48 (6.03) 
Control 3.68 (6.46) 1.67 (4.95) 2.68 (5.80) 
Threat Total 3.92 (5.69) 2.92 (5.90)  
Figures in Parentheses indicate standard deviation. 
There was no main effect of threat level, F(1, 174) < 1, ns, nor of regulation 
strategy, F (2, 174) < 1, ns. Furthermore, the interaction between threat level and 
regulation strategy was not significant, F(2, 174) < 1, ns.  
Testing for WM Performance differences After Controlling for Heart Rate: Heart 
rate change scores from the last 2 minutes of LNS performance were used to test the 
affective hypothesis. The affect hypothesis predicted a positive relationship between HR 
and WM performance. Results from the correlations showed that HR change from baseline 
during the last 2 minutes of WM performance did not significantly correlate with WM 
performance: Total score, r (180) = -.007, p =.92; Low load; r(180) = .002, p = .98; medium 
load, r(180) = .002, p =.98, and; high-load, r(180) = -.018, p = .81. 
A 2 (threat level) X 3 (regulation strategy) X 3 (load level: low, medium and high) 
mixed design ANOVA on the WM performance data was conducted with the last 2 minutes 
of HR change score data as a covariate to remove the affective influences on performance. 
The results showed that the covariate did not account for a significant amount of the 
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variance, F(1, 173) < 1, ns. Furthermore, there was no significant interaction between the 
HR and load, F(2, 172) = < 1, ns. To test if affect impacted negatively on working memory 
performance only during a high-load trials, a 2 (threat level) X 3 (regulation strategy) 
ANCOVA with HR change as the covariate was used. Results showed that HR change did not 
account for a significant amount of the WM performance variance, F(1, 173) = < 1, ns. 
Hence, the performance results remained largely unchanged when adding HR change as a 
covariate, with the effect of threat, F(1, 173) = 6.61, p = .011., ηp
2 = .037, and the effect of 
regulation within the high-threat level F(2, 86) = 3.15, p = .048., ηp
2 = .068, remaining 
significant.  
  Self-Reported Anxious Affect: A 2 (threat level) x3 (regulation Strategy) ANOVA was 
conducted on self-reported anxiety change scores (anxiety experienced during LNS-
baseline) to determine whether differences in anxious affect occurred amongst the threat 
and regulatory conditions during LNS. Table 7.3 presents the mean change scores for each 
condition. 
Table 7. 3. 
Mean Self-Reported Anxious Affect Change Scores (reported during LNS - baseline) for Each 
Condition. 
 Threat Level  
 High-Threat Low-Threat Regulation Total 
Distraction 2.21 (1.41) 2.21 (1.09) 2.21 (1.25) 
Acceptance 2.25 (1.51) 2.18 (1.52) 2.22 (1.50) 
Control 2.04 (1.48) 1.55 (1.13) 1.79 (1.33) 
Threat Total 2.17 (1.46) 1.98 (1.28)  
Figures in parentheses indicate standard deviation.  
The participants in the high-threat condition did not report more anxiety during 
LNS than the low-threat participants, as the main effect of threat level was not significant, F 
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< 1, ns. The main effect of regulation strategy was non-significant, F(2, 174) = 1.88, p = .16., 
ηp
2 = .021. Furthermore, there was no significant interaction between threat level and 
regulation strategy, F < 1, ns. These results showed, counter to the affective hypothesis, no 
differences in affect amongst the threat and regulatory conditionsrr.  
Testing for Differences in WM Performance After Removing the Variance Shared 
with Self-reported Anxiety. The affective hypothesis predicts that increased anxiety and 
worry causes decreased WM performance. A correlation was used to test whether greater 
anxiety and worry are associated with lower WM performance, particularly at the higher 
load levels. The results showed very low negative correlations (i.e., increased anxiety and 
worry were associated with poorer performance) across the load levels and in each of the 
three load levels in the predicted pattern, however none reached significance: Total score = 
r(180) = - .01 p = .92  low, r (180) = -.07, p =. 36; medium, r (180) = -.08, p = .26; high, r (180) 
= -.09, p =.22. 
A 2 (threat level) x3 (regulation strategy) x3 (load level) mixed design ANCOVA on 
the WM performance data tested whether anxiety accounted for a significant amount of 
the variance in WM performance and reduced the differences between the threat and 
regulatory conditions. Anxious affect change score (anxiety experienced during LNS minus 
baseline) was a covariate. Results showed that reported anxiety during LNS did not account 
for a significant amount of the variance, F(1, 173) = 1.22, p = .27, ηp
2 = .007, and there was 
no significant interaction between load and self-reported affect, F < 1, ns. A covariate 
analysis only within the high-load level showed that that self-reported affect did not 
account for a significant portion of the variance, F(1, 173) = .14, p = .71, ηp
2 = .001. Hence, 
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 As PET predicts that it is particularly worry that disrupts working memory performance 
the worry item was subject to the same analysis but no significant differences were noted. 
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the WM performance differences between the threat and regulatory conditions remained 
largely unchangedss with the effect of threat, F(1, 173) = 6.27, p = .013., ηp
2 = .035, and the 
effect of regulation within the high-threat level F(2, 86) = 3.29, p = .042., ηp
2 = .071, 
remaining significant.  
7.10.3. Discussion 
 The results from study 7.4 support the self-regulatory strength predictions over the 
affective predictions. Neither physiological nor self-reported measures of anxious affect 
displayed differences between the threat levels or regulation strategies when participants 
were engaging in the executive tasks of prepotent response inhibition or updating and 
maintaining representations in working memory. Further, there were no significant 
associations between affect measures and executive control that, when statistically 
controlled, altered the pattern of results noted amongst the threat and regulatory 
conditions. Therefore, the results of this study show that the differences noted amongst 
the threat and regulatory conditions were not due to differences in anxious affect 
experienced during executive task performance. Hence, these results suggest that the 
change in the pattern of results from prepotent response inhibition to working memory 
were not due to differences in the pattern of affect experienced during the execution of 
these tasks amongst the experimental groups.  
There was one finding in study 7.4 that suggested an alternative to a self-regulatory 
strength explanation. When the HR shift scores were correlated with Stroop interference 
there was a trend towards significance, with increased arousal associated with less 
interference. The affective theories predicted a relationship where increased mental effort 
                                                          
ss
 The worry item also did not account for a significant portion of the variance in WM 
performance.  Adding both HR shift scores and self-reported change scores simultaneously into the 
ANCOVA also made no significant change to the WM results. 
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as represented by HR would be associated with better performance (Eysenck & Calvo, 
1992b; Jorna, 1992), in contrast to the neurovisceral account, which predicted the opposite 
(i.e., increased HR associated with impaired performance). However, even when controlling 
for this increased mental effort, the impacts of the threat circumstances and regulation 
strategies were still significant, suggesting that the increased mental effort had a minimal 
effect on results. 
Unlike previous studies, study 7.4 measured anxious affect retrospectively during 
the performance of the executive tasks. Studies testing the affective theory predictions 
often measure anxious affect in the period of time just before engaging in the executive 
tasks and show negative impacts of increased prior anxious affect on executive task 
performance (e.g., Derakshan et al., 2009; Eysenck et al., 2005; MacLeod & Donnellan, 
1993; Shackman et al., 2006; Sorg & Whitney, 1992; Tohill & Holyoak, 2000). The aim of 
study 7.5 is to test whether affect experienced before undertaking the executive control 
tasks accounts for the executive control differences amongst the threat and regulatory 
groups.   
7.11. Study 7.5: Are the Between Group Differences in Response 
Inhibition and Working Memory Performance Due to Variations in 
Anxious Affect Experienced During Regulation? 
Study 6.1 established systematic differences between threat levels and the 
regulation strategies on measures of HRV, HR and self-reported affect towards the end of 
regulation. The affective theories are usually tested on the assumption that anxious affect 
experienced prior to engaging in the executive tasks is detrimental to performance (e.g., 
Derakshan et al., 2009; Eysenck et al., 2005; MacLeod & Donnellan, 1993; Shackman et al., 
2006; Sorg & Whitney, 1992; Tohill & Holyoak, 2000). It may be that affect experienced 
during the regulatory periods (i.e., just before engaging in the executive tasks) has a carry-
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over effect on the executive control tasks. If carry-over effects are occurring it is likely that  
they would be more prominent on the response inhibition task (being temporally proximal 
to the regulatory period) and this reduction in the level of influence of prior experienced 
affect may explain why the WM results (study 7.3) did not reflect the same pattern of 
results amongst the threat and regulatory conditions as those noted on prepotent response 
inhibition in study 7.3. In addition, a number of studies have also tested Thayer’s 
neurovisceral account (Hansen et al., 2003; Hansen et al., 2004; Hansen, Johnsen, Sollers, 
et al., 2009; Hansen, Johnsen, & Thayer, 2009) measuring vagal tone before undertaking an 
executive control task, with increased vagal tone associated with superior executive 
control. Hence, studies both on affect and HRV influencing executive control have 
demonstrated that prior increased affect or decreased HRV coincide with impaired 
executive control. 
Study 7.5 tests the common occurrence found in previous research that the 
performance differences found between the threat and regulatory conditions are due to 
differences in affect experienced prior to executive task engagement, which in this study 
would be the latter periods of regulation. Furthermore, study 7.5 assesses the possibility 
that affect during the regulatory period had more influence on the temporally proximal 
executive task (response inhibition) than the temporally distal executive task (WM). Shared 
variance between affect and executive control shown on prepotent response inhibition 
may be greater than the shared variance between affect variables and executive control 
shown on WM. This difference in the level of shared variance may explain the different in 
patterns in executive control across threat and regulatory conditions noted in studies 7.2 
and 7.3.   
Several predictions arise from the affective theories of ACT and PET and Thayer’s 
neurovisceral approach.  Firstly, the differences in executive control will eliminated when 
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statistically controlling for the systematic differences noted on affective variables noted 
between the threat and regulatory conditions during the third regulatory period (cf. study 
6.1). Secondly, there will be significant correlations between arousal during the third 
regulatory epoch and executive task performance. The direction of these correlations will 
differ depending on the variables examined. According to the predictions made from the 
above theories, HRV (with increased HRV indicating lower levels of dysregulated affect) 
should be negatively correlated with Stroop interference (i.e., greater HRV leading to less 
interference) and positively correlated with WM performance (i.e., greater HRV leading to 
greater WM). The HR and affect variables are both predicted to correlate positively with 
Stroop interference (i.e., greater affect leads to greater Stroop interference) and are 
predicted to correlate negatively with WM performance. Furthermore, affect should 
account for a significant amount of variance in executive control and controlling for it 
should reduce the differences in executive control performance noted amongst the threat 
and regulatory conditions. Lastly, response inhibition should show more shared variance 
with affect experienced during regulation than WM performance, due to the temporal 
proximity of the assessment of that function to the thinking regulatory period.  
7.11.1. Method 
 The design was the same as the previous studies. The affective measures chosen 
were HRV and HR change from baseline scores during the final thinking regulatory epoch, 
and self-reported affect change from baseline scores to post-regulation (see study 6.1). 
Executive task performance was measured by Stroop interference and WM accuracy. See 
Figure 7.11, showing the phases of the experiment during which the data were collected. 
For a full description of the method see chapter 4.  
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Phase 1: Participant Screening and Pre-Experimental Questionnaire 
 
Random Allocation of Participants to Threat and Regulation Conditions 
Phase 2: Preparation and Baseline  
Phase 3: Threat Manipulation 
High-Threat 
Introduction to Impromptu Speech and Test 
Recording 
Low-Threat 
Introduction to UK Offshore Asset Disclosure 
Video Viewing  
Phase 3: Regulation Manipulation Tasks 
“Writing Task”  
5 minute Writing on Regulation Strategy Consistent Topic   
Post Regulation SR Affect (present moment) 
“Thinking Task”                                 
15 minute Audio Regulation Strategy Consistent Audio Content  
 
Phase 4: Stroop 
 
Post Stroop SR Affect (during incongruent trials)  
Post LNS SR Affect task (during latter trials) 
Phase 4: Letter-Number-Sequencing (LNS) 
 
Phase 5: Threat-Task and Recovery 
Low-Threat 
Watch Video 
High-Threat 
Deliver Impromptu Speech  
Post Threat HR, RR Recovery and SR Affect (During and Following Threat-Task)  
Phase 6: Regulation Manipulation Checks 
Regulation Strategy Quiz, Self-Reported Effort and Difficulty and, Attention 
Allocation Focus, Cognitions and Regulatory Attempts 
 
Figure 7.11. Flow Diagram of Procedural Phases with Relevant Data Collection Periods 
(Phases 3 and 4) Highlighted 
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7.11.2. Results 
 The HRV changes and HR changes during third regulatory epoch were chosen to be 
presented to test the affective and neurovisceral hypothesestt.  
7.11.2.1. Response Inhibition 
The HRV (RMSSD residuals) change scores from the third regulatory epoch showed 
a weak, non-significant negative correlation, r (175) = -.10, p = .18, with Stroop 
interference. A 2 (threat level) X 3 (regulation strategy) ANCOVA was used to compare the 
impacts of threat and regulation on Stroop interference after the influence of HRV changes 
(covariate) had been removed. The results showed that HRV changes did not account for a 
significant portion of the variance in Stroop interference, F(1, 168) = .97, p = .33, ηp
2 = .006, 
and the interaction between threat level and regulation strategy remained unchanged, F(2, 
168) = 7.39, p = .001, ηp
2 = .081, when removing this shared variance.  
A correlation between Stroop interference sores and HR change scores (third 
regulatory epoch- baseline) revealed that greater interference was weakly but significantly 
associated with increased HR, r (175) = .18, p = .02. A 2 (threat level) X 3 (regulation 
strategy) ANCOVA showed that the effect of HR change in the third regulatory epoch on 
Stroop interference was marginally significant, F(1, 168) = 3.54, p = .06, ηp
2 = .021. 
However, when the shared variance between HR and Stroop interference was removed, 
                                                          
tt
 The researcher also tried the first and second epochs and the mean of the three 
regulatory epochs with the same analytical strategy. A summary of the results of this analysis from 
the first and second regulatory epochs is that neither HRV changes nor HR changes accounted for a 
significant amount of the variance in executive control, nor did by removing any shared variance 
between HRV changes or HR changes and executive control did the pattern of differences between 
the experimental conditions.   
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the interaction between threat level and regulation strategy remained significant, F(2, 168) 
= 7.16, p = .001, ηp
2 = .079uu.  
The same analysis steps for HRV and HR were undertaken with self-reported affect 
change scores.  Firstly, the reported affect change scores (post regulation - baseline) were 
unrelated to Stroop Interference, r (175) = -.02, p = .87. A 2 (threat level) X 3 (regulation 
strategy) ANCOVA, was used to establish whether the significant interaction between 
threat level remained after controlling for self-reported affect during regulation (covariate). 
Self-reported anxiety did not explain a significant portion of the variance in Stroop 
interference, F(1, 168) = .002, p = .97, ηp
2 < .001, and therefore did not significantly reduce 
the differences amongst the threat and regulatory conditionsvv,  F(1, 168) = 7.67, p = .001, 
ηp
2 = .084.  
7.11.2.2. WM Performance 
HRV (RMSSD residuals) change from baseline scores (third regulatory epoch- 
baseline) were correlated with WM performance including the total WM score and the 
                                                          
uu
Several issues sought to be ruled out with additional analyses. The first issue was that the 
limited impact of affect may have only been noted on the Stroop interference scores rather than the 
Stroop accuracy rate scores. Hence, the same ANCOVA analysis was undertaken with the Stroop 
accuracy rate scores. The results showed that HR changes from the third regulatory epoch did not 
account for a significant portion of the variance in Stroop accuracy rate, F(1, 168) = 1.12, p = .29, ηp
2
 
= .007, and the significant interaction between threat level and regulation strategy remained, F(2, 
168) = 7.56, p = .001, ηp
2
 = .083.The second issue was that affect may have had more of a influence 
in the mind-wandering conditions on Stroop interference. An ANCOVA specifically removing shared 
variance between HR changes during the third epoch and Stroop interference was undertaken. The 
results demonstrated, that HR accounted for a significant amount variance in Stroop interference, 
F(1, 55) = 8.39, p = .005, ηp
2
 = .13, and the impact of threat was reduced to non-significant 
difference,  F(1, 55) = 2.34, p = .13, ηp
2
 = .041. However, using the same analysis on Stroop accuracy 
rate scores, HR changes were only approaching significance, F(1, 55) = 2.95, p = .092, ηp
2
 = .051, and 
the impact of threat was marginally significant, F(1, 55) = 4.00, p = .051, ηp
2
 = .68. 
vv
HRV, HR and self-reported affect change scores were added simultaneously as covariates 
in an ANCOVA however the pattern of differences between the threat and regulatory conditions 
remained the same, suggesting that neither of the variables mediated the combined impact of 
threat and regulation on Stroop interference.     
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three WM load levels. The results were: Total, r (180) = .10, p =.16; Low, r (180) = .04, p 
=.59; medium, r (180) = .07, p =.33, and; high, r (180) = .12, p =.14. A 2 (threat level) X 3 
(regulation strategy) X 3 (WM load) ANCOVA was used to determine if threat levels and 
regulation strategies still influenced WM performance, after controlling for HRV changes 
during regulation (covariate). The results showed that the covariate did not account for a 
significant portion of the variance, F(2, 173) = .91, p = .34, ηp
2 = .005 and there was no 
interaction between the HRV and WM load, F(2, 172) = .36, p = .70, ηp
2 = .004, suggesting 
that HRV changes had little impact on the influence of threat level and regulation strategy. 
Regarding HR, performance on each load level showed a significant negative 
correlation with HR change from baseline (third regulatory epoch - baseline), with the total 
WM score and with each of the threat levels, the strongest correlation within the load level 
being the high-load level: Total, r (180) = -.23, p =.002; low, r (180) = -.19, p =.013; medium, 
r (180) = -.17, p =.027, and; high, r (180) = -.22, p=.004.   
The same 2 (threat level) X 3 (regulation strategy) X 3 (load) ANCOVA as for the 
HRV analysis was conducted to test this affective hypothesis, this time with HR change from 
base line (HR from third regulatory epoch- baseline) as the covariate.  Unlike HRV, HR 
change scores did account for a significant portion of the variance in performance, F(1, 173) 
= 6.80, p = .010, ηp
2 = .038, although the interaction between HR and WM load was still not 
significant, F(2, 172) = 1.42, p = .24, ηp
2 = .016, showing that the effect of arousal did not 
vary across load levels. Within the high-load level only, a 2 (threat level) X 3 (regulation 
strategy) ANCOVA, using HR changes as the covariate showed HR change significantly 
influenced performance, F(1, 173) = 3.91, p = .05, ηp
2 = .020. Importantly, the main effect of 
threat level was still significant within the high-load level, F(1, 173) = 4.04, p = .046, ηp
2 = 
.023. Furthermore, when controlling for HR, the difference between distraction and 
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acceptance within the high-threat condition remained significant with the means in the 
same direction, F(1, 57) = 5.33, p = .025, ηp
2 = .086.  
Interestingly, reported changes in affect did not show a significant correlation with 
WM performance or with any of the WM loads, although all coefficients were nominally 
negative: Total, r (180) = -.09, p = .24; Low, r (180) = -.13, p = .074; medium, r (180) = -.05, p 
= .47, and; High, r (180) = -.07, p = .34. A 2 (threat level) X 3 (regulation strategy) x3 (load 
level) ANCOVA on WM performance with self-reported affect change scores used as the 
covariate showed that self-reported affect did not significantly reduce the differences 
amongst the threat and regulatory conditions. The results showed that self-reported affect 
did not account for a significant amount of the variance in performance, F(1, 173) = .56, p = 
.46, ηp
2 = .003. Furthermore, the interaction between self-reported affect and load level 
was not significant, F(1, 172) = .04, p = .97, ηp
2 < .001. Results from the high-load condition 
only showed that changes in reported affect did not account for a significant portion of the 
variance in performance, F(1, 173) = .14, p = .71, ηp
2 = .001. Therefore, the differences 
noted between the threat levels and regulatory conditions remained largely unchangedww, 
with the impact of threat, F(1, 173) = 5.78, p = .017, ηp
2 = .032, and the impact of regulation 
within the high-threat level, F(2,86) = 3.24, p = .044, ηp
2 = .070, remaining significant.  
7.11.2.3. Baseline Individual Differences in HRV and Executive Control 
As there was no association found between HRV and executive control during the 
regulatory epochs it was decided to establish if the imposition of threats and regulation 
had also  eliminated the relationship between individuals differences HRV at baseline and 
executive control, as demonstrated in previous research (Hansen et al., 2003; Hansen, 
                                                          
  
ww
HRV, HR change scores and self-reported affect change scores were added 
simultaneously as covariates in an ANCOVA however the differences between the threat and 
regulatory conditions did not change significantly. 
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Johnsen, & Thayer, 2009; S. C. Segerstrom & Solberg Nes, 2007). However, neither of the 
correlations between baseline HRV and executive control  for Stroop interferences, r(175) = 
.01, p =.86 ,  or for the WM total score r(180) = -.07,p = .38, WM performance in the high-
load level,  r(180) = .04, p =.61, were significant.  
7.11.3. Discussion 
 Study 7.5 set out to establish whether affect experienced during the latter 
period of regulation was associated with impaired executive control and if this 
relationship accounted for the differences in executive control noted amongst the 
experiment groups.  The correlations between HRV and executive control, although in the 
direction consistent with the neurovisceral account (i.e., greater increases in HRV 
correlating positively with executive control), these correlations did not reach significance.  
Higher HR during the third regulatory epoch was associated with worse executive 
control. Both Stroop interference (significant positive correlation) and working memory 
scores (significant negative correlations) showed this relationship, which was somewhat 
consistent with the neurovisceral account in that increased arousal would be expected to 
be associated with increases in amygdala activation and decreased prefrontal cortex 
activity that is required for the performance of these tasks. Importantly, for similar reasons 
to the neurovisceral account, the HR results are particularly consistent with affective 
theories of ACT and PET. Furthermore, HR explained marginally significant portions of both 
Stroop interference and WM score variance, before accounting for the impacts of threat 
and regulatory influences. However, the pattern of executive control differences amongst 
the regulatory conditions remained the same and the differences significant, suggesting 
that that impacts of threat and regulation were not predominantly mediated by affect 
experienced during regulation. Furthermore, HR during regulation accounted for similar 
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amounts of variance in both Stroop and WM performance. The similar levels of variance 
accounted for suggests that the affect experienced during regulation did not influence the 
temporally proximally measured response inhibition more than the temporally distally 
measured working memory.  
Self-reported affect, unlike HR, did not significantly correlate with executive 
control, nor did it account for a significant portion of the variance. Hence, self-reported 
affect did not reduce the differences between the threat and regulatory conditions. This 
result is inconsistent with the predictions of the affective theories of ACT and PET in that 
the subjective experience of anxiety, and the level of worrisome cognitions, is considered 
to be just as important in influencing executive control as physiological indicators.  
Lastly, the influence of resting, vagally mediated changes in HR (i.e., HRV as 
indicated by RMSSD) at baseline did not correlate with executive control. This result is 
inconsistent with previous research demonstrating this link between resting baseline 
individual differences in HRV and executive control (Hansen et al., 2003; Hansen et al., 
2004; Hansen, Johnsen, Sollers, et al., 2009; Hansen, Johnsen, & Thayer, 2009; S. C. 
Segerstrom & Solberg Nes, 2007). This result suggests that the experimental manipulations 
involving threat and regulation occurring between baseline and the executive control tasks 
reduced the link between stable individual differences in resting HRV (indicating greater 
vagal tone) and superior executive control. 
Taken together with study 7.4, the results of study 7.5 suggest that changes in 
physiological arousal from baseline during the latter phases of the regulatory period 
explain more participant variation in subsequent executive control than physiological 
arousal during executive task performance. In contrast self-reported affect at neither time 
point was associated with executive control. However, the pattern of results noted on 
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executive control between the threat and regulatory conditions remained largely 
unchanged when controlling for these variables. Therefore, the results of study 7.5 showed 
that differences in affect did not account for the pattern of findings amongst the threat and 
regulatory conditions. Moreover, affect experienced during regulation did not influence 
prepotent response inhibition more than WM, and therefore does not explain the 
differences between the pattern of executive control amongst the threat and regulatory 
conditions for the two executive tasks reported in studies 7.2 and 7.3. Furthermore 
individual differences in HRV at baseline also have little influence over executive control.  
These results further suggest that the self-regulatory strength theory of depleted executive 
resources remains the most plausible explanation the performance decrements noted 
amongst the experimental conditions, and that this depletion of resources occurs through 
physiological mechanisms that do not relate to the neurovisceral account. 
7.12. General Discussion 
The aim of this chapter was to establish the extent to which threat level and affect 
regulation influenced subsequent executive control. The present research also tested three 
competing propositions for why differences between threat levels and regulatory 
conditions may occur. The first was the self-regulatory strength theory, which attributes 
impairments in executive control to a temporary depletion of a limited pool of executive 
resources. The second proposition was an affective explanation based on Eysenck and 
colleagues,’ PET and ACT theories that may attribute differences in executive control 
between the strategies to systematic differences in the experience of anxious affect during 
and prior to undertaking an executive task. These theories consider physiological arousal 
during task performance to represent mental effort, with increased arousal predicted to 
lead to better executive control. The third theory is Thayer and colleagues’ neurovisceral 
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account, which, like PET and ACT, predicts increased prior arousal will result in executive 
task performance decrements. However, it more specifically predicts that decreased vagal 
inhibition of arousal before or during an executive task will result in impaired performance. 
Furthermore, unlike PET and ACT the neurovisceral account predicts arousal to have 
opposite effects on executive task performance depending on whether it occurs prior to or 
during the task, so increased arousal during the task should lead to impaired performance.   
The self-regulatory strength theory was tested with a design that encompassed two 
threat levels, enabling the testing of executive resource depletion due to ego-threat (i.e., 
threat hypothesis), and three regulation strategy conditions, enabling the testing of 
depletion due to the inhibitive nature of a strategy (e.g., demanding distraction), and the 
interaction between ego-threat and regulation (e.g., susceptible acceptance hypothesis). 
Cognitive motivational accounts of attention and self-regulatory theory claim that 
individuals, when anxious, will initially reflexively engage attention to threat information 
(Bar-Haim et al., 2007; Mogg & Bradley, 1998) and become self-focused (Carver & Scheier, 
1988; Duval & Wicklund, 1972). These initial reflexive responses are suggested to be 
subsequently inhibited by individuals in order to reduce or avoid experiencing unpleasant 
affect (Derryberry & Reed, 2002; Johns et al., 2008; Koster et al., 2006; Koster et al., 2005). 
High-threat situations that facilitate attentional engagement with threats and towards the 
self may make attentional diversion difficult (Knight et al., 2007) and effortful, thereby 
depleting executive resources and leading to impaired executive control (Heatherton et al., 
1993; Johns et al., 2008).  Situations that do not involve high-threat would not facilitate 
attention to threats or self-focused attention and therefore make increased attention 
towards threats or the self effortful, depleting of executive resources and detrimental to 
subsequent executive control.   
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7.12.1. Summary of Findings   
The first three studies aimed to establish whether the regulatory strategies 
impacted directly on executive control in proportion to their predicted depletion of 
executive resources, given the level of threat under which they were undertaken. Studies 
7.4 and 7.5 aimed to rule out the possible indirect effects of the threat circumstances and 
the strategies on executive control via differences in anxious arousal, and vagal tone 
elicited by the experimental conditions.  
Firstly, it was predicted that the spontaneous tendency to limit self-awareness and 
attention to threat stimuli in high-threat circumstances would deplete executive resources 
and impair subsequent attempts to exercise executive control. To test this proposition, the 
high- and low-threat mind-wandering control conditions were compared, showing no 
differences in perceived effort expended during regulation (study 7.1), but impaired 
subsequent executive control by those in the high-threat level relative to the low-threat 
level (studies 7. 2 and 7. 3). These results suggest that in high-threat circumstances mind-
wandering can impair executive control without individuals perceiving that they are 
investing increased mental resources.  
Secondly, it was predicted that engaging in an attention consuming task to reduce 
self-awareness would deplete executive resources, particularly in high-threat 
circumstances (i.e., the demanding distraction hypothesis). Study 7.1 showed that 
distraction was perceived to be more mentally demanding than the other conditions in 
both threat levels; study 7.2 showed that distraction led to increased Stroop interference. 
In study 7.3, distraction led to worse performance in the ability to update and maintain 
high-load levels within WM when assessed after persistent exposure to increased threat. 
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These results suggest that prior engagement in distraction, particularly in increased threat 
circumstances, can impair the subsequent executive control.  
Based on the definition of the attentional process associated with strategy of 
acceptance, it was predicted that the acceptance conditions would facilitate increased 
attention to threat-related thoughts and affective responding in high-threat circumstances 
and therefore be less effortful in these circumstances than a strategy that tried to inhibit 
attention to threats and affective responding. However, acceptance in low-threat 
circumstances was predicted to operate counter to the prevailing tendency to limit 
attention to threats and affect and, therefore, to demand increased mental resources. 
Results from study 7.1 showed that in high-threat circumstances acceptance was perceived 
to be marginally less mentally demanding than distraction and also less demanding than 
acceptance in low-threat circumstances. In contrast, acceptance in the low-threat level was 
perceived to be marginally more mentally demanding than the mind-wandering control 
and no different from distraction.  The different influence of acceptance under different 
threat circumstances was again evident in study 7.2, where acceptance in high-threat 
circumstances led to significantly superior response inhibition relative to the distraction 
and mind-wandering conditions. In contrast, in the low-threat level acceptance led to 
significantly impaired response inhibition relative to acceptance in the high-threat level, 
and to the mind-wandering condition in the low-threat level. Hence, the threat 
circumstance in which acceptance is undertaken in can influence whether the strategy 
preserves and diminishes the capacity to demonstrate executive control.    
Study 7.3 tested the impacts of prior regulation on WM. However, this was tested 
after participants were exposed to the threats over a longer period relative to when 
prepotent response inhibition was assessed and thus was temporally further from the prior 
regulation task. The results of study 7.3 further demonstrated the protective effect of 
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engaging in acceptance in high-threat circumstances.  However, unlike studies 7.1 and 7.2, 
study 7.3 did not show negative impacts of engaging in acceptance in the low-threat 
circumstances or of distraction in low-threat circumstances. Consistent with participants 
being exposed to the threats for longer, the negative impact of increased threat was 
demonstrated both pooling across the regulatory conditions, and between the control 
conditions. Thus, longer exposure to increased threat increases its impact on executive 
control and can sustain the impacts of prior regulation relative to exposure to lower threat 
circumstances.   
Study 7.4 tested whether anxious affect or arousal experienced during executive 
task performance accounted for experimental group differences in executive control. The 
variance shared between executive control measures and anxious affect and arousal were 
statistically removed to observe whether group differences were attenuated. The results 
showed that  neither concurrent arousal nor self-reported affect during the executive tasks 
accounted for a significant portion of the variance in executive control, such to alter the 
pattern of differences between the threat and regulatory conditions. Thus affect 
experienced during executive task performance did not explain the pattern of executive 
control differences.  
Study 7.5 tested whether affect experienced during the third regulatory period 
(being temporally proximal to the assessment of response inhibition) explained the pattern 
of executive control results in terms of; (1) differences amongst experimental conditions, 
and (2) differences in the pattern of executive control between response inhibition (study 
7.2) and WM (study 7.3). The results from study 7.5 showed that HRV did not predict a 
significant amount of the variance in executive control, although the non-significant 
relationship between the variables was in the expected direction (i.e., greater HRV increase 
from baseline associated with superior executive control). In contrast to HRV, HR did 
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significantly predict variance in performance on both measures of executive function, with 
increased arousal associated with impaired executive control. Hence, the influence of HR 
did not only impact significantly on response inhibition (being temporally proximal to the 
regulatory period), rather it was significant for both measures with the effect size of HR 
being nominally larger on WM than response inhibition. However, group differences in 
executive control remained significant after the statistical removal of this shared variance. 
Self-reported affect had no impact on the executive control results. Hence, the results of 
study 7.5 demonstrated that affect experienced during the latter period of regulation did 
not explain the differences in executive control between the experimental groups. 
Furthermore, prior affect did not impact on response inhibition more than WM, and 
therefore time lag did not explain the difference in executive control patterns amongst the 
threat and regulatory conditions from studies 7.2 and 7.3. In addition, baseline HRV was 
shown not be linked with executive control, contrary to demonstrations from previous 
research (Hansen et al., 2003; Hansen, Johnsen, & Thayer, 2009; S. C. Segerstrom & Solberg 
Nes, 2007).  
7.12.2. Theoretical Implications  
The studies presented in this chapter show cumulative support for self-regulatory 
strength theory and its predictions regarding executive resource depletion. This support 
began with study 7.1 finding the mental demands of a strategy may differ depending on 
which strategy is used and the threat circumstances in which that strategy is used. 
Matching the pattern of perceived mental demands, the combined effects regulation and 
threat circumstances on executive control was evident in study 7.2 and to a lesser extent 
study 7.3. Differences in executive control exhibited by the experimental conditions in 
studies 7.2 and 7.3 could not be attributed to differences in changes to self-reported affect, 
physiological arousal or vagal inhibition (studies 7.4 and 7.5). Hence, although different 
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threat levels and regulation strategies may lead to different affective responses (cf. chapter 
6), these differences do not explain the executive control differences between 
experimental groups.    
Theories of attention and anxiety (Mogg & Bradley, 1998) and self-regulatory 
theory (Carver & Scheier, 1988; Duval & Wicklund, 1972) claim that individuals, when 
anxious, reflexively engage with threats, with self-regulatory theory stating that this leads 
to attention to the self in high-threat circumstances. Furthermore, it was claimed by self-
regulatory theory (Carver & Scheier, 1988; Duval & Wicklund, 1972) that spontaneously 
initiated regulatory attempts to inhibit this reflexive attentional engagement requires 
significant ongoing cognitive control, a claim that has some support (Cornwell et al., 2011; 
Knight et al., 2007). Consistent with these propositions, self-regulatory strength theory 
(Muraven & Baumeister, 2000) predicts and research has shown (Heatherton et al., 1993; 
Johns et al., 2008) that attempts (spontaneous or imposed) to inhibit reflexive attentional 
engagement with threats and or negative affect are cognitively effortful and lead to 
impaired executive control. In contrast, low-threat/stressor situations, where low levels of 
anxiety are present, and thus do not involve reflexive attentional engagement with threat 
stimuli or to the self require little inhibition of reflexive attentional  responses and thus 
preserve the capacity to demonstrate executive control.  
The results of studies 7.2 and 7.3 were consistent with the above assertions 
regarding which situations and coinciding regulatory responses are likely to lead to 
impaired executive control. First, individuals who are under high-threat and used 
spontaneous attempts to avoid the experience of negative affect (see attentional focus 
results from chapter 5) showed diminished executive control relative to those who are not 
under such a high level of threat (Heatherton et al., 1993; Inzlicht et al., 2006; Johns et al., 
2008; Schmader & Johns, 2003). Second, in high-threat circumstances, acceptance had the 
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opposite effect on executive control to the distraction and the control conditions, both 
inhibiting attention to affect. This suggests that under high-threat circumstances, allocating 
attention towards external neutral stimuli in a mentally active way in an attempt to limit 
attention towards the self or internal affective experiences achieves similar depletion 
effects to spontaneous attempts to avoid attending to the self and experiencing negative 
affect. In contrast, attention towards threats and towards the self and the experience of 
unpleasant affect, as undertaken during acceptance, preserved the subsequent ability to 
exercise executive control.  
These results are consistent with existing research showing decrements in 
executive control in dietary restraint (Heatherton et al., 1993) resulting from either the 
natural tendency to avoid attending to the affective experience of threat or experimenter 
facilitation of this process through providing distracting content. Furthermore, Heatherton 
et al.’s (1993) study showed that increased attention to the threatening situation and to 
the self in high-threat circumstances led to restrained calorie intake (i.e., the measure of 
executive control) relative to a distraction condition and a control condition involving no 
particular attentional focus, which would evoke lower self-awareness. Similarly to the 
present research, Heatherton et al. showed that increased self-awareness did not differ 
from the low-threat control condition in demonstrated executive control. Hence, the 
present study extends existing findings by demonstrating that the beneficial impacts self-
awareness may have on executive control do not necessarily have to be facilitated using a 
mirror, or videotaping individuals, but by providing an affect regulation strategy that draws 
attention to one’s threat-related thoughts and emotions.  Furthermore, it has now been 
demonstrated that both increasing self-awareness and distraction in low-threat 
circumstances can also impair executive control.  
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Considering the impacts of regulation in low-threat circumstances, purposefully 
allocating attention to auditorily presented reminders to generate novel responses in a goal 
driven manner (i.e., distraction) and attention towards the self in noticing negative 
thoughts and feelings (i.e., acceptance) led to temporary impairments in executive control 
(study 7.2). However, unlike the high-threat level, the natural tendency to limit self-
awareness demonstrated in the low-threat level control condition preserved the capacity 
to exercise executive control.  This finding suggests that any focusing of attention or 
attentional control that prevents the attention from drifting depletes executive resources, 
consistent with self-regulatory strength theory and previous research (Muraven & 
Baumeister, 2000; Schmeichel, 2007; Schmeichel et al., 2003). As both acceptance and 
distraction require attentional control, it would be expected that they would both differ 
from the mind-wandering control condition in low-threat circumstances as noted by the 
results in study 7.2. 
Hartley (1973) demonstrated the effects of prior self-regulation to diminish over 
time. Hartley (1973) also showed that persisting stressors have additive detrimental effects 
over time. Consistent with Hartley (1973), study 7.3, showed the impact of threat level was 
the dominant factor influencing WM, rather than the interaction between regulation and 
threat level as noted in study 7.2.   The depleting impacts of regulation within the low-
threat level indicated in study 7.1 and study 7.2 were not replicated in study 7.3. However, 
the impacts of regulation still remained in the high-threat level. One potential reason for 
regulatory effects to appear in the high-threat level but not the low-threat level may be 
that the low-threat level allowed for mental rest and replenishment of executive resources 
during the temporal delay (Muraven & Baumeister, 2000) whilst the high-threat level did 
not allow for this replenishment.  
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Lastly, the link between increased vagal inhibition of arousal (HRV) and executive 
control was tested. The pattern of differences in HRV amongst the regulatory conditions in 
the third epoch of the regulatory period, noted in study 6.1, largely matched the pattern of 
differences in executive control in studies 7.2 and 7.3. Hansen et al. separated individuals 
into high- and low HRV groups, based on resting baseline measurement, and showed that 
those with higher HRV showed better performance in an executive task. Hansen et al. also 
showed significant relationships between baseline HRV and executive control.  However, in 
study 7.5, there was no significant relationship between HRV changes from baseline to the 
affect regulatory period and executive control (both response inhibition and working 
memory), despite a nominal association in the expected direction, was not significant. 
Several studies have demonstrated the link between baseline HRV and executive control 
(Demaree et al., 2004; Hansen et al., 2003; S. C. Segerstrom & Solberg Nes, 2007), however 
none have demonstrated that HRV changes in a regulation context is directly related to 
superior regulated responding. The fact that the present study showed that neither 
baseline HRV or changes in HRV during regulation were linked with subsequent executive 
control, suggests that the threat and regulatory manipulations removes the link between 
HRV and executive control.  
The shared variance between heart rate changes from baseline and executive 
functioning demonstrated how several theoretical accounts may possibly simultaneously 
co-exist to some extent without being mutually exclusive. Heart rate changes from baseline 
measured during the performance of the Stroop task and during regulation showed a near 
significant negative correlation with executive control. The correlation between HR and 
Stroop interference was consistent with the predictions of the affective theories of PET and 
ACT (Eysenck & Calvo, 1992b; Eysenck et al., 2007), that increased arousal during the 
undertaking of an executive task would support faster response inhibition. However, this 
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result was counter to the predictions of the neurovisceral account (Thayer et al., 2009; 
Thayer & Lane, 2000), which predicted that increased HR should coincide with decreased 
performance.  In contrast to study 7.4, study 7.5 showed a correlation between HR change, 
assessed during the regulatory period, and executive control on both response inhibition 
and working memory (across all load levels) in the direction (i.e., lower HR associated with 
better performance) consistent with the both the affective theories of ACT and PET and 
with the neurovisceral account. Studies supporting the affective theories of ACT and PET 
can only explain the relationship between HR and executive control in terms of affect 
experienced prior to the executive task having a carryover effect to influence subsequent 
executive control (Derakshan et al., 2009; Eysenck et al., 2005; MacLeod & Donnellan, 
1993; Shackman et al., 2006; Sorg & Whitney, 1992; Tohill & Holyoak, 2000). Processing 
efficiency theory and ACT also predict that reported affect would explain variations in 
executive control. However, neither affect reported during the performance of the 
executive task, nor during the regulatory period explained significant amounts of the 
variance in subsequent executive control. Hence, although some evidence was found for 
the affective theories of PET and ACT and the neurovisceral account, when taking the 
results together, mediation tests of the predictions of the affective theories of ACT and PET 
or the neurovisceral account could completely rule out that prior regulation was having a 
significant direct impact on executive control.  Hence, the effect of regulation was still 
evident when removing of the influence of the variables hypothesised to be mediating the 
effect of prior regulation on executive control, with the significant combined effects of the 
threat and regulation remaining. 
7.12.3. Limitations  
 The most obvious limitation of the present research is the difficulty of interpreting 
the discrepant patterns of executive resource depletion for prepotent response inhibition 
298 
 
(study 7.2) and WM (study 7.3).  As the order of tasks was held constant, with Stroop 
preceding LNS, it is unclear whether the different results are due to the nature of the task 
or to order. The choice to systematically measure response inhibition first was made 
because this measure was expected to be the more sensitive in detecting the depletion of 
executive resources (Muraven & Baumeister, 2000). However, the assessment of response 
inhibition may have influenced the measurement ofWM. Response inhibition has been 
demonstrated to influence later self regulatory patterns (Schmeichel, 2007; Wallis & 
Hetherington, 2004). Although engagement in the Stroop task is likely to deplete all threat 
and regulatory conditions equally, this assumption has not been tested directly. Hence, 
there may have been carry-over effects of prior response inhibition assessment on WM.  
Another issue related to order of measurement issue is that some combinations of threat 
and regulatory strategy may have combination-specific effects. It is possible that engaging 
in acceptance and distraction under low-threat levels may have been more detrimental to 
response inhibition than working memory. Hence, the role of temporal delay on response 
inhibition and working memory tasks is uncertain until these alternative possibilities (i.e., 
order/carry-over effects and task-specific effects) are addressed.  
  It is increasingly common for self-regulatory strength studies to rule out systematic 
differences in the perceptions of executive task difficulty amongst experimental groups 
that may also explain executive control differences amongst different experimental groups 
(Hagger et al., 2010; Schmeichel, 2007). Accounting for systematic differences in 
perceptions of executive task difficulty, by asking participants to rate the difficulty of the 
executive task and removing shared variance between the rating and executive task 
performance, may eliminate the possibility that there were systematic individual 
differences in executive functioning at baseline due to ineffective randomisation. In the 
present research, the level of anxiety experienced during each task was measured, and may 
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provide some indication of the difficulty of the task for individuals, however this measure 
of anxiety is not a direct measure of how difficult the participants perceived the executive 
tasks to be, or their level of cognitive ability, and therefore cannot rule out the possibility 
that there may have been systematic differences in the experimental groups in how 
difficult they found the executive control task.  
Lastly, although the present research measured HR during the executive tasks, HRV 
was not computed and the study did not seek to rule out the level of HRV during the 
performance of the executive tasks as a potential explanation of the variance in executive 
control. The neurovisceral account does indeed predict that tonal vagal inhibition or 
arousal during executive task performance could explain differences in executive control, a 
finding supported by previous research (Croizet et al., 2004). HRV was not measured during 
executive task performance in the present research as the executive tasks required verbal 
responses, altering respiratory patterns and therefore HRV, and were also not long enough 
to measure HRV for the five minute period of measurement recommended (Task Force of 
the European Society of Cardiology and the North American Society of Pacing and 
Electrophysiology, 1996).  The extent to which this may have changed the interpretation of 
the current set of results is unclear. If indeed HRV during executive task performance 
mediated the effect of regulation on executive control, this may lead to an interpretation 
that required a more comprehensive integration of self-regulatory strength theory with the 
neurovisceral account.  
7.12.4. Future Research 
Given the novelty of the finding, future research should aim to expand the 
understanding of how regulation strategies vary in their demand for executive resources 
under different threat/affective circumstances. Additionally, it  is important, in the 
interests of providing a more confident theoretical account of the findings, to rule out the 
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possibility of carryover/order effects on working memory, as well as task specific effects 
(i.e., some regulatory attempts in low-threat circumstances only influencing response 
inhibition and not WM) of the threat and regulatory conditions. Specifically, future 
research could either assess WM alone, counterbalance the task order, to determine more 
precisely the circumstances under which persistent threats begin to have more influence 
over executive control when temporal delay exists between executive control assessment 
and affect regulation.  Furthermore, future studies should investigate the diminishing 
impacts of affect regulation on executive control in circumstances where there is an 
absence of persistent threats and where these diminishing effects of regulation cannot be 
attributed to carry over/ order effects or task specific effects. Additionally, future research 
could also address the assumption behind the temporal delay explanation regarding the 
different pattern of executive control from study 7.2 to study 7.3 by varying the time delay 
between the regulation tasks and engaging in the executive task. 
Future studies seeking to extend the understanding of the depleting nature of 
particular affect regulation strategies should carefully consider the experimental 
circumstances. Varying the threat level under which acceptance was undertaken led to a 
nuanced understanding of what impacts acceptance may have. Previous research has 
shown that the influence that both reappraisal and distraction have on executive resources 
can also be altered by the circumstances in which they are used in (Alberts et al., 2008; 
Johns et al., 2008; Sheppes & Meiran, 2008). Such previous research has highlighted the 
time sequence, early versus late initiation of the strategy in relation to the affective 
stimulus. Hence, the present study, along with previous research (Alberts et al., 2008; 
Johns et al., 2008; Sheppes & Meiran, 2008), highlights how important the context in which 
regulation occurs in influences subsequent executive control. Therefore, future studies 
should continue to test strategies under a variety of circumstances (e.g., high-threat vs low-
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threat, anticipatory regulation vs assisting stressor recovery) to discover when they may 
best preserve executive control.  
Future self-regulatory strength studies investigating the influence of affect 
regulation strategies on executive control should pre-test or gain a baseline of participants’ 
executive functioning in an earlier experimental session or measure the perceived difficulty 
of the executive tasks in the attempt to eliminate potential systematic difference in 
executive functioning amongst experimental groups due to participant randomisation 
ineffectively equating the groups on capacity to exercise executive control.  
Lastly, the neurovisceral account provides a physiological mechanism to explain 
why executive control may be impaired by regulation. This physiological mechanism may 
have been represented in HRV during the executive control task, as indicated in Croizet et 
al. (2004), rather than HRV changes prior to executive task performance. To fully test the 
neurovisceral explanation of the present studies’ results, HRV should have ideally been 
measured during the performance of the executive control task and any shared variance 
between HRV and executive control should be removed, before concluding the regulatory 
strength model is the most likely explanation for any significant differences found between 
threat levels or regulatory conditions.   
7.12.5. Summary and Conclusions  
 This chapter presented the results of five studies that demonstrated the effects of 
the affect regulation strategies of distraction and acceptance, used in the anticipation of 
threats, on executive control. Each strategy was tested under both high- and low-threat 
circumstances to investigate their impact on the perceived mental demands of strategy 
engagement on response inhibition and WM. The strategy of distraction, regardless of 
threat level, was found to impair subsequent executive control. In contrast, acceptance 
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preserved participants’ capacity to demonstrate executive control in the high-threat 
circumstances, but impaired capacity in the low-threat circumstances, at least when 
executive control (prepotent response inhibition) was assessed temporally proximally to 
regulation. The pattern of executive control for the acceptance conditions relative to the 
other threat and regulatory conditions was not consistent across executive tasks: 
acceptance in the low-threat level led to impaired performance on response inhibition but 
not on the later assessed WM,  and this inconsistency was not due to differences in anxious 
affect experienced either during executive task performance or during the latter periods of 
regulation prior to executive task performance.  Arousal (HR) experienced during the latter 
periods of regulation did account for a significant amount of the variance in executive 
control, however it did not account for the differences in executive control noted amongst 
the experimental groups, suggesting that arousal is relevant to executive control but does 
not account for the impacts prior regulation on subsequent executive control. Hence, the 
results are most strongly supportive of the self-regulatory strength model of executive 
resource depletion due to imposed threats and engagement in affect regulation rather 
than the affective theories of PET or ACT, or the neurovisceral account.  Furthermore, 
theory (Carver & Scheier, 1988; Duval & Wicklund, 1972; Mogg & Bradley, 1998) and 
findings regarding reflexive attentional focusing when anxious (Bar-Haim et al., 2007) and 
cognitively effortful spontaneous attempts to divert attentional focus from unpleasant 
stimuli (Cornwell et al., 2011; Knight et al., 2007) provide understanding of how regulatory 
attempts and circumstances are likely to combine either to preserve or deplete executive 
resources. Future research should test affect regulation strategies under different 
circumstances to gain a better understanding their limitations in facilitating or impairing 
executive control.  
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Chapter 8: Discussion and 
Conclusions 
 
The introduction to this thesis (chapter 1) identified three research questions, 
which were addressed in chapters 5, 6 and 7. These three research questions corresponded 
to three domains in which the utility of two regulation strategies, distraction and 
acceptance, could be evaluated, including: (1) effectiveness in altering attentional focus 
and reducing maladaptive regulatory attempts; (2) effectiveness in reducing anxious affect, 
and (3) effectiveness in preserving executive control. The threat level in which participants 
engaged in distraction and acceptance was manipulated to evaluate the extent to which 
the strategies had utility in reducing affect and preserving executive control in different 
circumstances.   
The first research question related to the first domain, the emphasis being on the 
cognitive mechanisms via which the strategies of distraction and acceptance alter affective 
experiences. Two possibilities were considered: (a) via altering attention focus with respect 
to threats and feelings and/or (b) via restricting the use of maladaptive regulatory 
attempts.  The second research question focused on the effectiveness of distraction and 
acceptance in reducing anxious affect, firstly during active engagement in the strategy 
while anticipating threat, and secondly, the strategies’ subsequent impacts on affective 
reactivity and recovery to during and following engagement in threat-tasks. The third 
research question comprised two separate but related questions: (a) what direct impacts 
do distraction and acceptance have on the subsequent executive control? And (b) are the 
impacts of regulation on executive control accounted for by fluctuations in anxious affect 
and vagal inhibition caused by regulation?  
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A single sample of 180 university student participants was subjected to a within 
and between subjects experimental procedure (see chapter 4 for method) to answer these 
three research questions. Between subjects manipulations included threat level (high and 
low), and regulation strategy (distraction, acceptance and a mind-wandering control 
condition).  The data gathered were divided into three groupings of measures based on the 
questions that they would answer: (1) reported attentional focus and level of engagement 
in maladaptive regulatory attempts (presented in chapter 5); (2) affect (subjective and 
physiological) and vagal tone measured during threat anticipation, engagement and 
recovery (presented in chapter 6, studies 6.1 and 6.2), and (3) indicators of executive 
resource depletion including reported effort during regulation,  executive control 
(prepotent response inhibition and working memory), and affect and arousal experienced 
during the performance of executive control tasks (presented in chapter 7, studies 7.1 to 7. 
5).  
8.1. Content, Focus and Structure of this Chapter     
This final chapter aims to integrate the findings presented in chapters 5, 6 and 7 
with each other and with previous research and theory. Discussion will focus on evaluating 
the possible interpretations of the findings of the present research in light of previous 
research and theory.  Possible interpretations aim to explain why the imposed strategies of 
distraction and acceptance had the observed impact on attentional focus and engagement 
in maladaptive regulatory attempts, affect, and subsequent executive control. Hence, the 
sections 8.1.1, to 8.1.4, provide summaries of the findings from chapters 5, 6 and 7, 
discussed in relation to predictions from theory, consistency with previous research and 
alternative possible explanations for the phenomena observed.  
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The sequence of presentation to build an understanding of the effects of 
distraction and acceptance begins, in section 8.1.1, with findings regarding imposed 
regulation reducing or eliminating the well-documented impact of increased threat on 
attentional focus (Bar-Haim et al., 2007; Derryberry & Reed, 2002; Ellenbogen et al., 2002; 
Koster et al., 2006; Koster et al., 2005), maladaptive regulatory attempts (Lazarus & 
Folkman, 1984; Pyszczynski & Greenberg, 1987), affect experienced (Bloom et al., 1977; 
Carver & Scheier, 1988, 1990; Feldman, Cohen, Hamrick, & Lepore, 2004; Gramer & Saria, 
2007; Houston & Holmes, 1974; Lazarus & Folkman, 1984; Monat et al., 1972), vagal tone 
(Croizet et al., 2004; S. C. Segerstrom & Solberg-Nes, 2007) and executive control (Inzlicht 
et al., 2006; Johns et al., 2008; Lavric et al., 2003; Schmader & Johns, 2003; Shackman et al., 
2006; Tohill & Holyoak, 2000). To establish the situations or contexts in which regulation 
strategies decrease or eliminate the usual impact of threat, the findings relating to the 
effect of threat averaged across the regulatory conditions is compared with previous 
findings of studies investigating the effect of threat with and without imposed regulation. 
Hence, the sequence begins with understanding the impact of threat and the extent to 
which imposed regulation diminished threat impacts.   
The second and third steps (presented in sections 8.1.2  and 8.1.3, respectively) in 
the sequence of developing an understanding of distraction and acceptance focus on the 
possible interpretations of the effect of regulation (both imposed and spontaneously 
initiated) on attentional focus, levels engagement in maladaptive regulatory attempts, 
anxious affect, and executive control. The second step in the sequence illustrates how the 
imposed regulation strategies (distraction and acceptance) prevented, reduced or 
disrupted the typical attentional focus of spontaneously initiated regulatory processes  
found  in the mind-wandering control conditions and in previous research (Derryberry & 
Reed, 2002; Ellenbogen et al., 2002; Koster et al., 2006; Koster et al., 2005; MacLeod et al., 
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1986). Within this second step of the sequence, the comparisons made between the 
imposed regulation strategies and the mind-wandering control conditions on attentional 
focus, engagement in maladaptive regulatory attempts, affect and executive control, are 
presented with the emphasis on the different strategies providing the opportunity to test 
competing theoretical predictions.  
The third step in sequence outlines the utility of the imposed regulation strategies 
relative to each other in each threat circumstance and how each strategy can be 
understood in terms of how they differ in altering the spontaneously initiated regulation 
occurring in each circumstance. Following this is a brief discussion of the possible 
physiological mechanisms that may explain impairments in executive control. Section 8.1.5 
presents a two-step model of regulation that an explanation for the present set of findings 
in the context of previous research and theory. Sections 8.2, 8.3, and 8.4 which address the 
clinical and organisational implications of the research, methodological limitations, and 
avenues for future research, follow this.  
8.1.1. Effects of Threat  
Previous research shows that exposure to threat increases  engagement in 
maladaptive regulatory attempts (Lazarus & Folkman, 1984; Pyszczynski & Greenberg, 
1987) and anxious affect experienced (Bloom et al., 1977; Carver & Scheier, 1988, 1990; 
Feldman et al., 2004; Gramer & Saria, 2007; Houston & Holmes, 1974; Lazarus & Folkman, 
1984; Monat et al., 1972), reduces vagal tone (Croizet et al., 2004; S. C. Segerstrom & 
Solberg-Nes, 2007), and has a detrimental impact on executive control (Inzlicht et al., 2006; 
Johns et al., 2008; Lavric et al., 2003; Schmader & Johns, 2003; Shackman et al., 2006; Tohill 
& Holyoak, 2000). When individuals are anxious, attention has been shown to engage with 
threatening stimuli presented for short durations (Bar-Haim et al., 2007), but diverted away 
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from threats when presented for longer durations (Derryberry & Reed, 2002; Ellenbogen et 
al., 2002; Koster et al., 2006; Koster et al., 2005; MacLeod et al., 1986).  
8.1.1.1. Threat and Attentional Focus 
Chapter 5 tested the extent to which threat influenced attentional focus and the 
engagement maladaptive regulatory attempts. Mogg and Bradley (1998) propose that 
stimuli of lower threat value may be allocated less attention than those of higher threat 
value. Wilson and MacLeod (2003) supported this proposal showed that threat-stimuli of 
lower threat value were more easily ignored than those of high-threat value. Interestingly, 
the effect of the level threat influencing attentional engagement  has been shown to 
reduce where threat-stimuli are presented over longer durations (Mogg, Bradley, De Bono, 
& Painter, 1997). Based on the evidence, that when anxious, individuals are  likely to 
engage with high-threat-stimuli (Bar-Haim et al., 2007)  chapter 5 hypothesised that high-
threat-stimuli  would engage more attention than low-threat-stimuli, during the 
anticipatory regulatory period, translating into high-threat conditions reporting less 
attention diversion from threats than low-threat conditions.  
The results from chapter 5 demonstrated that threat level, when averaged across 
the regulatory conditions, did not have a major influence on attentional focus towards 
threatening stimuli or towards affective responses. Furthermore, within the mind-
wandering condition, there were no significant effects of threat on the extent of 
attentional diversion from threats or from feelings. Hence, even when removing the 
imposed regulation strategies from the analysis, an effect of threat on focus of attention 
could not be established. Studies suggest that increased threat primarily enhances initial 
reflexive attentional engagement with threat-stimuli (Bar-Haim et al., 2007), however, in 
studies evaluating controlled attentional focus when threat-stimuli are presented over 
longer durations(≥500ms) these biases are reversed (Derryberry & Reed, 2002; Ellenbogen 
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et al., 2002; Koster et al., 2006 ; Koster et al., 2005; MacLeod et al., 1986) or eliminated 
(Mogg et al., 1997). The present research used a 15-minute anticipatory period during 
which participants were assessed on their overall attentional focus. Hence, it is likely 
participants have reported their control attempts (i.e., top-down efforts) to divert attention 
from threats, rather than their occasional reflexive engagement with them, thus not 
demonstrating the impacts of increased threat. However, the present research used self-
report as a measure of attentional focus rather than a more objective cognitive task, as 
used in the studies finding the influence of threat, and this may also explain why the no 
effect of threat were found in the present research.    
8.1.1.2. Threat and Maladaptive Regulatory Attempts 
A stimulus to which attention is allocated, and which is appraised as a threat, is 
predicted by Lazarus and Folkman’s (1984) and Gross and Thompson’s (2007) models to 
lead to maladaptive (i.e., counterproductive in reducing affect) response-focused 
regulatory strategies such as worry, rumination and suppression. In addition, the control 
process theories (Carver, 1979; Carver & Scheier, 1988, 1990; Pyszczynski & Greenberg, 
1987) predict that a situation perceived to impede progress towards a goal, or to produce a 
larger discrepancy between an actual state and desired state, will facilitate cognitive 
processes that are representative of maladaptive regulatory attempts, particularly when 
the person is unable to avoid that impediment. Importantly, such maladaptive, response-
focused strategies have been shown to demand concurrent attention capacity (Exner, 
Martin, & Rief, 2009; S. Hayes et al., 2008; Richards & Gross, 2000; E. Watkins & Baracacaia, 
2002). 
The results of chapter 5 showed that increased threat across the regulatory 
conditions led to participants reporting significantly more spontaneously initiated 
maladaptive regulatory attempts (i.e., worry, rumination and suppression).  This finding 
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supports the predictions of Lazarus and Folkman (1984) and Gross and Thompson (2007) 
and the control processes models (Carver & Scheier, 1982, 1988, 1990; Pyszczynski & 
Greenberg, 1987) that threat will spontaneously initiate maladaptive coping strategies, and 
this effect of threat is not eliminated by facilitating engagement in adaptive regulatory 
strategies.   
8.1.1.3. Threat, Reported Affect and Physiology 
Lazarus and Folkman (1984), and Gross and Thompson’s (2007) appraisal based 
models also predict that once a stimulus is attended to and appraised as a threat, it will 
lead to increased affect relative to a stimulus of lower threat value. Additionally, the 
control process theories (Carver, 1979; Carver & Scheier, 1988, 1990; Pyszczynski & 
Greenberg, 1987) predict that regulation towards a stimulus is widening the gap between 
an actual state and an ideal state will increase anxious affect. The results from chapter 6 
showed that the threat manipulation did lead to increased anxiety during threat 
anticipation, during threat-task engagement, and during threat-task recovery, as indicated 
by both subjective reports and physiological arousal across regulatory conditions. In 
addition, increased threat reduced vagal tone (indicating reduced regulated responding) 
across the regulatory conditions (including within the mind-wandering control conditions); 
suggesting that imposed regulation did not eliminate the influence of threat on affect and 
the inhibition of arousal.  
The findings from chapter 6 show, consistent with previous research, that 
increased threat in the absence of imposed regulation (Croizet et al., 2004; Monat et al., 
1972; S. C. Segerstrom & Solberg Nes, 2007), or in the presence  of imposed regulation 
(Bennett & Holmes, 1975; Bloom et al., 1977; Holmes & Houston, 1974; Houston & Holmes, 
1974), can have significant impacts on subjective reports and physiological arousal 
indicators of anxious affect. Previous research investigating attentional focus during threat 
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(Bloom et al., 1977; Houston & Holmes, 1974) and the results from chapter 5 and 6 of the 
present research have demonstrated that imposed regulation, subsequent to attending to 
a threatening stimulus, does not remove the influence of increased threat on affect. In 
addition, like previous research (Davis et al., 2002),  the present findings suggest that when 
a threat is attended to and appraised as a threat to either one’s physical wellbeing (Bloom 
et al., 1977; Holmes & Houston, 1974; Houston & Holmes, 1974; Monat et al., 1972), or 
positive self-perceptions (Bennett & Holmes, 1975),  it gives rise to an affective response 
which gradually intensifies from when that stimulus is presented (Croizet et al., 2004; 
Fuller, 1992; S. C. Segerstrom & Solberg Nes, 2007). Indeed, it may take some time for the 
individual to restore positive self perceptions or be assured of physical safety and, hence, 
affect may linger once the threat stimulus has passed. Importantly, however, previous 
research testing the mediation effects of stimulus appraisal on affect suggests that it only 
accounts for a portion (13-25%) of variance found in physiological variables (Feldman et al., 
2004). Hence, in the present research, appraisal of the threat stimuli alone may not have 
maintained high levels of affect during the anticipation of threat and following threat-task 
engagement; the engagement in maladaptive regulatory attempts, shown to 
spontaneously occur in chapter 5, may also have contributed. 
8.1.1.4. Threat and Regulated Responding: Controlled Thought, Inhibition 
of Arousal and Executive Control 
There are several indicators of regulated responding, including reported level of 
maladaptive regulatory attempts, vagal inhibition of arousal and lastly executive control. 
Before presenting the executive control results it is important to consider the results from 
chapter 5 and 6 regarding the reporting of maladaptive regulatory attempts and vagal 
inhibition of arousal. The impacts that threat had on increasing maladaptive regulatory 
attempts and reducing vagal tone, when taken together with previous research (Geisler et 
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al., 2010; B.  Verkuil et al., 2009) suggest that threat led to dysregulated responding (Carver 
& Scheier, 1988; Pyszczynski & Greenberg, 1987; Thayer et al., 2009; Thayer & Lane, 2000) 
that resulted in increase affect. Thayer and colleagues (Thayer et al., 2009; Thayer & Lane, 
2000) argue that the increased perception of threat disrupts regulated responding by 
decreased activation in the prefrontal cortex (the anatomical region, when activated, 
supports regulated responding) and can be represented by decreased vagal inhibition, a 
claim that has received some support (Shapiro et al., 2000). If increased threat has a 
uniform negative impact across the regulatory conditions on prefrontal activation, as 
indicated primarily by decreased vagal tone, and secondly by increased arousal, thirdly with 
the engagement in maladaptive regulatory attempts, this uniform negative impact of 
increased threat, across the regulatory conditions, should have also be noted on the ability 
to demonstrate executive control, an activity heavily associated with prefrontal activation 
(Braver et al., 1997). This hypothesis was tested in chapter 7.     
In chapter 7 increased threat was hypothesised to impair regulated responding in 
the form of executive control. Importantly, three possible pathways through which the 
effect might occur were tested. The first of these pathways came from the self-regulatory 
strength theory (Muraven & Baumeister, 2000), claiming that increased threat would 
trigger spontaneously initiated effortful regulatory attempts to inhibit prepotent affective 
and attentional responses, which would in turn temporarily deplete executive resources. 
The second possible pathway was drawn from the affective theories of the processing 
efficiency theory (PET; Eysenck & Calvo, 1992b) and attentional control theory (ACT; 
Eysenck et al., 2007), which propose that threat elicits anxiety, and anxiety itself disrupts 
executive control. The third possible pathway tested was drawn from the neurovisceral 
account (Thayer et al., 2009; Thayer & Lane, 2000), which proposes that threat reduces 
vagal tone, increasing amygdala activity and reducing activation of the prefrontal cortex, a 
312 
 
region supporting executive control (Braver et al., 1997), resulting in executive control 
impairment.  
Study 7.1 tested the self-regulatory prediction that threat would influence the 
perceived mental demands of engaging in regulation. Threat did influence the perceived 
mental demands of engaging in regulation. However, increased threat did not lead to 
participants perceiving regulation to be more mentally demanding when averaged across 
the regulatory conditions or within the mind-wandering control conditions. Study 7.2 
tested the influence of threat on prepotent response inhibition (an objective indicator of 
executive control). Results showed that increased threat did not lead to impaired executive 
control across the regulatory condition. However, within the mind-wandering control 
conditions, increased threat impaired executive control, a finding consistent with previous 
research investigating the influence of threat without imposed regulation (Croizet et al., 
2004; Inzlicht et al., 2006; Lavric et al., 2003; Schmader & Johns, 2003; Shackman et al., 
2006; Tohill & Holyoak, 2000).  
The results of study 7.2, taken together with previous findings, support the 
suggestion that the impact of threat on executive control can be reduced by regulation 
(Heatherton et al., 1993; Johns et al., 2008; Schmader et al., 2009). Neither ACT, nor PET 
nor the neurovisceral account convincingly explain  why regulation moderates the effects 
of threat as the effects of threat level on affect or vagal tone were not eliminated by 
regulation (c.f. study 6. 1). Hence, the results of study 7.2 supported the predictions of self-
regulatory strength theory in that prior regulation can alter the impacts of threat on 
executive control.  
In contrast to 7.2, study 7.3, tested the impacts of prolonged exposure to threat on 
working memory (another indicator of executive control) and found a detrimental impact 
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of increased threat across the regulatory conditions. This result, when taken together with 
study 7.2, suggests that the prolonged exposure to different threat circumstances led to 
more pronounced influences of threat level. The suggestion that prolonged exposure to 
stressors results in more impairment in executive control is similar to pattern of results 
found in a study (Hartley, 1973) showing that persistent exposure to a stressor can have a 
cumulative effect and reduce the prior impacts of prior regulation. Hartley (1973) 
speculated that the increased level of arousal due to the prolonged presence of a stressor 
caused performance decrements. Consistent with Hartley’s (1973) speculation, study 6.1 
showed that threat led to increased affect prior to performing the executive tasks. Hence, a 
plausible explanation for the executive control differences between the mind-wandering 
control conditions in studies 7.2 and 7.3 was due to prior experienced affect (Eysenck & 
Calvo, 1992b; Eysenck et al., 2007) or perhaps reductions in vagal tone (Thayer et al., 2009; 
Thayer & Lane, 2000). However, studies 7.4 and 7.5 testing the impacts of reported affect 
and physiological arousal experienced during executive tasks (study 7.4), and the influence 
of reported affect, arousal and vagal tone during regulation prior to the executive tasks 
(study 7. 5), indicated that none of these factors, at any of the time-points assessed, could 
explain the effect that threat had on executive control.  Taking together the findings of 
studies 7.1 – 7.5, the only remaining mediating mechanism that could provide a plausible 
explanation for why threat leads to impairments in executive control is that threat depletes 
a finite reserve of resources that support executive control (i.e., self-regulatory strength 
theory).  
How good an explanation self-regulatory strength theory offers for threat impairing 
executive control is influenced by whether this theory can be integrated with theories 
relating to spontaneous regulate of attention and affect. Regarding the regulation of 
attention, the proposal of self-regulatory strength theory that threat impairs executive 
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control because people spontaneously seek to inhibit their initial automatic attentional 
engagement with the threat and their affective responses (Johns et al., 2008; Koster et al., 
2006; Koster et al., 2005; Schrooten & Smulders, 2010), and this depletes a finite pool of 
resources making them unavailable to support further acts of executive control (Croizet et 
al., 2004; Heatherton et al., 1991; Lavric et al., 2003; Schmader & Johns, 2003). The findings 
from chapter 5 regarding attentional focus of the mind-wandering control conditions 
suggested that the initial attentional bias for engagement with threat, when anxious, that is 
usually noted (Bar-Haim et al., 2007) had been reduced, possibly by spontaneously initiated 
controlled regulation.  
Previous research has suggested that individuals’ attention, when anxious, initially 
automatically engages with threat-related stimuli (Bar-Haim et al., 2007), however, after 
prolonged exposure (≥500ms), individuals will actively ignore threat-related stimuli 
(Derryberry & Reed, 2002; Ellenbogen et al., 2002; Koster et al., 2006; Koster et al., 2005; 
MacLeod et al., 1986). This active ignoring of threat-stimuli is suggested to be a mentally 
difficult (Carver & Scheier, 1988; Duval & Wicklund, 1972) top-down process (Bar-Haim et 
al., 2007; Mogg & Bradley, 1998) that requires substantial attentional resources to be 
maintained (Cornwell et al., 2011; Knight et al., 2007; Mather & Knight, 2005). It has also 
been demonstrated that ignoring low-threat-stimuli may be easier than ignoring high-
threat-stimuli (Wilson & MacLeod, 2003) and thus may be less demanding of executive 
resources. In addition, the prolonged exposure to threat would also be likely to lead to 
continued spontaneous attempts to inhibit reflexive attention towards threats and further 
depleted executive resources thus explaining the impairments to executive control noted in 
study 7.3.  
The findings that the detrimental impact of threat on executive control being 
confined to the mind-wandering control conditions in study 7.2, but then demonstrated 
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across the regulatory conditions after prolonged exposure to threats in study 7.3 can be 
explained by two processes proposed in self-regulatory strength theory (Muraven & 
Baumeister, 2000): resource depletion and resource replenishment. The first process, 
depletion, refers to the reduction in available executive resources that occurs when 
sustained effort is required to divert attention away from a persistent and prolonged 
exposure to threat. This continued depletion of executive resources impacted on all 
conditions in high-threat circumstances, with all leading to at least nominally lower scores 
than their low-threat counterparts. In contrast, the process of replenishment refers to 
executive resources being recharged by periods of rest, for example, when threatening 
stimuli are transient or their threat value is less and they are thus more easily ignored 
(Wilson & MacLeod, 2003). Prolonged exposure to low-threat circumstances may not have 
initiated effortful ongoing controlled regulation, thus allowing the replenishment of 
executive resources resulting in superior executive control compared to high-threat. Hence, 
a combination of what is known about regulation of attention towards threat and resource 
depletion and replenishment provide an explanation of why the impact of threat was more 
influential in study 7.3, than study 7.2. 
8.1.1.5. Summary of the Impacts of Threat   
In summary, threat was predicted to influence attentional focus, increase 
engagement in maladaptive regulatory attempts, to increase affect, reduce vagal tone and 
to impair executive control. The results from chapter 5 showed that increased threat did 
not influence self-reported attentional focus. This absence of an impact of increased threat 
on attentional focus suggests that participants are equally able to ignore high- and low-
threat-stimuli over longer response durations. The results from chapters 5, 6, and 7 showed 
that increased threat level, across the regulatory conditions, did increase maladaptive 
regulatory attempts and affect, but only led to impaired executive control after further 
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exposure to threat on working memory, rather than when executive control was assessed 
immediately following imposed regulation via prepotent response inhibition. Increased 
threat did have detrimental impact on executive control (via prepotent response inhibition) 
in the mind-wandering control conditions immediately following regulation. Impairments 
to executive control were not attributable to increased affect or diminished vagal tone 
(studies 7.4 and 7.5). These results suggest that increased threat does not necessarily 
impair executive control via increased anxiety, arousal, reductions in vagal tone, or 
engagement in the maladaptive regulatory attempts of worry, rumination or suppression.   
 
8.1.2. Effects of Imposed vs Spontaneous Regulatory Strategies  
The discussion below summarises findings from the comparisons made between 
the mind-wandering control conditions and the imposed regulation strategies of distraction 
and acceptance on attentional focus, maladaptive regulatory engagement, affect, and 
executive control. The mind-wandering control conditions serve as an indicator of 
individuals’ spontaneous regulatory attempts. Hence, the comparisons with mind-
wandering show how the imposed strategies of distraction and acceptance facilitated, 
prevented, disrupted or altered spontaneously initiated regulatory attempts. These findings 
are compared with previous research and interpreted in the context of affect regulation 
theory to provide an understanding of the utility of imposing distraction and acceptance, 
how these strategies alter spontaneous regulatory processes to influence affect and 
subsequent capacity to exercise executive control. 
8.1.2.1. Imposed Regulation Altering Spontaneous Attention Diversion 
Chapter 5 provided the first evidence for the utility of the imposed strategies of 
distraction and acceptance in altering attentional focus and in building the understanding 
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of how they may alter the affective experience. Based on Mogg and Bradley’s (1998) 
cognitive-motivational model of attentional allocation to threat and Duval’s and Wicklund’s 
objective self-awareness theory (1972), chapter 5 tested the predictions that the mind-
wandering control conditions would show moderate levels of spontaneous diversion of 
attention from threats and feelings, showing less diversion than distraction (which should 
facilitate it) but more than acceptance (which should impede it).  As predicted, the mind-
wandering conditions showed decreased attention to threats and feelings relative to 
acceptance. However, in contrast to predictions, the mind-wandering also led to 
significantly more diversion from threats than distraction, suggesting that the distraction 
task was less effective than the naturally occurring process of attentional diversion (see 
section 8.1.3.1 for more detailed interpretation on the impacts of distraction on attentional 
focus). Hence, the theoretical implications from the mind-wandering control conditions in 
chapter 5 are that healthy individuals in high- and low-threat circumstances automatically 
attempt to avoid attending to threat-stimuli (Mogg & Bradley, 1998) perhaps to the self 
(Duval & Wicklund, 1972; Wicklund, 1975), possibly in an effort to down-regulate anxious 
affect. The results also suggested that attentional focus towards threats can occur through 
two manipulations: first, by instruction to focus on threats and feelings (acceptance), and 
second, paradoxically, by providing an unrelated task that disrupts spontaneous attempts 
to divert attention from threats (Cornwell et al., 2011; Knight et al., 2007; Mather & Knight, 
2005).  
The comparison between the mind-wandering condition and the acceptance 
condition is consistent with previous studies investigating the time course of attentional 
focus to threats, which have demonstrated that when psychologically healthy individuals 
are given no attentional directive, they eventually spontaneously direct attention away 
from threat and affective stimuli (B. P. Bradley, Mogg, White, & Millar, 1995; Derryberry & 
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Reed, 2002; Ellenbogen et al., 2002; Johns et al., 2008; Koster et al., 2006; MacLeod et al., 
1986).  Studies using spatial cuing tasks and dot probe tasks show that individuals, initially 
focus attention on high-threat-stimuli when presented for short durations of  100-250ms  
(Bar-Haim et al., 2007; Derryberry & Reed, 2002; Koster et al., 2006). However, when 
threat-stimuli are presented for longer durations, ≥500ms (Koster et al., 2006; Koster et al., 
2005) and/or when participants are given longer to respond (Derryberry & Reed, 2002; 
Mackintosh & Mathews, 2003; Schrooten & Smulders, 2010), individuals across the trait 
anxiety spectrum will show at least a reduction in their attentional bias towards threat and 
often enhanced attentional avoidance of threatening stimuli (B. P. Bradley et al., 1995; 
MacLeod et al., 1986). The present research findings are consistent with studies showing 
attentional diversion amongst undergraduate individuals (B. P. Bradley et al., 1995; 
MacLeod et al., 1986) whose trait and state anxiety and stress are within the normal range 
(P. F. Lovibond & Lovibond, 1995; C. Spielberger et al., 1983), see study 6.1 for scores for 
trait anxiety and state anxiety and stress scores. Hence, the present study is consistent with 
the assertions of Mogg and Bradley (1998) and Duval and Wicklund (1972) that, given 
sufficient exposure duration or response time, healthy individuals will spontaneously 
engage in top-down cognitive control processes (Cornwell et al., 2011; Knight et al., 2007; 
Mather & Knight, 2005) to direct attention away from threats and affective stimuli in an 
attempt to regulate their affective experiences. 
8.1.2.2. Imposed Regulation and Maladaptive Regulatory Attempts  
In chapter 5, the utility of distraction and acceptance in reducing maladaptive 
regulatory attempts was investigated as an alternative mechanism to alter affect.  Nolen-
Hoeksema and Morrow (1990; 1991) suggested that distraction minimised unpleasant 
affect by restricting concurrent attentional capacity for the spontaneous engagement in 
perseverative processes of worry and rumination. Similarly, Hoffman and Asmundson 
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(2008) proposed that acceptance reduces unpleasant affect by restricting the capacity to 
engage in suppression and attempts to avoid the experience of affect. Nevertheless, 
previous studies have assumed that engagement in experimentally manipulated adaptive 
strategies led to reductions in negative affect by minimising engagement in maladaptive 
strategies (Blagden & Craske, 1996; Hofmann et al., 2009; Low et al., 2008; Lyubomirsky & 
Nolen-Hoeksema, 1993; Morrow & Nolen-Hoeksema, 1990; Wong & Moulds, 2009), and 
none of these studies has explicitly tested this assumption. In chapter 5, it was 
hypothesised that imposed regulation would reduce reported maladaptive regulatory 
attempts. In contrast to these predictions, the results presented in chapter 5 indicated no 
differences amongst the regulatory conditions in the spontaneous engagement in 
maladaptive self-regulatory attempts, including worry, rumination and suppression.  
A potential explanation for not finding differences in the level of engagement in 
spontaneously initiated maladaptive regulatory amongst the regulatory conditions comes 
from the attentional focus results. These suggested that participants in the mind-
wandering conditions were spontaneously directing attentional focus away from threats 
and affect. Previous research has suggested that spontaneous attentional diversion from 
affective or threatening stimuli requires significant online attentional resources (Cornwell 
et al., 2011; Knight et al., 2007; Mather & Knight, 2005). Hence, these spontaneous 
attempts may have restricted attentional capacity available to engage in maladaptive 
regulatory attempts competing for the same online resources to a similar extent as the 
imposed regulation strategies of distraction and acceptance.  
8.1.2.3. Implications of the Attentional Focus and Maladaptive Regulation 
Findings for the Interpretation of Affective and Executive Control Results 
The finding that the regulation strategies altered attentional focus but not the 
engagement in maladaptive regulatory attempts has important implications for the 
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interpretations of the affective and executive control findings. Primarily, this combination 
of findings suggests that the attentional focus, rather than restriction of maladaptive 
regulatory attempts, is more likely to explain why the regulatory strategies result in 
different impacts to affect and executive control.  In addition, the attentional focus results 
from chapter 5 affected the relevance of particular theoretical models’ explanations of 
interpreting the affective and executive control findings. Both affect regulation (Greenberg 
& Paivio, 1997; Gross & Thompson, 2007) and self-regulatory theories (Carver & Scheier, 
1988, 1990; Duval & Wicklund, 1972) predicted that differences in attentional focus would 
mediate differences in affective response. The results from chapter 5 indicated that the 
mind-wandering control conditions showed a pattern of attentional allocation away from 
threats and away from affect, demonstrating attentional diversion, that made testing the 
predictions of Gross and Thompson’s (2007) modal model, and Greenberg and Paivio’s 
(1997) process of a feeling model  possible. Hence, the above theories predict that 
differences in attentional focus found between the regulatory conditions in chapter 5 
should lead to differences in affect experienced in chapter 6 (studies 6.1 and 6.2). 
Due to attentional diversion from threats and affect found to be occurring 
spontaneously in chapter 5, Duval and Wicklund’s (1972) objective self-awareness theory 
and Mogg and Bradley’s (1998) cognitive motivational model of anxiety, predicting that 
individuals spontaneously minimise attention to threats and towards the self to reduce 
unpleasant experiences, were given specific consideration in how difficult it would be to 
minimise attentional focus to stimuli of high-threat. Attempts to control automatic or 
reflexive attentional responses are predicted by self-regulatory strength theory (Muraven 
& Baumeister, 2000) to be effortful and depleting of self-regulatory (or executive) 
resources available for subsequent acts requiring executive control.   
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8.1.2.4. Imposed vs Spontaneous Regulation and Effective Affect 
Regulation 
Chapter 6 addressed the second research question, regarding the utility of 
distraction and acceptance in reducing affect, both during strategy engagement while 
anticipating threat (study 6.1), and subsequently, during threat-tasks engagement and 
recovery (study 6.2). According to the predictions of the Gross and Thompson’s (2007) 
modal model, Duval and Wicklund’s (1972) objective self-awareness theory, and Mogg and 
Bradley’s (1998) cognitive motivational account of anxiety, the mind wandering conditions 
(showing greater spontaneously initiated attentional diversion from threats than either of 
the imposed strategies, in chapter 5) should have shown reduced affect relative to both 
acceptance and distraction during the anticipatory regulation period. In contrast, based on 
the predictions of  Greenberg and Paivio’s (1997) process of a feeling model, in the high-
threat level, mind-wandering  should have led to significantly more anxious affect than 
acceptance by the end of the regulatory period following acceptance’s initial peak in 
arousal. When considering the attentional focus results of chapter 5 (attention to threat 
but not to affect), all of the above mentioned theories would predict that distraction would 
result in increased affect.  
The results from the comparisons between acceptance and mind-wandering in 
study 6.1 were not consistent with the predictions of the process of a feeling model in that 
engaging in acceptance never eventuated in lower levels of anxious affect than mind-
wandering, and actually led to increased reported affect following regulation relative to 
mind-wandering. These results were more consistent with the predictions of the modal 
model, objective self-awareness theory, and cognitive motivational accounts in that mind-
wandering led to significantly lower reported affect than acceptance. In addition, mind-
wandering led to lower levels of arousal during the middle of the regulatory period, relative 
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to acceptance, while those in the acceptance condition were instructed to attend to threats 
and affect.  
Mind-wandering led to increased vagal tone (indicating less dysregulated affect) in 
comparison to the distraction conditions, across both threat levels. In addition, in the low-
threat level, distraction and acceptance led to lower levels of vagal tone in comparison to 
the mind-wandering condition. These results further support the prediction that 
attentional focus towards threat and affect, exhibited by distraction and acceptance, led to 
increased reported affect, increased arousal and lower vagal tone (indicating dysregulated 
responding) relative to spontaneously initiated attentional diversion.  Hence, the 
comparisons of mind-wandering with distraction and acceptance from study 6.1 
demonstrated partial support for the modal model, objective self-awareness theory and 
the cognitive motivational account, but limited support for the process of a feeling model.  
Study 6.2 investigated the subsequent impacts of distraction and acceptance on 
affect experienced during threat-task engagement and during recovery. The process of a 
feeling model predicted that prior engaged, self-initiated, attentional diversion from affect 
(shown in the mind-wandering control conditions) should lead to increased affect relative 
to acceptance due to limited opportunity to integrate affect with reason. In contrast, 
objective self-awareness theory predicts that the conditions that reduced self-awareness 
(as exhibited in the mind-wandering control conditions) would show reduced affect relative 
to acceptance, which increased self-awareness. In addition, based on the cognitive 
motivational account of anxiety, more attention to threat-stimuli, such as occurred in 
distraction and acceptance, should have resulted in increased affect. The results of study 
6.2 contradicted the predictions of the process of a feeling model: ignoring of threats 
during the anticipation phase by the mind-wandering conditions led to reduced affective 
reactivity and more rapid affective repair during threat-task engagement and threat-task 
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recovery, respectively, than the regulation strategies of distraction and acceptance. These 
results were consistent with the predictions of objective self-awareness theory and the 
cognitive motivational account of anxiety in that the conditions that resulted in more 
attention towards threatening stimuli (acceptance and distraction) showed increased affect 
and arousal relative to mind-wandering, which facilitated spontaneous attentional 
diversion from threats.  
The results from study 6.2 are consistent with Ellenbogen et al. (2002), 
demonstrating that naturally occurring attentional diversion from threat-stimuli can 
subsequently reduce indicators of stress immediately following stressor cessation. Other 
studies have also demonstrated that attentional focus towards threats leads to increased 
cortisol release (Dandeneua, Baldwin, Pruessner, Baccus, & Sakellaropoulo, 2007) and 
lowered vagal tone (Baert, Casier, & De Raedt, 2012), and that participants trained to focus 
attention away from threats reported lower stress (Dandeneua et al., 2007) and faster 
recovery of vagal tone (Baert et al., 2012) following stressor exposure. Hence, the present 
research adds to previous research (Baert et al., 2012; Dandeneua et al., 2007; Ellenbogen 
et al., 2002) supporting the predictions of objective self-awareness theory and the 
cognitive motivational account regarding the effectiveness of self-initiated attentional 
diversion in reducing unpleasant affect (reported and physiological) and in sustaining 
regulated responding (indicated by increased vagal tone).  
8.1.2.5. Imposed vs Spontaneous Regulation and Executive Control  
The third research question focused on the utility of distraction and acceptance in 
preserving the ability to demonstrate executive control.  Three theories were pivotal in 
deriving predictions for the pattern of executive control differences expected amongst the 
regulatory conditions. Firstly, according to self-regulatory strength theory (Muraven & 
Baumeister, 2000), prior attempts to inhibit automatic responding deplete finite executive 
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resources and thus diminish subsequent attempts at executive control. Secondly, according 
to the affective theories of impaired executive control,  PET and ACT (Eysenck & Calvo, 
1992b; Eysenck et al., 2007), increased affect would result in impaired executive control. 
Thirdly, the neurovisceral account (Thayer, Friedman, Borkovec, Johnsen, & Molina, 2000; 
Thayer et al., 2009) predicted that reduced vagal tone resulting from regulation would give 
rise to impairments in executive control.  
The reasons for self-regulatory strength theory predicting differences between the 
regulation strategies were based on the way that the strategies were conceptualised. 
Distraction was conceptualised as a strategy that would require actively directing attention 
away from stimuli that reflexively engage attention and, therefore, be mentally effortful. In 
contrast, acceptance, directing attention towards threats and towards affect, would be 
relatively effortless in circumstances of high-threat where attention automatically captured 
engages with such stimuli (Duval & Wicklund, 1972; Mogg & Bradley, 1998), but effortful in 
circumstances of low threat, being inconsistent with reflexive responding, where it would 
require controlling attention (Schmeichel, 2007; Schmeichel et al., 2003). In direct contrast 
to acceptance, spontaneously initiated attentional diversion from threats and affect 
(represented by the mind-wandering control condition) was predicted to be mentally 
demanding in  circumstances of high-threat when attention was automatically engaging 
with threats and affect, but  effortless in circumstances of low-threat when participants did 
not have to override the automatic tendency to engage with threat (Bar-Haim et al., 2007; 
Mogg & Bradley, 1998) making diverting attention easier (Wilson & MacLeod, 2003).  
Chapter 7 presented five studies that investigated the influence of regulation 
strategies undertaken in high and low-threat levels on subsequent executive control. Study 
7.1 investigated the extent to which participants perceived regulation to be effortful and 
difficult. The results from study 7.1 demonstrated that distraction was perceived to be 
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effortful and difficult in both threat levels relative to mind-wandering, and thus supported 
the prediction that a strategy requiring controlling attention and maintaining an attentional 
load would be mentally effortful regardless of threat level. In contrast, acceptance was 
perceived to be as effortful and difficult as mind-wandering in high-threat circumstances, 
but more effortful than mind-wandering in low-threat circumstances. These results are 
consistent with self-regulatory strength theory in that different forms of regulation require 
different levels of mental resources. In addition that the results supported the proposition 
that the mental resource demands of regulation strategies are not constant but depend on 
threat level of the circumstance they are undertaken in  (Alberts et al., 2008; Duval & 
Wicklund, 1972; Mogg & Bradley, 1998; Sheppes & Meiran, 2008).  
Study 7.2 investigated the impacts of threat and regulation on executive control via 
subsequent prepotent response inhibition. Distraction impaired response inhibition to the 
same extent as the mind-wandering control condition relative to acceptance in high-threat. 
In the low threat level distraction impaired response inhibition to the same extent as 
acceptance relative to mind-wandering. Hence, the results for acceptance varied by threat 
level, where, relative to mind-wandering, acceptance preserved the capacity to inhibit 
responses in high-threat circumstances, but impaired response inhibition in low-threat 
circumstances. In addition, acceptance in high-threat circumstances did not differ from 
low-threat mind-wandering, suggesting that focusing on threats in high-threat 
circumstances is just as effortless as ignoring low-threat-stimuli in low-threat 
circumstances. The results of study 7.2 largely reflected the pattern of differences in 
perceived expended mental resources reported in study 7.1, except that in high-threat 
circumstances, mind-wandering led to impaired executive control relative to  acceptance 
(study 7.2), despite both strategies being rated as having similar effort and difficulty levels 
(study 7.1).   
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Taken together, the findings from studies 7.1 and 7.2 are generally consistent with 
the interpretation that high-threat circumstances promote attention to threats and 
negative affect and that it requires more executive resources to direct attention away from 
these than towards them.  Conversely, in low-threat circumstances, it was effortful to 
allocate attention to threats and affect where circumstances did not facilitate attention to 
threats and affect. These results support the integration of objective self-awareness and 
cognitive motivational accounts of attention and anxiety with self-regulatory strength 
theory, in that regulation counter to reflexive attentional responding in some 
circumstances that results in impairments to executive control, but that this same 
regulation, when consistent with reflexive attentional responding in other circumstances, 
preserves executive control .  
The finding in study 7.2 that increased attention to threat in high-threat 
circumstances preserves the ability to demonstrate executive control relative to attempts 
to ignore threats presented are consistent with previous research. A study by Heatherton 
et al. (1993) showed that in high-threat circumstances, both spontaneously occurring and 
experimentally manipulated attentional diversion from threat led to impaired subsequent 
controlled responding (i.e., restricting intake of ice cream whilst on a limited calorie diet) 
relative to a condition that encouraged attention to threatening stimuli and participants’ 
own responding, and to a low-threat control condition with no regulation task. In addition, 
Johns et al. (2008) established that objectively measured spontaneous attempts to divert 
attention from threat-stimuli led to subsequent impairments in executive control.  
The present research extends Heatherton et al.’s study by demonstrating that 
increasing attention to threat and to the self can occur via the manipulation of an affect 
regulation strategy rather than via a mirror or a video camera to lead to similar level of self-
control in high-threat circumstances relative to a control condition in low-threat 
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circumstances.  In addition, unlike the Heatherton et al. study, the present study 
confirmed, via participant reports that the acceptance condition had a higher focus on 
threats than the control condition. A further extension of Heatherton et al. is the finding 
from the low-threat level that regulation that increases self-awareness (acceptance) may 
actually be as detrimental as a strategy that involves controlling attention (distraction), 
indicates that increased self-awareness does not preserve executive control in all 
circumstances. These findings from study 7.2 in the low-threat level, are consistent with 
studies demonstrating that controlling attention, even in the absence of affect regulation, 
leads to subsequent impairments in other tasks requiring different forms of cognitive 
control (Schmeichel, 2007; Schmeichel et al., 2003). Hence, the findings from study 7.1 and 
7.2 provide, within a single experiment, an extension of previous research (Alberts et al., 
2008; Heatherton et al., 1993; Johns et al., 2008; Sheppes & Meiran, 2008) in 
demonstrating that strategies that may preserve capacity to demonstrate self-control in 
one circumstance may impair capacity in another.   
Study 7.3 assessed executive control (through assessment of working memory) 
after prolonged exposure to threat. The findings from study 7.3 were not consistent with 
study 7.1 and 7.2 in that the effect of regulation was only present within the high-threat 
level. Increased threat significantly impaired working memory in high-load trials, however 
increased threat impaired working memory when averaged across the regulatory 
conditions rather than only within the mind-wandering control conditions. Importantly, 
study 7.3 still indicated that acceptance at the high-threat level did not significantly differ 
from low-threat mind-wandering condition. A potential interpretation of this null result 
may be that, when taken together with the same null finding from study 7.2, the 
attentional focus facilitated by acceptance in high-threat circumstances preserves 
executive control to a similar extent to being under little threat and engaging in minimally 
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effortful regulation. This may be because the attentional focus demonstrated by the two 
regulatory conditions in their respective threat circumstances (high-threat acceptance, and 
low-threat mind-wandering) is consistent with automatic/reflexive responding in those 
circumstances and therefore translates into similar levels of preserved executive control.   
The results from study 7.3 also showed that in high-threat level, the pattern of 
effects of regulation on executive control remained consistent with study 7. 2. However, in 
the low-threat level, the effects of regulation had disappeared, suggesting that some 
circumstances can sustain the influence of prior regulation and others diminish it.  The 
findings that the influence of the regulation strategies had on executive control found in 
study 7.2 remained in study 7.3, although in a somewhat reduce form, in high- but not low-
threat conditions. In study 7.3 participants had been exposed to threats for a prolonged 
period and this prolonged exposure to threat may have influenced the processes of 
resource depletion and resource replenishment that may account for the discrepancy in 
executive control findings from study 7.2 and 7.3. It may be that resource depletion, 
occurring as part of the effortful process of divert attention away from a persistent and 
prolonged exposure to threats (Cornwell et al., 2011; Knight et al., 2007) sustained 
differences in executive resources between regulatory conditions in high-threat 
circumstances. In contrast, resource replenishment, occurring in the low-threat 
circumstances, where threat-stimuli are more easily ignored (Wilson & MacLeod, 2003) 
may not have required effortful ongoing controlled regulation to divert attention, thus 
allowing the replenishment of executive resources and thus resulting in reduced the 
differences in executive resources available support executive control amongst the 
regulatory conditions previously existing at this threat level. Hence, a combination of what 
is known about regulation of attention towards threat and resource depletion and 
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replenishment provide an explanation of why patterns of executive control amongst the 
regulatory conditions differed from study 7.2 to study 7.3. 
Studies 7.4 and 7.5 tested the predictions of affective theories (PET and ACT) and 
the neurovisceral account that differences in executive control may be accounted for by 
differences in affect experienced during executive task performance and differences in 
affect and vagal tone demonstrated during prior regulation. The results from these studies 
suggested that differences in affect experienced did not explain the differences in 
executive control amongst the regulatory conditions. This analysis also suggested that the 
differences in the pattern of results between response inhibition and working memory 
could also not be explained by different levels of affect experienced during executive task 
performance or to varying carry over effects from affect experienced during regulation. 
Hence, studies 7.4 and 7.5 ruled out the explanations proposed by PET, ACT and the 
neurovisceral account that affect and vagal inhibition could be the causes of impairments in 
executive control shown by particular regulatory conditions, leaving self-regulatory 
strength as the only theoretical explanation investigated and not ruled out.  
8.1.2.6. Summary of Comparisons Between Imposed and Spontaneous 
Regulation  
The most plausible interpretation that summarises the comparisons between 
mind-wandering and the imposed strategies of distraction and acceptance is that the 
imposed regulation strategies alter spontaneous regulatory attempts.  Consistent with the 
predictions of objective self-awareness theory and the cognitive motivational account of 
anxiety, participants in the mind-wandering control conditions spontaneously sought to 
divert attention from threat and this diversion led to lower levels of affect relative to 
imposed strategies, which either disrupted the spontaneous controlled responses to divert 
attention from threats (i.e., distraction) or facilitated attention to threats (i.e., acceptance).  
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In addition, regulation that alters attentional focus towards or away from threat was 
suggested to deplete executive resources if these controlled regulatory responses were 
inconsistent with reflexive attentional responses. Hence, although attention to threat and 
one’s own negative affect may be subjectively unpleasant and lead to increased arousal, it 
appears that such attention in high-threat circumstances (a situation likely to facilitate this 
attentional focus) requires little effort and thus preserves executive control. However, in 
situations of low-threat, which may not facilitate attention to threats and one’s affective 
response, is relatively effortful, increases affect and impairs executive control.  
8.1.3. Effects of Distraction and Acceptance  
This section presents and interprets the findings of the comparisons between 
experimentally manipulated distraction and acceptance on attentional focus, affect and 
executive control. These findings are discussed with the aim of further developing an 
understanding of how spontaneous regulatory attempts to control attention can be altered 
through imposed regulation strategies including how the focus of attention, when altered 
by imposed regulation, leads to different affective and executive control outcomes. In 
addition, this section discusses findings in context of previous research, to build an 
understanding of how particular circumstances influence the effectiveness of distraction 
and acceptance in reducing affect and preserving the capacity to demonstrate executive 
control. Hence, this section proposes explanations of why the imposed strategies led to 
differences in attentional focus, affective responding and the ability to demonstrate 
executive control. 
8.1.3.1. Distraction, Acceptance and Attentional Focus  
Chapter 5 addressed the first research question, regarding the effects of the 
imposed regulation strategies on attentional focus. It was hypothesised that providing an 
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alternative attentional focus that had an associated attentional load (i.e., distraction) 
would minimise threat-related thoughts and the awareness of affective response relative 
to acceptance, which facilitated attention towards threat and affect. In contrast to this 
prediction, the results of chapter 5 showed that participants engaging in distraction did not 
differ in their level of threat-related thoughts from those in the acceptance condition. 
Effective distraction was defined as diverting attention from affect eliciting and maintaining 
stimuli, through engagement in a task that involves attentional focus to neutral and benign 
stimuli (Gross & Thompson, 2007; Morrow & Nolen-Hoeksema, 1990; Van Dillen & Koole, 
2007). However, as noted in chapter 5, experimentally manipulated distraction resulted in 
an attentional focus that did not exemplify effective distraction, as participants reported 
more thoughts related to threats than the mind-wandering condition and a similar level to 
acceptance.  
There are two possible explanations for the relatively high level of threat-related 
thought noted in the distraction conditions: the disruption account and the suppression 
account. The disruption account is based on the assertion made from several studies 
(Cornwell et al., 2011; Knight et al., 2007; Mather & Knight, 2005; Wegner et al., 1993) that 
an attentional load (e.g., a distraction task) disrupts the spontaneously initiated goal 
directed regulatory processes that divert attention from threats (Duval & Wicklund, 1972; 
Knight et al., 2007; Mather & Knight, 2005; Mogg & Bradley, 1998). These spontaneously 
initiated attentional regulatory processes are suggested to require substantial concurrent 
attentional resources (Knight et al., 2007; Mather & Knight, 2005) for the maintenance of 
such cognitive control. Imposing an attentional load may disrupt these spontaneously 
initiated cognitively effortful goal-directed processes, resulting in the reinstitution of the 
innate prepotent response to engage attention with threats (Bar-Haim et al., 2007; Mogg & 
Bradley, 1998).  
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Support for the disruption account comes from several studies. A study by Cornwell 
et al. (2011) demonstrated that when participants were under high attentional load, they 
showed a greater attentional bias to a distracting threat stimulus relative to a distracting 
neutral stimulus than when not undertaking a task to create a high attentional load. 
Similarly, Knight et al., (2007) also showed that distraction (via an arithmetic task) reversed 
an emotional attentional bias from positive visual stimuli to negative visual stimuli in older 
adults.   Likewise, Wegner  et al. (1993) demonstrated that imposing an attentional load 
(through an arithmetic task) when individuals were already asked to control their affective 
experiences led to paradoxical effects to attention and affect, in that attentional focus and 
valence of affect  was the opposite to what the individual’s mental control motivation was. 
Mather and Knight (2005) demonstrated that the bias for retrieving positive emotional 
episodes from memory typically shown by older adults can be reversed to retrieving 
negative episodes when they were asked to simultaneously engage in a distraction task. 
Hence, each of these studies show that goal-directed or controlled regulation (affective and 
attentional) can be disrupted by an attentional load, leading to increased attention to 
stimuli sought to be avoided and difficulties in reducing affect that was sought to be down-
regulated. These studies support the notion that controlled regulatory attempts 
(spontaneous and imposed) are disrupted by imposing a concurrent attentional load and 
suggest that regulation (spontaneous and imposed involving directed at altering attention 
or emotion) require considerable cognitive resources to be implemented without adverse 
consequences.    
The second account that provides an explanation for why distraction resulted in 
increased threat-related thoughts is based on the proposition that imposed distraction 
initiates a similar cognitive process to thought suppression. This suppression account is 
based on the premise that attempts at mental control (such as distraction and suppression) 
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have paradoxical effects on the internal phenomenon sought to be inhibited (Wegner, 
1994; Wegner, Schneider, Carter, & White, 1987). The paradoxical effects are explained by 
a proposed underlying search and operate process. Seeking to inhibit a particular internal 
phenomenon initiates a search process for the presence of the internal phenomenon to be 
inhibited, and this search process inevitably keeps that internal phenomenon at the 
forefront of consciousness, thus undermining the goal of suppressing that internal 
phenomenon from consciousness (Wegner, 1994; Wegner et al., 1987). Support for the 
suppression account being relevant to investigations of distraction is based upon the 
constructs of distraction and suppression being conceptually and empirically related 
(Kamholz et al., 2006; Wegner & Zankos, 1994). Conceptually, both strategies involve 
seeking to avoid or inhibit the experience of unpleasant affect. Empirically, items from self-
report measures of these constructs load on the same factor when subjected to a factor 
analysis, forming scales that have high internal consistency (Kamholz et al., 2006; Wegner 
& Zankos, 1994).  Studies investigating suppression have demonstrated similar patterns of 
results to the studies investigating distraction tasks in the presence of situations requiring 
controlled regulation (Abramwitz et al., 2001; Cornwell et al., 2011; Knight et al., 2007; 
Mather & Knight, 2005; Wegner et al., 1993).  
It was also predicted in chapter 5 that distraction would result in reduced attention 
to affect compared with acceptance. The results of chapter 5 showed that, despite similar 
levels of attention to threat-related thoughts being reported in the two conditions, those 
engaged in distraction reported allocating less attention to feelings than those engaged in 
acceptance. Hence, consistent with the definition of distraction, the imposed distraction 
task did reduce attention towards affect relative to acceptance but, as noted in section 
8.1.2.1, it did not reduce attention to affect more than mind-wandering. This combination 
of results is important because it suggests that imposed distraction did not reduce 
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attention to affect any more than what naturally occurs due to spontaneous attempts at 
diverting attention occurring in mind-wandering in healthy participants. However, the 
reason why imposed distraction resulted in low levels of attention to affect but selectively 
disrupted the spontaneously initiated attempts to direct attention away from threats is 
unclear, although several highly speculative explanations may be plausible.  
One plausible explanation for the selective disruption of attention diversion from 
threat but not affect by the imposition of attentional load relates to the underlying 
processes behind the disruption and suppression accounts of why imposed attentional load 
increases attention to threats. Both disruption and suppression accounts predict increased 
affect as a result of imposing the attentional load, but do not explicitly predict the selective 
increase in attention to threats but not affect. However, both accounts do implicitly 
suggest that the processes behind the eventual inhibition of threat-related thoughts are 
top-down, intentional attempts of individuals to avoid the experience of unpleasant affect. 
The selective effect of an attentional load increasing on attention to threat but not to affect 
may be due to innate initial engagement of attention to threats but not to affect (Bar-Haim 
et al., 2007; Mogg & Bradley, 1998). Attentional focus may not be innately pre-
programmed to be drawn or engage with affect or arousal to the same extent as to threats 
as the affective response may be less relevant to maintaining immediate physical safety. 
Hence, if individuals are not innately attentive to feelings, one would require some initial 
level of controlled responding to initiate attention to such internal phenomena. If cognitive 
control is already being utilised to avoid or inhibit threatening stimuli or to direct attention 
elsewhere, there would be restricted attentional capacity to attend to feelings. Hence, it 
may be that the attentional load of imposed distraction assisted in maintaining limited 
attention towards affect to a similar extent as spontaneous attempts to divert attention 
from threats. Thus, the attentional load imposed by the distraction condition is suggested 
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to have disrupted the spontaneously initiated and cognitively effortful process of ignoring 
threats to reveal the innate pre-programmed response of attending to threats, whilst 
simultaneously sustaining the limited the ability to focus attention to affect.  
8.1.3.2. Distraction, Acceptance and Affect Regulation 
There are some similarities and differences between the theories of affect 
regulation regarding the role of focus of attention, and effective affect regulation that 
relate directly to the attentional focus exhibited by distraction and acceptance. The affect 
regulation models including the modal model (Gross & Thompson, 2007) and the process of 
a feeling model (Greenberg, 2004; Greenberg & Paivio, 1997) allow for the possibility that 
attentional focus will not be allocated to affective responses even if stimuli that initiated 
and maintain those affective responses continue to be an attentional focus. However, the 
process of a feeling model stands alone in predicting  that the combination of attentional 
focus towards threat and feelings (as reported by those undertaking acceptance) would 
lead to increased affect initially but would eventually reduce the affective response by 
providing the opportunity for these stimuli to be integrated with reason. In contrast, 
objective self-awareness theory and cognitive motivational accounts of attention and 
anxiety predict that focus towards threats and towards one’s own responding would result 
in increased affect. Chapter 6 tested the above predictions regarding the affective impacts 
of distraction and acceptance.   
Study 6.1 tested the relative effectiveness of distraction and acceptance in 
reducing affect during the anticipation of threat. The results confirmed that imposing a 
distraction task, in anticipated threat circumstances, led to reduced vagal tone (suggesting 
affect dysregulation) and increased arousal relative to acceptance at the conclusion of 
regulation. Coinciding with the results of chapter 5, that distraction restricted attention to 
affect, the distraction conditions did not report increased affect relative to acceptance, 
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despite showing greater arousal. This combination of low reported affect and attention to 
affect but high physiological arousal from 6.1 and chapter 5 is remarkably consistent with 
previous studies that have investigated individuals using distraction or suppression in 
response to threat showing that these individuals reported low levels of anxious affect, but 
showed high levels physiological arousal (Asendorpf & Scherer, 1983; Fuller, 1992; 
Hofmann et al., 2009; Houston & Holmes, 1974; Wegner et al., 1993). Such findings are also 
consistent with the predictions of the process of a feeling model (Greenberg, 2004; 
Greenberg & Paivio, 1997). These differences in affect between distraction and acceptance 
in study 6.1 in combination with the attentional focus results of chapter 5 are also 
consistent with the modal model in that both distraction and acceptance reported higher 
levels of attention to threat and this co-occurred with increased affect. From these results, 
it can be concluded that active engagement in distraction was counterproductive in 
reducing affect resulting in increased affect and dysregulated responding whereas active 
engagement in acceptance resulted in an eventual lowered level of arousal and regulated 
responding, suggesting that acceptance may result in affective response completion, and 
perhaps longer lasting benefits.  
Study 6.2 tested the predictions of the process of a feeling model that acceptance 
would facilitate the completion of an affective episode and thereby lead to decreased 
affective reactivity and quicker recovery from threat-tasks than distraction. In contradiction 
to this prediction, the results from study 6.2 showed that acceptance, in both threat levels, 
did not differ from distraction during the threatening task or during recovery. Thus, there 
was no support for the conceptualisation of acceptance within the process of a feeling 
model as a strategy that facilitates the integration of affect with reason, thereby reducing 
affective reactivity and facilitating rapid affective repair.  
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The findings of studies 6.1 and 6.2, when taken together, are consistent with those 
of several previous studies. Previous research investigating distraction have found that it 
can increase physiological arousal during regulation in anticipated threat circumstances 
(Houston & Holmes, 1974). Others have found that imposing an attentional load in 
situations where participants are already regulating can lead to increases in unwanted 
affect (Cornwell et al., 2011; Wegner et al., 1993). The relevance of the paradoxical effects 
of prior mental control is related to distraction having conceptual and empirical similarities 
to suppression. The finding that distraction led to increased affect following regulation can 
also be explained via this suppression account. Early research on mental control found that 
paradoxical effects can be found most prominently after suppression has ceased (Wegner 
et al., 1993). A more recent study by Koster, Rassin, Crombez and Naring (2003) supported 
this previous research, demonstrating that inhibition of a particular unpleasant thought can 
increase the presence of unpleasant affect after the attempt at inhibition had ceased. Thus, 
these studies suggest that distraction during the anticipation of a threat can be akin to 
suppression, leading to both concurrent (Fuller, 1992; Hofmann et al., 2009) and 
subsequent increased affect (Koster et al., 2003; Wegner et al., 1993). Due to the 
combination of results on attentional focus and affect in chapter 5 and study 6.1 and 6.2, 
the disruption account could also explain how an attentional load could interrupt effective 
spontaneous regulatory attempts that prepare the individual for stressors and thus protect 
the individual from later experiencing stress (Ellenbogen et al., 2002; Kamphuis & Telch, 
2000).  
Although the present research findings from study 6.1 and 6.2 suggest that 
distraction is an ineffective strategy in reducing affect relative to both mind-wandering and 
acceptance, these results are inconsistent with several other studies finding that distraction 
was effective in reducing affect (Bloom et al., 1977; Glynn, Christenfeld, & Gerin, 2002; 
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Lyubomirsky & Nolen-Hoeksema, 1993; Morrow & Nolen-Hoeksema, 1990; Neumann et al., 
2004; Nolen-Hoeksema, 1991; Rusting & Nolen-Hoeksema, 1998; Sheppes et al., 2009; Van 
Dillen & Koole, 2007; Wong & Moulds, 2009). The reason for the inconsistency between the 
present research and these studies may be due to some key factors, including the 
circumstances in which the strategy was evaluated and how distraction was manipulated.  
The previous research that has found distraction to be ineffective has only examined 
anticipated threat circumstances (Houston & Holmes, 1974; Kamphuis & Telch, 2000), 
where participants are perhaps already attempting to regulate by diverting their attention 
(Knight et al., 2007; Mather & Knight, 2005). The effectiveness of distraction has been 
demonstrated in other circumstances, such as during or subsequent to an affect-eliciting 
task, in reducing affective reactivity (Sheppes & Meiran, 2007; Van Dillen & Koole, 2007) 
and improving affective repair (Blagden & Craske, 1996; Neumann et al., 2004; Wong & 
Moulds, 2009). However, this support for the use of distraction comes from studies that 
compare distraction to a strategy that is counter-productive in the circumstances (Glynn et 
al., 2002; Lyubomirsky & Nolen-Hoeksema, 1993; Morrow & Nolen-Hoeksema, 1990; 
Neumann et al., 2004; Nolen-Hoeksema, 1991; Rusting & Nolen-Hoeksema, 1998; Sheppes 
et al., 2009; Wong & Moulds, 2009). Sheppes and colleagues (Sheppes et al., 2009; Sheppes 
& Meiran, 2007) have demonstrated that self-facilitated distraction (i.e., instruction to 
focus on some other topic with no specific topic or externally relevant attention-consuming 
task), after an affective stimulus has been presented, results in lower levels of experienced 
affect than late initiations of reappraisal (i.e., initiation of developing an alternative 
meaning after prolonged exposure to the affective eliciting stimulus to be reappraised). 
Although partly consistent with the findings of Sheppes and colleagues (Sheppes et al., 
2009; Sheppes & Meiran, 2007), the present findings did suggest that self-initiated 
attentional diversion or distraction (as represented by the mind-wandering control 
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condition) was effective. The present research did not evaluate the use of distraction 
during the actual affect eliciting task/event, or following it, so the results are not directly 
comparable with those of studies supporting the use of distraction task to effectively 
reduce unpleasant affect. However, the present findings clearly show that distraction in 
anticipatory threat circumstances is an ineffective strategy in reducing affect. 
The effectiveness of acceptance in reducing anxious affect depended on some of 
the same issues as distraction. The present findings, when placed in the context of previous 
research, show that acceptance’s effectiveness can be impacted by experimental and 
contextual factors. These factors include: (1) the circumstances in which it is evaluated 
(threat level and whether effects are evaluated during or subsequent to engagement); (2) 
for how long the strategy is used and the method used to elicit the strategy, and (3) the 
conditions against which it is evaluated.  
Firstly, the present research showed that the level of threat under which 
acceptance is undertaken, and the time point at which its effectiveness is evaluated can 
impact on the findings.  Acceptance used in low-threat circumstances led to dysregulated 
responding relative to mind-wandering.  No identified published studies have evaluated 
acceptance in low-threat circumstances, however Ellenbogen et al. (2002) showed that 
attention towards threatening stimuli, as demonstrated by those in the acceptance 
conditions, will lead to increased anxious affect. However, the present study is not the only 
one to show acceptance, used in high-threat/affective circumstances sometimes resulting 
in increased affective responding subsequent to the strategies engagement.  A study by 
Dunn et al. (2009) evaluated the effectiveness of acceptance and suppression both during 
engagement, in response to negatively valenced film content, and then subsequent to 
engagement in response to pictures of positive, negative and neutral content unrelated to 
the film content.  Dunn et al. found, similarly to the findings from studies 6.1 and 6.2, that 
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acceptance initially led to lower arousal during engagement, but subsequent to 
engagement resulted in increased reactivity in response to all picture content (negative, 
neutral and positive). In addition, participants who had engaged in acceptance showed 
prolonged affective recovery according to self-reports taken at one week follow-up. 
Findings against the effectiveness of acceptance come from studies, including from chapter 
6, where the strategy is provided when there is minimal anticipatory anxiety placed on the 
individual (low-threat level study 6.1) or affect is measured after strategy use has ceased 
such as study 6.2 and (Dunn et al., 2009). However, studies, including study 6.1, finding 
beneficial effects for acceptance have evaluated affect while the strategy is being actively 
used (Dunn et al., 2009; Hofmann et al., 2009; Low et al., 2008).  
The second set of related factors that influence the effectiveness of acceptance is 
the time period of evaluation and how the strategy is elicited (i.e., how the strategy is 
manipulated influences how long the strategy may be used for). The present findings (from 
study 6.1) and Low et al. (2008), both using regulation tasks that required longer 
participant engagement time, showed that acceptance led to lower arousal in a stressful 
circumstance after more than 10 minutes of engagement, relative to a maladaptive 
strategy (i.e., ruminative evaluative recall), but no difference from control comparison 
condition (objective recall). Neither Low et al. (2008) nor Hoffmann et al. (2009), who both 
showed beneficial effects of acceptance on HR, found that acceptance resulted in initial 
higher levels of arousal relative to a control condition, followed by a decline in arousal as 
found in study 6.1. The reason for no peak in affect in either Hofmann et al.’s (2009) or Low 
et al.’s (2008) studies may be that these two studies provided initial regulatory instructions 
to follow, rather than a mindfulness script to continually follow to support regulatory 
strategy use. The simple instruction manipulation, relative to the mindfulness script, may 
have been less successful at directing attentional focus towards threat and affect, thus not 
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creating an initial peak in arousal. Hence, the way that the present research manipulated 
acceptance facilitated an attentional focus that resulted in the peak in arousal noted in 
study 6.1 that was not found in previous studies manipulating acceptance via alternative 
methods. Although this may not necessarily be desirable in the short-term, if it facilitates a 
process similar to habituation or an eventual sustained reduction of affect towards that 
stimulus it may be desirable, although this outcome is yet to be seen.  
The third factor that influences how effective acceptance is judged to be is the 
comparison condition used to evaluate this effectiveness. Low et al. (2008) and Hofmann et 
al. (2009) compared acceptance in high-threat/stress circumstances to maladaptive 
strategies (viz, ruminative evaluation and suppression) and found favourable reductions in 
anxious affect, but did not find differences relative to another adaptive or neutral control 
condition. The present research set out to evaluate acceptance against another proposed 
adaptive strategy (distraction), however the findings clearly suggest that experimenter 
imposed distraction was maladaptive in anticipated threat circumstances. Nevertheless, 
like the previous research finding benefit for acceptance, the present research did not find 
that acceptance was more beneficial than other possibly adaptive strategies (such as self-
initiated attentional diversion occurring in the present research’s mind-wandering 
conditions), factual recall in Low et al., (2008) and reappraisal in Hofmann et al., (2009). 
Hence, the present findings, like previous research (Hofmann et al., 2009; Low et al., 2008) 
suggest that acceptance is no more effective than other known adaptive strategies, or than 
neutral control conditions and sometimes can be counter-productive (Dunn et al., 2009).  
The present research findings from distraction and acceptance, when combining 
attentional focus and affective responding results, can be summarised as two strategies 
that share a similar level of attentional focus towards threat-related thoughts and often 
show similar levels of increased affect, relative to mind-wandering control. In addition, 
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when considering the findings from distraction and acceptance together with previous 
research, the impact of these strategies on affect varies depending on the circumstances in 
which they are used (e.g., high or low level of threat and engagement before, during or 
after the encounter of an affect eliciting stimulus). Furthermore, the effects of strategies 
can vary depending on the duration of time over which they are evaluated, their 
subsequent affective impacts and what alternative regulatory conditions they are 
evaluated against. Hence, the suggestion that there are several factors that influence the 
extent to which a strategy will be effective in reducing affect, leads to the conclusion that 
the rigid and repetitive use of any affect regulation strategy across contexts may be 
somewhat counterproductive, and thus effective regulation may be about adjusting 
attention and appraisals to the particular circumstance. 
8.1.3.3. Distraction, Acceptance and Executive Control    
The third research question asked what temporary impacts distraction and 
acceptance have on subsequent executive control. Distraction and acceptance were 
proposed to differ in the extent to which they depleted executive resources that would 
subsequently lead to impairments in executive control. Study 7.1 tested the self-regulatory 
strength prediction that demands of regulation would be perceived by participants to be 
greatest for distraction, and the results supported this across threat levels. A more detailed 
analysis showed that acceptance was evaluated as less effortful than distraction in high-
threat circumstances, but equally effortful in low-threat circumstances. In addition, 
acceptance was perceived to be more difficult in low-threat circumstances than acceptance 
undertaken in high-threat circumstances. Hence, the results of study 7.1 were largely 
consistent with the predictions of self-regulatory strength theory in that strategies were 
found to differ in their perceived mental demands. In addition, the pattern of differences in 
perceived mental demands between the regulatory conditions was supportive of objective 
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self-awareness theory predictions in that threat level influenced how effortful it was to 
focus on threats and feelings for the acceptance condition.   
Study 7.2 tested the impacts of regulation on inhibition of prepotent responses 
immediately following regulation. The results were largely consistent with participants’ 
perceived demands of the strategy found in study 7.1. Although distraction was not found 
to be detrimental to subsequent attempts to inhibit prepotent responses when assessed 
across both threat levels, it was found to be detrimental in high-threat circumstance 
relative acceptance, but the two were equally detrimental in low-threat circumstances. In 
addition, acceptance preserved executive control in high-threat circumstances relative to 
low-threat circumstances. These findings, taken together with the results of study 7.1, 
suggest that individuals find it less mentally effortful to focus on threats and feelings in 
high-threat circumstances than engaging in strategies that seek to direct attention away 
from threats and feelings or to focus on threats and feelings in low-threat circumstances. It 
was always mentally fatiguing to maintain an attentional load that was unrelated to 
threats.  
The findings of study 7.2, like the findings of study 7.1, supported the predictions of 
self-regulatory strength theory in that strategies reported to be more mentally demanding 
were also found subsequently to impair executive control. The pattern of findings across 
the regulatory conditions was consistent with objective self-awareness theory and 
cognitive motivational account of anxiety propositions that increased threat facilitates 
reflexive attentional engagement with threatening stimuli and towards affective 
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responding, where as in low-threat circumstances attention is not reflexively drawn to such 
stimulixx.  
Previous research supporting the finding made distraction’s impact on subsequent 
self-control attempts has invoked two different accounts to explain the results.  The first 
explanation is based on the interpretation of findings by Heatherton et al., (1993), of which 
the finding that were discussed previously in section 8.1.2.5, which related to distraction 
reducing self-awareness. Heatherton et al., interpretation of the findings was self-
awareness is necessary to identify deviations from desired states (Duval and Wicklund, 
1972) and because distraction shifts attention from this self-monitoring error detection 
process evaluating actions in relation to goals it disables a mind-set that facilitates 
subsequent impairments in controlled responding (i.e., error detection mind set account).  
The second account for distraction impairing subsequent self-control comes from 
conceptualising distraction as an act of mental control (similar to that of suppression) that 
also disrupts self-control in the domains of attention and affect (Cornwell et al., 2011; 
Knight et al., 2007; Mather & Knight, 2005; Wegner, 1994; Wegner et al., 1993), and 
depletes executive resources available for subsequent acts of self-control (i.e., effortful 
mental control account).  
There is significantly more evidence for the effortful mental control account. 
Previous research has shown that both, thought suppression and affective suppression 
have led to subsequent impairments regulated thought or action (Baumeister et al., 1998; 
Johns et al., 2008; Schmeichel et al., 2003) that resembles the impacts on executive control 
                                                          
xx
 More detailed argument is presented in section 8.1.2.5, regarding the integration of 
cognitive motivational accounts of anxiety and objective self-awareness theory with self-regulatory 
strength as an explanation for the findings relating to the impacts of prior regulation on executive 
control.    
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that distraction had in studies 7.1 and 7.2. In addition, distraction led to similar impacts to 
executive control as attempts to inhibit reflexive attention to task irrelevant stimuli seen in 
previous research (Schmeichel, 2007; Schmeichel et al., 2003).These studies have also 
typically shown that suppression, and in this study distraction, is perceived as mentally 
more demanding  than alternative mental acts, which suggests the depletion of an internal 
reservoir of executive resources. Additionally there is evidence counter to the error 
detection mind-set account from the present research from the finding that acceptance 
increases self-awareness but was rated as more difficult and impaired executive control in 
low-threat circumstances (study 7.2). Thus, the proposal that increased self-awareness, 
leads to superior self-control because it primes a mindset for error detection was 
contradicted in the presence of evidence supporting the alternative account, that any 
regulation if depleting of mental resources will impair subsequent attempts at executive 
control. Hence, the impact of distraction, represented as a strategy requiring mental 
control of reflexive responses that is mentally demanding rather than as a strategy that 
disables an error detection mind-set better accounts for the findings of the present 
research. 
Interestingly, previous studies have actually showed, contrary to the present 
findings, that distraction, in some circumstances, can preserve the capacity to demonstrate 
executive control (Alberts et al., 2008; Sheppes & Meiran, 2008). The pivotal difference of 
the present research and previous research supporting the use of distraction in preserving 
executive control was that distraction did not occur in anticipated threat circumstances. 
Rather, the circumstances in which distraction has been shown to preserve executive 
control is when it is engaged in concurrently with the affective response such as when 
asked to watch a sad movie (Sheppes & Meiran, 2008) or when engaging in a pain eliciting 
task (Alberts et al., 2008). Distraction in these circumstances would still reduce self-
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awareness and thus provide further evidence contradicting the assertions of Heatherton et 
al. (1993) and Duval and Wicklund (1972) suggestion that self-awareness primes error 
detection necessary to promote subsequent self-control.  
Importantly, Alberts et al.’s (2008) also showed that when participants engaged in 
the distraction task while anticipating the same pain eliciting task, it led to impaired self-
control, similar to findings of the study 7.2. The reason for anticipatory circumstances 
making distraction an executive resource depleting strategy, relative to non-anticipatory 
circumstances suggests that executive resource depletion (Muraven & Baumeister, 2000) is 
occurring in these anticipatory circumstances due to control attempts to inhibit innate 
attentional engagement with threat (Bar-Haim et al., 2007; Mogg & Bradley, 1998), as 
inhibiting reflexive attention engagement with peripheral stimuli of any valence is effortful 
(Schmeichel, 2007; Schmeichel et al., 2003). However, in the study of Sheppes and Meiran 
(2008) the initiation of distraction in non-anticipatory circumstances involving sad affect, 
when watching a movie, may not have reflexively enaged attention to feelings or sad movie 
content and therefore distraction did not require inhibition of reflexive responding in these 
circumstances and thus preserved executive control. Hence, when taking the findings from 
previous research supporting distraction and the present findings, the circumstances that 
distraction is undertaken influences the extent to which it impairs executive control, and 
further supports the suggestion that it is only when distraction involves substantial 
inhibiting of reflexive responding occurring within a circumstance that it impairs 
subsequent self-control.  
Alternative explanations for why acceptance may preserve executive resources in 
high-threat circumstances but deplete them in low-threat circumstances (in studies 7.1 and 
7.2) comes from previous research on the effects of meta-cognitive awareness (Ben-Zeev et 
al., 2005; Johns et al., 2008; Schmader et al., 2009) and engagement in late reappraisal 
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(Sheppes & Meiran, 2008) on subsequent executive control. One alternative explanation is 
that acceptance may represent meta-cognitive awareness, relating specifically to being 
aware of thinking, feeling and to actively changing interpretations of particular thoughts 
and feelings (as distinct from objective self-awareness of simply observing one’s response). 
A study by Schamder et al. (2009) placed participants in threatening circumstances and 
then prompted them to interpret affect and bodily sensations in alternative or more benign 
ways. Those who interpreted their feelings in more benign ways subsequently showed 
better executive control. It may be that, in the present study, acceptance (supporting meta-
cognitive awareness), led participants to interpret their affective states differently in high 
and low-threat circumstances, with this alternative interpretation being less mentally 
demanding in high-threat circumstances leading to superior executive control relative to 
developing an alternative interpretation in low-threat circumstances and thus resulting in 
the discrepancy in executive control. Studies by Sheepes and Meiran (2009; 2007, 2008) 
have suggested that reinterpreting stimuli once an individual has become entrenched in an 
emotional response to that stimulus and has already begun to make meaning of affective 
stimuli, is effortful and executive resource depleting. These results suggest that the more 
familiar the individual is with the affective stimuli, the more effortful they will find it to 
change their interpretation of them.  Altering the meaning of an affective state, that is 
entrenched possibly because it is consistent with an individual’s usual pleasant affective 
state (e.g., affect experienced in low-threat circumstances), may therefore be effortful and 
executive resource depleting. However, altering the meaning of such stimuli in high-threat 
circumstance may have been less effortful due to it facilitating an alteration of an already 
unpleasant state that an individual does not usually experience. Hence, meta-cognitive 
awareness and changes to interpretations of affective stimuli an alternative explanation to 
objective self-awareness theory and cognitive motivation theory of altering attention focus 
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as to why acceptance led to impaired executive control in low-threat circumstances and 
preserved executive control in high-threat circumstances.  
8.1.3.4. Summary of Influences on the Utility of Distraction and Acceptance  
In summary, the findings from the comparisons made between distraction and 
acceptance aided the understanding of how imposed regulation strategies can impact on 
attentional focus, affect, vagal tone and executive control. When comparing the findings of 
the present research with previous studies, it was emphasised that contextual factors (e.g., 
time period for evaluation, threat/affective level of circumstances, timing of regulation 
strategy in relation to affective stimulus) in which both distraction and acceptance are 
evaluated will influence each strategy’s effects on attentional focus, affect, vagal tone, and 
executive control. The overall patterns for distraction appears that if the strategy is 
engaged in during the anticipation of a threat or affective stimulus it is likely to result in 
increased affect, reduced vagal tone and impaired executive control. This is in contrast to if 
distraction is engaged in during or subsequent to exposure to that stimulus, where it is 
likely to reduce affect, increase vagal tone and preserve executive control. In contrast, 
acceptance, during engagement, is effective in reducing affect during the anticipation, 
exposure, and recovery from an affective stimulus, as long as engagement can be sustained 
for a period longer than 10 minutes. However, subsequent to engagement, acceptance may 
result in increased affect. In addition, acceptance may only be beneficial in reducing affect 
and preserving executive control in high-threat/affective circumstances, and may actually 
be counterproductive in reducing affect and preserving executive control in low-threat 
circumstances.  It was argued that imposed regulation involves mental control to the 
extent that it runs counter to the reflexive responses dominant within the situation, and 
this mental control often results in increased affect and impaired executive control.   
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8.1.4. Are Executive Control Differences Between Conditions 
Explained by a Physiological Mechanism?  
Chapter 2 (the literature review) presented two possible physiological pathways 
that may account for different levels of executive control. The first, drawn from the 
neurovisceral account (Thayer et al., 2009; Thayer & Lane, 2000), was that increased  vagal 
inhibition of arousal influences the central autonomic network, decreasing amygdala 
activation and increasing activation in the prefrontal cortex, supporting executive control. 
Consistent with this link between arousal and executive control, increased vagal tone 
(representing regulated responding that inhibits arousal) has often co-occurred with 
superior executive control (Croizet et al., 2004; Hansen et al., 2003; Hansen, Johnsen, & 
Thayer, 2009; S. C. Segerstrom & Sloberg-Nes, 2007; Thayer et al., 2009). In addition, 
previous research has shown that increased arousal resulting from a stressor co-occurred 
with impaired executive control (Croizet et al., 2004; Lavric et al., 2003; Shackman et al., 
2006; Sorg & Whitney, 1992). The second potential pathway presented was drawn from a 
physiological resource account, linked to self-regulatory strength theory, that proposes that 
blood glucose is vital to supporting effortful mental processes required when engaging in 
tasks requiring executive control, and that regulation can deplete blood glucose levels 
resulting in diminished levels to support further acts requiring these same reserves to 
support requiring self-control (Gailliot et al., 2007).  
Study 7.5 tested the presence of a relationship between vagal inhibition and 
arousal variables as potential explanations for the impacts that the imposed threat and 
regulation strategies had on executive control.  In study 7.5, the threat and regulatory 
conditions that displayed a pattern of increased vagal inhibition towards the end of the 
regulatory period also displayed better executive control in absolute terms, but increased 
vagal inhibition did not correlate significantly with superior executive control. Increased 
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arousal (indicated via increased HR) was associated with poorer executive control on both 
response inhibition and working memory. However, the differences between the 
experimental conditions in executive control still remained when heart rate was statistically 
controlled. Thus, the present research did not support the suggestion that vagal tone and 
arousal during the regulatory period mediated the impact of threat or regulation strategy 
on executive control.  In addition, the co-occurrence of low resting baseline vagal tone and 
poor executive control found in previous studies (eg., Hansen et al., 2003; Hansen, Johnsen, 
& Thayer, 2009; S. C. Segerstrom & Solberg Nes, 2007; Thayer et al., 2009) was not found in 
the present research. These previous studies did not involve exposure to threat in 
combination with regulation prior to engagement in executive control tasks, rather they 
involved either regulation (S. C. Segerstrom & Solberg Nes, 2007) or threat (Croizet et al., 
2004; Hansen, Johnsen, & Thayer, 2009) but not both together.  Hence, the underlying 
physiological explanation of decreased vagal tone, increasing amygdala activation and 
decreasing activation in the prefrontal cortex, did not account for executive control 
differences amongst the threat and regulatory conditions. Rather, the results of the 
present research suggest that the combination of threat and regulation removes the usual 
relationship noted between baseline resting vagal tone and heart rate and executive 
control.   
The differences in executive control found between the threat and regulatory 
conditions in studies 7.2 and 7.3 were best explained by the self-regulatory strength 
account of executive control impairments. This account emphasises a depletion of limited 
reserves of energy. Hence, it is very consistent with the physiological mechanism of 
decreased blood glucose as being the cause of executive control impairments.  Several 
studies (Benton et al., 1994; Gailliot et al., 2007; P. Y. Martin & Benton, 1999; Scholey et al., 
2001) have suggested that blood glucose is required to fuel intensive brain activity that 
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supports sustained, attentive and flexible responding and the performance required for 
tasks required for executive controlyy. It may be that threat and regulatory strategies 
deplete glucose levels in the blood, and this reduction in blood glucose overrides the 
positive relationship between baseline vagal tone and executive control. Thus, the possible 
explanation for disconnect between resting baseline vagal tone with executive control is 
that imposed threat and affect regulation strategies utilise the more sensitive physiological 
pathway, unrelated to vagal tone, of reducing blood glucose and impairing executive 
control. 
8. 1.5. A Synthesis of the Effects of Distraction and Acceptance: 
The Two Step Model 
From the foregoing discussion, it is apparent that explaining how distraction and 
acceptance influenced attention, affect and executive control is best achieved through the 
integration of several theories of affect regulation (Gross & Thompson, 2007), self-
regulation (Carver and Scheier, 1982; Duval & Wicklund, 1972), and the automatic and 
controlled attention to threat-stimuli (Bar-Haim, et al., 2007; Mogg & Bradley, 1998). The 
unique account proposed in this thesis is referred to as the two-step regulatory model 
(presented in Figure 8.1) presents a proposed integration of these theories and provides a 
figural synthesis of the interpretations of the findings of the present research.  
This two-step model begins with cognitive motivational accounts of attention 
involving the reflexive bottom-up influences over attentional allocation to peripheral 
                                                          
yy Other studies (e.g., Kurzban, 2010; Molden, Hui, Scholer, Meier, Noreen, D’Agostino & 
Martin, 2012) have not found a link between blood glucose and executive control or diminishing 
blood glucose as a result of an initial self-regulatory task, so the glucose depletion mechanism is 
suggested tentatively. 
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stimuli followed by a pre-conscious evaluation of those stimuli and either sustained or 
disengaged subsequent attention. This first step in the model represents primitive reflexive 
regulatory processes where threats engage attention and this rigidly promotes the survival 
responses of fight, flight or freeze. These primitive reflexive responses, although vital when 
encountering physical threats, are often not appropriate to the more ambiguous threats 
experienced in work and social environments of adults in modern, industrialised societies. 
When initiated, these reflexive responses may complicate attempts to engage in more 
flexible, controlled responding that is better suited to such diffuse ambiguous threats. 
The second step in the model introduces components included in affect and self-
regulatory models, specifically, controlled attention and controlled evaluation/appraisal. 
These components require top-down processes and are aimed at promoting higher-order 
goal achievement (e.g., positive self-view) rather than primitive urges (e.g., safety). The 
habitual or spontaneous initiation of these top-down processes in a circumstance may 
occur as a consequence of over-learning. However, these spontaneously initiated top-down 
processes still involve adjusting attentional and thought processes that differ from the 
automatic reflexive processes, regarding the time duration over which they are initiated 
and the level of cognitive resource required for their initiation and maintenance (if 
required). Hence, a situation may elicit a reflexive regulatory reaction and this, depending 
upon the time an individual has available to respond and whether or not control processes 
are being used for an alternative task, may also result in a controlled regulatory response in 
the form of altering the reflexive attentional focus or altering the meaning of the stimulus 
from its reflexive automatic evaluation. Hence, this model predicts that it is the 
combination of these two steps (automatic, reflexive, bottom-up regulatory processes and 
the top-down, controlled, regulatory processes) that influences the frequency, intensity 
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and duration of affect that will be experienced and the amount of executive resources that 
will be utilised.  
The level of affect that the two-step model predicts individuals will experience 
depends on the level of attentional allocation (both reflexive and controlled) provided to 
the stimulus and how threatening it is evaluated (by reflexive and controlled processes) to 
be. The more attention (reflexive and controlled) is allocated to a stimulus, the more affect 
will be experienced, unless the attention results in an interpretation that the stimulus is of 
low-threat value. If attention to the threat is inhibited or if the deployment of attention 
allows or facilitates an appraisal of the stimulus that is more benign than the reflexive 
evaluation, then anxious affect will be reduced.  
The depletion of executive resources predicted by the two-step model depends 
upon the extent to which top-down regulatory processes operate to inhibit the automatic 
reflexive processes occurring in response to threat, with greater inhibition of reflexive 
responses by the controlled processes being more depleting of executive resources. In 
addition, if an attentional load (engaging top-down processes) is imposed, the controlled 
regulatory processes usually used to maintain comfortable levels of affect are impaired, 
thus unveiling the automatic reflexive responses to dominate the system and leading to 
dysregulated affect and depleted executive resources. 
The two step model presented in Figure 8.1 starts by presenting two possible 
situations: in the first, the stimulus is of high-threat value and in the second, it is of low-
threat value. Peripheral, novel stimuli that reflexively attract attention will be automatically 
evaluated and, if evaluated to be of high-threat value, will be momentarily allocated 
increased attention (Bar-Haim et al., 2007; Mogg & Bradley, 1998).  If the individual 
evaluates the stimulus as a threat but subsequently determines, via controlled processes, 
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that a fight, flight or freeze response is not appropriate, then the individual is likely to 
spontaneously initiate a controlled regulatory process. The first of these spontaneously 
initiated controlled regulatory processes is to inhibit the reflexive response of attending to 
the threat stimulus and thus avoid experiencing anxious affect (Carver & Scheier, 1988; 
Duval & Wicklund, 1972; Mogg & Bradley, 1998). Because this spontaneously initiated 
controlled process actively seeks to inhibit an automatic, reflexive process, it is effortful 
and depletes executive resources (Muraven & Baumeister, 2000). In contrast, low-threat 
circumstances that  do not greatly facilitate attention towards mildly threatening stimuli 
(Bar-Haim et al., 2007; Mogg & Bradley, 1998; Wilson & MacLeod, 2003), do not trigger 
spontaneous control process attempts to inhibit attentional reflexes, and thus pleasant 
levels of affect are maintained and executive resources are not depleted.    
In Figure 8.1, the arrows down to the executive resource expenditure box indicate 
when components of the controlled regulatory processes in particular circumstances are 
inconsistent with the automatic reflexive regulatory processes and likely to deplete 
executive resources. Lastly, the impacts of a distraction or suppression task is represented 
in the model as consuming controlled processes that support more effective forms of 
controlled regulation, exposing the reflexive regulatory responses, dysregulating affect and 
depleting executive resources.  
In summary, the two-step model sets out a sequence involving two regulatory 
processes to represent underlying affect regulation mechanisms.  These two underlying 
mechanisms are best represented as (1) automatically initiated, bottom-up, reflexive 
regulatory processes, and (2) top-down, conscious and goal directed controlled regulatory 
processes. Although other models have suggested that some affect regulation may be 
automatic and some under conscious control (Gross & Thompson, 2007; Lazarus & 
Folkman, 1984), the few that have incorporated this distinction explicitly within their 
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models have been more centred on the disruption of behavioural goals (Bar-Haim et al., 
2007; Carver & Scheier, 1988; Mogg & Bradley, 1998) rather than affect regulation. In 
addition, the two step model is the first model to attempt explicitly to provide the 
components of top-down processes and bottom-up processes that enable more reliable 
predictions of when executive resource depletion is likely. Hence, this two step model 
provides a unique integrated perspective on how reflexive and controlled processes 
combine to result in a particular focus of attention, levels of arousal, and the ability to 
demonstrate executive control.  
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Figure 8.1. Two Step Model of Automatic and Controlled Regulatory Processes Influencing Affect and Executive Resource Depletion 
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8.2. Practical and Clinical Implications 
There are several clinical implications of the present research regarding informing 
individuals of the autonomic and the costs to executive control they are likely to incur 
when entering particular situations, and what forms of controlled regulation strategy they 
may choose to undertake in that situation. There are also implications for the long-term 
outcomes of the experience of increased affect and reduced executive control. These are 
important because sustained periods of increased exposure to stress and anxiety can 
increase risk of health (Bleil et al., 2008; Esch et al., 2002) and mental health problems 
(Hammen, 2005). In addition, impaired executive control may result in impaired 
educational performance (Schmeichel et al., 2003), poor calorie intake restriction 
(Heatherton et al., 1991; Heatherton et al., 1993; Herman et al., 1987), and increased 
aggression (DeWall et al., 2007). The first major implication relates to increased threat and 
the influence of regulation in limiting the affective and executive control deficits associated 
with increased threat, the second to the use of distraction and acceptance and when these 
strategies are likely to be effective in reducing affect. The third implication relates to when 
distraction and acceptance are likely to impair or preserve the capacity to demonstrate 
executive control.  
Firstly, the present findings indicate that the unpleasant effects of increased threat 
on anxious affect are unlikely to be eliminated by regulation, with high-threat 
circumstances resulting in increased affect no matter what regulation strategy adopted. 
Hence, if reflexive attention and evaluations cannot be altered, behavioural strategies for 
threat avoidance, such as predicting threats and finding less threatening situations in which 
to achieve behavioural goals are likely to be most effective in reducing exposure to the 
harmful effects of sustained affect. However, when behavioural avoidance of threat 
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circumstances may impair social and occupational functioning, controlled cognitive 
regulation may partially moderate the level of affect experienced in higher threat 
circumstances, making it more manageable if not fully eliminating the increased risk of 
negative outcomes from remaining in a threatening environment. 
To preserve the capacity to demonstrate executive control, a practical strategy may 
be to identify what the reflexive responses may be in particular situations and to identify a 
regulation strategy that does not merely seek to inhibit these reflexive responses but 
rather to transform them into relevant and functional responses to the situation. If 
controlled regulation can limit the extent to which reflexive responding is inhibited, this 
may eliminate the negative impacts of increased threat on executive control. However, 
increased threat is likely to lead to subsequent impairments in acts requiring executive 
control, especially as exposure to threat becomes increasingly prolonged. 
Secondly, the practical use of distraction through focused attention towards a 
response generation task under anticipated threat circumstances lacks support for use in 
reducing affect during engagement, subsequently, in reducing affective reactivity or in 
promoting affective repair. However, distraction used in the recovery from threat (i.e., 
affective repair) may still provide a benefit in accelerating affective recovery (Augustine & 
Hemenover, 2009). The present research suggested that distraction in anticipated threat 
circumstances, like suppression, has paradoxical effects on attentional focus which lead to 
increased affect and impaired executive control. Rather than providing a task that provides 
an attentional load (e.g., the present study’s manipulation of distraction), training of 
attentional refocusing (e.g., rehearsal of altering attentional focus from threat-stimuli to 
naturally occurring environmental stimuli) may be a more useful intervention strategy for 
those experiencing increased anxiety as a result of anticipated threats (Baert et al., 2012; 
Dandeneua et al., 2007). Thus, imposing an attentional load during the anticipation of 
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threat is likely to lead to subsequent increased affect, and is not recommended if seeking 
to reduce anxiety. 
In contrast to distraction, the use of acceptance during anticipation of threat does 
receive support, albeit with limitations. When considering the results of studies 6.1 and 6.2 
together with Hofmann et al. (2009) and Dunn et al., (2009), the evidence suggests that, for 
acceptance to be an effective strategy, it must be initiated in moderately high affect-
arousing circumstances and must be used continually as the situation changes (throughout 
anticipation, to threat engagement, and threat recovery) for sustained benefits to be noted 
throughout such changing circumstances. If the strategy of acceptance cannot be 
continued as the situation changes, the strategy is likely to be counterproductive (study 6.2 
and Dunn et al.). Therefore, individuals intending to use the strategy may need to practice 
using the strategy under different circumstances, and constantly remind themselves to 
adopt the approach as the situation changes (Hofmann, et al., 2009). However, acceptance 
may not lead to experiencing subjectively less anxious affect despite physiological arousal 
being reduced, hence clients with physiological symptoms may benefit more from 
acceptance than those seeking to reduce subjective anxiety. 
The implication from the present research for distraction’s impact on executive 
control was that, in anticipated threat circumstances, maintaining an attentional load 
impaired subsequent ability to demonstrate executive control. Importantly, previous 
research suggests that distraction in the presence of unpleasant affect, not in anticipatory 
circumstances, can preserve the capacity to demonstrate self-control (Alberts et al., 2008; 
Sheppes & Meiran, 2008). Hence, any possible benefits to executive control arising from 
maintaining an attentional load may be specific to the circumstances in which it is 
undertaken. However, undertaking distraction in anticipated threat is likely to lead to 
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impaired decision making in social, health and educational contexts and is not 
recommended for clinical use in these anticipated threat situations. 
The effect that acceptance had on executive resources is also of importance to 
clinical practice. The present study is consistent with the previous research by Heatherton 
et al. (1993) showing that increased awareness of affect and threats in high-threat 
circumstances preserves the ability to exercise self-control. The present research extends 
these findings by showing that increased self-awareness (facilitated by acceptance) can 
preserve executive control, even after prolonged exposure to threats (study 7.3). However, 
the present study also further extended Heatherton et al.’s (1993) study by showing that 
increased self-awareness in low-threat circumstances can actually lead to impairments in 
self-control. The clinical implication of this is that increased awareness of mild threats and 
affect increase a person’s vulnerability to submit to temptation or to automatic, rigid 
responding. Thus, acceptance is not recommended in low-threat circumstances. Thus, the 
context in which this strategy is used needs to be carefully considered to determine 
whether it will provide benefit in reducing affect and preserving executive control.  
In summary, in recommending strategies to individuals, the outcome sought, 
whether it is to reduce affect or to preserve self-control needs to be taken into account. 
This is due to some strategies reducing affect but not preserving executive control, and vice 
versa. Thus, in some situations where one outcome will be preferred over others, achieving 
this outcome may occur to the detriment of another.  
8. 3. Methodological and Interpretive Limitations 
There are several potential methodological factors that have not been discussed 
during the previous chapters that constrain some interpretations of the results presented 
in chapters 5, 6 and 7. These include the method of manipulating the regulatory strategies, 
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absence of measurement of participant interpretation of affective responses, skill of 
participants in using the strategies, the extent that experimental conditions altered 
motivation or beliefs about executive resources, the psychometric properties of 
physiological measurement, and the limited application to clinical population.  
First, the tasks that were used to facilitate the engagement in regulation strategies 
require deeper consideration. These tasks were not presented to participants as being 
designed specifically to regulate emotions. Instead, they were presented as preparation for 
providing written responses to be assessed for their creativity. Although the use of this 
instruction was designed to reduce participants’ demand awareness, it did not necessarily 
give participants the conscious motivation to use the task to alter their affective state in 
the way that engaging in a regulation strategy might outside of an experimental laboratory 
situation. Other studies (Dunn et al., 2009; Hofmann et al., 2009; Richards & Gross, 2000; 
Sheppes & Meiran, 2007) do present instructions as affect regulation and do not give such 
consideration to minimising demand awareness, with the contributions of this demand 
awareness towards the differences in outcomes noted between the present study and 
previous studies being unknown. Hence, future research could investigate whether the way 
that the strategies are manipulated by different activities or by giving participants different 
information about the purpose of particular tasks influence the utility of the strategies in 
reducing anxious affect and preserving executive control. 
Another issue with regulation strategy manipulation was that there was limited 
opportunity for the participants to tailor the strategy to make it suitable for the situation 
that they were in. Regarding distraction, generating different uses for donkeys, ponies and 
horses by imagining them in different settings may not have been particularly suitable for 
providing a distraction in anticipated threat situations, as opposed to an active card sorting 
strategy (Blagden & Craske, 1996) or completing arithmetic tasks (Van Dillen & Koole, 
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2007), as these are more typical working memory tasks that have been suggested to more 
fully consume participant attention and limit attention to threats, rather than a response 
generation task. The manipulation of acceptance was not tailored to the different threat 
levels, but was based on scripts provided by reputable sources on mindfulness and 
acceptance-based regulation of affect (Roemer & Orsillo, 2009). Both threat levels using 
acceptance were asked to focus their attention on any negative thoughts and feelings, 
however, the low-threat condition may not have been experiencing many negative 
thoughts or feelings at the time and the script may not have given participants the 
flexibility to focus on other thoughts and feelings. This limitation may have influenced the 
physiological results (HRV and HR) during engagement in acceptance when anticipating the 
threats in study 6.1, which showed acceptance leading to increased arousal particularly 
when participants were asked to turn to unpleasant thoughts and feelings. Furthermore, 
asking participants to focus on negative thoughts and feelings if they are not the dominant 
feature being experienced may also explain why acceptance was reported as more difficult 
and more effortful in the low-threat level relative to the high-threat level (study 7.1), and 
led to worse performance in inhibiting prepotent responses (study 7.2). Furthermore, not 
tailoring the acceptance instructions to each threat level manipulation may also not have 
allowed the participant to accept their thoughts and feelings specifically about the 
anticipated activity and therefore may explain why the acceptance conditions responded 
with increased affectivity to the threat manipulation tasks and slower affective recovery in 
study 6.2. Hence, future research may benefit from giving more flexible instructions to 
account for different tasks/situations, and thoughts and feelings experienced when 
manipulating these regulation strategies.  
The present research did not measure an individual’s integration of affect with 
logical thought as per the sequence of steps to affect reduction proposed by the process of 
363 
 
a feeling model. Rather, integration was assumed to occur as participants became 
increasingly aware of the threat-stimuli and their affect. Therefore, participants were 
possibly not integrating the affective experiences and detaching from the affective 
experience once it became too unpleasant.  Previous research into the mindfulness 
construct has shown that awareness is not always associated with reduced affect or 
reduced use of maladaptive regulatory strategies. Bayer, Smith, Hopkins, Krietermyer and 
Toney (2006) showed that awareness of emotions and bodily sensations can be associated 
with increased reported dissociation (tendency to detach from present situation including 
internal and external stimuli). Furthermore, Bayer et al., (2008) have also shown that 
awareness accounts for no variance in psychological wellbeing after controlling for other 
factors associated with acceptance (such as non-judgement or non-reactance). Hence, the 
present research and previous studies such as Dunn et al. (2009) may simply contribute to 
our understanding of how increased awareness can lead to increased detachment from 
affective responding, leading to subsequent increased reactivity and increased affect noted 
in study 6.2. Some more appropriate measures demonstrating integration of affect and 
logical thought or at least a lack of detachment in experimental circumstances may rule out 
this possibility. 
It is a key assumption of the present research and previous research (Hofmann et 
al., 2009; Dunn et al., 2009) that experimenter manipulation of acceptance would lead to 
less evaluative thinking.  However, this assumption contradicts the predictions of Duval and 
Wicklund’s objective self-awareness theory that increased observation of the self and 
responding would automatically initiate such evaluative and self-critical thoughts. In the 
present research, the acceptance conditions did not demonstrate less judgemental or less 
evaluative thoughts than other strategies when participants were directing attention 
towards themselves (no differences between regulation strategies on rumination shown in 
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chapter 5). Furthermore, individuals’ appraisals of their affective responses were not 
assessed, so the acceptance conditions could not be shown to be different from distraction 
or the mind-wandering control condition in the way they interpreted their affect , which 
would be a stronger test of the cyclical version of the modal model or meta-awareness 
theory. The assumption that acceptance does indeed lead to some kind of integration of 
the affective experience with reason and restricts spontaneously initiated self-evaluation, 
should be explicitly tested in future research. Furthermore, appraisals of affective 
responses should be measured to determine whether individuals engaging in experimental 
investigations of acceptance appraise negative thoughts and feelings differently (Wells, 
2009; Wells & Cartwright-Hatton, 2004). 
A final criticism of the acceptance manipulation is that it may have more accurately 
reflected relaxation. However, the results from study 6.1 demonstrate that participants in 
the acceptance condition did not report being more relaxed, or demonstrate lower arousal 
through the regulatory period. Importantly, the acceptance condition reported and 
physiologically showed increased anxious affect during the regulatory period in comparison 
to the mind-wandering control condition, suggesting that participants were not simply 
undertaking relaxation. Hence, the data from study 6.1 are not readily explained by 
interpreting the strategy of acceptance as a relaxation condition.  
The participants in the present research were provided with regulation strategies 
but their level of experience using these strategies is unknown. It may be that with 
increased practice, individuals can use a strategy more effectively to reduce affect. 
Furthermore, practice may render the strategy less depleting of executive resources. 
Hence, the present research findings cannot explain how effective or costly the strategy is 
to executive resources when it is highly rehearsed. Future research should test whether 
training and rehearsal of distraction and acceptance influences the utility of the strategies.  
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Muraven & Slessareva, (2003) demonstrated that differences in participant 
motivation and beliefs about executive resources can influence performance on the 
executive control task that indicating executive resource depletion. From these findings it 
may be suggested that the regulation strategies may have influenced participant 
motivation. However, this explanation appears unlikely as the influence of the regulation 
strategies did not uniformly impact on executive control across both threat levels. Despite 
motivation being a possible explanation, the present results cannot indicate whether 
resource depletion occurred due to exhaustion and fatigue, or because participants were 
motivated to preserve limited resources. Because, it remains unclear how a regulation 
strategies, such as acceptance and mind-wandering, may be motivating in one 
circumstances and not in another, an explanation concerning motivations remains 
implausible until further research is conducted.  
A larger issue, relevant to research evaluating the effectiveness of affect regulation 
strategies using physiological measures, is the limitation of the psychometric properties of 
HR as an indicator of anxiety and HRV as an indicator of regulated responding. Physiological 
variables, particularly HR and HRV have all been suggested to provide indicators of the 
energetical requirements of an organism (Jorna, 1992; Wientjes, 1992). These energetical 
requirements result from a flight or fight or response that is associated with the subjective 
experience of tension and anxiety that occurs particularly under threat (physical and 
social). However, the same physiological response can be found when undertaking 
mentally demanding tasks due to the energetical requirements associated with them and, 
hence, HR and HRV have been considered indicators of mental workload (Jorna, 1992) with 
central parasympathetic influences of HRV reduced during mentally demanding tasks 
(Althaus et al., 1998). It could be argued that threats impose a situation that requires an 
individual to focus their attention, and engage in planning or regulatory attempts to avoid 
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or cope with the threat, which indeed imposes a mental workload and therefore increases 
HR and decreases in HRV result. However, an important consideration regarding these 
physiological variables is that they may reflect differences in mental workload rather than 
anxiety, particularly when considering the regulation strategies. When observing the HR 
and HRV results from study 6.1, in the third regulatory epoch, and the reported effort 
results in 7.1, there is a consistent pattern amongst the regulatory conditions, of similarity 
between effort and HR and HRV.  Hence, it is possible that engagement in distraction 
imposes a high mental workload on participants reflected as increased HR and decreased 
HRV, rather than increased affect.  
Lastly, although the present research advanced understanding of how effective 
acceptance may be for healthy undergraduate populations, its application to cases with 
severe anxiety or clinical cases with disorders relating to self-control may be limited. 
Previous research has investigated the impacts of experimentally manipulated acceptance 
on individuals with anxiety and mood disorders when watching affective content and 
demonstrated reduced HR relative to suppression (Campbell-Sills et al., 2006). Hence, the 
present research is consistent with the findings from this sample, in that acceptance led to 
reduced arousal relative to an anti-experiencing strategy in affectively arousing 
circumstances. Considering the scope and size of the present research, it was not possible 
to recruit a clinical sample of 180 participants to randomly allocate to conditions. However, 
the results of the present research provide a point of reference smaller studies involving 
clinical samples to further test the proposed explanations for how affect may be best 
regulated and to preserve executive resources in high- and low-threat circumstances.   
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8. 4. The New Questions and Directions for Future Research  
The present research assessed the focus of attention, but did not assess the extent 
to which online attentional resources were available. Objective assessments of incidental 
attention to information presented in the environment while participants were regulating 
have been used in previous studies (Richards & Gross, 2000; Sheppes & Meiran, 2008). 
Sheppes and Meiran (2008) have demonstrated that the usage of online attentional 
resources by a strategy does not necessarily lead to impaired executive control.  The 
present research suggested that attentional focus to some stimuli may be more effortful 
than to others, and this may differ according to circumstance, which may explain how 
directing online attentional resources to a particular set of stimuli may sometimes be 
relatively effortless and not result in impairments in executive control. Nevertheless, future 
research could further investigate the circumstances under which online use of attentional 
resources does and does not deplete executive resources.  
Lastly, the impacts of affect regulation on individuals of different trait tendencies to 
experience affect could be investigated in light of the two step-model proposed. For 
example, high trait-anxious individuals have more reflexive initial attentional bias to engage 
with threat (Bar-Haim et al., 2007) but also subsequently display greater attentional 
diversion from threat than low trait anxious individuals (Derryberry & Reed, 2002; Koster et 
al., 2006; Koster et al., 2005; Mackintosh & Mathews, 2003). From this, the two-step model 
predicts that altering attentional focus of high trait-anxious individuals through acceptance 
may provide alternative affective outcomes and perhaps reduce the impacts of increased 
threat on executive resource depletion. It has been demonstrated that high trait-anxious 
individuals show impaired executive control (Derakshan & Eysenck, 1998; Eysenck et al., 
2005; MacLeod & Donnellan, 1993) in the presence of a threat or stressors (Eysenck, 1985; 
Sorg & Whitney, 1992). Hence, based on the two-step model proposed, it may be that, 
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where high-threat would usually lead to excessive inhibition and impairment in executive 
control, the supporting of the reflexive focus of attention may reduce the level of executive 
resources depletion and result in less impaired performance. In contrast, the opposite 
should be true of low trait anxious individuals. Such potential exists for other individuals 
such as those who are high in levels of narcissism (being particularly sensitive to threats to 
their positive self-views) to be investigated (Besser & Priel, 2010; Bushman & Baumeister, 
1998; A. L. Pincus et al., 2009) to determine the extent to which regulation influences their 
attentional focus or reduces the negative impacts of threat on the ability to demonstrate 
self/executive-control.  
8. 5. Concluding Remarks  
This thesis evaluated the impacts of the two cognitive affect regulatory strategies 
of distraction and acceptance, under different threat levels, on altering attentional focus, 
restricting use of maladaptive regulatory strategies, reducing anxious affect, and preserving 
executive control. The findings suggested that the imposed strategies alter spontaneously 
initiated regulation that compete for the same control processes required for top-down, 
goal-directed regulation producing different outcomes on attentional focus, affective 
responding and the capacity to demonstrate executive control. Distraction was shown to 
disrupt spontaneous regulatory attempts to divert attention from threats, leading to 
increased arousal and impaired executive control. Acceptance encouraged attentional 
focus to threats and affect, which led to increased affect and arousal. However, acceptance 
did preserve executive control in high-threat circumstances, although it impaired capacity 
in low-threat circumstances.    
A two-step model of affect regulation was proposed to explain the current findings. 
This two-step regulatory model includes both immediate, bottom-up, reflexive, primitive 
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regulatory responses and slower-acting, top-down, controlled regulatory processes. The 
interaction of these two regulatory processes accounts for the impact of both spontaneous 
and imposed regulation on attentional focus, affect, and executive control in high- and low-
threat circumstances. This model accounts for the time course of an individuals’ reflexive 
attentional and physiological responses to threats, and controlled responses to these 
reflexive responses including attentional inhibition or reappraisal of stimuli, and their 
resulting consequences for resources available to demonstrate executive control. The 
findings from the present research, when placed within this two-step model suggest that 
seeking to inhibit one’s own primitive responses to threat may reduce affect but can harm 
one’s subsequent attempts to demonstrate executive control. In addition, rigid regulation 
requiring the maintenance of attentional load (irrelevant to the situation), as exhibited by 
those undertaking distraction, disrupted one’s ability to effectively inhibit reflexive 
responses and increased attention to threats, reducing regulated responding and 
increasing physiological arousal.  
A concluding message that best summarises the interpretation of the findings of 
this thesis is that the primitive attentional and affective responses need to be incorporated 
(e.g., organised in combination) within a controlled response, rather than inhibited, to 
preserve the ability to show further regulated responding. However, this incorporation of 
reflexive responses with controlled responses may lead to initial increases in arousal and a 
heightened subjective experience of affect which individuals would understandably want to 
avoid. Neither avoidance nor awareness of threat and affect results in reduced affect and 
superior executive control. Hence, some level of recognition of one’s dominant reflexive 
response may be vital in determining what controlled regulation, if any, is required to 
result in a beneficial affective or cognitive outcome.  
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Appendix A: Writing Paper 
Regulation Instructions on Writing Pages 
Acceptance 
Please do not just list your thoughts. Rather, describe your observation, 
allowance, non reactive, non judgmental acceptance of your bodily sensations, 
thoughts and feelings that you experience.  
 
Distraction 
Generate and describe as many uses as possible for donkeys ponies and horses 
within a context taking into account the animals characteristics. 
 
Mind-wandering Control Condition 
 Let your mind wander and write down any of your thoughts that come to 
mind. 
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Appendix B: Reported Affect (Experiment) 
To what extent do the following words describe how you feel at the present moment from 
“not at all” (1) to “very much”( 7). 
Item 
No 
Adjective Not at 
all 
     Very 
much 
1 agitated  1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
2 anxious  1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
3 nervous 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
4 uneasy 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
5 worried 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
 
Don’t turn over page until instructed to. 
 
Several different instructions were used at different points during the experiment including 
with reference to what time period people were asked to report their affective state, 
rather than simply “at the present moment”  or how you feel right now, at the present 
moment”.  
Such wording included:  
1. During the Stroop; 
“how you felt whilst engaged in the colour naming task involving the colour words (ie. not 
during  naming the XXX strings)”and,” how you felt whilst engaged in the colour naming 
task involving the colour words (ie. not during  naming the XXX strings)” 
2. During Letter Number Sequencing; 
“how you felt towards the end of the letter number task” and, “how you felt towards the 
end of the letter number task” 
3. During the Affect Manipulation Task 
“how you felt during the speech” or “how you felt during the movie” 
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Appendix C: Regulation Audiotape Quiz Questions with 
Answers 
 
Acceptance 
Quiz A 
Participant no: 
1. What sort of posture were you asked to get into? (Relaxed dignified back erect but 
not stiff) 
2. Were you asked to close your eyes? (yes) 
3. How were you asked to view your thoughts? (as passing mental events/ as clouds) 
4. Were you asked to notice feelings?(yes) 
5. Was there a poem in the tape?(no) 
6. What were you asked to do with clouds? (put thoughts and feelings on them) 
7. Were you asked to let go of efforts to change your thoughts and feelings? (yes) 
8. Where were you asked to picture yourself? (on the deck of a house, on a raft in a 
pond, on a blanket in a field, anywhere you have a clear full view of the sky) 
9. What were the clouds meant to represent in your mind? (thoughts and feelings) 
10. What was the sky meant to represent in the tape? (your mind) 
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Distraction 
Quiz D 
Participant no:    
 
1. Were you instructed to think about each animal individually? (yes) 
2. Was it mentioned that donkey ponies and horses are part of the equidae family in 
the audio? (no) 
3. Were you instructed to think about the animals in movies? (yes) 
4. Were differences in coats, manes and tails considered for use generation? (yes) 
5. Were you asked to think about the landscape each animal is in? (yes) 
6. Were you asked to think about the noises the animals made? (yes) 
7. Were the uses for animals body parts presented as an opportunity for use 
generation? (no) 
8. Were you asked to visualise the different animals. (yes) 
9. Was past or present contexts mentioned? (yes) 
10. Was differences in food consumption mentioned?(no)  
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Mind-wandering Control condition 
Quiz NR 
Participant no:    
 
1. Was there any songs or beats played in the audio? (no) 
2. Was there both male and female voices in the audio? (yes) 
3. Was there girls voices saying ok in the audio? (yes) 
4. Was there girl laughing in the audio? (yes) 
5. Was there male laughter in the audio? (yes) 
6. Was there the sound of a printer or photocopier in the audio? (no) 
7. Was their a squeaky high pitched sound (like a door opening)? (yes) 
8. Was their a high pitched chime sound (lie a computer providing a notification)? 
(yes)  
9. Did someone mention something about going to work? (yes) 
10. Was the expression “no worries” used by someone in the audio? (yes)  
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Appendix D: Effort and Difficulty Items 
Please answer the following regarding the period in which you were asked to engage in the 
thinking (i.e., following the audio tape). 
Item 
No 
 1 
not any 
effort at 
all 
 
2 3 4 5 6 7 
all of my 
available 
effort 
1 How much effort did the thinking task 
require?  
 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
2 How difficult did you find the thinking 
task? 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
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Appendix E: Attentional Focus, Cognitive Evaluations and 
Attempts at Controlling Thoughts or Feelings 
 High-Threat level 
Item 
No 
 not at 
all 
     Very 
much so 
1 I distracted myself by thinking about 
other things unrelated to the future 
speech. 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
2 I concentrated on some other topic and 
tasks rather than how I felt. 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
3 I thought about things other than the 
speech 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
4 I tried to see the impromptu speech task 
as positively as possible. 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
5 I viewed the impromptu speech as a 
challenge. 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
6 I thought of the impromptu speech in a 
way that made me stay calm. 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
7 I accepted my thoughts and feelings 
about doing the impromptu speech. 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
8 I had thoughts that it was natural to feel 
this way. 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
9 I wished that I could control my thoughts 
and feelings more easily. 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
10 I had thoughts about the consequences 
of performing poorly in the impromptu 
speech.  
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
11 I had thoughts wondering how well 
others would perform in the impromptu 
speech. 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
12 I had worrisome thoughts about my 
performance during the speech. 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
13 I thought “what am I doing to deserve 
this?” 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
14 I thought “why do I always react this 
way?” 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
15 I thought “why can’t I handle things 
better?” 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
16 During the situation I thought I should 
control my thoughts.  
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
17 I tried to control my feelings. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
18 I tried to stop thinking about the 
upcoming impromptu speech. 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
19 I tranced out during that moment in time. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
20 I zoned out and lost a sense of where I 
was and what I was to do. 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
21 I numbed out to what was going to 
happen. 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
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 Low-threat Level 
Item 
No 
 not at 
all 
     Very 
much so 
1 I distracted myself by thinking about 
other things unrelated to the short film 
clip. 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
2 I concentrated on some other topic and 
tasks rather than how I felt. 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
3 I thought about things other than the 
short film clip. 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
4 I tried to see the short film clip task as 
positively as possible. 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
5 I viewed watching the short film clip as a 
challenge. 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
6 I thought of the short film clip in a way 
that made me stay calm. 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
7 I accepted my thoughts and feelings 
about watching the short film clip. 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
8 I had thoughts that it was natural to feel 
this way. 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
9 I wished that I could control my 
thoughts and feelings more easily. 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
10 I had thoughts about the consequences 
of performing poorly at watching the 
short film clip.  
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
11 I had thoughts wondering how well 
others would perform at watching the 
short film clip. 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
12 I had worrisome thoughts about my 
performance at watching the short film 
clip. 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
13 I thought “what am I doing to deserve 
this?” 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
14 I thought “why do I always react this 
way?” 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
15 I thought “why can’t I handle things 
better?” 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
16 During the situation I thought I should 
control my thoughts.  
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
17 I tried to control my feelings. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
18 I tried to stop thinking about the 
upcoming short film clip. 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
19 I tranced out during that moment in 
time. 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
20 I zoned out and lost a sense of where I 
was and what I was to do. 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
21 I numbed out to what was going to 
happen. 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
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Regulation Item Instructions 
Several different instructions were used before participants completed the items in the 
regulation strategy manipulation check, depending on the regulation condition and affect 
condition they were in.  These instructions included:  
1. High-threat Acceptance 
What sorts of thoughts or mental activities did you undertake during the thinking task (ie. 
when asked to follow the audio taped instructions) when asked to observe and accept your 
thoughts and feelings. Please rate the following items as being indicative of what you did 
during the thinking period which was after hearing the news that you would be delivering 
an impromptu speech. 
 
2. High-threat  Distraction 
What sorts of thoughts or mental activities did you undertake during the thinking task (ie. 
when asked to follow the audio taped instructions) when asked to think about donkeys, 
ponies and horses and their uses. Please rate the following items as being indicative of 
what you did during the thinking period which was after hearing the news that you would 
be delivering an impromptu speech. 
 
3. High-threat Control Condition 
What sorts of thoughts or mental activities did you undertake during the thinking task (ie. 
during the audio tape) when asked to let your mind wander. Please rate the following items 
as being indicative of what you did during the thinking period which was after hearing the 
news that you would be delivering an impromptu speech. 
 
4. Low-threat Acceptance 
What sorts of thoughts or mental activities did you undertake during the thinking task (ie. 
when asked to follow the audio taped instructions) when asked to observe and accept your 
thoughts and feelings. Please rate the following items as being indicative of what you did 
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during the thinking period (when following the audio taped instructions)  which was after 
hearing the news that you would be watching a short film clip about UK tax Law. 
 
5. Low-threat Distraction 
What sorts of thoughts or mental activities did you undertake during the thinking task (ie. 
when asked to follow the audio taped instructions) when asked to think about donkeys, 
ponies and horses and their uses. Please rate the following items as being indicative of 
what you did during the thinking period (when following the audio taped instructions)  
which was after hearing the news that you would be watching a short film clip about UK tax 
Law. 
 
 
 
6. Low-threat Control Condition 
What sorts of thoughts or mental activities did you undertake during the thinking task (ie. 
during the audio taped instructions) when asked to let your mind wander. Please rate the 
following items as being indicative of what you did during the thinking period which was 
after hearing the news that you would be watching a short film clip about UK tax Law. 
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Appendix F: Advertisement 
 
 
Ethics Permit No: 2010/092 
Some tasks are thought to be more stressful than others. Stress can be not only unwanted 
by unhelpful on particular tasks, impairing performance. This study investigates the role 
how stress can result from varying task and how it may impact on performance.  You will be 
given feedback regarding your stress levels for each task and how you performed on that 
task at the end of the experiment, plus some information about how to handle stress 
during particular tasks. 
What the Study will Involve? 
If you decide to participate in this study, you will be asked to complete the following tasks: 
1. Complete a questionnaire about personal dispositions towards experiences and 
how you deal with particular situations before attending the experimental session. 
It is estimated that the questionnaire will take approximately 20 minutes. 
2. Complete an experimental session, involving a range of tasks. These will include 
memory and attention tasks, and writing a short piece on a set topic. 
3. Responses will be verbal and written. Some self report questions regarding your 
emotional state and a heart rate measurement will be taken. It is estimated that 
the experimental session will take approximately 1.5 hours.  
You are likely to experience mild degree’s of stress during the tasks and if you have any 
conditions that may result in particularly adverse reactions please do not take part. You are 
free to withdraw at anytime.   
Participation Requirements 
Participants should be fluent English speakers and 18 years of age or older. 
 
Reimbursement for Your Participation 
Participants have a choice of a hot drink voucher at a guild coffee shop or 2 hours logged 
on subject pool if a psychology student. 
 
If you wish to participate in the study simply log on to subject pool on the Murdoch’s 
school of psychology web page http://www.psychology.murdoch.edu.au/subjpool.html  or 
contact Paul on telephone 9360 6911 (leave a message if office is unattended) or email 
paulknorman@gmail.com    
If you have any questions about this project please feel free to contact either Paul Norman 
on 9360 6911, or email paulknorman@gmail.com or my supervisor, Dr Helen Davis, on ph. 
9360 2859 or on email h.davis@murdoch.edu.au.    
 
 
Performance and Stress in 
Creative and Assessment 
Based Tasks 
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Appendix G: Threat Manipulation Instructions 
High-threat Manipulation 
“As the assessment based task, after a unrelated 5 minute writing task in the middle of the 
experiment, you will be asked to deliver a 5 minute speech which will indicate your capacity 
for grasping an understanding of a core  academic topic. The topic must remain unknown to 
you until the very moment before you must deliver the speech. During your impromptu 
speech you will be videotaped. This video of you will be watch by some staff, who will rate 
your speech on three areas, including (1) clarity of presentation, (2) correctness of points, 
and (3) level of detail provided as indicators of understanding. You will have the choice of 2 
questions on the topic, both taking slightly different perspectives. Which one do you choose. 
Ok so here is the envelope with the question in it. You must not open the envelope until I say 
which will be at the very moment before the speech. So I’m just going to test the camera 
now by doing an initial recording of you and to get you used to how you need to sit and 
where to look and what volume level you should speak at. Initially we were using a 
microphone however that appears faulty so we are having to use the microphone on the 
video camera instead, which requires you to speak up. Ok so this is on now and I am going 
to hit record for a test. This is participant number X. What year you are in and is psychology 
is your only major? Speak up a bit. How did you get to uni today? Ok so make sure you look 
into the camera when you speak. So now that we have done the test run we will prepare 
you to perform the written task.  
Low-Threat Manipulation 
 “In the middle  of the experiment you will be watching a short film clip about UK tax Law as 
we were interested in your physiological responses. There will not be any questions on any 
of the information presented in the film clip or on your knowledge of UK tax law. You must 
maintain your focus on the video for the whole time. The film clips runs for a bit over 6 
minutes but you will only watch about 5 minutes”. It involves an interview of a particular 
tax expert regarding offshore bank accounts and the disclosure of income from those 
offshore bank accounts. The film clip has been made for people from the UK who have an 
account or an asset and have not paid enough uk tax on it. Typically these people are in 
their 60’s and 70’s and have not touched the money for many years. It informs these people 
as to how they can make a disclosure to the relevant authority and the benefits of doing this 
if they think that they have something to disclose regarding unpaid taxes. Both men in the 
interview have very heavy accents, they are both dressed in suits. The interviewer is older 
than the interviewee. Both men are balding. Adrian Houston, the interviewee was a former 
tax inspector working for the British government and now is a tax consultant. The film was 
made for the 2009 calendar year. Do you have any questions about the film clip? Do you 
have any interest in UK tax law? When the time comes all you will have to do is swivel your 
chair around and face the screen when the time comes and sit nice and still and quiet whilst 
watching the screen paying attention to what they are saying.”   
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Appendix H: Affect Regulation Instructions 
Initial General Instructions 
Participants in the acceptance and distraction conditions heard  
“I’m going to get you to do a writing task in a moment, but first I will give you 15 minutes to 
think about the topic, with an recording to help guide your thoughts that you will then write 
about”.  
 
Participants in the mind-wandering control conditions heard 
“I’m going to get you to do a writing task in a moment, but first I will give you 15 to think 
about the topic, with a recording of some background noises in the library  to help you 
prepare for what you will then write about”.  
 
Initial Specific Instructions 
 
1. Acceptance 
“ We want to you to notice and later describe your process of watching your thoughts and 
feelings come and go. We want you to observe and accept your thoughts and feelings as 
they arise.” 
 
2. Distraction  
“For this period of time please sit and think about donkeys, ponies, and horses and how 
they might be used. Please generate as many uses for donkeys, ponies and horses as you 
can.” 
 
1. Mind-wandering 
“ We want to describe your thoughts as on whatever crosses your mind. You could describe 
anything from the upcoming tasks in the experiment to a memory of a previous lecture.” 
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Appendix I: Regulation Writing Examples 
Regulation Strategy Writing Examples 
All participants heard:  
I will read you an example of how you could do this and then an example of how not to do 
this followed by an improved example and then your time will begin 
 
1. High-threat Acceptance 
A Good Example 
“I have noticed the silence now in the room, as I am now supposed to sit write. I have made 
a judgment about how silly this writing task is, and I now am accepting the fact that I will sit 
here for the next five minutes, noticing and describing my thoughts, feelings and sensations. 
I can feel the chair on my back and the wires around me. I can feel the pen pressing into my 
fingers and my hand on the cold paper. I am having thoughts about what the impromptu 
speech topic will be about and there is a touch of excitement, and then fear and then 
possible boredom and I watch these feelings just drift away. I think I just spelt boredom 
wrong. I notice the slight interruption in writing and simply continue.  I take the perception 
of misspelling boredom as just a thought and then accept that this causes some 
nervousness, and allow feelings to subside as I wait for the next thought or feeling to arise. I 
see the thought and feelings like a leaf on a stream, slowly approaching, until the leaf floats 
on past me and out of sight, and I wait for the next sensation, thought or feeling to come to 
awareness.” 
 
 
A bad example of the task is simply listing thoughts without separating and yourself from 
them  
I think that this writing task is silly and I don’t really want to do it. These wires and tape feel 
funny and weird around me and will hurt to take off.  I am going to start fidgeting to stay 
comfortable. Now I don’t know what to write about, how am I going to write about my 
thoughts feelings and sensations for five minutes.  
 
This bad example could have been written like 
I have noticed that I am having the thought that the writing task is silly. I am noting the 
sensations of the wires and how they feel around me and the way they make contact with 
my body and I am allowing the experience of these sensations. I have noticed that I am 
having the thought that I don’t know what to write about and I watch this thought pass.   I 
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then observe the next follow on thought of a question if I can write about my thoughts, 
feelings and sensations for the next five minutes and I see this thought drift away.  I sit 
waiting for the next sensation, thought or feeling to come to awareness.    
 
 
 
2. Low-threat Acceptance 
Instructions are the same as anxious acceptance except to reference to the speech is 
replaced with reference to the short film clip on UK tax law.  
 
3. High-threat Distraction 
Good example 
“In the past donkeys ponies and horses were used much more extensively than they are 
now. Horses were the main form of transportation for centauries before the invention of the 
car. Horses could be ridden on or used to draw a carriage. Horses were used in both civilian 
urban and rural settings as well as in military activities in remote area’s.  Now days horses 
no longer have these primary roles in transportation, in westernized nations. However, 
horses have retained their uses in entertainment and sports activities, such as doing circus 
tricks, dressage events, jumping, and racing.  On the less humane side horses have for some 
time been used for meat, and for the production of certain goods, including for human and 
pet consumption, for making soap products, and for the production of gellatine.  Donkeys 
have different uses from a hoarse because they don’t have the same elegance and beauty. 
Kings, important and wealthy people own horses, and would never be seen riding a donkey. 
Ponies look pretty and are very popular amongst little girls for riding and made into toys. 
Many young girls have a liking towards ponies and hence can be used for entertainment for 
shows or at parties for this group.” 
 
A bad example of this is simply just listing the differences between the animals 
“Donkeys ponies and horses are different from each other. Ponies are simply just a small 
horse with thicker coats, mains and tails than horses, and larger bodies proportionally to 
horses. Horses are taller and faster animals, whilst donkeys have longer ears and hear 
better and make very loud sounds to communicate to other donkeys. In the wild horses live 
in packs whilst donkeys are solitary animals.” 
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A better example of this is 
“In coming up with many different uses for donkeys ponies and horses it is important to 
note the similarities and differences between the animals. Although ponies are considered 
simply small horses, their thicker coats make them more suitable for colder environments 
than horses. Horses being faster than ponies could be used for traveling further distances or 
where speed is a high priority (eg. in delivering urgent messages in areas where there are 
no cars). Although donkeys make different noises and have longer ears this does not 
present any clearly favourable uses for them different to that of a horse or pony. Horses are 
more suited to be used together due to their natural tendency to live in packs in the wild.”  
 
4. Low- threat Distraction 
Instructions are the same as anxious distraction. 
 
5. High-threat Mind-wandering 
Good Example 
“Ok so I have to sit here and describe my thoughts about whatever comes to mind. This 
thinking task seems pretty silly. I wonder what this topic and question for the speech will be 
about. I wonder what the other tasks will be. This is a strange room, I have never been in 
here before. I wonder if I can move my leg a bit to be a bit more comfortable. I don’t really 
know what to think about. I have an assignment coming up. Is there a chance it is going to 
have anything to do with the topic I will have to speak about. That unit’s workshops are so 
boring I can’t remember what the assignment topics options were, none of the topics 
presented seemed interesting. Just got to jump the hoops and do what the marking guide 
says.  I wonder if I can reference the text book or some of the set reading. I liked one of the 
set readings. It reminded me of a good documentary I had seen on channel 2. I love channel 
2 documentaries. The best part is that they make you think and you don’t have to watch 
any ads.  Plus the ABC jingle is so catchy and makes me feel relaxed and at home.” 
A bad example is focusing on one topic 
“An important topic in psychology is the nature versus nurture debate in which academics 
debate whether particular tendencies are influenced primarily by genes or by learning.  To 
investigate this topic researchers often use monozygotic twin based studies where the twins 
were separated at birth and raised in different environments. The twins are then followed 
up and measured on a range of constructs usually personality based.”   
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A better example of this bad example would be 
“I wonder what the speech topic will be on. Will it have anything to do with the nature 
versus nurture debate. I wonder if it will be a practical or ethical issue or a methodological 
issue topic.  I really like the nature versus nurture debate because there is so much you can 
say. I often just think about myself and try and think about which characteristic I must have 
learned and what I must have inherited. Sometimes I wonder about my voice, if that is a 
heritable or a learned thing. I wonder what would have happened if I took more singing 
lessons and sung different songs in the shower if my voice would change. Inhaling helium 
will definitely help.” 
 
6. Low-threat  Mind-wandering  
Good example 
“Ok so I have to sit here and describe my thoughts about whatever comes to mind. This 
thinking task seems pretty silly. I wonder what this film clip on UK tax law will be like. I 
wonder what the other tasks will be. This is a strange room, I have never been in here 
before. I wonder if I can move my leg a bit to be a bit more comfortable. I don’t really know 
what to think about. I have an assignment coming up. There is no chance that it is going to 
have anything to do with UK tax law. That unit’s workshops are so boring I can’t remember 
what the assignment topics options were, none of the topics presented seemed interesting. 
Just got to jump the hoops and do what the marking guide says.  I wonder if I can reference 
the text book or some of the set readings. I liked one of the set readings. It reminded me of 
a good documentary I had seen on channel 2. I love channel 2 documentaries. The best part 
is that they make you think and you don’t have to watch any ads. Plus the ABC jingle is so 
catchy and makes me feel relaxed and at home.”   
 
A bad example is focusing on one topic 
“Uk tax law is similar to that of Australian tax law, it is legislated for and the money goes to 
pay for government programs. They also have a GST in the UK like here in Australia but the 
rate is over 10%. UK tax law is very relevant to people in the UK or people deriving an 
income within the UK.” 
 
A better example of this bad example would be 
“I wonder what is going to be in the short film clip on UK tax law. Will it have anything to do 
with Australian tax law. Stupid GST makes everything more expensive, maybe I could take a 
unit in taxation so that I can evade paying tax legally. I wonder what units I actually have 
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left to do and if I can do some more general electives. Tax law doesn’t really fit in with my 
other general electives or my degree in general. Maybe I could just start another degree 
that is related to tax. No actually, not that keen on starting something else just yet. I want 
to earn some money rather than start another degree. I can’t spend my life at uni.” 
Appendix J: Affect Regulation Audiotape Instructions 
 
Acceptance 
“Please take a very definite posture…. Relaxed, dignified, back erect, but not stiff, letting 
your body express a sense of being present and awake. Now closing your eyes, if that feels 
comfortable for you,  move your observation to how you are sitting in the chair………, to the 
sensations of your body pressing against the chair……. and to the pressure on the soles of 
your feet on the floor……….. Now bring your attention to your breath…notice how the air 
enters your body……., where it travels,……….. and how it leaves your body…..Notice the parts 
of your body that move as you are breathing…. Now placing your hand on your abdomen 
and noticing whether it moves as you are breathing…gently deepen your breath so that you 
are breathing from you abdomen….Noticing your abdomen, chest, and shoulders expand as 
you inhale….Continue to deepen and slow your breath…..Pay attention to the sensation you 
experience…..just continue to focus on your breath for the next several moments…. 
 
 Now move your attention to what is going through your mind…… what thoughts are 
around? …………….just notice the thoughts as mental events………………… and then notice the 
feelings that are around at the moment … …..in particular, turning toward any sense of 
discomfort or unpleasant feelings……………. Rather than trying to push thoughts or feelings 
away……….observe them……………acknowledge them……………. Perhaps saying “ah there you 
are”…… And similarly with sensations in the body……… are there sensations of tension, or 
holding?…..and again, awareness of them……. simply noting them. Just notice each 
sensation…. Each thought….. each feeling as it arises……not trying to alter or change your 
experience……and noticing any desire to change what you are feeling ……….and gently 
letting go of that effort……….expanding your attention to allow your full experience here 
and now….notice what the feelings are like……..noticing if the feelings change in 
anyway………………. If you notice yourself becoming immersed and caught within a particular 
thought or feeling….. simply allow yourself a moment to label whatever it was that you 
were experiencing……. and move your attention back to observing your bodily sensations.  
 
Now, picture yourself, lying someplace outside where you can see the sky. You can picture 
any place that feels comfortable and vivid to you—lying on your back on raft in a 
pond…………..on a blanket in a field……..on the deck of a house…………any place where you 
have a clear full view of the sky.  Now imagine yourself comfortably lying……..your body 
sinking into whatever you’re lying on………. as you gaze at the sky…… Notice the sky and the 
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clouds that hang in the sky, moving across it ………….Imagine that your thoughts and 
feelings are the clouds in the sky……………….while your mind is the sky itself……….. See your 
thoughts and feelings gently drifting across the sky………………..as you notice your thoughts 
and feelings place them in the clouds and notice them passing across the 
sky………………Notice yourself as you become distracted or immersed in the clouds, loosing 
sight of the sky………………… noticing how even when the clouds cover the sky, the sky still 
exists behind the clouds…….. Practice putting your thoughts and feelings onto the 
clouds………………..notice the different shapes they take……………………the different 
consistency of the clouds they are on………………….when you find yourself drifting on a cloud, 
slowly shift your attention back to the sky behind the clouds and practicing putting your 
thoughts and feelings onto the clouds. 
 
Begin to bring your attention back to the room……..Start making small movements with 
your finger as your toes…..and open your eyes…… and turn to the experimenter now that 
the audio has finished.” 
 
Distraction 
“Please sit and concentrate your thought on donkeys, ponies and horses. You can generate 
uses for these animals by thinking about each suggestion provided.  Think about each 
animals characteristics…….. Think about one animal at a time and then compare 
across…………. Think about each potential use for each animal at a time.  Think about 
context………….think about what the animal does in the wild………what is usually associated 
with the animal? 
 
Picture a donkey in you mind………….what does donkey look like?…………..is anything 
attached to donkey? Is the donkey dirty or clean? ………………………. Are there other donkeys 
around? Are there any other animals around?................where is the donkey? What sort of 
landscape or setting is the donkey in? Is the donkey making noises………….? What does the 
donkey’s mane, tail and coat look like? How big is the donkey?................does the donkey do 
as it is commanded…………………. Is the donkey easily scared? Are there different types of 
donkeys? 
 
 
Now picture a pony in your mind…………..what does the pony’s look like……………..is there 
anything attached to the pony? Is the pony dirty or clean? Are there other ponies around? 
Are there any other animals around?................where is the pony? What sort of landscape or 
setting is the pony in? Is the pony making noises………….? What does the pony’s mane, tail 
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and coat look like? How big is the pony?................does the pony do as it is 
commanded…………………. Is the pony easily scared? Are there different types of ponies.  
 
Now picture a horse in your mind…………..what does the horse look like……………..is there 
anything attached to the horse? Is the horse dirty or clean? Are there other horses around? 
Are there any other animals around?................where is the horse? What sort of landscape 
or setting is the horse in? Is the horse making noises………….? What does the horses mane, 
tail and coat look like? How big is the horse?................does the horse do as it is 
commanded…………………. Is the horse easily scared? Are there different types of horses? 
 
Imagine the past. Where may have donkeys been used in the past? Now think to the 
present, what are donkeys used for now? What movies have you seen with lots of donkeys 
in it? Were these movies set in the past or the present? What were the things that the 
donkeys were doing in that movie? What were the donkeys being used for? Have there been 
media stories or news bulletins about donkeys that you can recall? 
 
Imagine the past. Where may have ponies been used in the past? Now think to the present, 
what are ponies used for now? What movies have you seen with lots of ponies in it? Were 
these movies set in the past or the present? What were the things that the ponies were 
doing in that movie? What were the ponies being used for? Have there been media stories 
or news bulletins about ponies that you can recall? 
Imagine the past. Where may have horses been used in the past? Now think to the present, 
what are horses used for now? What movies have you seen with lots of horses in it? Were 
these movies set in the past or the present? What were the things that the horses were 
doing in that movie? What were the horses being used for? Have there been media stories 
or news bulletins about horses that you can recall? 
 
Begin to bring your attention back to the room……..and remember to keep your thoughts in 
mind about donkeys, ponies and horses.  Turn to the experimenter now that the audio has 
finished.” 
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Appendix K: Affect Regulation Writing Instructions 
Acceptance 
“In this next part of the task we are going to ask you to simply write about your approach of 
observing, allowing and accepting your thoughts, feelings and sensations that you 
experience. Spelling and grammar is not important. You have 5 minutes to write about 
observing, allowing and accepting your thoughts and feelings as they arise. Simply place 
your written response into the box next to you when you have been notified that the 5 
minute writing period ends. Please don’t write outside the border provided. At the top of the 
writing sheets are the key instructions for the task. I will give you the sheets face down, and 
when I say turn over your time starts.  There is only one rule. You have to write for the entire 
time. If you run out of things to say, just repeat what you have already written. Please do 
not just list your thoughts. Rather, describe your observation, allowance, non 
reactive, non judgmental acceptance of your bodily sensations, thoughts and 
feelings that you experience.” 
 
Distraction  
“In this next part of the task we are going to ask you to simply write how many uses you can 
come up with for donkeys, ponies and horses,. You have 5 minutes to write about all the 
many different uses for donkeys, ponies and horses.  Spelling and grammar is not 
important. Simply place your written response into the box next to you when you have been 
notified that the 5 minute writing period ends. Please don’t write outside the border 
provided. At the top of the writing sheets are instructions reminding you of the task. I will 
give you the sheets face down, and when I say turn over your time starts. There is only one 
rule. You have to write for the entire time. If you run out of things to say, just repeat what 
you have already written. Generate and describe as many uses as possible for donkeys 
ponies and horses within a context taking into account the animals characteristics.” 
 
Mind-wandering 
“In this next part of the task please sit for 5 minutes and please let your mind wonder and 
write any thoughts you are having. You can write about anything that you like. You have 5 
minutes to write down any thoughts that cross your mind. Spelling and grammar is not 
important. Simply place your written responses into the box next to you when you have 
been notified that the 5 minute writing period ends. Please don’t write outside the border 
provided. At the top of the writing sheets are instructions reminding you of the task. I will 
give you the sheets face down, and when I say turn over your time starts. There is only one 
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rule. You have to write for the entire time. If you run out of things to say, just repeat what 
you have already written. Let your mind wander and write down any of your thoughts 
that come to mind.” 
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Appendix L: Stroop Instructions 
 
“For this next task, I am going to ask you to name some colours. Can you name, out loud the 
colour of the ink that the XXX strings are printed in this practice list, in order without 
missing any.” 
 
Answers for practice examples are: 
1. Brown 
2. Red  
3. Purple 
4. Blue 
5. Red 
6. Green 
7. Brown 
 
 
Participants are corrected on their use of colour terms, with visual examples (set of XXX 
strings in a particular colour with the name of the colour printed under the particular XXX) 
of name of the ink used in the practice list and then asked to complete the practice list 
again using the following instructions: 
“Let’s call this ink colour...  
Can you please name the colours one more time for me?” 
 
Participants then do a full trial of 40 XXX string stimuli introduced by the following 
instructions. Point to the top of the list and run your finger down it to demonstrate: 
 
“Here is a longer list of XXX strings (show them). Please name the colour of the ink of each 
XXX string out loud and as fast as possible, without making mistakes. Start at the top and 
work down to the bottom, without missing any. If you make a mistake and you realise you 
can correct yourself.I will give you this sheet facing the other way. The number should be at 
the top of the page, so you start the list from the start. Use both hands to hold the page 
throughout the task. When I say start you turn it over and  begin. ”  
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Once participants have completed the initial trial list participant then are presented with 
the incongruent colour practice list using the following instructions: 
 
“Now, this one is a bit harder. Don’t read the words. Same as before: just name the ink 
colour as fast as possible without making mistakes. If you make a mistake and you realise 
you can correct yourself. Use both hands to hold the page throughout the task. When I say 
turnover you can begin.”  
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Appendix M: Threat-Task Instructions 
High-Threat 
“It is time to deliver a speech on the academic topic. Remember to look into the 
camera and keep your voice volume at the level before. You may open your 
envelope now. The topic is “what are the possible ways investigators might establish 
that an event or construct causes another event or changes in another construct? 
Give examples and give a description of such methods.” Please talk for 5 minutes 
about this topic. Ok I am hitting record now. This is participant number XX doing the 
speech.”  
 
If participants finishes before 5 minutes indicate how long they talked for but still 
wait out the five minute period and use the prompt: 
 
“Keep thinking about the topic for the remaining 5 minutes and if you can think of 
something you wish to add simply do so.” 
 
Low-Threat 
“Now simply sit and relax and watch this film clip. It goes for about 5 minutes. We are 
simply interested in your physiological responses to it. Please remember to focus on the film 
clip. 
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Appendix N: Blind Coder Classification 
Answer Sheet 
Place participant number under the subheading that you think best fitted the participants 
written response.  
Group 
Distraction Acceptance Mind-wandering 
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
 
Distraction participants were asked to:  
Generate and describe as many uses as possible for donkeys ponies and horses within a 
context taking into account the animals characteristics. 
 
Acceptance Participants were asked to: 
Please do not just list your thoughts. Rather, describe your observation, allowance, non 
reactive, non judgmental acceptance of your bodily sensations, thoughts and feelings 
that you experience 
 
Mind-wandering participants were asked to: 
Let your mind wander and write down any of your thoughts that come to mind. 
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Appendix O: Stroop Accuracy Rate from Study 7. 2 
 
 
Figure 7. 12. Mean Stroop Accuracy Rate Difference Scores (incongruent trial accuracy 
score/RT - XXX trials accuracy score/RT). Error Bars indicate SE. 
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